1 Wednesday, 11 May 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you call the next witness,
6 I'd asked you to spend five minutes telling us about the charges in the
7 indictment to which this witness's testimony relates. He's scheduled for
8 I think it is nine hours -- 12 hours, so it would help the Chamber to
9 manage the evidence better, to understand it better, if you gave us a
10 brief outline.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in the briefest possible
12 terms, then, Mr. Robinson, in view of the fact that General Stevanovic was
13 the assistant minister of the interior and that he spent time in Kosovo at
14 different intervals, periods and occasions very frequently and that he is
15 well acquainted with the situation and that ex officio he was able to have
16 access to all the relevant information for what we're discussing here.
17 And he is going to testify as extensively as you said, but we're
18 not wasting time. On the contrary, we're making up the time because --
19 and saving time because he's covering a large number of issues and
20 questions that need to be elucidated and clarified here. In fact, we can
21 say that the testimony of the general is linked to all five counts from 1
22 to 5.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Counts 1 to 5, that's very general. That's all
24 counts. What about the paragraphs?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, what I've said is very general,
1 but I'm going to be more specific. And then he will testify, for example
2 when, it comes to paragraphs -- the paragraphs, an important paragraph is
3 paragraph 16 in which -- which talks about joint criminal enterprise and
4 some sort of plan of that joint criminal enterprise, and you'll be seeing
5 documents testifying to the opposite, that is to say measures --
6 confidence-building measures which cannot be brought into connection with
7 any of this. But the intentions were quite the opposite, quite the
8 reverse, and acts to support that. So as I say, linked to paragraph 16
9 and 19, where it says that there is responsibility and -- criminal
10 responsibility for the acts or omissions of their subordinates, of the
11 perpetrators, as contained in paragraph 19. So that is another thing
12 linked to a specific count. And then the authorisation and relationship
13 between the army and the police and the subordination-resubordination
15 And then linked to paragraph 23, the functioning and control of
16 the police. Then we go on to paragraph 27, which mentions the Ministry of
17 the Interior and then it is claimed that they committed crimes in counts 1
18 to 5 in the indictment. And then 28, the crimes of the -- the alleged
19 crimes of the employees of the MUP, as it says in paragraph 28.
20 And then furthermore we come to the link to paragraph 95, which
21 talks about the forces of the FRY and Serbia who started a campaign of
22 shelling on predominantly Albanian towns and villages in Kosovo, et
23 cetera, et cetera. And we're going to give quite clear information as to
24 what was actually happening. And then the extensive use of force, that
1 So those are just some of the things that are linked to this
2 document, in very brief terms, superficial terms. And he is going to
3 testify -- in view of his competence and authority in Kosovo and Metohija,
4 he is going to testify about the situation there itself, the situation in
5 Kosovo and Metohija during the material time when he was there and the
6 joint forces of the Federal Secretariat of the Interior in Kosovo and
7 Metohija. He's going to testify linked to the paragraphs and counts that
8 I mentioned about the organisation and competence once again of the
9 Ministry of the Interior, and he's going to clarify and elucidate certain
10 questions linked to ranks in the police force because that was the topic
11 of expertise by a group of experts and presented by Mr. Nice, trying to
12 show, as he put it, I believe, that the police was militarised. And you
13 will have an opportunity of getting clear explanations of that.
14 And then the supervision of the police, and then a question that
15 was mentioned quite a lot, Joint Command in Kosovo and Metohija. He's
16 also going to testify about local security matters and a very widespread
17 activity of establishing confidence-building measures and organising the
18 Albanians in the villages to act as a local police force, which is quite
19 contradictory to what Mr. Nice claims with respect to the intentions or,
20 rather, to perpetrate crimes against them and do evil to them.
21 He's going to speaking about the circumstances in which the police
22 worked in Kosovo and Metohija, the legality of the work of the police
23 force. He's going to talk about the events resulting in death which are
24 to be found in the indictment. I haven't listed them here separately, but
25 there are several events of that type to be addressed. And he's going to
1 speak of the sanitation of the terrain that was also mentioned, the
2 refugees and displaced persons that was also a subject of discussion here.
3 We discussed it at length and heard different testimony about that. And
4 also the paramilitary groups and volunteers and the meetings and state
5 policy and politics with respect to what was going on in the region.
6 So there you have it, in the briefest possible terms of breakdown
7 in the several minutes I've taken up about what this witness is going to
8 testify. He's also going to introduce a series of documents through his
9 testimony. As he was on the spot, on location, he'll be able to testify
10 with great competence on all these matters that I have indicated.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. That's informative.
12 Will the testimony follow the structure that you just presented in terms
13 of sequence?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Roughly speaking, yes. In
15 principle, yes.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let the witness be called.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
20 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
22 And, Mr. Milosevic, you may begin.
23 WITNESS: OBRAD STEVANOVIC
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
1 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
3 A. Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning to everybody in the
5 Q. General Stevanovic, where and when were you born?
6 A. I was born in 1953 in Brekovo, the Arilje municipality of the
7 Republic of Serbia.
8 Q. And what education have you had?
9 A. I completed primary school where I was born in 1969, elementary
10 school, and then the secondary school for internal affairs or secondary
11 police school in Sremska Kamenica near Novi Sad. I completed that in
12 1973. And the military academy for the ground forces in Belgrade I
13 completed in 1977.
14 Q. Tell me briefly, please, where you worked and what positions you
16 A. From 1977 until 1979, I worked in the secondary police school in
17 Sremska Kamenica. From 1979 until 2001, I worked in the Republican
18 Secretariat for the Interior, for Internal Affairs or, rather, the
19 Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia; and from 2001
20 to the present day, I've been working at the police academy in Belgrade
21 and I'm there now.
22 Q. Tell me, please, based on what you've just told us, you have spent
23 your entire working career in the police force; is that right?
24 A. Yes. I have been wearing a police uniform since I was 16, and it
25 goes on to the present day.
1 Q. Tell me briefly, please, what specific tasks did you do in the
2 Republican Secretariat for the Interior?
3 A. In the Republican Secretariat for the Interior or, rather, the
4 Ministry of the Interior of Serbia I performed a number of different tasks
5 of a medium leadership level and higher leadership level. From 1979, for
6 example, up until 1983, I was the executive officer and leader of the
7 group and then head of department or, rather, sector in the department for
8 law and order, and later on in the police administration. From 1983 until
9 1990, I was also the head of the sector and head of the department in the
10 police administration; and from 1990 up until 1996, I was also the head of
11 a department in the police administration, then police commander, then
12 deputy head of the police administration and the head of the police
13 administration after that. From mid-1997 up until the beginning of the
14 year 2000 or, rather, 2001, I was assistant minister of the interior.
15 Q. General, who appoints assistant ministers of the interior to that
17 A. All the assistant ministers in the government of the Republic of
18 Serbia are appointed by the government of Serbia as well as the assistant
19 ministers in the Ministry of the Interior.
20 Q. I assume that I don't need to explain who appoints the ministers
22 A. No, of course. All the ministers are elected by the National
23 Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.
24 Q. Tell us the criteria for the selection of assistant ministers.
25 How -- what is the criteria like for that selection?
1 A. In the Ministry of the Interior, all the assistant ministers since
2 I've been working in the Ministry of the Interior were appointed according
3 to their professional criteria and not their political criteria.
4 Q. And tell me, when the government appoints an assistant minister,
5 does it also assign and determine their authorisations?
6 A. No. The government just appoints the assistant minister to the
7 post of minister.
8 Q. Who determines the assignments?
9 A. The assignments specifically of the assistant minister, since
10 there are several ministers in the Ministry of the Interior and there were
11 six during my time in the ministry, is determined by the minister of the
12 interior himself.
13 Q. And does each of the assistant ministers of the interior, are they
14 at the head of a particular branch or department of the ministry?
15 A. In the Ministry of the Interior, no, because during my period in
16 the ministry or, rather, when I was there, there were two basic sectors,
17 sections -- sectors, and there were six assistant ministers. So the
18 minister decides and determines which of those six assistant ministers
19 would head one of the two sectors.
20 Q. And what kind of work did you do predominantly in your
21 professional career? What were your assignments and tasks as assistant
22 minister? What did that include?
23 A. Well, while working in the Ministry of the Interior, I generally
24 dealt with organisational matters, normative matters, and other
25 professional subjects and matters relating to the selection, training, and
1 equipment of police cadres of general purpose. While I was assistant
2 minister, pursuant to a decision of the minister I was more specifically
3 in charge of affairs from the realm of the police administration, the
4 operative centre of the Ministry of the Interior, and also for education
5 institutions and training institutions within the Ministry of the
6 Interior; that is to say, the police academy, the higher school of the
7 interior, and secondary school for the interior.
8 Q. In tab 4, can we find, inter alia, an excerpt from the law on
9 state administration of the Republic of Serbia. There are excerpts from
10 different laws here.
11 This particular one says how assistant ministers are appointed and
12 what kind of work they do and what they do within their job description in
13 terms of what the minister gives them as an assignment. Is that contained
14 in this tab?
15 A. If you're asking me --
16 Q. Yes, I'm asking you.
17 A. This is part of the law on the organisation of state
18 administration, but unfortunately I haven't got the opportunity to see
19 that particular tab.
20 Q. General, I hope that you have all the tabs right next to you on
21 that shelf. So please use them. You have the right to use all documents
22 that were given to everyone else in this room.
23 Let's not waste time. There's a direct quotation here of Article
24 46 from this law just as you mentioned, and that's contained in this
25 quotation. Is that exactly what you established just now, General?
1 A. Yes. It is Article 46 of the law on state administration of the
2 Republic of Serbia, which clearly states who appoints assistant ministers
3 and what their line of work is.
4 Q. All right, General. In tab 9, we have this document of the
5 minister or, rather, the minister's dispatch dated the 4th of June, 1997.
6 I'm going to skip everything that does not pertain to you since this is a
7 general document that has to do with the duties of assistant ministers.
8 Here it says General -- Major General Obrad Stevanovic for
9 administration of the police and operative centre for the schools of the
10 interior and the police academy.
11 So that was contained in the dispatch, in this information that
12 was sent to everybody in the ministry. Does this compass your scope of
13 work? That is to say, police administration, the operative centre, the
14 secondary and higher schools of the interior, and the police academy.
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. So it's schooling, and you referred to that.
17 A. Yes, precisely. This is a document, a decision of the minister of
18 the interior informing the entire ministry and all its units that I was
19 appointed assistant minister and also what duties he assigned to me. And
20 of course not only to me but also to other assistant ministers at that
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I assume that I can
23 ask for all these tabs to be admitted into evidence later because this is
24 just documentation corroborating what the witness has been saying.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you can ask. What are the duties that were
1 assigned to him? It's not translated, is it? I'd like to find out the
2 duties that were assigned to him. So could it be placed on the ELMO, and
3 could you direct us to the passages, if there are any, which indicate the
4 duties that were assigned to him.
5 But let us give a number for the binder. It's 2 -- 299.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's tab number 9.
7 I hope it's on the ELMO now. In the one but last paragraph, the
8 one but last paragraph that has to do with Major General Obrad Stevanovic,
9 it says: "Major General Obrad Stevanovic for affairs related to the
10 police administration and operative centre, for the secondary and higher
11 School of Internal Affairs and the police academy." All the other
12 paragraphs pertain to the other assistant ministers.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Move on.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, in which period were you in Kosovo and Metohija on
16 official business?
17 A. From 1981 until 1999, I went on official business to Kosovo and
18 Metohija, every now and then on official business. So that is to say
19 almost 18 years.
20 Q. It is a well-known thing that the Ministry of the Interior, the
21 Republican Secretariat of the Interior, as it was called at the time until
22 the constitutional amendments were passed in 1989, did not really have any
23 powers in the autonomous provinces, the autonomous provinces that were a
24 part of Serbia. How come you were in Kosovo and Metohija on official
25 business from 1981 until 1999?
1 A. First of all, what you asserted previously is correct; that is to
2 say the Republican Secretariat of the Interior practically at that time
3 did not have any powers in the territory of the autonomous provinces. I
4 stayed on official business in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija at
5 that time within the command of the joint forces of the Federal
6 Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.
7 Q. You mean internal affairs.
8 A. Sorry, yes, internal affairs.
9 Q. These joint forces of the Federal Secretariat of the Interior came
10 from all republics; right?
11 A. Yes. Within these joint forces of the police of the Federal
12 Secretariat of the Interior there were police units from all the republics
13 of the then Yugoslavia.
14 Q. What were your duties in Kosovo and Metohija after 1989?
15 A. After 1989, primarily in the period from 1989 to 1990 and perhaps
16 up to 1991, I was in Kosovo and Metohija within the staff of the MUP of
17 the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, and in that period I was
18 head of that staff at least on two occasions.
19 Q. In these accusations that were brought here there are references
20 made to 1988 and 1989 primarily. Tell me, at that time were you in Kosovo
21 on official business? I'm talking about '88 and '89.
22 A. Yes. During 1988 and during 1989, I was often in Kosovo and
23 Metohija, and always upon instructions from the minister in order to do
24 what the minister of the interior at the time had instructed us to do.
25 For the most part, this work of mine had to do with the following:
1 Together with leaders of organisational units of the police in Kosovo and
2 Metohija in the staff for Kosovo and Metohija, I was supposed to have
3 meetings together with all of them, and at such meetings I was supposed to
4 convey the positions, the instructions, and the assignments given by the
5 minister, to see to what extent these tasks were carried out, and then to
6 brief him on what had been done.
7 Q. What were the tasks that you had with a view to the implementation
8 of the agreement of the Kosovo Verification Mission?
9 A. As for the Kosovo Verification Mission, first and foremost in
10 Belgrade in the second half of 1998, I was a member of the official
11 delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of
12 Serbia at the talks with the representatives of NATO that were headed by
13 Generals Clark and Naumann.
14 At that meeting, what was primarily discussed were measures for
15 implementing the agreement on the Verification Mission, specifically on
16 reducing police troops in Kosovo and Metohija and especially reducing the
17 scope of work of the police in Kosovo and Metohija.
18 After that meeting in Belgrade, I went to Kosovo and Metohija in
19 order to work on the implementation of the agreement of the Kosovo
20 Verification Mission and the document that was signed by Schombers [phoen]
21 and General Djordjevic after the meeting in Belgrade. And then I was
22 supposed to look at this with the top personnel in Kosovo and Metohija in
23 order to prepare them for the implementation of this agreement.
24 Perhaps I wasn't clear enough.
25 Q. No, it is clear enough. I just want to get the questions in the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 right order, so I need to mark some things on this paper that I have here.
2 So just a second, please.
3 Now, in addition to the fact that over a long period of time you
4 held top positions in the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia and in Kosovo
5 and Metohija, as one of the top people in the Ministry of the Interior, in
6 what other ways did you receive information about what was going on in
7 Kosovo and Metohija?
8 A. As assistant minister, and before that as deputy head of the
9 police administration and head of the police administration, I was
10 informed every day about security events in the territory of the republic,
11 especially what was going on in Kosovo and Metohija. Also, I often had
12 occasion to attend important meetings where there were discussions on the
13 security situation in the Republic of Serbia, notably the situation in
14 Kosovo and Metohija.
15 As for everything that was going on and all the measures that were
16 taken in Kosovo and Metohija, my knowledge is based on my own state in
17 Kosovo and Metohija, the work I did there myself, my presence at meetings,
18 important meetings at that, where the subject matter was discussed, and
19 also daily and periodical information received on the security situation
20 in the republic, especially in Kosovo and Metohija.
21 Q. During one of your previous answers, General, you explained that
22 you were in Kosovo and Metohija for quite a long period of time. Of
23 course not all the time, but from 1981 until mid-1999. I would like to
24 put a question to you: Security related problems in Kosovo and Metohija
25 throughout that period, from 1981 to 1999, were they always of the same
1 degree of complexity and intensity?
2 A. It was quite clear that the security situation in Kosovo and
3 Metohija became more complex and then was alleviated in cycles. A
4 particularly complex situation in Kosovo and Metohija reigned from 1981 to
5 1983, and then from 1989 to 1990, and of course the most complex situation
6 started in 1998 and 1999.
7 Perhaps I could add one more thing because I omitted to mention
8 that in relation to my activities in Kosovo; that in mid-June, as a member
9 of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the
10 Republic of Serbia, I attended the talks on establishing the peace in
11 Kosovo, and I'm the signatory of the Kumanovo agreement on behalf of the
12 Republic of Serbia.
13 Q. We'll get to that, General.
14 A. I thought that I had omitted an answer to that question.
15 Q. Oh, you mean in relation to your own activities.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. All right. How and in which way did this first cycle of violence
18 in Kosovo and Metohija start, to the best of your knowledge? We're
19 talking about your knowledge. I'm not asking you about the '60, '65, '68,
20 whatever, only your own knowledge at the time when you were there.
21 A. Of course. My knowledge dates back to the time when I joined the
22 Ministry of the Interior, and I already said that I first stayed in Kosovo
23 and Metohija in 1981. So my first professional knowledge about what was
24 going on in Kosovo and Metohija dates back to that period, that is to say
1 Q. What happened in this year 1981? What was characteristic of that
3 A. Well, 1981 is characteristic because there were sudden violent
4 demonstrations staged by Albanians first in Pristina and then throughout
5 Kosovo and Metohija, and of course the consequences of that violence.
6 Very often there were deaths as well.
7 Q. And what was the key demand of these violent demonstrations?
8 A. It is a generally known fact, and the demonstrators were not
9 concealing that fact either: Kosovo Republic. That was the main slogan,
10 and it was present everywhere and all the time.
11 Q. You were there yourself, and you say Kosovo Republika, now Kosovo
12 Republic. When Professor Slavenko Terzic testified here, Mr. Nice
13 suggested to him that these were student revolts that had to do with the
14 poor quality of food. Was that the reason or only what you said just now?
15 A. Well, of course that was no reason. It was evident to all who
16 were there and I believe all who could follow these demonstrations in the
18 The alleged problem of poor quality food was just used as a
19 pretext for guising the separatist nature of the demonstrations.
20 Q. General, you said that tensions went up and down and that there
21 were tensions on the rise. One of these cycles was in the late '80s and
22 the beginning of the '90s and within about one year, a year and a half.
23 What were the activities of the Albanian separatists, the Albanian
24 separatist movement at that time?
25 A. At that time, as opposed to 1981, it was somewhat different. When
1 I say "different," I mean special forms of expressing their political
2 motives and special forms of disguising the political motives and
3 objectives of these demonstrations. I remember very well, first and
4 foremost, this so calmed uni-ethnic poisoning. I remember the exceptional
5 activities in settling alleged blood feuds between different families. I
6 remember the protests of the Trepca miners in the mines. Of course, I was
7 also present when the illegal Assembly was held in Pristina. And, of
8 course, I remember when the illegal constitution was adopted in Kacanik.
9 Q. Do you recall from that period any particular event or events or
10 any type of behaviour that resulted in the departure of Albanian policemen
11 from the Ministry of the Interior?
12 A. Yes, I remember that very well. I myself took part in attempts
13 made to overcome this problem. That is to say, most of the policemen who
14 were ethnic Albanians at that time, on orders issued by the separatist
15 movement, decided to leave the police force, and the Ministry of the
16 Interior at the time did their best to convince people that there was no
17 reason to do that. However, all efforts made to keep the Albanian
18 policemen within the police force of the Republic of Serbia practically
19 did not succeed.
20 I myself was present at a few gatherings of policemen, and I
21 conducted long exhaustive detailed discussions, convincing them that they
22 were citizens of the Republic of Serbia, that they were policemen of the
23 Republic of Serbia, and that there is not a single reason for them to
24 leave the police.
25 Of course, all these attempts did not bear any fruit. It was
1 obvious that they had political instructions to do that kind of thing.
2 Q. Did you personally talk to a great number of Albanian policemen
3 about this?
4 A. That is correct. First of all, I talked in the municipal hall of
5 Gnjilane with over 200 Albanian policemen for over three hours, at least.
6 All the policemen were then armed. Some even had long barrels. If I
7 remember well, the meeting was attended by General Lukic. He is a general
8 now, I don't remember his rank at the time. We did all we could, but we
9 did not succeed in convincing them that there was no reason whatsoever for
10 them to leave the police and that it was in our common interest for them
11 to stay on the force, considering that Albanians in the Kosovo police were
12 a majority.
13 Q. You said that everybody in this hall was armed, everybody had
14 their sidearms at this meeting?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. Were there any incidents? Was there any unrest at this meeting
17 during the discussions?
18 A. No. There was no unrest or incidents in connection with this. I
19 went to Pristina for the same purpose several times, and if I remember
20 well, I went to Kosovska Mitrovica as well.
21 Q. Did any of them state their reasons for leaving the police force?
22 You said the meeting in Gnjilane alone lasted three hours. What were they
23 saying about their reasons?
24 A. I had many former schoolmates among Albanians from the higher
25 school for internal affairs from Sremska Kamenica and from the academy of
1 the ground forces in Belgrade, and I asked my former schoolmates what was
2 going on, and the only thing they were able to tell me was, "We must do
3 this. We have to do this."
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: What year is this? 19 --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was 1989 or maybe 1990. I cannot
6 be quite sure. But this is a matter of common knowledge. I cannot place
7 it exactly within a year, but it was one of those two years.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. I will not now go back to quote these allegations, because
10 everybody in this courtroom knows them, but do you know from that time -
11 let's take 1990 - about anything -- about any case of dismissal of
12 Albanian policemen from the organs of internal affairs in the province of
14 A. I have no such knowledge, and I'm absolutely certain that there
15 were no such attempts and no such decisions. On the contrary, great
16 efforts were made to keep Albanian policemen on the force in Kosovo and
18 Q. Can you tell us how many Albanian policemen remained in Kosovo and
19 Metohija working on the force after this desertion that you described?
20 A. Despite this general desertion of the police force by Albanian
21 policemen, a certain number of policemen remained on the force. I cannot
22 remember the exact number, but if I remember correctly, 4 per cent of the
23 total troops remained. Of course, all those who had left had to be
24 replaced, so that additional police units were sent to Kosovo to replace
25 those who had left in order for the police to continue to be able to
1 discharge their regular duties related to public law and order, traffic
2 safety, et cetera.
3 Q. Was it the constitutional obligation of the Republic of Serbia to
4 protect the rights and freedoms of all its citizens?
5 A. Doubtlessly.
6 Q. Is it the case that organs of internal affairs play an important
7 role in the protection of those rights and freedoms?
8 A. Indubitably. Organs of internal affairs had a very important role
9 in the protection of rights and freedoms.
10 Q. You already mentioned that organs of internal affairs of Serbia
11 had no powers in Kosovo and Metohija until the constitutional amendments
12 in 1989. Tell me, why were the joint forces of the Federal Secretariat of
13 Internal Affairs established?
14 A. The joint forces of the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs
15 were established at the time as the only way to restore peace and order to
16 Kosovo and Metohija in the general situation when security and public law
17 and order were in jeopardy.
18 And as I have already said, the police of Serbia could not play
19 that role because the authorities of the province were against the Serbian
20 police entering the province.
21 I remember very clearly that the police units that had been placed
22 on alert in order to restore peace and order in Kosovo after the
23 demonstrations I described waited at the administrative border of Kosovo
24 in Rasko, Kursumlija, Vranje for over seven days, but they were not
25 allowed to go in. And following certain political activities, it was
1 decided eventually that only forces under the command of the then Federal
2 Secretariat of Internal Affairs would be allowed to go in. That was the
3 situation from the demonstrations in 1981 until 1989. Only the forces of
4 the Federal Secretariat of the Interior were allowed to go into Kosovo.
5 These forces were made up of police troops from all over Yugoslavia.
6 I can tell you where the forces from each republic were mainly
7 concentrated if you want me to.
8 Q. That's not necessary. Tell me, who was the federal secretary of
9 the interior and who was the federal Prime Minister at the time when these
10 joint federal forces existed in Kosovo and Metohija?
11 A. If I remember correctly, and I think I do -- I'm sure, in fact.
12 In 1981, the Federal Secretariat of the Interior was General Franko
13 Herljevic, Franjo Herljevic. I believe the federal Prime Minister was
14 Stane Dolanc. And after him, it was Dobrosav Culafic.
15 Sorry, the following ministers were Stane Dolanc, and Dobrosav
17 Q. And who were the federal Prime Ministers?
18 A. I think it was first Milka Planinc, and then Branko Mikulic, and
19 after him, Ante Markovic. I think that is it.
20 Q. All these persons that you enumerated, both in the position on the
21 federal minister of the interior and in the position of federal Prime
22 Minister were persons who were not Serbs. In other words, people coming
23 from other republics of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
24 A. That is correct. None of the persons I enumerated were Serbs.
25 Q. And who was in command of these joint federal forces to which you
2 A. Senior leaders from the Federal Secretariat of the Interior and
3 the police brigade of the Federal Secretariat of the Interior were in
4 command, such as Brigade Commander Slavko Strika, then Special Purpose
5 Battalion Commander Franc Kosi, and several other leaders whose names I
6 cannot recall at the moment.
7 Q. Very well. Thank you, General. I think this will suffice. This
8 covers this entire period from 1981 to 1989 when the joint forces of the
9 federal police were involved in Kosovo and Metohija.
10 General, one of the witnesses who have appeared here, an expert
11 witness who was called to explain the work of the police, claimed that
12 Serbia was a police state and that the police force in Serbia was a
13 politicised and militarised force. In view of your position and your
14 knowledge about the subject, your personal involvement and the positions
15 you occupied, I will now ask you a series of questions regarding the
16 structure and organisation of the police in order for everybody to
17 understand these things clearly.
18 Tell me, during the '90s in Serbia, is it the case that there was
19 one single Secretariat of the Interior, a unified single Ministry of the
21 A. In that period up to 1990, in the Republic of Serbia there was one
22 single Ministry of the Interior that was in charge of the entire republic.
23 Q. And what about before the constitutional amendments?
24 A. Before the constitutional amendments in the territory of the
25 Republic of Serbia, there was one Republican Secretariat for the Interior
1 and two provincial secretariats that were completely independent of the
2 Republican Secretariat of the Interior, so that the republican SUP had
3 powers practically only in the territory of central Serbia but not in the
4 territory of the autonomous provinces which were part of the republic.
5 Q. Tell me, in the course of 1970s, was the ministry -- excuse me,
6 1990s, was it a centralised ministry or not?
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a second. The answer that you gave
8 previously, "In that period up to 1990..." should that have been after
9 1990 or is it up to 1990?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am sorry, which answer do you
11 mean? One of my answers related to the period prior to 1990, and the
12 other answer after 1990.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'll read the answer and you can tell me what is
14 correct. "In that period up to 1990, in the Republic of Serbia, there was
15 one single Ministry of the Interior that was in charge of the entire
16 republic." Was that correct?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It must be a mistake. That should
18 refer to the period after 1990. One single ministry in charge of the
19 territory of the entire republic existed after 1990, not before.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: That's what the witness actually said at the time,
21 after 1990.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Thank you.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. We have clarified this, General. Since there was one ministry, in
25 organisational terms it means it was centralised.
1 A. But I haven't completed my answer, sorry. In the period after
2 1990, in the republic of the whole Republic of Serbia, there was one
3 ministry in charge of all the affairs prescribed by the law as belonging
4 to this ministry for the entire Serbia. Organisationally speaking, of
5 course it was centralised. However, functionally speaking, one could say
6 that the Ministry of the Interior was decentralised.
7 Q. What does that mean in practical terms? It's not clear enough.
8 A. This functional decentralisation within a centralised ministry
9 means practically that in keeping with the law on internal affairs as well
10 as other legislation, the vehicle of police powers is the authorised
11 officer. In other words, a policeman. So it is the policeman who is
12 empowered and not the ministry.
13 Apart from that, lower organisational units in municipalities are
14 also in keeping with the law responsible for the security situation on the
15 territory of their municipalities.
16 So to summarise, the ministry was centralised in organisational
17 terms. However, specific duties were discharged by authorised officers,
18 that is policemen and the authorities in municipalities, and they are the
19 vehicles of police power in municipalities and responsible for the
21 Q. Which legislation stipulates the powers of the MUP in Serbia?
22 A. The affairs that belong within the purview of the Ministry of the
23 Interior are specified by the law which is practically changed with each
24 new government. These affairs used to be stipulated by Article 7 of the
25 then law on ministries.
1 Q. General, in tab 4 where we have excerpts from these various pieces
2 of legislation, we have also an excerpt that relates to the Ministry of
3 the Interior. Would you please read it. That is precisely Article 7 on
4 the law on the ministries of the Republic of Serbia.
5 A. Article 7 of the law on the ministries of the Republic of Serbia
6 defines matters within the purview of the ministry and says: "The
7 Ministry of the Interior shall attend to matters of state administration
8 relating to the following:
9 "Protecting the security of the Republic of Serbia and detecting
10 and preventing activities aimed at undermining or destroying the
11 constitutionally established order.
12 "Protecting lives and guaranteeing personal safety and the
13 security of citizens' property.
14 "Preventing and detecting crimes, finding and apprehending
15 perpetrators and bringing them before the competent organs.
16 "Maintaining public law and order.
17 "Providing security at rallies and other public gatherings.
18 "Providing security for specific officials and buildings.
19 "Road traffic safety.
20 "Monitoring crossings of the state border.
21 "Monitoring movement and presence in the border belt.
22 "Monitoring movement and presence of foreigners.
23 "Procurement, possession, and carrying of weapons and ammunition.
24 "Production and sale of explosives, flammable liquids and gases.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 "Citizenship, personal identification number, personal identity
2 cards, passports, citizens' domicile and place of residence.
3 "Training personnel and other matters prescribed by law."
4 That is Article 7 of the law on the ministries of the Republic of
5 Serbia that was in force at the time. It must have been amended in the
6 meantime, but we can conclude from this that the purview of the Ministry
7 of the Interior was such that it can be divided into police affairs and
8 internal administration affairs.
9 Q. Thank you, General. Now, what organisational wholes and entities
10 was the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia compiled?
11 A. After 1990, in the organisational sense, the Ministry of the
12 Interior changed relatively slightly up until 1999, and within the
13 ministry there were two sectors, the sector of state security and the
14 sector of public security.
15 The public security sector had organisational entities at the seat
16 of the ministry and territorial units as well. I don't know whether you
17 want me to go into detail here and give you a further breakdown of those
19 Q. Tell me what the territorial units were.
20 A. The territorial organisational units were the secretariats of the
21 interior which performed duties from the purview of the ministry as
22 contained in the former article mentioned in the districts of Serbia and
23 the districts were in fact administrative units, how the territory was
24 divided up in administrative terms. And within the secretariat, the
25 organisational units in charge of the municipalities and the territory
1 there were the departments of the interior or police stations in the
2 smaller municipalities.
3 Q. General, can we see what this looks like on the basis of the law
4 governing the Ministry of the Interior that we find in tab 5? It's rather
5 a long document. I don't want to dwell on it for too long.
6 THE INTERPRETER: In fact, this document is the rules. Not the
7 law but the rules, interpreter's note.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. In Article 1, if you found that, the organisational units of the
10 ministry --
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I observe it's not translated.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, we have the advantage
13 with this witness, in terms of documents, that almost all of them have
14 been translated. However, the entire rules I -- we considered would be
15 irrational to translate the entire rules which are given here as an
16 exhibit. We have the entire text here in the original. But I merely wish
17 to dwell on the establishment of the organisational aspects, which can be
18 seen on the basis of these rules and which relate to Kosovo and Metohija.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: To what sections do you wish to refer?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if we look at Article 3, for
21 example, we will find a list of the organisational units, and it says the
22 secretariats in the text to follow, and they start out with Belgrade.
23 Article 3.1 is Belgrade. They're not grouped for Kosovo and Metohija, but
24 under number 5 we will find Gnjilane for the municipalities of VP
25 Gnjilane, Kosovska Kamenica and Novo Brdo. 6 is Djakovica, for the
1 municipalities of Djakovica and Decani. Number 11 is Kosovska Mitrovica,
2 the Secretariat of the Interior for the municipalities of Vucitrn, Svec
3 [phoen], Zubin Potok, Kosovska Mitrovica, Leposavic and Srbica. Number 20
4 is Pec, for the municipalities of Istok, Glina and Pec. Number 23 is
5 Prizren, for the municipalities of Gora, Opolje, Orahovac, Prizren, and
6 Suva Reka. Number 24 is Pristina, for the municipalities Glogovac, Kosovo
7 Polje, Lipljan, Obilic, Podujevo and Pristina. Number 31 is Urosevac, the
8 secretariat for that, for the municipalities of Kacanik, Urosevac, Stimlje
9 and Strpce.
10 On several occasions here we came across these names, place names
11 and places mentioned here, so it is a good idea for us to see how the
12 service of the interior or Ministry of the Interior was organised in those
13 particular municipalities.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if you're going to rely
15 extensively on it, that will not be possible. I won't allow it.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I won't be relying on
17 the document extensively. I just wanted to highlight a couple of points.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: And that is what you've already done. You can
19 just ask the witness whether what you have read out confirms the
20 organisational structure, and then we can move on.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, I read out the Secretariats of the Interior and the
23 composition in Kosovo. Is that the organisational structure? Does that
24 confirm it in the way in which you have explained it to us?
25 A. Yes. You've read out the Secretariats of the Interior that were
1 set up for the area of Kosovo and Metohija in such a way as to define the
2 municipalities which come under their competence in security related
3 terms. And I could just add to that that the duties and affairs pursuant
4 to the law were determined by the law and that the organisation of the
5 ministry was determined by the rules.
6 Q. And is that the rules contained in tab 5?
7 A. Yes, that's right.
8 Q. General, what types of police units existed within the frameworks
9 of the public security sector, that is to say the uniformed police sector?
10 A. Well, within the public security sector there were different units
11 in the general sense. There was the crime unit, general unit, traffic
12 safety unit, border belt unit, intervention unit, and so on and so forth.
13 Within the uniformed police, when we say "uniformed police" we have in
14 mind the general police units first and foremost of general competence and
15 authority, then traffic police units, then border police units, and
16 finally the so-called police intervention units or, rather, police units
17 -- Special Purpose Units.
18 Q. Special Purpose Units. I see. So that is the PJP abbreviation.
19 A. Yes, that's right.
20 Q. Now, at the relevant time, and we're talking about 1998 and 1999
21 here, how many policemen did Serbia have, the total number of policemen?
22 A. In the last decade of the 20th century or, rather, in the 1990s in
23 the Republic of Serbia, the total number of policemen were approximately
24 25.000 policemen, plus or minus 1 to 2 per cent, of course. Out of a
25 total of 37.000 employees working in the Ministry of the Interior.
1 Q. And you explained to us a moment ago, I believe, what we mean when
2 we say an authorised official pursuant to the law and as stipulated by the
3 law. So when you say 37.000 employees, MUP employees, the 25.000, are
4 those those authorised persons, authorised officers?
5 A. Yes. The 25.000 are authorised officers or persons; that is, in
6 simple terms, the policemen, policemen with police authorisation.
7 Q. And what is the 12.000? The difference between 25.000 and 37.000,
8 what is the 12.000?
9 A. They were the administrative staff, the administrative employees
10 and also the fire brigade. We had the fire brigade units and in Serbia
11 those come under the Ministry of the Interior, the firefighters. Then we
12 have the various personnel department employees, logistics, et cetera,
13 administrative department, financial department, and so on and so on.
14 Q. So from the kitchens to the fire brigades; is that right?
15 A. Yes, from the kitchens to the fire brigades
16 Q. Yes, so those are all the units that come under the Ministry of
17 the Interior, and you said 25.000 policemen in all, in total.
18 Now, what is the per capita ratio of policemen and citizens in
20 A. Well, we analysed the ratio between the number of citizens and the
21 number of policemen in the republic and tried to compare that to other
22 countries because individuals sometimes said that there were too many
23 policemen. I remember full well when it was quite obvious that in Serbia
24 for every policeman there were 400 citizens -- or the other way round. It
25 was a 400 to 1 ratio. And if you look at 10.000 inhabitants, then it
1 would be 2.5 policemen per 1.000 inhabitants.
2 Q. All right. Now, since you're comparing -- you said you compared
3 the figure to other countries, who did you compare our country to?
4 A. Well, I remember looking at France, the figures for France, for
5 example, according to our figures, that there were five policemen to every
6 1.000 inhabitants and that was 4. something. As far as I remember in
7 Czechoslovakia, for example, about 4.5, and in Croatia 4.5. In Belgium it
8 is 3.5. So from those figures, we were closer to Great Britain where it
9 was 250 -- 2.5.
10 Q. Now, in most European countries - you've mentioned some of them -
11 do they have local police forces or communal municipal police forces that
12 doesn't -- that -- whose figure doesn't figure in the overall figure?
13 A. Well, in -- with the statistics, we had two problems. There are
14 different definitions defining a policeman in the different countries.
15 Not all countries define a policeman the same way. Some states have
16 decentralised police forces, so they have a state police force and a local
17 police force, for example. In the Republic of Serbia, from what I've said
18 so far it is quite clear that each and every policeman was a state
19 policeman, if I can put it that way, and every policeman is counted within
20 the statistical analysis.
21 Q. So what you mean is there were no other policemen apart from the
22 25.000 policemen or authorised officers in Serbia?
23 A. Yes. And we felt that in other countries, the local policemen
24 were not included into those general statistics, just the state policemen.
25 Q. All right. I hope that that ratio is clear now in comparison to
1 other countries as well and within our own country and figures are easily
3 Now, tell me, General, from your own experience, for example, in
4 the leadership post that you occupied in the ministry and your general
5 experience in your many years of service in the police force, what
6 criteria were used to select the leadership cadres in the police force of
8 A. I think I've answered that question in part already. Throughout
9 my time in the police force, especially since I was in the assistant
10 minister, which is 1996 and 1997, and after that date I claim that the
11 key, main, and sole criteria applied for the selection of the leadership
12 cadre in the police were professional criteria.
13 Q. Let's pause there for a moment. You were assistant minister.
14 Were you in a situation -- or, rather, did you personally propose certain
15 individuals, leaders to the minister from the force to assume certain
16 positions within the ministry?
17 A. Yes. And that comes within the purview of an assistant minister.
18 The proposal of cadres, putting forward names, nominating people for
19 different positions and levels within the ministry. And this was of
20 course something that all the assistant ministers did, not only I myself.
21 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, I'm interested in the following:
22 Since you were in a position to put forward candidates and give your
23 opinion, take your own example. Did you ask any candidate for his
24 political options or anything of that sort?
25 A. No, never. None of the candidates that I put forward did I ever
1 ask to which political -- which political options they held. And let me
2 also say that the minister never asked me. The only important thing for
3 me was what the man was like, what his professional capabilities were
5 Q. All right. Fine, General, thank you. Now, tell us what the
6 organisational structure was like of the Ministry of the Interior in
7 Kosovo and Metohija itself.
8 A. The organisational structure?
9 Q. Everything that existed. I want to know everything that came
10 under the Ministry of the Interior in Kosovo and Metohija or any people
11 under the ministry spending time in Kosovo and Metohija.
12 A. In principle, the organisational structure, the organisational
13 units of the ministry in Kosovo and Metohija did not differ in any way
14 from the organisational structure of the ministry, for example, in
15 Vojvodina province or in Sumadija or anywhere else in Serbia. So all the
16 Secretariats of the Interior were organised in exactly the same way; they
17 had the same structure, they had the same purview, the same competencies
18 and authority. The numerical state and the number of internal
19 organisational units depended on the territory covered by a secretariat
20 and the security related situation in the given area.
21 Now, of course, if you're asking me about the period from 1998 and
22 1999, then what I can say is this: There were certain additions to what
23 I've just said. In addition to the regular police units, there were
24 extraordinary local units and units sent there from other secretariats
25 outside Kosovo and Metohija. And I can go into the details if need be.
1 Q. Just let me ask you this: You've told us that the regular forces
2 were the same as in any other part and region of Serbia and from time to
3 time there would be extraordinary units. What kind of units would they be
4 and what functions would they perform?
5 A. Yes. And I can explain that. The regular units in Kosovo were
6 the secretariats for the districts as administrative parts of the
7 territory, then the departments at the level of the municipalities and
8 police stations in the very small areas, smaller than municipalities, et
9 cetera, the communities. So that was how the police stations of general
10 purpose were organised as well.
11 In addition to the general purpose units, the regular units of the
12 police force in Kosovo were the units of the traffic police, mostly in the
13 headquarters of the secretariats, the seven secretariats that we
14 enumerated or, rather, I enumerated in response to another question of
15 yours, and I can say there were four other units, four other border police
16 stations as well.
17 Q. All right. Those four were in the tab we saw and the breakdown.
18 They were in Brgovnice [phoen], Djeneral Jankovic, Doganovici [phoen],
19 Pristina, I believe.
20 A. And Dzapra Krusi.
21 Q. Yes, Dzapra Krusi.
22 A. And I think there were four.
23 Q. And Pristina was the airport, the border crossing was the airport.
24 The rest were along the border crossing on land.
25 A. Right, and of course in Kosovo the special anti-terrorist unit was
1 located with its permanent headquarters in Pristina and the organisational
2 units belonging to the state security sector. Those were the regular
3 organised units of the Ministry of the Interior in Kosovo and Metohija or,
4 rather, organisational units.
5 Now, in addition to that, in Kosovo and Metohija during 1998 and
6 1999, there were extraordinary local police units that were engaged, and
7 those first and foremost were the -- were temporary police departments,
8 reserve police departments, local special police units and local reserve
9 force police units. And to round off that answer, the third structure
10 located there were the extraordinary special units sent to Kosovo from
11 other parts of the republic. And when I say that, I mean special units,
12 special police units like a special terrorist unit and the JSO police unit
13 from the state security sector.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: General, just one question on that: These
15 extraordinary or additional units, were they comprised entirely of Serb
16 police officers or Serb personnel, or were there Kosovo Albanians as part
17 of any of these groups?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would just like us to be very
19 precise on this. I said that there were two groups of extraordinary
20 units, one group established at local level and the units on the other
21 hand that were sent from the other parts of the republic. These units
22 that were sent from the other parts of the republic practically had the
23 kind of manpower that the police in the area that they were being sent
24 from had. In Kosovo and Metohija, the local extraordinary forces also
25 matched the manpower in the area from which they were formed, but it is
1 correct that there were less Albanians within their ranks, significantly
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note that the microphone wasn't
4 turned on and at line 10.20.29 the term was special anti-terrorist unit.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sure that there were Albanians
6 in the units but I cannot give you any specific names now. I can say, for
7 example, that at the headquarters of the MUP in Kosovo in 1998 and in 1999
8 - General Sreten Lukic headed that - there was a high ranking Albanian
9 who held a high rank until 1999, all the way up 'til 1999.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As for the situation in the entire
11 republic, and especially what General Stevanovic said just now about the
12 organisational units, could you please briefly place on the overhead
13 projector this map which is contained in tab 453. There is nothing to be
14 translated here. The secretariats are marked in red, and you can see all
15 the departments and the distribution pattern throughout the territory of
16 Serbia. Please take this.
17 MR. NICE: Tabs of this number haven't yet been presented to us.
18 We don't -- I think we've got four volumes so far of a projected dozen or
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, is this tab among the documents
21 that you have presented?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your index ends at 449.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then probably this is an index that
25 was not updated, because this tab does bear the number that I read out. I
1 haven't got it in my hands now, but you can just cast a glance at it.
2 It's very easy to see.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's look at it, yes. We'll allow that.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I say something?
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, in answer to the question.
6 What's the question, Mr. Milosevic?
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. The question is whether this is a map of the Republic of Serbia
9 with the heads -- with the headquarters of the secretariats marked and all
10 the departments of the interior and their distribution pattern in the
11 Republic of Serbia.
12 A. That's right. This is a sketch of the division of the territory
13 of the Republic of Serbia according to secretariats and headquarters of
14 the interior. I know that very well that there are 33 such secretariats
15 in the territory of Serbia, four of which are in Kosovo and Metohija --
16 I'm sorry, seven. Seven are in Kosovo and Metohija. Those are the ones
17 that we mentioned in response to one of the previous questions.
18 On this map, we can also see the municipal organisational units
19 or, rather, the units of the Ministry of the Interior in the territories
20 of the municipalities.
21 Q. So the entire organisational structure can be seen on this map.
22 A. That's right. The territorial horizontal review of the Ministry
23 of the Interior in the 1990s. And I believe that it has remained
24 unchanged until the present day.
25 Q. Thank you, General. What were the assignments given to the police
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 forces and how many forces were there in Kosovo and Metohija, how many
2 police personnel?
3 A. The police forces in Kosovo and Metohija were primarily engaged in
4 carrying out their every day regular policework, that is to say protecting
5 law and order and the safety and security of citizens and institutions in
6 Kosovo and Metohija. Of course, in the period of 1998 and 1999, one of
7 the key priority tasks was to combat terrorism. In addition to that,
8 another important task was to prevent all forms of serious crime,
9 organised crime, drug smuggling, weapon smuggling, and so on. That is to
10 say, control of terrorism and control of serious crime.
11 Q. All right. As for all this work, is this regulated in the law on
12 the interior?
13 A. Of course. Everything that the police did in Kosovo they did in
14 accordance with the law on internal affairs and of course other laws that
15 the police apply in their work.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As for these laws -- as for this
17 particular law, Mr. Robinson, it is in tab 1. It is there. It is an
18 excerpt from the Official Gazette. As for the other regulations, I've
19 already quoted them.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, I asked you about the number of personnel in Kosovo and
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. The figures in terms of the police in Kosovo and Metohija, are
25 they contained in tab 13?
1 A. Well, this is an overview of police levels in Kosovo and Metohija
2 at one particular point in time, specifically the 4th of June, 1999. This
3 survey shows the local forces - that's the first five vertical columns -
4 and also the forces that were seconded there in the following five
5 columns. And in the last vertical column on the right we see the total
6 number of police in Kosovo and Metohija at that point in time.
7 Q. All right. This has to do with the state of war; right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The total level of police presence in Kosovo and Metohija during
10 the war; right?
11 A. Of course it is logical that that is when the police presence
12 peaked in Kosovo and Metohija. And I know full well that there were never
13 more than 16.000 policemen in Kosovo and Metohija. That is the maximum
14 number that ever appeared in Kosovo and Metohija.
15 This survey shows this maximum police presence in Kosovo and
17 Q. I wanted this survey to be admitted precisely for that reason,
18 because that shows the maximum strength.
19 I wanted to ask you whether there could have been more than this,
20 but you said that this was the maximum number that could be found in
21 Kosovo and Metohija during the war.
22 A. This was the maximum number that actually was in Kosovo and
23 Metohija. There could have been more.
24 Q. I'm not talking about what could have happened, whether more could
25 have been sent, but this is the maximum number of policemen that were
1 actually there.
2 A. That's right.
3 Q. Thank you, General.
4 JUDGE KWON: Can I hear the explanation as to Intervention Brigade
5 and AS and RS. What do they mean?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please help me with this?
7 Were can these letters be seen? Ah, yes, I can see it now. It is
8 vertical column 5 and vertical column 6. "AS" is an abbreviation for
9 active force, that is to say regular policemen from the Ministry of
10 Interior. "RS" is reserve force, the reserve force of the police. In
11 accordance with the law on internal affairs, it can be engaged in carrying
12 out police work.
13 JUDGE KWON: And if you could explain to me column 3 and 4 as
14 well, which is belonging to 124th Intervention Brigade, PJP.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. Columns 3 and 4
16 pertain to the Intervention Brigade of the special police units, and this
17 is a special unit of the police established from the territory of Kosovo
18 and Metohija. That is to say there were several special units but this
19 particular unit bearing this number is the local PJP in Kosovo and
20 Metohija. That is to say it is manned only by policemen from the seven
21 secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija.
22 JUDGE KWON: So can I take it that while PJP is a local force, JSO
23 and SAJ [Realtime transcript read in error "ASJ"] is dispatched from
24 Serbia? So they are not local organisations, JSO and SAJ. It's 8th and
25 9th row in that chart. Transcript should say "SAJ."
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really cannot find it.
2 Unfortunately, in columns 8 and 9 I cannot see these abbreviations but of
3 course I can answer your question.
4 JUDGE KWON: The 8th and 9th row. The 8th and 9th line.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see. I'm sorry I didn't look at
6 this properly. It is quite clear that JSO cannot be a local police unit.
7 That is a state security unit, the JSO, and it is certain that its
8 headquarters were outside Kosovo and Metohija.
9 SAJ, of course, is the special anti-terrorist unit. For the most
10 part it is outside Kosovo and Metohija but part of it is in Kosovo and
11 Metohija. I assume that the entire personnel of that unit is included in
12 column 9 although part of it is not based in Kosovo and Metohija.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, we are going to dwell on these special police units a bit
16 longer but before I move on to this question of special police units, I
17 wanted to deal with this other aspects too that Mr. Nice's expert Babovic
18 presented as proof of militarisation. The first aspect was the actual
19 number that we've already looked at, and we see what that is and we see
20 what the distribution pattern is. Another aspect that he took into
21 account was the existence of ranks in the police. He said that that was
22 an indicator of police militarisation.
23 Please, as a police general and assistant minister, what can you
24 say about that statement?
25 A. Well, from the entirety of my experience and everything I know, it
1 is obvious that such a statement is not correct.
2 Q. Can I just ask you something? Mr. Babovic is a policeologist.
3 You are a police professional. You teach at the police academy. As a
4 police professional, are you aware of this kind of profession?
5 A. I know the name. I know the man's name, of course, but I've never
6 actually met him. And I don't know what his career has been. What he
7 called himself from a professional or educational point of view is really
8 a laughing matter as far as police are concerned, because nowhere in the
9 world or, rather, nowhere in any law has such a profile been established.
10 People who graduate from the police academy become graduated police
11 officers. I don't know what kind of school he completed, but I'm quite
12 certain that at that time there was no institution of higher learning in
13 Serbia that schooled such people. I'm quite certain that something like
14 that does not exist in Serbia.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, you teach at the police academy. You're
16 not a policeologist.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. If Mr. Babovic were a
18 policeologist, then in Serbia we'd have 30.000 policeologists.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: You would be well served. On that note we'll
20 break for 20 minutes.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, can the existence of ranks in the police be used as an
1 argument to claim that the police in Serbia was militarised, a claim made
2 by Mr. Babovic, for instance?
3 A. Of course that is a wrong conclusion. It can't.
4 Q. Let us take it from south to north, east, west. Are there any
5 ranks in the police in Greece, Hungary, France, other countries?
6 A. As far as I know, there are ranks in the police in Greece, in
7 France, in Hungary. That should be enough to prove that this claim does
8 not stand up to scrutiny.
9 Q. When did you get the rank of general?
10 A. In 1996 when I was head of police administration.
11 Q. On what basis does one get ranks in police in Serbia?
12 A. In keeping with the law on ranks for employees of the Ministry of
13 the Interior, the basic criterion for being awarded a rank are
14 professional training, professional experience, time spent in the previous
15 rank, and the requirements for the next rank. So a rank testifies to the
16 professional abilities and competencies and qualifications of a person in
17 view of the rank that he or she is holding.
18 Q. In tab 3, we have the law on ranks, General. Can you please have
19 a look at it.
20 A. Yes, I have found the law.
21 Q. Please look at the last paragraph of Article 5. It says: "By
22 completing the basic studies of the police academy, cadets, in keeping
23 with the law, obtain the initial rank of 2nd lieutenant".
24 A. Yes, that is prescribed by the law.
25 Q. Can you comment on Article 7, because I asked you a moment ago on
1 what basis does one get awarded a rank. It says: "An authorised
2 officer --"
3 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... mislaid it.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was just observing this. Mr. Milosevic, there
5 is no translation.
6 MR. NICE: If the witness has been reading from Article 5 and it's
7 the last paragraph, I think it would be helpful if it's on the overhead
8 projector so we can see what it is he's reading from.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let it be placed on the ELMO.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. So can we see from this last paragraph of Article 5 that I quoted
12 -- this is a photocopy of the Official Gazette, a publication where
13 legislation is promulgated. It says: "By graduating from the basic
14 course of studies at the police academy, cadets, in keeping with the law,
15 are awarded the initial rank of 2nd lieutenant."
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Now, tell us about Article 7.
18 A. It prescribes precisely what I mentioned in my previous answer.
19 "An authorised officer is promoted to the next rank under the following
20 conditions: 1, that he has adequate professional training; 2, that the
21 rank is prescribed for the workplace to which he is assigned or to which
22 he shall be assigned; 3 -- that is again item 2, that a rank is prescribed
23 for the workplace to which the person is assigned or shall be assigned; 3,
24 that he has spent a certain period of time in the previous rank; 4, that
25 he has had positive professional assessment -- performance assessment for
1 the previous two years prior to promotion." Those are the conditions
2 under which one can be promoted to the next rank.
3 Q. Tell me, what is the relationship between the rank and workplace
4 in the police?
5 A. As I've already said, the rank tells us more about the
6 professional abilities and qualifications for the performance of complex
7 duties, whereas the workplace defines the duties and competencies and
8 powers. The difference is that getting a rank does not add to the rights
9 or authorisations of a person, whereas being assigned to a particular
10 workplace means new rights or authorisations or powers, or maybe losing
12 Under the law, a junior corporal, that is a corporal, has the same
13 powers as a person in a higher rank in the same workplace.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, was the Prosecution evidence that the
15 force was -- the police force was militarised because it had ranks?
16 MR. NICE: It is a part of the case that the creation of ranks
17 reflected the militarisation of the police. The court should obviously --
18 not "should obviously"; might wish to turn to Mr. Babovic's report at some
19 stage between now and the conclusion of this witness's evidence to
20 understand the nature of the disagreement between the two sides.
21 Certainly, yes, ranks reflect [microphone not activated].
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were there other factors?
23 MR. NICE: Oh, yes.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. There has been mention of the role of the president of the
2 republic, which is regulated by the law. In this specific case it was my
3 role at the time when I was president of the republic.
4 Do presidents of the republic appoint and assign ranks to members
5 of the MUP?
6 A. The president of the republic, of course, never appointed or
7 assigned any member of the Ministry of the Interior. Ranks can be awarded
8 only by authorised officers in the rank of general. So the president of
9 the republic only appoints generals.
10 Q. Does he appoint generals independently or at somebody's proposal?
11 A. At the proposal of the minister of the interior.
12 Q. Were there any instances when the president of the republic
13 promoted somebody into a higher rank contrary to the proposal of the
15 A. I know all about promotions, specifically promotions to the rank
16 of general, and I don't think it ever happened.
17 Q. So apart from the number, powers, ranks, everything that was used
18 as an argument to claim that the police was allegedly militarised, I will
19 ask you now about the level of arming of the police. Were the level of
20 arming and equipment of the Ministry of the Interior indicative in any way
21 of its militarisation?
22 A. My answer is no.
23 Q. Would the level of arming and equipment of the police in Serbia be
24 completely consistent with the existing legislation?
25 A. That is absolutely certain. All of the weaponry and equipment of
1 the police in Serbia was in complete conformity with the relevant
2 legislation. I believe there is a rule book or maybe a provision on the
3 arming of the police.
4 I could add that it is one thing to talk about the weapons that
5 one person may carry and weaponry in the possession of the police force as
6 such. It doesn't mean, by the way, that all the weaponry can be used in
7 every occasion. The fact that the police had a certain amount and quality
8 of weapons does not mean that they are allowed to use it without control.
9 The use of weapons depended on the level of threat and security risk. Of
10 course, weapons are also used as part of police coercion, in keeping with
11 the law.
12 Q. Police coercion, in keeping with the law, you said?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Is it the case that under tab 8 we can find the rules on the level
15 of arming of authorised officers -- rules on the weapons of authorised
16 officers and employees performing certain duties?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. Do you believe that there is anything in this text that is
19 particularly important that you could quote in corroboration of what you
20 said about the difference between the sidearms of a person, of a
21 particular individual, and the police force as such?
22 A. I can quote. I know this text. Article 1, paragraph 2, says:
23 "The firearms of authorised officers shall comprise pistols, revolvers,
24 sub-machine-guns, rifles, and light machine-guns.
25 "3. The firearms of employees performing certain duties shall
1 comprise pistols, revolvers and rifles."
2 Therefore, in Article 1, there is a stipulation of the type of
3 weapons to be carried by certain persons such as police officers and
4 employees of the police with certain powers.
5 Article 2 defines the type of weapons that are considered adequate
6 for members of the police. I will quote: "The firearms used by the
7 police, by police units shall comprise machine-guns, mortars, hand-held
8 launchers and rocket launchers, hand grenades, rifle grenades, and other
9 shells and the weapons with which certain police vehicles are equipped."
10 I can thus confirm that the police of Serbia had nothing in its
11 arsenal apart from these specified weapons.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Before -- I see before that passage and after that
13 passage there is reference to what's described as chemical weapons. So
14 what --
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... actually
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply overlooked that I should
19 read on. So in paragraph 3 of Article 2 we read: "The chemical weapons
20 of police units shall comprise chemical pistols, rifles and adapters for
21 launching chemical and other projectiles and chemical hand grenades,
22 atomisers and devices containing tear gas."
23 Of course the very next paragraph specifies the weapons used by
24 police units for special operations and by special police units. These
25 weapons can also comprise particular kinds of special weapons, cold steel,
1 and weapons with a bowstring.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue, Mr. Bonomy?
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one moment. I would just like to ask one
4 other question. Does -- does what you have said so far mean that every
5 police officer, every ordinary police officer was authorised to have the
6 weapons which you've outlined; that's the first two categories of weapons,
7 the second paragraph and the third paragraph?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Maybe I wasn't clear enough.
9 Article 1, paragraph 2, which I just quoted, refers to every police
10 officer individually, whereas Article 2 in its entirety deals with police
11 units. So what we read in Article 1 is what every police officer has. Of
12 course it doesn't mean that he carries it all all the time he is on duty.
13 Article 2, however, deals with police units; police station,
14 police platoon, police battalion, et cetera, company.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I think the answer is, in fact -- explains it fully
16 but can I just be absolutely clear: That means that where the expression
17 "authorised officials" is used, or "authorised officials and employees,"
18 that simply means police officers, anyone who is an authorised police
19 officer. It doesn't mean you need special authority to be specially
20 authorised to carry a weapon of that kind.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Every police officer always has on
22 him either a pistol or a revolver; as we call them, short barrels. Every
23 policeman also, in case of extraordinary assignments, may have a long
24 barrel on him. Let me be even more precise. In paragraph 2 of Article 1
25 says that an individual policeman may carry either a pistol or a revolver
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 plus a submachine-gun or a rifle or a light machine-gun. Any other weapon
2 is to be used mainly in emergency extraordinary assignments, such as
3 anti-terrorist activity, but not on regular duties.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much, General. That's very helpful.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. General, now in view of these rules and what they contain, and
7 they contain everything referring to weapons used by the police force,
8 General, did you have any comparison as to what the weapons used in other
9 police forces in the world -- or in Europe first and foremost, let's take
10 Europe first. Is there anything there within the weaponry of the police
11 force in Serbia that does not exist in the weaponry of policemen in other
12 European countries, for instance?
13 A. Of course we took that into account, bore it in mind and quite
14 certainly there are no essential differences. The differences are only in
15 type of -- the type or make of weapons but not in the weapons themselves,
16 and of course we also bore in mind the conditions under which certain
17 weapons are used.
18 Q. Very well, General, fine.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Can that possibly be correct, though, because we
20 know of countries where police officers do not routinely carry weapons at
21 all, and therefore that must be a situation which is entirely different
22 from the situation that you're envisaging in Serbia. So it may be better
23 if you were able to say which countries you were comparing the Serbian
24 position with.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you're quite right, Your
1 Honour. So certain countries, of course, even in their regular duties do
2 not carry weapons, but they are exceptions to the best of our knowledge.
3 So we were in a position to analyse the countries surrounding us and we
4 looked at the French police, in actual fact the French police force, and a
5 unit such as the gendarmerie, for example, the Carabinieri units in other
6 countries of Western Europe. They have similar weapons. Of course those
7 weapons cannot be seen publicly in peacetime when they go about their
8 regular duties. They are the types of weapons that are only used when the
9 situation and circumstances merit the use of such weapons.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Very well, but a policeman, an officer on the beat, what kind of
13 weapons do they have?
14 A. Well, in the Republic of Serbia, it is generally known and
15 specified what a regular police officer carries on a daily basis in
16 Belgrade, for instance. It is a pistol manufactured by the Crvena Zastava
17 factory of Kragujevac, so domestically produced, and none of the rest that
18 I read out. Now, of course if there were any demonstrations, violent
19 demonstrations or others, then the unit would have to carry out an
20 assignment in situations of that kind and such a unit would have some of
21 the other weapons specified, a few chemical substances as well.
22 Q. All right. What about a football stadium, a unit providing
23 security for an important football match at a stadium, for example? Would
24 it have any special devices, special weapons?
25 A. Well, yes. Let's take the case of football matches which are
1 frequently held in Belgrade. The police also uses the pistol, just that
2 one weapon officially issued service pistol, and in certain conditions
3 chemical weapons with special devices. They would have to wear special
4 uniforms, protective devices, and so on. But for a football match, just
5 the regular service pistol.
6 Q. Very well. Now, General, in addition to the ranks that you told
7 us about and the organisational aspects of the police force, and we were
8 just looking at weapons, the equipment and training of special units were
9 used as an argument to prove the militarisation of the police force. So
10 not only special purpose units but the entire police force was used to
11 show that there was militarisation of the force.
12 Now, arguments such as this, are they justified, would you say?
13 Or, rather, could you compare the situation from that period of time and
14 the situation in Serbia at present, for example.
15 A. Well, comments of that kind which were based on the type of
16 training and organisation for the special police forces are not an
17 argument in favour of the police's militarisation. It doesn't show that.
18 I'm sure that the organisation, training, equipment of special police
19 units at that time was commensurate to the security threats that the
20 Republic of Serbia had to deal with at that period of time. I'm also
21 certain that most European countries have similar units for similar
22 purposes, for purposes in situations of that kind.
23 And I think your question was also for me to compare the special
24 units then and special units now in Serbia for the same kind of
25 assignments. I can confirm that the present gendarmerie in the Republic
1 of Serbia, which to all intents and purposes was a replacement for the
2 previous special police units, is only an additional better qualified,
3 better organised and equipped force in terms of training, deployment, et
4 cetera. And at that time, we wanted to have the kind of unit that we have
5 today in the gendarmerie of Serbia, for example. And the government of
6 Republic of Serbia never had enough money to put that into effect because
7 professional units for that type of assignment require far greater funds
8 from the budget than the units that were a compromise at the time, the
9 units in force and a compromise and ones that answer to the needs of the
10 situation in Serbia and what Serbia was able to offer and also in respect
11 of the security situation that the country had to face.
12 Q. All right. Now, if we were to take the criteria of seeing the
13 degree of militarisation, for instance, what comparison could you make
14 between the special police units at that time and the present gendarmerie?
15 A. Well, it is incontestable that the present day gendarmerie is far
16 more similar to a military unit than the units of the day. That of course
17 does not mean that I have a negative attitude towards the gendarmerie of
18 the present day.
19 Q. I'm not asking of your attitude towards them but I'm asking you
20 from a factual basis in terms of organisation, weaponry, training, and so
21 on and so forth. So that's the terms I wanted you to make the comparison.
22 A. Well, these units were serviced by regular policemen whereas the
23 present gendarmerie is a professional unit and is more like, if I can use
24 the term, a standing army than the previous unit.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Returning to the assignment of ranks, were
1 civilians who worked in the police force also assigned ranks, civilians
2 such as typists and the translators?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course not. Quite certain that
4 that is not the case.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Very well. Now, General, in view of the question you were just
8 asked, if an individual had a rank, which -- a person performing some
9 technical duty as was mentioned a moment ago, for example, some
10 administrative work, then what kind of ranks would those be?
11 A. Ranks, as I've already said, in the police force of Serbia could
12 have been gained by only authorised officers, that is to say policemen,
13 individuals with police authorisation. No administrative workers had
14 police authorisation. They enjoyed the same status as any other employee
15 in the administration of local government or state government, and they
16 couldn't have received a rank of any kind let alone the rank of general.
17 Of course, an exception could have been made in the case of
18 somebody who was an administrative worker who in the course of time became
19 a policeman. But there again, he could have been given the rank which
20 corresponded to his professional training and experience and the time
21 spent on the job at a set post or position. But I don't know of any such
22 cases myself.
23 Q. And, all right, according to the law, we can see that the ranks
24 refer to authorised officers and not, for instance, drivers, cooks,
25 mechanics, or whatever.
1 A. Administrative staff, you mean.
2 Q. Yes, administrative staff.
3 A. There were classical positions and posts just like administrative
4 employees and staff in other ministries.
5 Q. General, now since we have followed the logical course of events
6 and arrived at this subject matter, I'd like to ask you something about
7 the special purpose police units and they are otherwise mentioned fairly
8 frequently here with respect to the events in Kosovo.
9 General, at one point in time during one period, as far as I know
10 up to 1996, in fact, you yourself were the commander of special police
11 units; is that right?
12 A. Yes, that is right.
13 Q. Could you please explain to us what kind of units they were.
14 A. We've already started discussing matters of that kind, but what I
15 could tell you is this: Special police units are police units, as we call
16 them special purpose units, that is to say units intended to perform
17 special assignments of different complexity, levels of complexity. So
18 those units most frequently carry out assignments when those assignments
19 go way beyond the scope and capabilities of the ordinary units, and they
20 are very broad, stemming from an ordinary football match, for example,
21 where it is difficult for the local police force to maintain law and
22 order. Then there can be public meetings and rallies of different types
23 which, in the security related sense, surpass the capabilities of the
24 regular police force, and it can also go towards arresting and taking into
25 custody various individuals, groups, criminals, and it ranges to
1 anti-terrorist assignments.
2 The other thing that is important and that I should like to
3 mention, something we've already touched upon, is this: They are units of
4 provisional -- provisional units, ad hoc units that are established when
5 the need for their involvement arises, and they remain in such a formation
6 for as long as the assignments for which they were formed last.
7 Q. All right. And once that assignment is completed, what happens to
8 that special assignment unit or ad hoc units? What happens?
9 A. They go back to their regular duties within the frameworks of
10 their regular police stations. And I'm talking about policemen from all
11 regular units. So patrol policemen on the beat, traffic policemen, border
12 policemen, and so on and so forth.
13 Q. So policemen going about their regular duties, when the need
14 arises, when the security situation is such, they are organised and sent
15 to form special police units, ad hoc units for the performance of a set
16 assignment, and they do not exist outside that assignment. They go back
17 to the jobs they were doing beforehand; policemen on the beat, patrol
18 policemen, border policemen, or whatever else they were doing beforehand;
19 is that right?
20 A. Yes, that's right. But let me also say that they are
21 organisationally provided for in advance. They're -- the members, the
22 strength and deployment of each unit is decided beforehand but, of course,
23 the number of policemen assigned to a task and unit depends on the
24 situation. Not all the units, the special purpose units, are deployed but
25 only those parts in sufficient numbers to carry out the assignment set.
1 Q. Very well, General. Now, tell us, when was the first time, to the
2 best of your knowledge, that these special units were established, special
3 police units? Were there units of that kind in the former Yugoslavia, for
5 A. This is a subject I am well-versed in. Those units under a
6 different name did exist in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia.
7 Now, the reason for which these units were established in the republics of
8 the former Yugoslavia was one that was very well known. It was the
9 storming of a terrorist group in the Radusa area of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
10 1972, when that incident occurred. And in the clash between the security
11 forces with that particular terrorist group, as I said in 1972, quite a
12 number of policemen and soldiers were killed, fell casualty. And of
13 course this was an event which was very worrying to all the former
14 Yugoslav republics. And as a result of their concern and to counteract a
15 situation of that kind, they decided to set up the special police units in
16 Serbia. So from that day onwards they have existed throughout in Serbia
17 up until the year 2000 or, rather, when the gendarmerie was established.
18 But now they, too, can be revived in Serbia should the need arise,
19 pursuant to certain legal stipulations.
20 Q. Judging by the rules and regulations, General, who has the right
21 to engage special police units?
22 A. Special police units were exclusively established by the minister
23 of the interior or the head of the sector for public security pursuant to
24 an order from the minister. The same method is applied, or the same legal
25 basis is applied for their engagement of the special units set up by an
1 act -- a decree of the minister. They too can be deployed only by an
2 activating order from the minister or in certain cases by the head of the
3 public security sector, pursuant to authorisation from the minister once
5 Q. Very well, General. Now, take a look at tab 5 of the rules
6 governing the internal organisation of the ministry. I am just going to
7 quote one paragraph from Article 6.
8 A. I apologise. What number did you say?
9 Q. It is tab 5, and Article 6.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. They're not translated. You're citing one
11 article, Article 6. Put it on the ELMO.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Article 6: "In addition to the organisational units established
14 pursuant to these rules for the ministers of the interior for the
15 performance of these duties under Article 2," and those units were listed
16 above, I mentioned the secretariat and the maps, and so on and so forth,
17 it says, "The minister of the interior shall establish a special purpose
18 units of the police force operative groups and other special units."
19 So he exclusively has the right -- these units can exclusively be
20 established and mobilised by the ministry. Is that what you said?
21 A. Yes. And from the text it would emerge that it -- that the
22 minister is the sole person that can do so. But there was another
23 authorisation, that the minister can pass on his authorisations to the
24 heads of sectors, and you can't see this from that article. And then the
25 heads of sectors can proceed according to what is stipulated in this
2 Q. You explained to us how they were formed and sent back to their
3 original jobs. Now, was there any permanence with respect to the
4 composition and deployment of these units?
5 A. Well, I answered that question in part as well, because there is
6 never any permanence with respect to the numerical state and organisation
7 of the parts deployed. These units, for the most part, are engaged in
8 smaller sections commensurate with the assignment, and they remain on
9 assignment only while the assignment is in force. So they are usually
10 deployed for brief periods with less members rather than being engaged as
11 a whole.
12 Q. Very well. Now, paragraph 2 of Article 6 that we have on the ELMO
13 says the following: "By the act of forming a special unit pursuant to
14 Article 1 of this -- these regulations, the tasks of the unit is
15 determined, the time period, the authorisations, and other conditions of
16 work of the police units. The units are formed from the members of the
17 ministry, the reserve force members and, when required, persons over the
18 age of 18 who go to military schools."
19 So those are specifications as to the composition and strength of
20 these units; is that right?
21 A. Yes, that is right.
22 Q. Now, outside this is it possible to form any unit at all, outside
23 the decision taken by the minister?
24 A. No. This is the legal framework and grounds for -- on the basis
25 of which these units are established, stipulating the assignments, the
1 time period, and so on and so forth.
2 Q. Tell me now, what about the reserve police force in Kosovo and
3 Metohija? How is that force manned?
4 A. The members of the police -- of the reserve police force, their
5 status and the mode of their employment are regulated in the law on
6 internal affairs, and of course I cannot remember the exact article.
7 As for engaging this force in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998 - I
8 assume that this is the year you have in mind - and 1999, and generally
9 speaking, for that matter, it was only the reserve force from the local
10 secretariats that were engaged. Engaging the force outside Kosovo was a
11 very sporadic thing. Perhaps there were only a few exceptions.
12 This reserve force in Kosovo and Metohija was primarily engaged in
13 provisional police departments, and they were seconded to regular police
14 units to help them out. Most of the policemen from these regular units
15 were engaged in special police units at the time. So they were
16 practically engaged to replace the active duty officers who were
17 combatting terrorism.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, although their functions would be
19 specific, would these special units have powers different from ordinary
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The law on internal affairs, and
22 other laws, of course, define the same powers for all policemen. That is
23 to say, for all authorised officers irrespective of the units that they're
24 on. Of course I'm talking about police authorisation, that is to say the
25 right to ask a person for an ID, to bring a person into custody, and so on
1 and so forth.
2 As for assignments and tasks, of course there are differences,
3 because regular policemen as a rule carry out standard customary police
4 tasks protecting law and order, providing security in particular places,
5 et cetera, whereas special units usually carry out more complex tasks, but
6 they have the same authority and they enforce the same legal regulations
7 when doing their jobs. That is to say that there is no special authority
8 vested in special units. There is authority vested in authorised officers
9 irrespective of the unit that they're in.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. A few moments ago you mentioned that the law on internal affairs
12 regulates this.
13 A. May I please take this page and put it back into the tab?
14 Q. I'm talking about the law on internal affairs now. That is tab 1.
15 A. Just a moment, please. I have found it.
16 Q. A few moments ago in response to my questions you explained how
17 the members of the reserve police force in Kosovo and Metohija were
18 engaged and who the members were, and you said that this is regulated in
19 the law on internal affairs. Here you have it from Article 27 onwards.
20 It says the reserve force. 27, 28, 29, and 30. Are these the laws -- the
21 regulations or, rather, the articles of the law that regulate the reserve
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be put on the ELMO. It's translated? No.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer now?
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already answered. I explained
2 which tasks the reserve force had, but I did not explain in which way it
3 was engaged.
4 So the reserve force can be engaged only through an order of the
5 minister to engage the reserve force. The authority is similar to that of
6 the authority of the minister to engage special units.
7 Article 27, Article 28, and Article 29 refer to the reserve force.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. General, I assume that right now we won't be needing the law on
10 internal affairs any longer. There is no need for further comment except
11 for what you've already said just now.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. When talking about special police units, you explained who could
14 give them orders, how they were engaged, and so on and so forth. Can you
15 please tell us now more specifically, when there is a particular situation
16 where a special police unit is engaged, under whose command are these
17 engaged parts of police units? You said that certain parts were engaged
18 depending on the need involved. Under whose command are they, then,
19 these individual parts?
20 A. Proceeding from the fact that one always engages a certain number
21 of policemen and a profile of policemen that are required in a particular
22 area in order to resolve a particular problem, then that kind of formation
23 and that kind of number of people is sent to that area, in accordance with
24 the actual assignment. Of course, everything happens in a particular
25 territory. In that territory it is always the locally organised unit that
1 is in charge.
2 Q. Let's be clear: For example, if a special police unit - let's
3 take Kosovo, Pristina or Urosevac -- never mind. Does that mean that this
4 special police unit that came to resolve a particular task is under the
5 command of the head of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs who is locally
6 in charge, either Pristina, Urosevac, or whatever, or the secretariat of
7 the municipality where they came?
8 A. Yes, that's right. Perhaps I didn't understand the previous
9 question very well. For example, if a company of special police units
10 from Kraljevo comes to Belgrade to help the Belgrade SUP in order to
11 provide security for a football match, which is often the case, of course
12 it is the leader of that unit who is in charge of that unit. He came with
13 his unit, but they are placed under the command of the staff that are in
14 charge of the entire security of that football match in Belgrade. So they
15 are resubordinated to the local commander who is in charge of a particular
17 Q. Talking about special police forces and special police units in
18 Kosovo and Metohija, special police units were engaged there for a certain
19 period of time. You explained a few moments ago that a special police
20 unit would be engaged for a particular period of time. How long were
21 special police units usually engaged in Kosovo and Metohija, as a rule?
22 A. Yes, I am aware of that. Usually parts of special police units
23 that were sent to Kosovo and Metohija were engaged usually for about 40
24 days. After that period, they would be replaced by other units also from
25 the ranks of special police units. The personnel were particularly
1 established for each case, that is to say their leaders and also the
2 length of their stay.
3 Q. General, how many special police forces were there in Serbia at
4 the time that we're talking about here and now, '98 and '99 that is, and
5 what was their establishment structure like?
6 A. As for numbers of all the special police units, again I would like
7 to remind you of the fact that we have to use this in the plural: Special
8 police units. There are several of them. Their total number was about
9 15.000. Of course, that number includes about 5.000 members of the
10 reserve force. So the total of active duty officers would be about
11 10.000. And all these 15.000 members of the active and reserve forces of
12 the police were structured in seven detachments, as we will called them,
13 of the A composition, six were B, and I think seven again were R.
14 Q. R being the reserve force.
15 A. Yes, R being the reserve force. Every one of these detachments
16 within their internal organisational structure had companies, and every
17 company had platoons, and every platoon had a squad. That is to say that
18 the organisational structure was quite similar to a military
19 organisational structure.
20 Q. Tell me, for how many days were people usually engaged in special
21 police units in Kosovo and Metohija during those years, in 1998 and 1999?
22 A. You mean what the total was or how many days it lasted?
23 Q. No, no. For example, say a beat policeman from a town in central
24 Serbia is within a special police unit which was sent to Kosovo and
25 Metohija for a certain amount of time. How long would that unit stay
1 there? How long would that man be kept away from his home and the town
2 where he worked and in this unit? In 1998 and 1999, how long would they
3 usually stay there in Kosovo and Metohija?
4 A. I've already said that such units went to Kosovo and Metohija and
5 stayed there for about 40 days on average. After that, they would return
6 to their original units and go on with their regular duties.
7 After a certain amount of time, depending on the necessity
8 involved, they would sent for another 40 days. It would be very hard for
9 me to say now annually how long a particular individual would stay there.
10 Q. But they went for 40-day stints.
11 A. Yes, and then they would go back to their units.
12 Q. What about the special police unit in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998
13 and 1999? How many members of special units were in Kosovo and Metohija
14 altogether? What was their maximum level at a given point in time?
15 A. From mid-1998 until mid-1999, the number went up, but as far as I
16 know, on average there were between 3 and 4.000 members of the special
17 police unit. Sometimes there were perhaps even less. The maximum,
18 though, was about 7 or 8.000. So approximately 100 per cent more than the
19 strength of the local police force, and of course this was during the time
20 of war.
21 Q. All right. We're not going to go back to tab 13 because we've
22 already dealt with these tables and you can see the numerical levels
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Very well, General. Now, many things could be heard about these
1 special police units, that they were some kind of very special units, very
2 particularly established for engagement in Kosovo and Metohija only.
3 Also, that these were some kind of death-sowing units, punitive units.
4 What can you say about that?
5 A. On the basis of what I've already said and what I'll add now, such
6 statements are absolutely nonsensical and incorrect. First of all,
7 special police units cannot belong to very specialised units at all. They
8 cannot be belong to that category. We've already said they basically
9 belong to regular police structures, their personnel belonged to these
10 units and they are engaged temporarily.
11 In addition to that, the assignments are not special assignments.
12 Any police provides security for a public gathering. Any police arrests
13 or brings into custody persons who commit crimes. So the same goes for
14 these units. These units did not undergo specialised training. Of course
15 they had training for the kind of tasks that I've already referred to.
16 Most importantly, these units were certainly not established only for the
17 purpose of going to Kosovo and combatting terrorism there. I've already
18 said that their tradition dates back to 1972 and perhaps even the period
19 before that. I know from 1972 for sure.
20 As for their stay in Kosovo, nobody really wanted them to go to
21 Kosovo and to have to handle the kind of work they did there and that they
22 were faced with. It just so happened that just before the events in
23 Kosovo and during the actual events in Kosovo, these units had to receive
24 additional training in order to be able to deal with that kind of
25 situation and in order to carry out their tasks lawfully and regularly and
1 survive at that.
2 Q. In tab 16 -- actually, before that, let's clarify something. On
3 the basis of what you've said, it can be established that special police
4 units do not belong to the category of specialised units.
5 A. Absolutely.
6 Q. And they were not established for the security related events in
8 A. Yes, absolutely.
9 Q. Did you say that very categorically?
10 A. Yes, that is the core of my previous answer.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please be asked to slow down.
12 It is too fast for the transcript.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, did you hear that? The
14 interpreters are asking you to slow down, to observe a pause between
15 question and answer. That applies to the witness as well.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I didn't hear the
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't either. But I know that,
19 as opposed to the witness, who does not know about that. However, we get
20 carried away.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, please look at tab 16.
23 A. Yes, I have it.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that this document has been
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, this is translated.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This is but one example. It is a decision on the establishment of
4 special police units. It says in the preamble that pursuant to Article 6
5 on the rules of the internal organisation of the Ministry of the Interior
6 -- we've just quoted that Article 6 when we looked at the rules on the
7 internal organisation. This is what the minister invokes. And the
8 minister hereby adopts the following decision on the establishment of
9 special police units. And now it says here how they are established and
10 how they function. So paragraph 1, General: "Special police units of the
11 Ministry of the Interior, hereinafter referred to as PJM, shall be
12 established with the overall strength of fifteen police detachments five
13 of which shall be based in Belgrade and two each in Novi Sad, Pristina,
14 Uzice, Kragujevac, and Nis."
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. These are the major towns in Serbia and that is where the majority
17 of the police force is. So would that be the reason why they were
18 deployed in this way?
19 A. Yes, that's the reason. And also the geographic distribution in
20 part affected this pattern as well.
21 Q. Further on it says that, "The PJM referred to in paragraph 1 of
22 this item at the Secretariat of the Interior shall be from two police
23 platoons up to a detachment in strength, as per the organisational and
24 establishment chart which is attached to this decision and is an integral
25 part of it."
1 A. That's right. The organisational structure is further specified
2 in the attachment but I don't believe we have the attachment here. I did
3 explain it, though, when I spoke about the number of detachments and so
5 Q. Yes. You said seven detachments of the A force, six detachments
6 of the B force, and seven of the reserve force. And we saw in tab 13 each
7 of these things one by one.
8 What is it about this decision that is consistent with the
9 explanations you gave about the organisation and establishment of special
10 police units? What is identical to your explanations?
11 A. This decision practically confirms all my previous answers. First
12 of all, we see that this decision was enacted by the minister, late Zoran
13 Sokolovic, and this decision governs all the matters that are to be
14 stipulated by such decision pursuant to the law on the organisation of the
16 Of course this decision remained in force all the way up to the
17 moment when the gendarmerie was established, and the only change is that
18 the name "milicija" is changed into "policija."
19 Q. I will draw your attention to item 6, which says: "Ministry
20 employees who are members of the PJM shall remain at their posts and
21 perform their regular duties when they are not engaged in the PJM, and
22 shall exercise the rights proceeding from their employment in accordance
23 with their letters of appointment."
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. So this is a reference to policemen in various workplaces who
1 remain in those workplaces. In the next paragraph, we read: "PJM members
2 are entitled to compensation for engagement in the PJM in accordance with
3 the law and internal ministry rules."
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So they have some per diem and other payments.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Was this decision adopted in full conformity with the rules we
8 quoted from earlier?
9 A. Yes, it was.
10 Q. Do you see here any particular detail that should be clarified
11 with regard to special police units?
12 A. I don't think so. Perhaps we can come back to it when we deal
13 with further tabs. What we have here is a document which confirms all my
14 previous answers regarding the establishment of special police units.
15 Q. Let us look at tab 17 now. This previous decision was adopted by
16 the minister, and under tab 17, we see the decision on the establishment
17 of PJM, signed by assistant minister and head of public security sector
18 Radovan Stojicic, also in 1993. We see that this was addressed to all
19 secretariats from one to 32.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Whereas this particular copy was addressed to Pristina.
22 A. It was addressed to what was then called the PJM headquarters in
24 Q. Could you please explain. In 1993 there were no particular
25 security problems there, or were there?
1 A. No, but staff of the Ministry of the Interior was operating in
2 Pristina nevertheless. If I didn't mention it earlier, let me say now
3 that beginning with 1990, the ministry staff operated in Pristina up to
4 1999. Only the personnel changed and the assignments changed.
5 In peacetime -- in more peaceful times, duties were more regular,
6 such as crime prevention and control, whereas in other times such as peaks
7 of crisis it was more oriented towards anti-terrorist activity.
8 If we remember the rules on the establishment of special police
9 units, we see also from this decision the level of management, the level
10 of leadership in the ministry which signs certain enactments and which
11 level determines particular assignments in the establishment of units, in
12 the training of units, writing of particular documents, et cetera. And we
13 see that this document is signed by the head of sector, no lower level
15 Q. In this para 2, we see an explanation of who is required to give
16 approval for which posts, which positions, and how, beginning with
17 detachment commanders, company commanders, et cetera. What is this about?
18 A. Paragraph 2 governs the operation of the existing force. We see
19 that detachment commanders and deputy detachment commanders must be
20 appointed with the approval of the commander of the PJM, whereas, as we
21 see in the next line, detachment command, company commander, and deputy
22 commander can be appointed with the approval of the detachment commander.
23 Q. And so on. It's always with the approval of the superior
25 A. Precisely.
1 Q. I hope this is self-explanatory and obvious. We have attachments
2 as well.
3 What is under tab 18? It is entitled "The basic principles for
4 forming special police units of the Ministry of the Interior of the
5 Republic of Serbia." It's a document from the 1st of August, 1993.
6 Explain very briefly what this document is about.
7 A. This document provides a basis or guidelines for forming these
8 units, stipulates for which assignments they are formed and in which ways
9 they will be used. This is an enactment, but in actual fact it has the
10 nature of guidelines as an aid to Secretariats of Internal Affairs for
11 them to better understand the way of forming, the purpose, the
12 replenishment and equipment of these units. It was happening at the
13 moment when these units were being formed for the first time, and the
14 secretariats needed to understand their purpose and way of organisation.
15 So this is the purpose of this document.
16 Q. Look now at tab 19. This is a decision to establish the 124th
17 Intervention Brigade of the PJP, special police units. It is a decision
18 of the minister again. I believe there was a question raised earlier on
19 about the nature and place of this Intervention Brigade within the special
20 police units. Can you give us an explanation?
21 A. We see here a decision to establish one of the Intervention
22 Brigades of the PJP, special police units, but it actually refers to the
23 linking of one of the PJP detachments, that is the Kosovo and Metohija
24 detachment, with one of the mechanised units in Pristina. Since these two
25 units merged into one, it was necessary to adopt a decision to rename this
1 24th Detachment, if I remember correctly, and this mechanised unit, and
2 the newly formed unit was named 124th Intervention Brigade.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll take the 20-minute break
4 now. We're adjourned.
5 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here. The microphone is on now.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. General, please look at tab 20. What can we find there?
11 A. This is a dispatch dated 8 March 1999, which issues an activating
12 order for certain parts of special police units that are sent to Kosovo
13 and Metohija to replace previously sent parts of special police units.
14 This is consistent with one of my earlier answers to your question about
15 who issues orders to engage PJP, special police units. In this case, this
16 was General Djordjevic who issued this order on the orders of the
17 minister. In this period, Colonel General Vlastimir Djordjevic issued
18 most such orders.
19 Q. If we look at the fourth paragraph from the top of this dispatch,
20 it says that members of the PJP shall remain on duty there for up to 40
21 days. That is consistent with what you said about the length of one
22 stint. It says: "Members of the PJP shall remain on assignment for 40
23 days without the right to leave the unit for the duration of the shift."
24 A. This echoes my previous statement that parts of units rather than
25 whole units are deployed. And we can see that from the SUP of Novi Sad
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 only certain companies of certain detachments are sent to this assignment.
2 Q. Look at the penultimate paragraph. Before that we read: "Members
3 of the PJP shall be relieved of their regular duties by 0700 hours." So
4 they are relieved of their regular duties when they are transferred to
5 special police units?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. Now, in connection with what you said about them replacing
8 previously sent units, it says: "For the employees returning from
9 assignment, organise reception, two days off," et cetera, et cetera. Was
10 that the usual practice, to maintain a certain level of presence in Kosovo
11 and Metohija?
12 A. Yes. The same level of presence was maintained using various
13 units each serving a 40-day stint.
14 Q. What about the next tab? Is it a similar dispatch, sending a
15 different unit according to the same scheme?
16 A. Yes. It is the same kind of dispatch, sending different units to
17 replace their colleagues.
18 Q. Under tab 22, is that the same kind of order?
19 A. Yes, it's the same scheme, same principle. The only thing that is
20 different is the time and the units.
21 Q. It says again: "For returning members, organise a reception, two
22 days off," et cetera.
23 We see from this series of dispatches how one and the same level
24 of presence was maintained in Kosovo and Metohija.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, are we going to deal
1 with the exhibits and their admission later, or shall I tender them in
2 succession, stage by stage?
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: These appear to be amenable to being dealt with
5 at the end, so we'll do that.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: General, could you tell me why these dispatches
7 were sent to the principal of the secondary school? That's the school in
8 Sremska Mitrovica.
9 JUDGE KWON: That's tab 20.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: And 22.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will look, of course, but I
12 suppose that it is the secondary school had a role to play in
13 transportation; to provide buses, for instance.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Just one correction. Maybe it was a mistake in interpretation.
16 It was the secondary school in Sremska Kamenica, not in Mitrovica. The
17 school in Kamenica is the School of Internal Affairs. It is a MUP school.
18 JUDGE KWON: It's Mitrovica in tab 20.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, mine too.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will establish easily exactly
21 which school it is.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It must be Kamenica.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, it must be a translation
24 mistake in your copy, because you will see in tab 20 it says secondary
25 school in Sremska Kamenica. Mitrovica is a much better known town, a
1 larger town. Sremska Kamenica is smaller. Maybe the translator made an
2 error. But the police cannot be wrong about their own school; they know
3 it is located in Sremska Kamenica.
4 JUDGE KWON: I note Kamenica in B/C/S version. It should have
5 been a misinterpretation.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is a secondary School of
7 Internal Affairs from which, by the way, this general graduated when he
8 was a boy. You heard about that when he was giving us his curriculum
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can suppose, although it's
11 difficult to understand from the contents what this is about, this
12 dispatch -- such dispatches are addressed to those parties that are
13 involved in a certain assignment. This can be either a case of the school
14 in Kamenica providing support in some logistical assignments, such as
15 providing buses because schools have buses and secretariats rarely do, or
16 maybe somebody from the personnel of the school was assigned to the force
17 that was being sent. We saw from previous provisions that all kinds of
18 profiles can be involved in a special police unit, and this particular
19 school is in the territory of the Novi Sad municipality, and maybe
20 somebody from this school was a part of the Novi Sad unit. I don't think
21 that this dispatch would be addressed to the school if a unit from
22 Kragujevac was concerned, for instance.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, we just saw a series of dispatches governing the rotation
1 of such units and determining the actions to be taken in this connection.
2 Give me an answer to this general question: What is the control
3 determined by?
4 A. Control is determined by the law on internal affairs governing the
5 entire ministry and its activities, and more specifically by the law on
7 Q. We have that in the binders.
8 A. Yes. It is governed by particular articles dealing with control
9 within the ministry.
10 Q. Regardless of which specific articles are concerned, we have the
11 entire rules.
12 What are the most senior posts in the Ministry of the Interior,
13 starting from the minister down to beat policemen, in the entire
15 A. The most senior posts in the ministry are specified precisely by
16 the rules. These posts are minister, heads of sectors, heads of
17 administrations in the MUP and heads of sections within these sectors,
18 then heads of secretariats of internal affairs - we've already explained
19 what secretariats are - heads of internal affairs in municipalities, and
20 commanders of police stations.
21 We could go further down below, but this is the level that is
22 specified by the rules of organisation.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Where does an assistant minister fit into that?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Under the minister.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As we said earlier today, he fits
1 within the senior level of the ministry. There were six assistant
2 ministers. They can at the same time be leaders but not necessarily.
3 Only heads of sectors are at the same time assistant ministers and
4 leaders. Two of the six have the position of leaders.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: We also saw in documents earlier the reference to a
6 deputy minister. Where does a deputy minister fit in?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A deputy minister, we can say, has a
8 limited leadership role. He is deputy to the minister in the minister's
9 absence or sees to duties based on authorisation from the minister. So in
10 the absence of a minister the deputy minister takes over or carries out
11 duties he is authorised to carry out by the minister. So he is in a
12 leadership position when he is acting as deputy to the minister.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: And is there only one deputy minister?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, just one. And a number of
15 assistants. Several assistants but just one deputy.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: So he is superior to the assistants. He's between
17 the minister and the assistant minister. Thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In principle that is the case, yes,
19 because he can be authorised by the minister exceptionally whereas the
20 assistants on far rarer occasions, much more exceptional occasions, only
21 if the minister or the deputy minister were absent, in their absence could
22 the assistant step in; otherwise not.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, during a state of war were there any changes in the
1 conduct of the police and in the -- how the police was controlled and led?
2 We saw the rules and regulations. Now, in a state of war, were there any
3 changes in the authorisation of the police force and how the police force
4 was led?
5 A. In police control and leadership, to all intents and purposes
6 there were no changes with the proclamation of imminent war or danger.
7 All the people in leadership positions remained there, and their
8 authorisation or their remit or their right to control were not changed.
9 Of course, the authorisations of the Ministry of the Interior and the
10 authorised officers in the ministry were changed in part through
11 provisions enacted which were in force during a state of war.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, was your question directed to the
13 state of war that existed or the typical position in a state of war?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, a state of war at all events.
15 But what I wanted to do was to show some documents, which unfortunately we
16 received subsequently, but they are provisions, rules and provisions. So
17 it's not a document that is a report or a brief or information, they are
18 rules and regulations. And I was asking the witness whether during a
19 state of war there were differences in command and control and he said
20 that in control there was no difference but with regard to procedure the
21 procedure was simplified during a state of war, but that is regulated on
22 the basis of rules and regulations once again.
23 I did not receive the documents on time, which of course -- or in
24 good time, which is just a comment and regards my own preparations, but I
25 would like to show -- I think that this is something we can place on the
1 ELMO, on the overhead projector. There are several rules and provisions
2 governing behaviour during a state of war which were passed during or,
3 rather, from the start of the war situation, the state of war, and is
4 linked to this issue, the one that we're discussing. It is not
5 incorporated into the documents found in the tabs because Professor Rakic
6 managed to come by this document only late last night. So these documents
7 are photocopies of the Official Gazette of Yugoslavia and Serbia, that is
8 to say official publications which print rules, laws, et cetera,
9 provisions, and so on.
10 So I'd like to ask the general a few questions in that regard and
11 he can answer them.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in citing all these rules and
13 regulations, don't forget that the important question is whether practice
14 accorded with the norms in those rules and regulations. It's one thing to
15 have the rules and regulations --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- what actually happened is another matter. But
18 let's move on.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. But, Mr. Robinson, I hope you
20 are bearing in mind the fact that -- of course what you say is quite true
21 but it depends on the level, because at a state level, of course, the
22 enactment of provisions and guidelines and so on is standard practice.
23 Now, whether that practice of bringing in provisions and passing
24 provisions, whether that coincides with practice lower down, at a level
25 lower down, is another thing altogether and we'll get to that in due
1 course. But as to what is practice and what are the provisions depends at
2 what level you're asking the question. So this is practice at state
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let's move on. Yes.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Now, General, I was asking you about what changed, if anything,
7 with respect to the way in which the police went into action during a
8 state of war. Do you know about the provision about the criminal --
9 criminal proceedings during a state of war enacted by the federal
10 government? Decree.
11 A. Yes, I do know about that decree and certain of its provisions.
12 Q. Now, with respect to a regular situation, regular state of
13 affairs, were there any major changes that took place?
14 A. I don't think so. Not major changes but concrete changes as far
15 as I remember, specific changes which went to the fact that the officials
16 in conformity with the provision could under extraordinary circumstances
17 undertake investigations of some kind, taking them over from the
18 competence and authority of other organs.
19 Q. All right. Now, here the changes provided for are that the organs
20 of internal affairs can undertake investigations without decisions of the
21 public prosecutor.
22 A. That's right. And as far as I remember, that amendment also
23 referred to the fact that the organ of the Ministry of the Interior can
24 also keep somebody in custody for a period of up to 30 days.
25 Q. So in the application -- this changed in the application of the
1 ZKP, the law; is that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And what about the provision of the Ministry of the Interior
4 enacted in Serbia during a state of war and referring to a state of war,
5 decree pursuant to the orders of the president of the republic?
6 A. Yes, I am aware of that decree as well.
7 Q. Does it raise the authorisations during a state of war?
8 A. Negligibly, as far as I can remember. If I remember correctly,
9 the decree had to do with the effectiveness of the disciplinary
11 Q. I'm going to provide you with a set of rules and regulations,
12 provision and decrees, governing the internal affairs organs during a
13 state of war, and they say that the authorised personnel from the ministry
14 can, without a warrant, exercise such functions to take into custody
15 persons whom they suspect of having committed certain acts. So searches
16 without a warrant and so on and so forth. And the provision on ID cards
17 during a state of war.
18 So these are several provisions -- and also which refers to public
19 gathers as well. Anyway, this is a set of provisions which envisage
20 certain changes. Now, these changes, are they geared towards speeding up
21 the process or are they substantive in terms of citizens' rights?
22 A. For example, the decree on domicile, for example, and residence
23 and ID cards, I think that the deadline for which persons can apply or say
24 that they have lost their ID cards has been reduced. And if there are
25 public gatherings taking place, then the person convening public
1 gatherings must seek permission prior to holding the gathering. That was
2 another provision.
3 Q. Very well. Now, let's take a look at this set of provisions,
4 regulations, which stipulate the changes, and I'd like to ask the usher's
5 help and have this placed on the overhead projector.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope, Mr. Robinson, that I won't
7 have to hand this in for translation, because on the ELMO you'll see that
8 it is a photocopy taken from the Official Gazette, and I have highlighted
9 several passages which the witness can read out and comment.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Take a look at that, General, please.
12 A. "Decree on the application of the law of criminal procedure during
13 a state of war." That is the first provision.
14 Q. It's a federal provision, is it, enacted by the federal
16 A. Yes, that's right. And Article 6 para 2 --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: What was the date of it?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The date is the 4th of April, 1999.
19 Of course this is a photocopy of the Official Gazette of the FRY. And the
20 date is here, you can see it for yourselves.
21 May I proceed?
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, yes.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Now, may we see the passage being quoted, because it's been
25 highlighted, the passage and provision has been highlighted.
1 A. We cannot see the entire text, but we can guess what it says.
2 "The organ of the interior can in urgent cases --" it probably says "--
3 take over -- take on investigative work without the decision of the public
4 --" or, rather, "republican prosecutor." I can't see the left-hand side
5 of the text, it's missing, but I can assume what it says, what the words
6 there are.
7 Now, Article 8 is the next article, and it says: "Detention can
8 be determined by the organ conducting an investigation." Probably it also
9 says, "To undertake certain investigative measures." And then: "The
10 detention set by a public prosecutor or state prosecutor or organ of the
11 Secretariat of the Interior can last up until --" I can't see the number
12 of days here, but as far as I remember, detention up to 30 days, custody
13 up to 30 days. And that is an extension of the authorisations of the
14 organs of the interior, the ones they had.
15 May I go on to the next provision? And the next decree is this --
16 Thank you.
17 So this is the decree governing internal affairs during a state of
19 Q. That's the Republic of Serbia now and what it refers to?
20 A. Yes. The date is the 7th of April, 1999. And the article
21 highlighted is Article 4. And it reads as follows: "Authorised personnel
22 of the ministry --" that is the Ministry of the Interior -- "can -- may
23 for security reasons without a search warrant conduct searches of
24 individuals while taking them into custody, while holding them in
25 detention, or while arresting them." Taking them into custody. So the
1 exception there is that a warrant is not necessary in that case. So that
2 was that decree.
3 Now we come to the next decree from the same Official Gazette of
4 the Republic of Serbia. It is a decree on citizens' gatherings during a
5 state of war. And Article 2 of that decree says that: "Public gatherings
6 can be convened and held" or, rather, persons can take part in that
7 "having received prior permission from the competent authorities, whether
8 that they take place in a closed premises or outside and regardless of the
9 character of the gathering."
10 So the difference here compared to the previous law, the peacetime
11 law, is that this decree changes the law in that it requires permission by
12 the competent authorities to hold meetings of this kind, and the competent
13 authority in this case is the organ of the Ministry of the Interior.
14 The next decree is the decree on residence, on the residence and
15 domicile of citizens, and there it is just the deadline that has changed.
16 Q. The time period, which is shortened.
17 A. Yes, that's right. And that all persons are duty-bound to declare
18 their domicile, and the age is dropped there. So records of domicile,
19 reporting domicile and changes of domicile is a duty that all individuals
20 above the age of 14 are required to comply with. Of course, in the
21 previous law, in the law, the age there was 18. So the age has dropped to
23 And Article 3 is important here. Article 3 reads: "Reporting a
24 domicile or a new address must be done immediately, at the latest within
25 24 hours upon arrival in a new place of domicile or residence once the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 address has been changed." So it's 24 hours here, whereas the standard
2 regulation was this should be done within a period of eight days.
3 And the last decree has to do with identification papers during a
4 state of war, once again published in the same Official Gazette. Of
5 course, Article 1 always says: "In a state of war, the law governing
6 identification cards holds true unless other provisions state otherwise,"
7 which means that the existing law is upheld.
8 Now, Articles 2 and 3 once again have reduced the age level. Here
9 persons required to have IDs are persons over the age of 14. And if an ID
10 is lost or if an individual remains without it, that individual is
11 duty-bound to report the matter within the space of 24 hours. Otherwise,
12 the law provided for a deadline of eight days.
13 Q. Thank you, General. General, the method of control and leadership
14 in the police, can it be compared to the hierarchy in an army?
15 A. No, of course not.
16 Q. What does that mean in practical terms?
17 A. An answer to that question is linked to the question of functional
18 decentralisation in the Ministry of the Interior. Or, rather, in the
19 police force of Serbia, the principle of a duty and implementing that duty
20 pursuant to orders is the subject we're dealing with, and this is
21 differentiated from going about your line of duty without specific orders.
22 I've already stated that the protagonists of carrying out police orders
23 are the policemen themselves and not their leaders.
24 And let me repeat this again: In that sense, political
25 authorisations are the same both for policemen with, say, one year of work
1 experience as they are for the head of a sector, for example. So the
2 principle is the same. All the employees or workers or members of a
3 police force are equated with respect to police authorisation and
4 competency, and that is how we show that the duty to carry out orders is
5 not the overriding principle. And in the police force, it is rarer to
6 follow orders issued by a superior police officer but, rather, it is on
7 the basis of each policeman's duty and to apply the authorisations
8 stipulated by law which relate to each and every policeman individually.
9 Q. General, are you trying to say that a policeman doesn't have to be
10 ordered to carry out the law? He does directly act in accordance with the
11 law and that is why he is an authorised officer?
12 A. Yes, that's right. Every official acts in accordance with the
13 law, without waiting for any kind of order.
14 Q. In all fairness, I didn't have this before, but now I do have it
15 separately. Tab 6. That is to say the rule book on the conduct and
16 interpersonal relations of the employees of internal affairs organs.
17 You explained what the rule was. What happens when there is an
19 A. When there is an order, the key principle is the duty to carry out
20 an order. However, this principle has serious constraints. That is to
21 say, the duty to carry out an order does not mean that one is duty-bound
22 to carry out any order.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is there a translation of that?
24 JUDGE KWON: We don't have it.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. If you haven't got it,
1 we'll put it on the ELMO. There aren't too many parts.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Have you got tab 6?
4 A. No, regrettably not.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just going to ask the usher to
6 put this on the ELMO.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, just these parts that are highlighted, the second
9 chapter; that is to say, the duty to carry out tasks and orders.
10 So if you look at Article 21, that is what I'd like to have
12 A. In my copy, there is only part of that.
13 Q. It's on the next page if --
14 A. I haven't got the next page.
15 Q. Well, then I'll give you my page. The duty of carrying out tasks
16 and orders. It starts on one page and then the other articles are on the
17 next page. Could you please just quote what is marked here.
18 A. These are the rules on the conduct and interpersonal relations of
19 employees of internal affairs organs, and this is chapter 2: "The duty to
20 carry out tasks and orders." Article 21: "The head of an organ, the head
21 of a service, organisational unit and unit of the police or an employee
22 who they authorise issue to employees --"
23 Q. It can't be seen now. Yes, now we can see it.
24 A. " -- oral and written orders to carry out official tasks and
1 Article 22: "An order to exercise authority that is vested by law
2 in authorised officers of an organ can only be issued by an employee who
3 is authorised on the basis of law, regulations passed on the basis of a
4 law, or on the basis of an order of his superior to issue such orders."
5 Article 23: "An order has to be lawful, complete, timely and
6 clear so that the employee concerned can understand it."
7 Article 24: "An order to directly carry out concrete official
8 tasks is as a rule issued to an employee by his immediate superior." And
9 we have explained who their immediate superiors or supervisors are.
10 Q. It can't be seen. Well, now we can see it.
11 A. Article 25: "An employee is duty-bound to carry out all orders
12 issued by the head of the organ or, rather, his immediate supervisor
13 issued in order to carry out service except those ordering the commission
14 of an act which would constitute a crime."
15 Paragraph 2 reads as follows: "If the implementation of an order
16 would constitute a crime, the employee is duty-bound to report this
17 directly to his higher supervisor or the head of the organ."
18 Q. Thank you, General. I think that we can move on now.
19 Is there anything specific with regard to the duties of policemen
20 in terms of carrying out the tasks that are strictly related to their
21 working hours, when they are in uniform, or are there any specific
22 characteristics as far as the police is concerned?
23 A. Well, what is special with regard to policework is the duty of a
24 policeman to carry out certain duties regardless of whether he is on duty
25 or not.
1 Q. Let me ask you concretely: For example, a person is not on duty,
2 he is on vacation, for instance, but he sees the commission of a crime.
3 Is he bound to intervene? Is he duty-bound to intervene?
4 A. Yes, that's right. That kind of thing, like crime control. A
5 policeman is duty-bound to engage in such activities regardless of whether
6 he's on vacation or at home.
7 In addition to that, in the Republic of Serbia it is the duty of a
8 policeman, when carrying out such tasks, it is his duty to expose himself
9 to danger if need be.
10 Q. All right. I think we've explained that sufficiently.
11 General, who led the units of the Ministry of the Interior in
12 Kosovo and Metohija?
13 A. Regular police units in Kosovo and Metohija were led by their
14 leaders. As for extraordinary units, they were led by persons appointed
15 for that particular purpose under extraordinary circumstances. And
16 specifically as far as, say, combat -- the combat of terrorism is
17 concerned, there was a staff for combatting terrorism that was established
18 in Kosovo.
19 Q. General, when was the staff of the Ministry of the Interior for
20 combatting terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija established?
21 A. Are you asking me about the one that operated during the war or
22 are you asking me in general?
23 Q. I'm referring to the staff that operated in 1998, 1999, that is to
24 say before the war and during the war. To move on more efficiently,
25 please be so kind as to look at tab 10. I hope it's been translated.
1 A. Perhaps I could be of assistance if I say that a staff of the
2 Ministry of the Interior practically existed in Kosovo since 1990, whereas
3 this staff that functioned in 1998 and 1999 was established by a decision
4 of the minister of the interior on the 16th of June, 1998. The decision
5 on the establishment of this staff is tab 9.
6 Q. All right. What is it?
7 THE INTERPRETER: Tab 10, interpreter's correction.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Does this invoke various laws on state administration, on the
10 interior, et cetera?
11 A. Yes, of course. It's set out in the preamble. That is Article 7
12 of the law on internal affairs and Article 43, paragraph 1, and Article 69
13 of the law on state administration.
14 This decision practically establishes a staff for the prevention
15 of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija. Its members are spelled out, that is
16 under I. II sets out the tasks of the staff. III establishes -- the
17 responsibility of the head of the staff is set out. IV establishes the
18 date when the staff will start operating with the members mentioned. Then
19 V explains how individual persons would be sent to work on the staff. And
20 the very end shows that all decisions adopted previously will cease to be
21 in force.
22 Q. General, as you said, point I deals with the members of the staff,
23 and their names are set out here.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Since all of those persons --
1 JUDGE KWON: I'm afraid the English translation and this B/C/S
2 version does not match. Under IV and V, I don't find the explanation the
3 witness does. In the English version, IV and V contains some substantive
4 volume of paragraphs, but B/C/S version does not have that kind of
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I can see, it's not the
7 same, the translation. What is on the overhead projector obviously does
8 not correspond to the decision that I'm talking about because there are no
9 numbers except for Roman numerals in this decision.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: So it's the translation which is out of place, is
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can have a look at the
13 translation. Let's see what it says at the very beginning. Does it bear
14 the same number and date, the front page? I haven't got a copy of the
15 translation here.
16 In the translation, in the upper left-hand corner, what it says in
17 the original is missing. "The Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Internal
18 Affairs, DTO 1, number 1580/98 the 16th of June, 1998, Belgrade," that
19 simply does not exist in the translation.
20 MR. NICE: His Honour Judge Kwon's sharp eyes have obviously
21 detected an incorrect matching of translation of documents. There's a
22 similarity between the content of the B/C/S or Serbian version and the
23 English version in that they all start off in the list with Sreten Lukic
24 but even there we can see it's not the parallel document because in the
25 B/C/S there's no numeral beside his title whereas in the English version
1 it's numbered I along with --
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
3 MR. NICE: So it's a complete mismatch.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, total mismatch. Mr. Milosevic, sort this
5 out overnight and move on.
6 Did you hear, Mr. Milosevic? Let's not waste time trying to
7 resolve it here. Move on to another matter.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand. Maybe the numbers
9 were put in by the translator, because I see that the names coincide;
10 Lukic, Gajic, Dzinovic, Lukovic, Trajkovic.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's not waste time on it. Sort it out in the
12 afternoon or overnight -- over the weekend, as a matter of fact.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Except for these persons mentioned by name and surname in this
16 decision, did the expanded staff included all heads of secretariat of the
17 Secretariats of the Interior in Kosovo and Metohija?
18 A. That's right. In the middle of page 2, there are many names, all
19 the way to Krdzic, and it is quite clear that members of the expanded
20 staff shall also include the chiefs of the Secretariats for the Interior
21 and the chiefs of the centres and departments of the state security
22 department in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.
23 Q. In tab 11, there is yet another decision on the establishment of a
24 staff. Could you please explain what the difference is. Was anything
25 changed in the tasks and duties involved or is there another difference?
1 A. This decision practically only changes the persons on the staff
2 itself. It was supposed to function --
3 Q. From the 1st of June, 1999. That is what it says under --
4 A. That is in paragraph 6.
5 Q. Do you have a translation of this decision?
6 All right. Then let's move on.
7 There are two documents here that have to do with the staff, so,
8 General, the content of the tasks involved is always the same. These
9 decisions are always changed when new persons are appointed to the staff?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. All right. General, tell us: What was the role of the staff of
12 the Ministry of the Interior for controlling terrorism, combatting
14 A. The role of the staff is defined precisely in II. By your leave,
15 it would be best if I would quote it.
16 Q. Do quote it.
17 A. "The staff is tasked with planning, organising and managing the
18 work and use of organisational units of the Ministry, both the sent and
19 attached units, and preventing terrorism in the territory of the
20 autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.
21 "In addition, the staff is tasked with planning, organising,
22 guiding, and coordinating the work of the organisational units of the
23 ministry in Kosovo and Metohija in carrying out complex special security
25 That is how Article II defines the mandate and tasks of the staff.
1 Q. I have the English translation here, which is totally identical to
2 what you read just now, although there's only a minimal difference between
3 these documents. Are these tasks specifically enumerated and spelled out
4 in concrete terms?
5 A. They are defined in the following way: The first paragraph
6 regulates the method of work of this staff in matters concerning
7 combatting terrorism, and paragraph number 2 defines their tasks with
8 regard to more complex security assignments. I believe it is clear what
9 is meant.
10 Q. How were decisions made in the MUP on the sending of units, the
11 undertaking of anti-terrorist actions, et cetera?
12 A. Ways of decision making vary for each of these assignments. For
13 instance, sending units to Kosovo and Metohija was a decision made by
14 heads of sectors upon orders of the minister, and I already explained this
15 in response to one of the previous questions. Reaction or reacting of the
16 police to terrorist acts was a decision made by leaders of units who were
18 Q. So when a unit would be attacked, the leader of that unit would
19 decide to react.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And who plans preventive measures in the combat of terrorism?
22 A. Well, that is a decision that is something that was done by all
23 units engaged in Kosovo and Metohija. Each unit in its own area of
24 responsibility and jurisdiction undertakes a number of preventive measures
25 to eliminate the danger of terrorism as far as they can.
1 Q. Tell me about decision-making, the entire process of
2 decision-making concerning anti-terrorist activity.
3 A. Speaking of anti-terrorist activity, that is a different form of
4 police activity. It concerns reaction to terrorist attacks.
5 There existed a basic plan for combatting terrorism in Kosovo and
6 Metohija which was used as groundwork for elaborating individual plans for
7 specific operations to combat terrorism. It was a single general basic
8 plan for combatting terrorism in general terms for the whole of Kosovo and
9 Metohija, and on the basis of that general plan individual plans for
10 specific operations were elaborated involving specific units.
11 Q. Tell me, General, with the establishment of this ministerial staff
12 for combatting terrorism and with the sending of these units to assist in
13 Kosovo, were the rights and authorities of local police units abrogated in
14 any way?
15 A. No, they were not. Local police units and local leaders continued
16 to perform all the tasks normally within their purview regardless of the
17 establishment in Kosovo of this ministerial staff for combatting
19 Local secretariats and the units within their composition
20 continued to regularly report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs all
21 incidents and events in their areas, with the only difference that on the
22 parallel track they also reported these incidents to the ministerial staff
23 for combatting terrorism.
24 Q. That means they reported along their vertical chain of command as
25 they normally did, but they also reported to this ministerial staff for
1 combatting terrorism.
2 A. Perfectly correct.
3 Q. Is it the case that all chiefs of secretariats in Kosovo were at
4 the same time members of this ministerial staff?
5 A. Yes. They were part of the expanded ministerial staff.
6 Q. General, we will now move on to certain questions that deal with
7 the relationship between the army and the police. Tell us as briefly as
8 you can what similarities and differences existed in terms of problems,
9 abilities, powers, and activities of the police and the army in Kosovo and
11 A. One could say that the police and the army in Kosovo and Metohija
12 had similar problems to deal with.
13 Q. You mean in terms of security?
14 A. Yes. In terms of security, they were facing, first of all, the
15 problem of terrorism. Of course, their jurisdictions differed and they
16 had different abilities to deal with certain problems, but each of these
17 two forces performed tasks from their own jurisdiction and followed their
18 own chains of command.
19 Q. What affairs were within the jurisdiction of the police and what
20 affairs were within the jurisdiction of the army?
21 A. The army had in its jurisdiction primarily activities that had to
22 do with preparations for the defence of the country from aggression,
23 whereas the central tasks of the police had to do with combat against
24 terrorism apart from regular police work as envisaged by the law.
25 Q. Who provided security at state borders?
1 A. Again, in keeping with the law, security at state borders was the
2 job of the army. That is something I omitted to say in my previous
4 Q. So one of the central jobs of the army was to defend the state
5 border and to prepare for defending the country against aggression?
6 A. Yes. And central police jobs were maintaining public law and
7 order, traffic safety, and one of their jobs was also to help in the
8 combat of terrorism.
9 Q. In which way did the two cooperate in Kosovo and Metohija?
10 A. The police and the army predominantly cooperated in the area of
11 exchange of information, training. When I say "exchange of information,"
12 I mean primarily security related information and information about each
13 other's position, to avoid friendly fire. And of course they cooperated
14 and acted jointly in combatting terrorism.
15 Q. Were there any overlaps in jurisdiction between army and the
17 A. No, at least not in the negative sense. But in keeping with the
18 law, the army dealt with certain jobs that fall within the jurisdiction of
19 the police, whereas the police performed certain army jobs after the
20 adoption of the enactment on resubordination.
21 Q. Regarding the rights and obligations of authorised officers, I
22 would like you to look briefly at tab 4.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, in order to save time,
24 we excerpted only items from various descriptions, from various
25 regulations to quote.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we have to stop. There is a
2 hearing in this courtroom shortly.
3 General, we are going to adjourn until Tuesday of next week, 9.00.
4 During that time, you are not to discuss your evidence with anybody. Is
5 that clear?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perfectly clear, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are adjourned.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day
10 of May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.