1 Friday, 17 December 2004
2 [Open Session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.22 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: We lost some time this morning, and this is how
7 we plan to make up the time: Mr. Milosevic to spend another hour, to
8 10.45 in examination-in-chief -- sorry, yes. Mr. Milosevic, another hour,
9 to 10.20. And we take the first break at -- we take the break at 10.45,
10 and with the indulgence of the interpreters, for five minutes -- for ten
11 minutes, resuming at 10.55, and working until ten past twelve when we will
12 have to break to allow for the changeover for the Appeals Chamber.
13 Mr. Milosevic.
14 KOSTA MIHAILOVIC [Resumed]
15 [Witness answered through interpreter]
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Milosevic.
17 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
18 Q. Good morning.
19 A. Good morning.
20 Q. Yesterday we left off at Fred Singleton's paper. The title of its
21 paper and especially its content lead to the conclusion that the increase
22 in development in Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, he saw as the
23 main reason of political tensions in Yugoslavia. This is what follows
24 from the article.
25 In connection with this, do you have any comment?
1 A. Yes. I think that Professor Singleton saw perfectly clearly what
2 the regional situation was in Yugoslavia and that he identified the issues
3 quite rightly; the deepening of differences in development between
4 Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand and the rest of Yugoslavia on the
5 other hand. This was almost obvious, and it was not hard to establish
6 this, especially, of course, if somebody wished to see what the real
7 situation was.
8 Q. As proof of his thesis that economic relations had a decisive
9 influence on interethnic or international tensions, he points out that the
10 mass movement in Croatia and the demonstrations of 1971 was important.
11 Something very strange happened: The students demanded a change in the
12 foreign currency regime.
13 Please look at page 293 of his paper, where he says: "The figures
14 show that both Croatia and Slovenia [In English] [Previous translation
15 continues]... last 25 years steadily improved, both in absolute per capita
16 income and also their relative income in comparison with the
17 less-developed republics."
18 [Interpretation] He goes on: "[In English] [Previous translation
19 continues]... what has been taken from the wealthier republics then to
20 assess the benefits they have received from the cheap food and raw
21 materials and more recently the cheap, unskilled labour which they have
22 been able to import from the poorer regions."
23 [Interpretation] In connection with what I asked you, and I ask
24 you to comment on this, on page 294, in his paper, in tab 7, he says: "It
25 is interesting to note [In English] [Previous translation continues]...
1 that the students who protested in the streets of Zagreb in November 1971
2 used to slogans such as 'End the plunder of Croatia,' and 'Foreign
3 exchange resources to those who earn' them. Foreign exchange resources
4 --" [Interpretation] Foreign exchange sources. "[In English] [Previous
5 translation continues]... those who earn them, those who really --"
6 [Interpretation] These were the slogans.
7 He goes on, and I quote -- he goes on to say that the then
8 president of the party in Croatia, Savka Davcevic-Kucar, spoke "[In
9 English] [Previous translation continues]... Socialist Sovereign State of
10 Croatia within the framework of Socialist Yugoslavia which is a national
11 state of the Croat nation."
12 [Interpretation] Do you see in this a correct description of the
13 growth in tensions and what caused them?
14 A. I think that this example that you gave of the student
15 demonstrations, which came out with slogans about the lack of hard
16 currency to the detriment of Croatia, I think that this is pure ideology,
17 nationalist ideology within the mass movement that took place in Croatia.
18 From what was said yesterday and today, we have seen that Croatia
19 was a republic with above average development and pulling a detail out of
20 context could not be justified. Also, it is not true in itself, because
21 Croatia insisted on the -- on using more foreign exchange because it was
22 the exporter of final products. It did not, however, take into account
23 the input coming from other republics; for example, electric power, raw
24 materials such as copper and lead, labour, and so on and so forth, and
25 this was met with severe criticism by economists who saw this demand as
1 totally unjustified.
2 It's interesting to note that this did yield some results, because
3 in spite of these demonstrations which were nationalist and which had to
4 be condemned even in Croatia itself, Croatia did obtain an increase in the
5 quota of foreign exchange remaining at its disposal.
6 Q. Thank you, Professor. What was Tito's attitude to Croatia?
7 MR. NICE: I didn't object to that question, but I shouldn't like
8 it to be thought that it's concession that this is an appropriate way of
9 using somebody else's writings and opinions. It doesn't seem to me from
10 my understanding of the question and of the document of Singleton that
11 he's an eyewitness. Now, it's one thing to ask a witness to comment on
12 what's in somebody else's report reflecting eyewitness evidence. It's
13 entirely another thing to simply put before a witness an article of
14 someone else and then to try and get the article in and to try and get
15 comment based on it.
16 It seems to me we are entering a difficult area, and I would ask
17 the Chamber to limit the accused in his use of other materials to the same
18 parameters that applied to us.
19 Before I sit down, this of course, an expert is entitled to and
20 typically does cite authorities. So he might cite in a footnote
21 Singleton, something like that. If not cross-examined on the point, then
22 the document will typically not go in. If cross-examined on it, then
23 typically it may go in. That seems to me the normal practice we've been
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. We take account of the
1 point that you have made.
2 Continue, Mr. Milosevic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume, gentlemen, that you have
4 in mind that these assessments by an expert such as Fred Singleton are
5 fully in accordance with the assessments made by Professor Mihailovic. So
6 that from the viewpoint of an economist from Yugoslavia and from the
7 viewpoint of a foreign observer who was also highly competent, we see that
8 they say the same thing.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Professor, did you know Fred Singleton personally?
11 A. Yes. I once met him while he was studying in Belgrade, and we had
12 a long conversation, but this was after he wrote his article.
13 Q. Even this meeting of yours could not affect what he wrote in this
15 A. No.
16 Q. And he represented the situation objectively, as far as I can see.
17 Do you agree?
18 A. I do for the most part.
19 Q. Tell me, please, what was the attitude of Tito towards the
20 Croatian mass movement, the nationalist wave in the '70s?
21 A. I think it was ambivalent. Professor Singleton established that
22 Tito acted decisively, but this is true only at one point in time. This
23 was a very bizarre situation.
24 In the summer of 1971, manoeuvres were held on the -- and on the
25 16th of September, when the manoeuvres ended, there was a reception in the
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 Hotel Esplanade. Tito welcomed the party chief from Croatia, Savka
2 Davcevic-Kucar, and he toured Croatia and learned precisely what was going
3 on in Croatia, that all kinds of things were being said.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've just stopped you because you have already
5 answered the question that Mr. Milosevic asked. You said his attitude was
6 ambivalent. We don't have much time. Move on to another question,
7 We don't have much time. Move on to another question, please,
8 Mr. Milosevic.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I just want to say that in tab 14 and tab 15, you have reports
11 from that time, from the leading newspaper Politika, and I will quote only
12 a small part where Tito says, that was on Tuesday the 9th of May, 1972,
13 and the article is entitled what Tito Told The Croatian Leadership Last
14 Summer, and it says that the demons of nationalism are gathering under the
15 wing of nationalism, all kinds of opposing opinions, and so on and so
16 forth. And then he goes on to say that the situation in Croatia is not
17 good, that Croatia has become a key problem in the country because of
18 rampant nationalism. Tito, the unchallenged leader of the country at the
19 time, said that Croatia had become a key problem because of rampant
21 And then in tab 15, you have what Professor Mihailovic now said.
22 He said that I -- "This time I saw that there are some really absurd
23 stories about Croatia, that a lot of chauvinism exists and flourishes
24 there. This is incorrect." And this was followed by applause.
25 Does this, Professor, express what you just said, his ambivalent
1 attitude? I wouldn't even use the word ambivalent; I would call it
2 two-faced. Is this a two-faced attitude?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. In your opinion, did Tito actually support Croatian nationalism at
5 the time?
6 A. Well, that's what follows from his statement. Maybe he felt
7 personally threatened because he had a young and aggressive political team
8 which was probably threatening his personal position. And this could have
9 been a reaction.
10 Q. Very well. We'll move on a bit faster. What was the response of
11 the party in Serbia? You were then a member of the administration of the
12 Literary Association.
13 A. Well, according to the principle of symmetry, nationalism had to
14 be discovered and pointed out in the other republics, and they wanted to
15 find a counterpart to the Croatian nationalism in Serbia. However, I
16 think that this attempt by the Serbian party to discover nationalism,
17 especially in the Serbian Literary Association, was unsuccessful.
18 In Serbia -- or, rather, in Croatia it was the Matica Hrvatska
19 that was the brain of this movement. So the counterpart in Serbia would
20 have been the Literary Association. However, they were unable to discover
21 any nationalist activities in that institution.
22 In Serbia, there were only isolated and trivial and unimportant
23 responses to that situation.
24 Q. Thank you, Professor. There was a party commission at that time
25 which attempted to find nationalism in the Serb Literary Association at
1 any cost.
2 A. Yes. This was a three-member commission: Milan Milutinovic,
3 Professor Kaparovic, and Bakocevic were its members.
4 Q. Thank you, Professor. Now, tell me, was there any direct or
5 indirect recognition by the official bodies in Croatia that the Yugoslav
6 republic -- this Yugoslav republic had above-average economic development?
7 In pages 58 and 59 or -- in your version, and 47, 48 in the English
8 version, speak about the improvement of the economy in Croatia. The
9 negotiations about secession showed this because the Croatian delegation
10 suggested that the principle of justice in division of the assets of the
11 former SFRY had to redress the situation.
12 THE INTERPRETER: This is too fast for the interpreters to follow.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters are complaining
14 about your speed.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The interpreters have Professor
16 Mihailovic's paper, and they can read from the English translation. I
17 assume this is not too difficult.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. There is no doubt, then, that this confirms that even they
20 admitted that Croatia's development had been above average. Is this
22 A. Yes. This was a bizarre detail.
23 Q. Yes, but this fact was established, is it not beyond doubt,
25 A. Yes. It was surprising that they themselves put forward such a
1 proposal, and the Yugoslav side accepted this immediately, to their
2 surprise. When they got home and realised how well Croatia had done, they
3 gave up their own convictions and even the principle of justice, which was
4 to have been the foundation of any agreement.
5 Q. Professor, what were the causes and the differences in development
6 between Croatia and the other republics and provinces?
7 A. This was the territorial distribution of assets. Croatia and
8 Slovenia, especially Slovenia, had above-average investment and a very
9 favourable structure of investments. Also, there was the institutional
10 system which provided conditions of exchange. There was customs
11 protection, there was the pricing system, there were subsidies for
12 exports, and these were all measures favouring the more developed
14 What came from the more developed republics, what they gave for
15 the development of the less developed republics was seen only as
16 compensation for this. If that is so, then these measures were
17 neutralised, in a way, and investments were used to their fullest.
18 Q. What assets were recruited, and what was done to prevent the
19 deepening of this gap between the more developed and less developed areas
20 of Yugoslavia?
21 A. Well, generally speaking, the measures of the development policy
22 were very meager in Yugoslavia. There was a fund for the development of
23 underdeveloped areas, and the contributions were between 1.50 and 1.70 of
24 the social sector of the economy, and transfer was made to the
25 underdeveloped areas in a very strange way. There were keys according to
1 which funds were allocated to the underdeveloped areas. These areas
2 authorised certain banks in their areas, and this was done automatically.
3 Afterwards, attempts were made for those areas giving funds to
4 this fund to take a direct part in the allocation of these resources and
5 investments, but this was not done. The technical assistance which is
6 normal under such circumstances was very meager. The underdeveloped areas
7 were given the possibility of doing whatever they wanted with their means,
8 even to use them for purposes other than those intended.
9 Q. Thank you, Professor. Now let's take a look at tab 18 where we
10 have just one part of the declaration made by the federal parliament,
11 which was published as an official declaration of the parliament in the
12 Official Gazette which publishes laws, bylaws, official documents of the
13 federal parliament, generally speaking.
14 And I'd just like to quote point 1.2, which is contained in tab
15 18. On the left-hand side of the column, where it says: "In keeping with
16 the options from the long-term programme for economic stabilisation and
17 stopping the relative lag in development in the economic development of
18 the territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, outside the territories
19 of the autonomous provinces in comparison to the overall country will be
20 done by reliance on one's own forces, the association of labour and
21 resources and the undertaking concrete measures of economic and
22 developmental policy."
23 Now, Professor, is this a clearly stated position according to
24 which the supreme authority in Yugoslavia at that point in time takes
25 clear note of the lag in development of the territory of Serbia outside
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 the provinces and that it is intending to apply some sort of - how shall I
2 put this? - launch a principled appeal to rely on their own forces to
3 improve the situation whereas there were no concrete measures and steps
4 actually taken?
5 A. Yes, your observation is correct. The Republic of Serbia and
6 Serbia proper, which despite the fact that it was constantly below the
7 Yugoslav average in terms of per capita income and per capita social
8 product was, from the beginning, ranked as a developed area, like Slovenia
9 and Croatia, for example. So that the sources were allocated from one
10 fund to another, but actually this territory received nothing from the
11 fund which in time led to a serious lagging behind in development. And it
12 was a typical area which did not see constant development. It continued
13 to be below average and was never able to reach that average, which meant
14 that it was not able to see any capital accumulation and development.
15 And on the basis of the analyses that were compiled in all the
16 institutes of economics, there were three institutes for Yugoslav as a
17 whole for conducting these economic analyses, and they resulted in two
18 five-year plans, development plans, in the 1980s, and Serbia proper was
19 not exempt from their obligations to allocate resources. But an attempt
20 was made through six or seven different measures that were set out and
21 taken to stop that process.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we don't need that much detail.
23 We just need the main points.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, yes.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. At any rate, the economic position of Serbia, which is confirmed
2 and borne out by the observations made by the top organs of power and
3 authority was below the Yugoslav average; is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So let's go back to the question once again of whether Serbia
6 dominated or whether it did not dominate.
7 A. Well, according to the analyses that we have before us here, the
8 social product of Serbia per capita decreased to 80 per cent, which means
9 that it lagged behind approximately 20 per cent. It was 20 per cent not
10 below the Yugoslav average but in relation to the average in the rest of
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this aspect of his evidence has
13 been made very, very clear, that Serbia lagged behind the other republics.
14 I think you should move on to something else.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Yes.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Just briefly, Professor, please, what were the limiting factors in
18 Kosovo's development? Let's focus our attention now on the question of
19 Kosovo. What were the limiting or restricting factors of Kosovo's
20 development, and how far was economic development efficacious in
21 comparison with the efficaciousness in the other parts of Yugoslavia?
22 A. Well, it was very low effectiveness. There was low investment,
23 low labour productivity, and so forth, so that in addition to the high
24 birth rate of the population, this was one of the main causes for the
25 area's slow development. For example, Kosovo had a rate of development in
1 the entire post-war period of 4 per cent, looking at the overall social
2 product development, which makes it 1.6 per cent per capita. So the
3 demographic investments accounted for 2.4 per cent. And if to that we add
4 the low efficiency of the investments and low labour productivity, then of
5 course it lagged behind considerably.
6 Q. How far did the federation and the Republic of Serbia itself
7 involve itself in the financing of Kosovo? What did they do to finance
9 A. Well, it was like this: Indirectly speaking, through the fund for
10 the lesser developed regions, Serbia made its contributions, although
11 Serbia also gained with Kosovo, because Kosovo increased its share
12 annually, so ultimately used 50 per cent of the overall resources in the
13 fund for assistance to the developing regions.
14 Q. Thank you, Professor. You studied not only the history of the
15 population of Serbia but migrations within Yugoslavia and the economic
16 emigration to other countries, to third countries. So what were these
17 migrations motivated by? What caused them amongst the Yugoslav republics
18 and within Yugoslavia, let's take that first.
19 A. Well, we have two motives, the economic and ethnocentric, as we
20 call it. The economic migration was relatively smaller in scope and of
21 lesser importance, and it occurred mostly between Slovenia and Croatia as
22 the republics which were immigration republics and had a need for labour
23 force coming in from other areas. They needed a labour force coming in.
24 But what is characteristic and interesting to note as far as relationships
25 go is the ethnocentric migration, as it was called, which went toward
1 Serbia. And as Serbia was lagging behind, it had unemployment rate that
2 was above average but it had this ethnocentric emigration and people
3 coming in from Croatia and Kosovo and Slovenia which was quite unusual.
4 If was very unusual to have a majority nation, for example, prompted by
5 non-economic measures, to leave their homes through -- for non-economic
6 reasons and move elsewhere, migrate elsewhere, to areas -- from areas
7 where they had been living for centuries.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were these Serbs from Croatia, Kosovo, and
9 Slovenia migrating to Serbia?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Into Serbia. Into
11 Serbia, yes.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Professor, so that this should not be understood in a one-sided
14 manner, you spoke about ethnocentrism as a concept and as a reason and
15 that there was population migration and movement whereby certain
16 nationalities from one republic would go to their central republics. And
17 as far as I understood you, that was a general phenomenon.
18 A. Well, yes. It was a phenomenon that was evident in Bosnia, for
19 example, because the Serbs went towards Serbia, the Croats went towards
20 Croatia, and the Muslims, not only did they not go away, but from Serbia,
21 from Sandzak, they would move into Bosnia.
22 Q. But what was the main reason for the Serbs leaving Kosovo, in your
24 A. Well, the reason the Serbs left Kosovo, the main reason for that,
25 was the pressure that was exerted on them. The Serbian Academy of
1 Sciences in 1985 organised a survey organised by two university
2 professors. They were not members of the academy themselves. Their names
3 were Marina Blagojevic and Ruza Petrovic, and they published a report
4 numbering 280 pages which showed all the modalities of pressure, all the
5 ways in which pressure was exerted on the Serbs to leave, and I think that
6 that has been attached to the documents that you already have. And that
7 1985 survey would be among those documents.
8 Q. Yes. Now, tell me, Professor, what do you think about the thesis
9 that by the 1974 constitution the -- that Serbia abolished the autonomy of
10 the provinces and returned the system to the system of centralisation in
11 the whole of Yugoslavia whereas Croatia and Slovenia came out in favour of
12 confederation and allegedly showed that they were in favour of the
13 development of democracy? What do you think about that idea, that
15 A. I think that autonomy was never abolished. That's my first
16 point. The situation that was created through the 1974 constitution --
17 MR. NICE: I must have missed it but I'm not sure that this has
18 been covered in his expert report, has it? And what expertise does he
19 have? And I haven't interrupted but the questions are pretty well at
20 large and without any reference to his either source material or his
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I think that point is well taken. Move on
23 to another point. It's not part of his expertise.
24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that the
25 speakers make pauses between question and answer, thank you.
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must make pauses, and
2 Professor, between question and answer in the interests of interpretation.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Professor, you were one of the authors of the memorandum of the
6 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. We're going to go over several
7 questions having to do with the memorandum. Our time is limited, of
8 course, so we'll have to be quick.
9 Tell us when and where it was decided to write the memorandum in
10 the first place. Was that an autonomous decision made by the Serbian
11 Academy or did anybody influence that decision-making?
12 A. It was a completely autonomous decision by the academy, mostly
13 people of the social sciences, and there were several of us. Academician
14 Maksimovic, at the Assembly held in 1985, for example, put forward the
15 proposal according to which the establishment should be presented with a
16 memorandum stating the seriousness of the crisis that had come upon us and
17 that serious steps should be taken to deal with it. This was adopted in
18 1985, and it was almost realised in 1986 because it was never actually
20 Q. Professor, what were the reasons, the motives behind writing the
22 A. The motives were first and foremost a feeling that existed that --
23 of the country having entered a serious crisis and that no way out was
24 immediately visible. And the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences not
25 only as a science institution but as a national institution as well was
1 deeply concerned by that. It felt that it could not keep quiet, could not
2 keep silent, but had to state its views and present its ideas. Also,
3 there were many scientific meetings organised by the academy that had been
4 held beforehand in which the powers that be, the political powers that be
5 showed themselves to be unmoved by the situation they were facing. So we
6 felt that there should be a document which would more immediately send out
7 a warning, an alarm to the government of the seriousness of the situation
8 in hand. So those were the main motives.
9 Q. After you had taken the decision to write the memorandum or,
10 rather, the academy, as far as I know, a commission was set up numbering
11 16 members, members of the academy, who were supposed to put that decision
12 into practice. You yourself were one of those members. What issues and
13 questions did you deal with before you actually sat down to write the
14 memorandum itself?
15 A. Before we wrote the memorandum, we discussed who the memorandum
16 should be addressed to, where to send it out to, and then it was said that
17 it should be addressed either to the Presidency of Serbia or the Assembly.
18 So it was a document prepared in order to be closed from the public. I
19 saw some versions; on one it said the Presidency of Serbia, on the other
20 it said the Assembly of Serbia. So that's one point.
21 Now, we discussed whether it should be a sort of programme
22 document, setting out a programme, or a document of warning, stating that
23 the situation was very serious and that steps should be taken.
24 So although there were ideas put forward according to which the
25 memorandum should contain some elements of a specific programme to deal
1 with the situation, that was rejected. And the working group and the
2 commission unanimously decided that it should be a strictly internal
3 document and that if a programme was to be devised, that this should be
4 done later on, and that's what happened. In the 1990s, or in 1990, an
5 attempt was made to make a different -- write a different document which
6 could resemble a national programme. However, that attempt did not
7 succeed. We came across some misunderstandings.
8 So these two documents are essentially different.
9 Q. Was there a synopsis according -- for the document, and have you
10 -- do you have the synopsis? Because as far as I understand it, it was
12 A. Yes, there was a four-page synopsis setting out the basic
13 schematic for the document and some basic theses were put forward as well.
14 The memorandum was not original, in fact. It is a synthesis of
15 existing knowledge and information. So in the synopsis itself, we could
16 see basic ideas and concepts and theses being put forward. So that the
17 synopsis itself was a synthetic picture of what was developed in the
18 memorandum itself.
19 Q. Now, how does the synopsis explain the writing of the memorandum,
20 the causes for writing it or reasons for writing it? How is the position
21 of Serbia defined? What is being requested?
22 A. Well, in the synopsis itself, as in the memorandum, we insisted
23 upon equality, having Serbia on -- be on an equal footing in the political
24 sense and in other senses. Nothing more than that was required.
25 Equality. And it was also mentioned that that might not be in keeping
1 with Serbia's position or, rather, that Serbia was historically
2 predestined to unite that portion of the population in the Balkans and
3 that it would have compromised its historical role had it asked for
4 anything more than full equality with other nations, to be on a footing of
5 equality with all the other nations and nationalities.
6 Q. You've said a moment ago that the memorandum was a synthesis of
7 the scientific research already conducted. So can I take it, then, that
8 the scientific basis for the memorandum was not any separate research
9 worked out for the purposes of the memorandum but that the group of
10 academicians drafting the memorandum used research that had already been
11 conducted up until then and that it represented a synthesis of what
12 science had established up until that time; is that right?
13 A. Yes, that's right. And this synthesis -- and what is important
14 here, I would like to note this, that there was an anticipatory note of
15 events that might take place unless steps were taken. So it was a
16 forecast of what might happen given the crisis unless certain steps and
17 measures were taken to deal with it. So I think that the value of that
18 document lies therein. It anticipated what might happen. It looked at
19 where development might lead. And it also mentioned the possibility of
20 Yugoslavia's disintegration and breakdown, and so it confirmed that the
21 analyses and basic foundations leading to that conclusion were sound.
22 Q. Tell me, Professor, in view of the fact that the memorandum is
23 said to have overly stressed the economic lagging behind of Serbia, as an
24 economist, to what extent can you respond to such criticisms? Did the
25 memorandum overstate the economic backwardness of Serbia?
1 A. Well, it could not be either overestimated or underestimated. If
2 Serbia was truly falling behind according to its GDP, the value of its
3 funds, if instead of maintaining its position at a little below average or
4 rising to average, if it was falling lower and lower below average,
5 according to all the indications, I don't know if that was cause for
6 equanimity or whether something had to be done.
7 Q. Professor, in the attacks on the memorandum, its content has often
8 been described as nationalist. It's been characterised as a nationalistic
9 document. Are these assessments based on the text of the memorandum?
10 A. On the contrary. Nationalism is condemned as one of the
11 fundamental causes of the crisis, the deformations in the economic system,
12 and if you have patience with me I can show you ten places where there are
13 explicit statements against nationalism. The memorandum is criticised
14 without ever relying on the text itself.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have that point. If you're asked in
16 cross-examination, you can give the references.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. The text of the
18 memorandum is here, but for the sake of saving time, I will not ask the
19 Professor to point out all these places.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Professor, the memorandum is said to be a Greater Serbia
22 programme. Is this correct?
23 A. I think I've already answered this question. This has already
24 been said. I would describe the memorandum as a document of warning.
25 Q. Professor, if it's not a national programme or platform, how would
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13 French transcripts correspond
1 you briefly describe the memorandum, as a document of warning?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. An assessment of the situation based on scholarship and a warning
4 of what this was leading to?
5 A. Yes, and that measures have to be taken, nothing more than that.
6 That was the clear framework and goal of the memorandum.
7 Q. Very well. Can you explain, in view of the fact that especially
8 in the West, in the Western propaganda, it has been said the memorandum is
9 responsible for stoking the fires of nationalist conflicts between the
10 peoples of the former Yugoslavia and that it contributed to the break-up
11 of Yugoslavia, is this based on fact?
12 A. No. You cannot find anything like this anywhere in the
13 memorandum. Secondly, people keep forgetting that the memorandum was not
14 addressed to the general public at all. It was a document which was
15 supposed to have been sent to one of the leading bodies in the republic,
16 either the Presidency or the Assembly. The fact that it was leaked and
17 misused in order to attack the academy, that's something that the
18 academy's not responsible for. Neither the academy nor the document can
19 be held responsible for this. If the language used in the memorandum is
20 quite strong, the purpose was to wake up the top leadership which was not
21 aware of the depth and profundity of the crisis.
22 Q. The memorandum is very critical of the 1974 constitution which it
23 blames for the break-up of Yugoslavia. Are those critics of the
24 memorandum right who see in it an advocation of a return to
25 centralisation, the positions of AVNOJ and so on?
1 A. No. I think that very erroneous opinions are being bandied about
2 with respect to centralism. The former Yugoslavia was a one-party state
3 with a hierarchical structure. It was the party that was centralised, and
4 the leader was at the top.
5 After the death of Tito and Kardelj, a new situation was created
6 where the state could not simply be a place of transmission but an
7 original organ. What sort of centralism was this? It could not be
8 restored in the same way that it had existed up to Tito's death, because
9 no one could become a second Tito in the former Yugoslavia or have such
10 pretensions, especially as Yugoslavia was broken up into a polycentrist
11 state. No one could impose this system on anyone else any longer.
12 People who say that confederation was a prerequisite of
13 democratisation are wrong. This is ridiculous. This was going on to its
14 full extent, decentralisation and democratisation, and this was
16 I don't know if in other countries they -- they have to become
17 Confederate countries in order to be democratic.
18 Q. Professor, have you heard about the Blue Book, and are you aware
19 of its content? Have you read it? When you were writing the memorandum,
20 did any member of the commission read this Blue Book?
21 In tab 3, I will quote. The document is called the Blue Book of
22 the Presidency of Serbia. It was drawn up in March 1977, and its full
23 title is The Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia Constitutional Position and
24 Practice, and the proposal was neither accepted nor rejected. Three years
25 after the constitution of 1974, the Presidency of Serbia found that such
1 systemic solutions had negative effects. They drew up the Blue Book, but
2 they put it under the carpet, so to say.
3 How do you explain this?
4 A. I heard and I think that others have heard of the existence of
5 this Blue Book. It was a document under seal. After the constitution of
6 1974 was enacted, the Presidency of Serbia set up a commission containing
7 -- which was composed of university professors and prominent civil
8 servants, people from the Assembly and so on, and their task was to show
9 what the effects the new constitution were and what problems were emerging
10 in connection with its implementation. This Blue Book was a confidential
11 document. It was under seal.
12 Rumours were going around, saying that it criticised the
13 constitution and asked for its amendment, but text itself wasn't
14 available. You may be surprised to hear that I found this text and was
15 able to obtain it only a few days ago. It was published in 1990 by a
16 journalist within the framework of certain interviews, but nobody knew
17 anything about this.
18 I have simply scanned it, and I think that what was said about it
19 is correct. It is about 50 printed pages long and contains a critique of
20 the legislation and the -- what was happening, and it shows that it was
21 the cause of a large-scale disintegration of Serbia, that the initial --
22 its initial shortcomings had grown into a huge problem. This was an
23 unsuccessful document which led to the full disintegration of Serbia,
24 which made it an ill-defined area.
25 Q. This -- these were the findings of the Presidency of Serbia three
1 years after the adoption of the constitution.
2 A. Let me just add that, according to reliable information, a
3 three-day session was held, and there was a heated discussion in the
4 comments to the text that was printed. It says that this was neither
5 approved nor adopted, and there was even a proposal that the document
6 should be burned. It had been printed in only 40 copies and those who
7 received it had to keep it strictly confidential.
8 I was unable to obtain the minutes and the transcripts of these
9 discretions -- discussions, but everybody knows that Kardelj was there and
10 that he prevented and suppressed the discussion - I think "suppressed" is
11 the right word - so that it practically petered out. And this was
12 characteristic of life in Serbia in general at the time. All the
13 republics thought that they could meddle in Serbia's internal affairs
14 while Serbia never meddled in the internal affairs of others. And I think
15 this indicates how subservient Serbia was.
16 Q. As you were a university professor at the time, tell me, how did
17 professional academic scholarly circles respond?
18 A. This was a response to the amendments which were built in as the
19 mainstays of this constitution. At the faculty of law, there was a very
20 strong reaction to this. Professor Mihailovic, who is now an academician,
21 and a secretary of our department were sentenced to eight months in
22 prison, and he served this sentence, because he was critical. He made a
23 speech, it's five or six typewritten pages long, and I think it's in the
24 documentation, from which it can clearly be seen that he started from the
25 positions that nationalism and the problems of the state were issues that
1 should not be prominent in the 21st century, especially not in our parts.
2 However, at that time Croatian nationalism was not only aggressive --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, according to the schedule that I
4 outlined at the start of the proceedings, there are just another three or
5 four minutes for you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will put only one
7 question, then.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Professor, how do you explain the large-scale propaganda campaign
10 in the West against the memorandum of the Serb Academy of Sciences?
11 A. This propaganda did not exist from the very beginning. I even
12 think that judging by the responses of the embassies in Belgrade, it was
13 seen as an act of civil courage, but the situation changed with the
14 break-up of Yugoslavia. The West accepted the thesis of Serbian -- of --
15 interpreter's apology -- Croatian and Slovenian propaganda. This is easy
16 to refute, but this was propagated on a wide scale. In the press, in
17 so-called scholarly institutions, they all copied texts from each other
18 without ever looking at the original text and never relying on an analysis
19 of the original text of the memorandum.
20 Q. Thank you, Professor.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.
22 Mr. Nice.
23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I can imagine the circumstances where
24 we'll be somewhat pressed for time at the end of the morning. I don't
25 forecast asking many, if any, questions about the accused's exhibits, the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Defence exhibits. I'm concerned that we may be facing an application to
2 let in really a large amount of documentation that hasn't either been
3 cited or quoted from at all and has simply been identified, and in those
4 circumstances I wonder if it might be prudent on this occasion to deal
5 with the Defence exhibits now in order not to avoid -- in order to avoid
6 dealing with them in a great rush at the end of the morning. I'm happy to
7 do it either way, obviously, but I can see problems.
8 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any specific opposition except for tab 19
9 and 20?
10 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, I haven't been, I'm afraid, noting
11 exhibits on an exhibit-by-exhibit basis because sometimes it's been going
12 too quickly for me, but it seems to me that there's been a lot of simply
13 identifying a document and then not referring to it or quoting from it at
14 all. And if we are to pursue the same policy which we have been pursuing
15 to date of dealing, in our analysis for the concluding arguments, with
16 every document that comes in, and I suspect that the Chamber with its
17 legal officers is doing the same thing, we are adding substantially to the
18 burden of work without the material necessarily having any evidential
19 value. That's my concern. There have been these very large books and I'm
20 not sure what their status is.
21 JUDGE KWON: My question is whether in this case if you have some
22 specific opposition to the specific exhibits, tabs, except for tab 19 and
23 tab 20.
24 MR. NICE: Those are the very big ones. Yes, I think -- in the
25 earlier ones -- for example, we've just looked at Klava Kniva [phoen], the
1 Blue Book. That one is probably an exhibit that we should have in because
2 it's part of the narrative, but it's only been referred to, it hasn't
3 actually been quoted from. I don't mind with that case. But with all the
4 others, I think where there's simply been reference, and I haven't
5 identified exactly which ones it is because it has been going fast, I
6 can't see any real reason to have them in. And there was the problem,
7 again, about the -- the problem I raised earlier about the report or the
8 opinion of another author which was simply borrowed. It wasn't -- it
9 wasn't being cited for any reason except to borrow it and repeat it. It
10 may be something the Chamber would want to think about in the short break.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic was operating under the pressure of
12 time. I think that's why he just made references.
13 MR. KAY: Can we just say it is a learned report with these
14 references in these tabs plainly going to the report and the argument of
15 this witness, which has a very clear direction when you consider the whole
16 of the report.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will admit all of the documents in the binder
20 except for tab 19. We admit them on the basis of the references made to
21 them. 20 is not admitted. Those that haven't been translated will be
22 marked for identification pending translation.
23 THE REGISTRAR: The expert report will be marked as D265, and the
24 binder of the expert witness will be D266.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just a minute. Since we're dealing
1 with exhibits, I'm reminded there are three exhibits from the last witness
2 -- four? Four exhibits. Well, three or four, and we just want to have
3 them admitted now. Do you have them ready?
4 I think we're losing time. Let's continue with the --
5 JUDGE KWON: Next tab numbers will be given.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll come back to these. We'll come back to
7 those at the end of the day's proceedings.
8 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Your Honours, I will deal with
9 this witness today. I shall, therefore, have to be extremely selective in
10 the material I put to him and won't necessarily be able to advance all
11 aspects of our case with him.
12 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:
13 Q. How long, Professor, have you known the accused personally?
14 A. I have known him since 1988.
15 Q. You've been not only working with him but you've become friends of
16 his -- a friend of his?
17 A. Well, I don't think you could call it friend. I don't know how
18 one defines friendship. He asked me to take part, in 1988, in the work of
19 the Commission for the Economic Reform. So I cooperated with him in the
20 commission until 1991, until the commission lasted and worked. We had
21 about 40 meetings, 40 sessions, and our relationship was very proper.
22 Now, whether they were -- whether it was friendship, I can't say
23 that it was intimate friendship.
24 Q. You also assisted him following the Karadjordjevo meeting in March
25 of 1991, did you not?
1 A. No. I was never in Karadjordjevo.
2 Q. The meetings that followed the Karadjordjevo meeting, the meetings
3 of the group of experts, did you take part in those?
4 A. I don't know which group you're referring to. Could you tell me
5 what meetings and which group of experts you mean?
6 Q. I'll come back to that later because I want to deal with things
7 chronologically, but thank you for your answer so far.
8 Let's go to the memorandum. The memorandum, it is said, was
9 leaked. Subsequently in 1995, there was an edition of the memorandum
10 published together with Answers to Criticisms, and that document was
11 prepared by you and Vasilije Krestic; correct?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. We have that as an exhibit in this case, number D250, I think. Do
14 you have a copy of that document before you?
15 A. I do.
16 MR. NICE: If the Chamber doesn't have their copy with them I'll
17 lay the appropriate passages on the overhead projector.
18 Can we ask for the assistance of the usher, please, and we'll lay
19 the -- lay this on the overhead projector, just a couple of passages to
20 look at, partly to remind the Judges of what it contains and to look at
21 one or two particular items.
22 Q. If we look on what is the English page 17 - and it may be that
23 we'll find the corresponding reference for you in the Serbian version - at
24 the foot of page 17, we find this passage: "The unauthorised --" I'll
25 read it to you, Professor, you will remember it, I expect. "The
1 unauthorised version of the text which was leaked to the public had not
2 received approval. Finally, the chapter stated its opinion that there
3 were compelling reasons for work on this important project to be
5 The next paragraph begins: "Unfortunately, the public outcry over
6 the memorandum did not die down even after the meeting of the party
8 Professor, we have done an analysis which I hope was made
9 available to you by the Defence, but it may not have been, comparing the
10 original 1986 version, which was always said to be a draft, with the
11 version published by you in 1995, and there were found to be only six
12 short passages that were different between the two versions. Are you
13 aware of the fact that the limit -- the differences between the two
14 versions were as limited as that?
15 A. I don't know about those differences. The only difference I know
16 about is that a line from the economic section was left out in the typing,
17 omitted in the typing. There was a version that was considered and copied
18 in a number of copies --
19 THE INTERPRETER: I think 20, the witness said, interpreter's
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- and there was a collective
22 editorship which was not completed, was edited, and 16 copies were
23 distributed among the 16 members of the commission. Three went to those
24 who were provisional consultants, such as Dobrica Cosic, Professor Jovan
25 Djordjevic, and Luba Tadic, those three. And one copy remained
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 undistributed as far as my memory serves me. So 20 copies.
2 MR. NICE:
3 Q. Is it --
4 A. I don't know that there were any differences between the text that
5 was printed and published. And if there are any differences, then they
6 can only be negligible, minor differences, not of any substance.
7 Q. You see -- thank you for that. That, then, probably confirms our
8 analysis. The limited differences between the 1986 version and the
9 version finally published in your Answers to Criticisms in 1995 raises as
10 a possibility that far from being accidentally leaked, the document was
11 intentionally leaked in 1986. What do you say to that?
12 A. It was absolutely not leaked intentionally, and it was shocking
13 when it appeared, the article in the Vecernje Novosti newspaper. The
14 editorial board had a meeting and they asked the question of have you --
15 the rest of us, Have you read the Vecernje Novosti edition? And we said,
16 Why should we read the Vecernje Novosti? And they said, Well, look at the
17 article. And we interrupted our meeting straight away when we heard about
18 it. But I think how the memorandum came out is a fact that is well known.
19 It went through Professor Jovan Djordjevic, who was sent a copy of the
20 version with a request for his remarks and comments, and there's no doubt
21 that it left his house, that that's where it came from, from his house.
22 And this was confirmed by his daughter.
23 The only question is which of the two versions is the correct
24 version, whether his son-in-law, who was a journalist of the Vecernje
25 Novosti newspaper, took the document on his own initiative or whether
1 Professor Djordjevic himself gave the document to the Ministry of the
2 Interior of Serbia since he had previously cooperated with Kardelj and
3 others and so on --
4 Q. Very well. If I can cut you short. Can we look, please, with the
5 usher's assistance, at page 24 in the English version. In the middle of
6 the page, please. And we found this passage in your answer to criticism:
7 "Even though the propaganda against the Serbian Academy and memorandum was
8 far from innocuous, the Serbian public did not allow itself to be
9 hoodwinked. A small section of the public might let itself be taken in
10 out of ignorance and might believe the propaganda being drummed into them,
11 but the majority of educated citizens who had some knowledge of the
12 contents of the memorandum realised that the accusations levelled against
13 the Serbian Academy were unfounded and the interpretation given of its
14 motives and messages skewed. The Serbian Academy's prestige rose rapidly
15 in the eyes of Serbian society, for this learned institution ..." and it
16 goes on.
17 You see, did this memorandum serve to mobilise public opinion in a
18 nationalist way, Professor?
19 A. I do apologise, but I can't seem to find the text in Serbian, the
20 passage in Serbia.
21 As to the translation, I have a translation of the translation; I
22 don't think you're going to have the right thing. Let me just find the
24 Q. It begins: "Even though the propaganda against ..." In the
25 paragraph immediately preceding the headline Croatian Criticism of the
2 A. Well, this sounds a little different, so please give me time to
3 read through it. "Even though the propaganda against," et cetera, et
4 cetera, "against the Serbian Academy memorandum was far from innocuous,
5 the Serbian public did not allow itself to be hoodwinked." A small
6 section of the public might let itself be taken in out of ignorance and
7 might believe the propaganda being drummed into them, but the majority of
8 educated citizens who had some knowledge of the contents of the memorandum
9 realised that the accusations levelled against the Serbian Academy were
10 unfounded and the interpretation given of its motives and messages skewed.
11 The Serbian Academy's prestige --"
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The Prosecutor stopped there. Perhaps you could
13 put your question again --
14 MR. NICE: Certainly.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- now that the Professor has read it.
16 MR. NICE:
17 Q. Did this memorandum serve to mobilise public opinion in a
18 nationalist way?
19 A. Please. This memorandum was not addressed to the public at all,
20 and I repeated this. It was to be a closed document, so it was written
21 with a -- with the kind of language that was supposed to animate the
22 political establishment. It had no pretensions whatsoever of going public
23 at all. And we had decided that. That was the decision we had taken
24 previously by which the memorandum should be a restricted document.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. NICE: If the usher would help me, and if the Chamber would
2 permit us to use, for reasons of speed, a highlighted version of an
3 existing exhibit, Exhibit 800, the memorandum -- the chapter from the late
4 Ivan Stambolic's book. If you would be good enough to place it on the
5 overhead projector. Thank you very much.
6 Q. As you will know, Professor, Ivan Stambolic initiated the process
7 that led to this memorandum, didn't he?
8 A. I don't know how you mean "initiated the process" that led to the
9 memorandum. What do you mean by that? I don't understand the question.
10 Q. I'll describe the passage in the way he described it himself
11 later, but will you now please listen to what he himself in his book wrote
12 about it. The first passage -- is that the first page you've got there?
13 Yes, it is -- asked the question: "Were the nationalists the most
14 dangerous opponents? He said: "They were and still are, but it's even
15 worse that they are, objectively, enemies of the people. This is
16 precisely why I immediately declared the memorandum as what it would
17 become: An obituary of Yugoslavia. I do not find any satisfaction in
18 this true prophecy."
19 He went on to say: "The advocates of pro-memorandum Serbia first
20 tried to subdue Yugoslavia, tightening it until bursting point. After
21 that, after they have failed, they will go to war against it, using all of
22 their force against the policies of the cool heads, which included mine.
23 I was not wrong in believing that the memorandum's makers, the instigators
24 of today's fratricide, were calling upon horrible evil."
25 Now, here is the accused's immediate predecessor as leader of the
1 Communist Party and a man who set up, as we've heard in evidence, this
2 process of preparing a memorandum. Can you explain why, with his
3 knowledge of your country, he could express those views?
4 A. Well, you know what? He was on the opposite side. He initiated
5 the campaign. And quite clearly, he is trying to defend the campaign and
6 his steps which were quite inappropriate. You could read what Stane
7 Kavcic said, for example, on the other hand, about the memorandum; that
8 the politicians did not have the reason to read the -- that they did not
9 read the document and see that it was speaking about real things and that
10 they didn't have the strength to come into contact with the people who
11 wrote the memorandum.
12 So this is a defence of one's positions, a repression that was
13 exerted. They are insinuations which just don't hold water, because he
14 didn't initiate it. It now turns out that the memorandum created that
15 crisis, whereas the memorandum was writing about the crisis once it had
16 become a deep-seated crisis and once the situation had become explosive.
17 And it issues warnings. It cautions people like Stambolic and like-minded
18 people to the fact that they should open their eyes wide and take steps to
19 do something about the situation.
20 Q. May we look at the next page and the next highlighted passage.
21 Then I think that will be all I will have time for with this document.
22 His other observations, and the Chamber can see them all in due
23 course, when asked, "What was your opinion about the presence of the
24 memorandum?" he replied: "I believe that science should be more present
25 in efforts to solve our social, economic, political and other problems.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Therefore, why should the academy, our highest institution, not join these
2 efforts? That is why we had agreed with the academy's leadership, one
3 year before the memorandum would appear, that it should organise several
4 teams made up of different experts who would deal with current social
5 issues ..."
6 Later asked, "Hence the story that you were the one who ordered
7 the memorandum," he relied in part: "When I read it, I clearly knew what
8 they meant by 'helping' us in solving social and economic problems. I
9 immediately reacted in a speech at Belgrade University in late October
10 1986. At that time, I said I was expecting the academicians to help carry
11 the load that we were carrying instead of trying to trip us! I called it
12 political insinuation which does not create science but evil blood and
14 Were you aware of the late Ivan Stambolic making that speech,
16 A. Yes, I did, but it is an incorrect diagnosis. It's a quite
17 deformed, distorted vision by a politician who himself was in large
18 measure responsible for the state of affairs. So he was speaking pro domo
19 sua. He was speaking in defence of the policy that the memorandum was
20 criticising. So his positions were quite clear.
21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I --
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that it is completely
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have a sufficient answer on that
1 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, as with all the material, I'm going
2 to have to deal with it by sample. The remainder of the material will
3 have to be available with the Chamber.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And we'll take a break for ten minutes.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.46 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Nice. Please continue.
8 MR. NICE: Would the usher please place on the overhead projector
9 the English language --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 MR. NICE: Would the usher please place on the overhead projector
12 the English language version of the memorandum at page 21 towards the top.
13 Q. One last passage from the memorandum, Professor. Where we see
14 that you and your colleague recorded the following about its history.
15 Just from the top of the page: "The memorandum struck a chord with the
16 public which had many of its own observations about the situation in the
17 country confirmed. The lucid -- the memorandum's lucid analysis of the
18 situation and its clear message had a powerful effect on shaping public
19 opinion. Overnight this document received huge popularity. It was
20 mimeographed, passed from hand to hand, and sold on street corners."
21 Now, you've denied that it was intentionally leaked, maintained
22 that it was a secret document. I must ask you again: Was this document,
23 perhaps like another famous document, Nacertanije in the 19th century,
24 benefiting from its alleged secret nature, generating a particular
25 interest in it?
1 A. I should like to repeat what I've already stated and that is this:
2 The document was not intended for the public at all. Now, the fact that
3 it found itself in the public eye without the will of its authors is a
4 coincidence, or it happened by chance that it was, but that it started to
5 be mimeographed, some made a good business out of it, photocopying it and
6 selling it even at marketplaces. The authors neither wished that nor are
7 they responsible for that. But of course once it was already in the
8 public, it had to have a ripple effect and influence the situation. But
9 this was not the intention or will of its authors at all.
10 Q. And finally on the text of the memorandum. Would you accept -- I
11 don't have time to go over it, but would you accept that there are
12 passages in the memorandum which are now reflected pretty well
13 word-for-word in passages of your expert report to this Court?
14 A. Well, that is certainly quite possible.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. I certainly didn't copy out the memorandum, but I took part in its
17 writing. So I haven't got two heads and two opinions about certain
19 Q. Let's move on to the next point, time being so short. I'd like
20 you, please, to comment on some passages from another chapter of
21 Stambolic's book, yet to be produced.
22 MR. NICE: May it be distributed. This is -- this has been copied
23 in both English and Serbian.
24 Q. Chapter 7. The title can be seen, but that's not what I'm
25 concerned about. I'm concerned at what we can find on page 13 in the
1 English, and I'll get you the B/C/S page, please.
2 Asked a question -- and this is on page 13 of the English and
3 perhaps if there is a spare copy for the overhead projector, I'd be
4 grateful. "Do you believe that you are being critical enough in measuring
5 up your potential responsibility in our talks?" Because this book was a
6 series of questions and answers. Gave an answer that included the
8 Bottom of the page, please, Usher.
9 "At any rate, by electing Milosevic President of the Presidency of
10 the Central Committee, he was not elected any kind of leader; the leader
11 would be created later.
12 "A major role in the creation of the leader and building of the
13 cult of the leader would be played by the intellectual elite in addition
14 to the propaganda provided by the media. They composed and wrote songs
15 about him; painters made his portraits and went to bow before him; his
16 photos were copied in great numbers. Academicians started competing:
17 Dobrica Cosic compared Milosevic to Nikola Pasic, Mihailo Markovic to
18 Roosevelt, Milorad Ekmecic to de Gaulle, Milovan Danojlic to Karadjordje.
19 Giving new meaning to Njegos, he wrote that Milosevic put 'new life into
20 the Serbian soul.'"
21 And if we could look, to save time, at another short passage on
22 page 18 in the English, before I ask the question.
23 On page 18: "He couldn't see --" this is the accused to whom
24 Stambolic was referring: "He couldn't see or hear from anyone sensible or
25 responsible that policies on other peoples had been pursued by having
1 rallies in their squares or that policies on his own people had been
2 conducted by using truncheons, water-guns, cold steel and firearms. Or
3 that we had put knives under each other's throats and shouted at the top
4 of our voice for dialogue at the same time. There was nothing in this
5 country or its peoples that hopelessly divided them. By separating Serbs
6 from everyone else, he divided them within. He divided them more
7 dangerously than it appears."
8 And then this: "Why was it necessary to incite Serbs outside
9 Serbia in such an aggressive way to create new Serbian states instead of
10 providing them with safe life and equal rights in their homeland of
11 Herzegovina, Bosnia or Croatia? Haven't the Serbs suffered enough in the
13 With those two passages, first, is it right that this man, the
14 accused, emerged as leader on the back of, in a sense, the intellectuals
15 and what they had established through, for example, the thought processes
16 lying within the memorandum?
17 A. Well, I'm not of the same opinion as you. The appearance of
18 Slobodan Milosevic meant something new in the political arena of Serbia,
19 and the intelligentsia felt relief. Up until his arrival, there was
20 something that was called verbal offence, that is to say intellectual
21 restriction and censorship of the spoken word, the uttered word and
22 phrase. So it meant an expansion of freedom. Slobodan Milosevic
23 introduced the multi-party system in Serbia, for instance. So that was
24 one step further towards democracy, a step that was seen as a progressive
1 Q. The question is -- the question is, and I'll rephrase it to help
2 you focus: This was not a man who led with his own ideas. He was a man
3 who was needed by the ideas generated or expressed by the intellectuals
4 through the memorandum, and he used or he instrumentalised those views by
5 becoming leader and taking the thing forward, didn't he?
6 A. No. You know what? It's like this: I said how within the circle
7 of intellectuals they experienced his arrival, what they felt about it.
8 Now, what the memorandum programme was is something else. There's a
9 misunderstanding here. Slobodan Milosevic is certainly an intelligent man
10 who was also well-versed in matters of the economy and politics so that
11 his arrival --
12 Q. Did he show any --
13 A. Just a minute. May I be allowed to finish?
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may finish.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And certainly he stood out among the
16 politicians of Serbia of the day with his own opinions. So he could have
17 had a lot in common, not in an organised fashion but thoughts and thinking
18 that coincided with analyses and observations set out in the memorandum.
19 But this coincidence cannot be instrumentalised, if I can use the word,
20 and construed as having been some sort of organisation. And let me say
21 that there were very weak personal ties.
22 So at the beginning when he first arrived and emerged, he included
23 people like me in the commission and Academician Macura and several others
24 working in the commission, but then that ceased. And many people later on
25 -- many of these people later on joined the opposition or took the side of
1 the opposition. So to look for ties and political ties, programme ties,
2 are mere constructions.
3 Q. And one programme tie we can establish is that he took over the
4 issue of reforming the 1974 constitution from what was contained in the
5 memorandum, didn't he?
6 A. No. The initiative for a reform, and we didn't finish discussing
7 the matter of the Blue Book, it was strong pressure from public opinion,
8 and professional public opinion too. Today's Prime Minister, for example,
9 the Prime Minister of Serbia, Mr. Kostunica, was sent away from the
10 faculty as a result of the constitution, and that was in 1971. I will
11 show you the annals of the faculty of law.
12 Q. I have so short a period of time.
13 MR. NICE: And with Your Honours leave, I will have to defer my
14 second question on that passage from Stambolic's book and move forward.
15 Q. You explain, Professor, that you and other academics and
16 intellectuals associated with the memorandum became advisors to the
17 accused. Now, in March 1991, there was the meeting between this accused
18 and the late Franjo Tudjman. A lot of evidence we've heard suggesting
19 that at that meeting what was discussed was the division of Bosnia. I
20 asked you at the beginning whether you had been a member of the Serbian
21 team set up after that initial meeting, a team consisting of yourself,
22 Smilja Avramov, Ratko Markovic, and Zlatan Kukvlesic [phoen]. Were you a
23 member of such a team?
24 A. Before I answer your question, I would like to say that I was
25 never appointed an advisor to President Milosevic. I was not appointed, I
1 received no remuneration, but from time to time he consulted me on
2 particular issues. This was simple consultation.
3 It is true, however, that I was part of that team.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 A. I did not even know that previously there had been a meeting
6 between President Milosevic and Tudjman, because we were given the task of
7 meeting with a group from the Croatian side to consider the situation that
8 had arisen in the Krajina, to see what the intentions were, because after
9 the adoption of the Croatian constitution there was a very tense situation
10 in the Krajina.
11 Q. I ask you to deal very briefly with this. If you say you
12 personally were never told anything about the original meeting. Did you,
13 as we have heard from Smilja Avramov, in those meetings, the three
14 meetings that happened in the hunting lodge close to Osijek on Dedinje in
15 Belgrade and in Zagreb, did you deal with maps and such like that were
16 consistent with planning the separation or division of Bosnia, please?
17 A. No. We did not deal with any maps at all.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When formulating his question,
21 Mr. Nice said that there has been a lot of evidence here as to how Tudjman
22 and I discussed the division of Bosnia. He is misleading the witness,
23 because no evidence has been presented here that we discussed the division
24 of Bosnia, nor could anyone expect such evidence.
25 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... inappropriate
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just remind us of the evidence.
3 MR. NICE: I most certainly will. We have had evidence on the
4 division of Bosnia coming from Paddy Ashdown. If you remember, there was
5 a map that was drawn for him by the late President Tudjman. From Stipe
6 Mesic, who was told by -- from Ante Markovic, who was told specifically by
7 both sides of the division, and indeed the terms of the division. And I
8 think from Hrvoje Sarinic as well, to name but four.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice, continue.
10 MR. NICE: And I think also -- I'm grateful. Also, Milan Babic
11 covered it as well.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
13 MR. NICE: So there we are.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, yes.
15 MR. NICE:
16 Q. Well, if you weren't engaged on work -- just see your answer. If
17 you weren't engaged on work consistent with planning a division of Bosnia,
18 what on earth were you doing for the three of you to meet on these
20 A. First let me tell you, it would be difficult to define. We went
21 without any instructions whatsoever. It consisted in getting information
22 on what the other side's intentions were in the given situation.
23 In the Krajina, this situation was such that it had a great impact
24 on our discussions. They wanted Slobodan Milosevic to intervene because
25 they failed to understand that they had a lot of independence. We had no
1 possibilities or instructions in this respect. We were not authorised,
2 and we had no contacts with Babic.
3 These talks then meandered left and right. Bilandzic said that he
4 had written an article about how the Serbs should be given autonomy and so
5 on and so forth. There were even attempts, you know --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. We then come to the summer of 1991, and two things happen in the
9 summer of 1991, both of which you'll be familiar. First there was the
10 Belgrade initiative which ended in November. You're acquainted with that,
11 aren't you?
12 A. Yes, but I don't know anything about its content. I wasn't
13 interested in it at all.
14 Q. Very well. But you know about it sufficiently for us to inform
15 the Court through you that the Belgrade initiative was the accused's plan
16 to retain within a former -- a reduced Yugoslavia, Serbia, Montenegro, and
17 also Bosnia. Now, that was his plan at that stage, wasn't?
18 A. I don't know about that.
19 Q. As to The Hague, do you know about The Hague Conference?
20 A. What do you mean?
21 Q. Did you come to The Hague yourself?
22 A. I came to The Hague to work on issues of succession and in the
23 group for economic issues.
24 Q. Very well.
25 A. I was the head of the delegation for these issues.
1 Q. In those circumstances, can you assist us, please, with a new
2 document that I'd like to be exhibited, recently provided by the relevant
3 country, which is the country of which we are resident.
4 MR. NICE: Perhaps it could be distributed and given a number if
5 it's produced.
6 Q. Look, please, at paragraph 5. It would have to go on the overhead
7 projector in English, I'm afraid. Paragraph 5. The document heading can
8 be seen to refer to the conference between the 7th of September and the
9 5th of November. And paragraph 5 tells us that: "In the margins of the
10 4th plenary, a meeting was held on the 4th of October chaired by the
11 minister for foreign affairs of the Netherlands," et cetera. "A statement
12 was read out subsequently by the Netherlands minister at a press
13 conference, reflecting the agreement of the Yugoslav parties involved
14 after Minister van den Broek had obtained the acquiescence of all parties,
15 Yugoslav parties at the plenary meeting. This included the principle that
16 a political solution should be sought on the basis of the perspective of
17 recognition of the independence of those republics in Yugoslavia wishing
18 it. At the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith and
19 involving all parties, the recognition would be granted in the framework
20 of a general settlement and have the following components:
21 "A loose association or alliance of sovereign or independent
23 "Adequate arrangements to be made for the protection of
24 minorities, including human rights guarantees and possibly special status
25 for certain areas;
1 "No unilateral changes in borders."
2 Pausing there, Professor, you were here in The Hague, and you know
3 that this accused agreed, as Lord Carrington has said, four times to this
4 proposal; correct?
5 A. I don't know what he agreed to. He didn't tell me that.
6 Q. You were here working for him and with him. Professor, did you
7 not realise that all -- all but for the one thing that the accused was
8 subsequently to do, the matter could have been settled in The Hague? Did
9 you not appreciate that? Did you not appreciate that he'd consented at
10 the beginning to the proposal?
11 A. No, I didn't know that.
12 Q. I'm going to ask --
13 A. You know, I was not fully acquainted with the political issues.
14 Ms. Smilja Avramov was here as an advisor. I only attended a plenary
15 session once with them. That was brief.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
17 Mr. Nice, just bear in mind the professor has said he was there to
18 deal with economic issues.
19 MR. NICE:
20 Q. 14, 16, 23, second paragraph of 23, again want of time, will help
22 I note what you said, Professor, about not being involved in
23 political issues, but we're going to come to the summer of 1992 as soon as
24 I can get us there when you did indeed become involved, you may think, in
25 political issues, but we'll look at that shortly.
1 You know, of course, that eventually the accused declined The
2 Hague proposal, didn't he, on the 18th of October?
3 A. I tell you, I did not deal with political issues. I was
4 relatively little acquainted with the ongoing discussions on political
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, say no more. Professor, say no more.
7 Mr. Nice.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. Certainly, but --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you going to continue to press him on this?
11 Because he said he did not come to The Hague to deal political issues.
12 MR. NICE: But the professor has nevertheless volunteered a number
13 of quite general opinions and I want to get the chronology before you.
14 Q. Professor, do you recall The Hague Conference and the Belgrade
15 initiative, which was aimed at keeping Bosnia within a reduced form of
16 Yugoslavia, all ended when the European Union asked the republics, in
17 light of the failure of The Hague conference, if they were going to go for
18 independence? Do you recall that happening?
19 A. I've told you I'm not familiar with these details. I wasn't
20 interested in the Belgrade initiative.
21 Q. Very well.
22 A. I didn't follow that course of events.
23 Q. Were you interested in the beginning of the following year in
24 something called the Third Yugoslavia Convention, which was a convention
25 of people from Serbia, Montenegro, and anywhere else who wanted to stay
1 within Yugoslavia, a convention that brought forth people from various
2 parts of Serbia and Montenegro but also from parts of Bosnia and Croatia?
3 Were you aware of that convention?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Very well. Then in your role as an advisor, you featured -- you
6 didn't feature, you took part in a body called the Council For
7 Harmonisation. Do you remember that?
8 A. This is the first time I've heard of it.
9 Q. I'm going to have to show you some documents and see if we can
10 remind you.
11 A. I have never heard of A Council For Harmonisation. Harmonisation
12 of what?
13 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... state policy.
14 A. I was a member of a commission for the economic reform of the
15 Presidency of Serbia. I was a member of that. But this body ceased
16 functioning in 1991.
17 Q. Do you remember --
18 A. After 1991, I participated in the work of The Hague conference on
19 economic issues and issues of succession and --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor. I think the Prosecutor
21 wants to remind you of something.
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. I would if I could adequately pronounce the Serbian title of the
24 committee. [Serbian spoken] Does that make any difference?
25 A. No.
1 Q. No, I didn't think it would.
2 A. No, I don't know anything about it.
3 Q. Do you remember sitting on a body, because we've got the
4 stenographic notes of it, with Milan Panic, with this accused, with
5 Dobrica Cosic, with Vladislav Jovanovic, and others?
6 A. Oh, yes, I recall now. I recall very well. Now I know what you
7 mean. This was a council --
8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
9 A. ... Dobrica Cosic, as the president or chairperson. I was not a
10 member of the council, I only attended meetings twice because President
11 Milosevic -- I think it was on two occasions only. I was not a member.
12 The members were the presidents -- or, rather, the Prime Ministers of the
13 republics and the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the federal
14 government. And on two occasions I was invited by President Milosevic to
15 accompany him. And that was when the Vance-Owen Plan was being discussed.
16 I remember that.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the microphone of
19 Professor Mihailovic was switched off when he was explaining that this was
20 a council established by Dobrica Cosic, the then president of Yugoslavia.
21 He explained its functioning. His microphone had been switched off, and I
22 see it's not in the transcript at all.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you have just put it in, Mr. Milosevic.
24 Thank you.
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. I want you to -- Professor, we have the stenographic notes of this
2 series of meetings, all but two, which are not available to us at the
3 moment, of the 9th of January, 1993, and the 21st of January, but you were
4 present and you contributed to them, and I'm going to ask you for your
5 assistance in relation to them.
6 MR. NICE: Can they be -- the first one be placed on the overhead
7 projector. 18th of August.
8 Q. You may have confined yourself by choice to particular matters of
9 economics, but you sat in very important political bodies, and here we see
10 -- the usher -- we see the title in English, Shorthand Notes from the
11 Session of the Council for Coordination of State Policy held on the 18th
12 of August, 1992. Next page, please, and we see this, Milan Panic saying
13 -- picking it up at page 18 of a very long document: "We're already in
14 that position. The problem is that we have been accused for the war in
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, that we support the war in Bosnia, that we left
16 the weapons for them to fight; that we support Karadzic financially. We
17 spoke here about the ethnic cleansing. I heard from Dr. Brankovic that
18 Serbs should get rid of others." To which the accused says: "Don't
19 trouble us with your associates."
20 Milan Panic continued: "He isn't my associate ..."
21 Next paragraph, second or third sentence: "This afternoon I
22 received the following information: Ethnic cleansing has begun. 15.000
23 Muslims from Sanski Most were given eight hours to leave their homes and
24 make twenty kilometres to Jajce in order to reach the Muslims. This
25 information was received from the United Nations. They asked me and said
1 that I should stop it."
2 Pause there. Do you remember, Professor, sitting in with this
3 accused, with Milan Panic, with Dobrica Cosic, on meetings where ethnic
4 cleansing, as alleged against Serbia, was being discussed?
5 A. I don't recall attending this meeting.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice is referring
7 to ethnic cleansing incited by Serbia. Where in the document does it say
8 it was incited by Serbia? Who is he quoting? Who said it was incited by
9 Serbia? He is construing a question. He is inventing it, in fact
10 fabricating it. Panic is saying that he's being asked to stop something
11 that's happening in Bosnia. Where does it say that Serbia instigated
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may make the correction, Mr. Milosevic.
14 MR. KAY: May I intervene here. I think the Prosecution should
15 first of all establish whether this witness was present at a meeting
16 before putting text like that, reading it out, getting it into the record,
17 and then the witness says, Well, I wasn't at that meeting.
18 MR. NICE: Should we go to page 20? If the usher would be good
19 enough to go to page 20. Here's a passage under the name --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I?
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Professor.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something? I remember
23 that I attended meetings, and that's all that comes to my mind now, when
24 the Vance-Owen Plan was being discussed. I know what I said and what
25 President Milosevic said, and I remember, with reference to Panic, that
1 once he made a statement at the airport in Moscow that he was abandoning
2 continuity, and Belgrade was alarmed --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you. I have your point. I
4 have your point, Professor.
5 Mr. Nice, if --
6 MR. NICE: Certainly.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- if this examination to be fruitful, if the
8 witness was not present, there's not much point.
9 MR. NICE: Page 20. If we go to page 20. The witness has
10 acknowledged being present at two meetings.
11 Q. And if I could read to you what appears on page 20 of the English
12 and then again we'll turn, in light of your answers, to page 45.
13 At page 20 you said this -- you asked for the floor of the meeting
14 and you said: "I just want to make a remark about introducing. With
15 reference to the Conference on Yugoslavia, we were told we were not
16 allowed to take part in the group of experts and other places on behalf of
17 Yugoslavia because it's the Conference on Yugoslavia, which implies
18 participation of six republics."
19 Now, that's one contribution attributed to you. But if we go on
20 beyond a long contribution from the accused, to page 45, and in mind your
21 account of your limited interest, Milan Panic said: "And we the Serbs in
22 Bosnia are 'naive.' They took 60 to 70 per cent of the territory in
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina." And you, Professor are recorded as contributing:
24 "Let me explain this 70-30 per cent ratio. It is the result of historic
25 conditions. Even after the World War II, the Serbs held the relative
1 majority of the territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 "Secondly, the Serbs were a discriminated nation, living on
3 agriculture, whereas the Muslims lived in the cities and along the river
4 valleys, and they were rather concentrated there.
5 "These 60 per cent is factual land owned by the Serbs. This was
6 not conquered in the war, it's factual ownership of the Serbs.
7 "This is subject to speculations because people do not know the
8 historic conditions."
9 Now, some of that matches what's in your report, the condition of
10 the Serbs, but despite your only being interested in economic issues, you
11 seem to be pressing the suggestion that that large percentage of land
12 should be retained. Do you remember making such a contribution,
14 A. I did say something to this effect but not as you interpreted it.
15 My contribution was an historical and economic explanation, which is
16 correct. The Muslims had a privileged position, and they lived in the
17 towns and in river valleys, where the best land was, and the rest of the
18 territory, the hills, belonged to others. That is how the situation arose
19 that the Muslims were concentrated on a smaller -- in a smaller area and
20 the Serbs in a broader area, and they became the owners of that land.
21 It's a fact that Serbs owned over half the land in Bosnia. It's a fact.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 A. These are scientific scholarly facts. But this has no other
24 meaning. I was simply trying to explain how the land was distributed --
25 Q. Can we --
1 A. -- and how this came about.
2 Q. Can we move to a conclusion for this document. With the usher's
3 assistance, just go to page 19.
4 We've already seen, Professor, how there was discussion about
5 ethnic cleansing, discussions about weapons left to fight.
6 A. I don't know where we've seen that from.
7 Q. [Previous translation continues]... earlier. And on page 19,
8 Milan Panic, at the bottom of that entry, is recording how he was taken
9 aside by -- it says -- he refers to Mitterand, Boutros-Ghali, "Major takes
10 me aside, everybody takes me aside and asks me these questions. I try to
11 reply that I went to Sarajevo twice; all the time I am speaking about
12 ethnic cleansing, and then I receive such a letter from the United
13 Nations; we lose battles and we like to fight on the international scene,
14 but we don't have ammunition. This is their ammunition. Then that one
15 says aggressor, the Serbs are dreaming of their Greater Serbia, of the
16 idea that the Serbs in Bosnia get rid of others and then join Serbia one
17 day. That's what they say and they will be against us."
18 And then one other short topic on page 38. The accused is
19 recorded as saying: "As for the help provided to the Serbs in Bosnia, it
20 is simply unacceptable for us to leave them helpless. This is not a war
21 material, this is humanitarian aid - food, clothes, money. But we cannot
22 deprive them of our assistance. I wonder, why would the assistance
23 granted to the Muslims be humanitarian and they are getting weapons that
24 have been apprehended in these conflicts, and our assistance is looked
25 upon as military though our shipments do in the contain military
1 supplies ..."
2 Now, there you are. There's a couple of passages. Do you
3 remember those things being discussed?
4 A. No, I don't remember at all. And as I said, I told you what I
5 remember. There were two things that stand out: When the Vance-Owen Plan
6 was being discussed and when Milan Panic, and you're mentioning Milan
7 Panic now, when Milan Panic made a statement at the Moscow airport about
8 the fact that he was relinquishing continuity and so on. And so that was
9 a subject up for discussion at the council and the council decided to take
10 a stand and insist upon continuity.
11 Now, what Mitterand told Panic and what Panic told the council, I
12 really don't remember any of that nor that there was any mention at all of
13 any ethnic cleansing. Perhaps there was, but as I say, I don't remember.
14 I was over 70 years old at the time when I went there, but I probably
15 would have remarked on it had I heard that, because I do have some sort of
16 continuous memory.
17 Q. I'm going to ask you more briefly, then, about the other meeting
18 at which you were present, because you may be the only witness we ever
19 have to explain the construct of these meetings and so on, but before I do
20 and as an intervening -- not an intervening act, you recall a conference,
21 an international conference on the former Yugoslavia that occurred in
22 London on the 26th to the 28th of August of 1992?
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. NICE: May the witness have, then, please, the next proposed
25 exhibit, which is a document from Yugoslavia Through Documents From Its
1 Creation to Its Dissolution. And if the usher would be good enough to
2 take us in the English version to what is at the bottom right-hand corner
3 page 711.
4 Q. And this is a paper by the co-chairman setting out the position
5 for Serbia and Montenegro, and I'll have to read the bullet points in
6 full, Professor.
7 "We welcome the fact that all participants to the conference have
8 subscribed to the Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. All participants
9 must fulfil the obligations to which they have agreed. In particular,
10 Serbia and Montenegro face a clear choice. They have undertaken to:
11 "Cease intervention across their borders with Bosnia and Croatia;
12 "To the best of their ability restrain the Bosnian Serbs from
13 taking territory by force and expelling the local population;
14 "Restore in full the civil and constitutional rights of the
15 inhabitants of Kosovo and Vojvodina and also ensure the civil rights of
16 the inhabitants of the Sandjak;
17 "Use their influence with the Bosnian Serbs to obtain the closure
18 of their detention camps, to comply with their obligations under
19 international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions,
20 and to permit the return of refugees to their homes. The Bosnian Croats
21 and Muslims have given similar undertakings;
22 "Fully observe the relevant resolutions of the United Nations
23 Security Council;
24 "Declare that they fully respect the integrity of present
1 "Guarantee the rights of ethnic and national communities and
2 minorities within the borders of Serbia and Montenegro in accordance with
3 the UN Charter, the CSCE and the draft convention of the EC Conference on
5 "Work for the normalisation of the situation in Croatia, for
6 implementation of the Vance Plan and for acceptance by the Serbs in the
7 Krajina of special status as foreseen in the draft convention of the
8 European Community Conference on Yugoslavia;" and then finally,
9 "If, as suggested by Mr. Panic's recent letter to the president
10 of the Security Council of the UN, Serbia and Montenegro do intend to
11 fulfil these obligations in deed as well as word they will resume a
12 respected position in the international community."
13 Now, that's one of the things that followed from the London
14 conference, and it set the terms upon which the former Yugoslavia could
15 join the international community and indeed become a member of the UN,
16 didn't it?
17 A. And what is your question?
18 Q. These terms that I've read out to you were the terms imposed at
19 this time by the London conference for Serbia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia,
20 FRY, to rejoin the international community as a respected member. Do you
21 remember that?
22 A. Just one thing. I did not participate directly in the plenary
23 session, although President Milosevic offered me to take part in the main
24 hall. I was in the advisory body, not in the main hall, where different
25 documents were passed around.
1 Now, I know that there was a resolution on Montenegro on the last
2 day when the conference was to end and that the then minister came to our
3 delegation --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, move on.
5 MR. NICE:
6 Q. And you see, if you could have, please, displayed the Council For
7 Harmonisation, or whatever it's properly described as, record for the 17th
8 of September, which is the other one you attended at and where I want you
9 to just help us a little bit, if you can, from memory, and I realise it's
10 a long time ago.
11 We see on page 65, at the bottom right-hand corner, the end of the
12 passage that's been extracted -- the end of 65 --
13 JUDGE KWON: Could I see the name of the committee?
14 MR. NICE: Yes, the name of the committee is differently expressed
15 in this version or it may be translation. Council For Reconciliation Of
16 The Standpoints Regarding State Politics.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. NICE:
19 Q. But I think, just to deal with that, this committee on which you
20 sat was non-statutory, Professor? That would be correct, wouldn't it? It
21 wasn't a statutory identified and designated committee?
22 A. No. I think it was outside the constitution. It was initiative
23 taken by President Cosic, and that they were a body which wished to expand
24 its competencies and authority in some way.
25 Q. Now, we have this entry at the foot of 65 associated with you:
1 "Mr. President, awhile ago --" and we can find it but I needn't trouble
2 you with it: "Awhile ago I used the expression 'The King is dead, long
3 live the King,' but the King needs to be murdered or to commit suicide."
4 And then you went on to say: "As far as I can understand the things, the
5 United Nations are facing the problem of expulsion of Yugoslavia from its
6 membership and very serious legal and other problems. Of course, it is
7 much simpler job for them - if Yugoslavia does it by itself."
8 You said more, but can you remember discussing the issue to which
9 the London conference requirements and membership of the United Nations
10 connected? Can you remember discussing those things?
11 A. I don't remember them at all, and that doesn't -- those don't seem
12 to be the kind of words I used. Are you sure that that comes under my
14 Q. Yes, I'm sure it comes under your name in the version that's been
15 provided to us and the earlier -- if you have doubts, I'll take you back
16 to --
17 A. I don't remember ever having spoken about that at all --
18 Q. We come back to --
19 A. -- at any time.
20 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and if we come back to page
21 28 at the beginning of the extracted passage, you're in discussion with
22 Miodrag Mitic, Ilija Djukic, and you responded to Djukic, who said: "Is
23 it possible to let me say bridge this gap between the demise of one thing
24 and the birth of the other exclusively within the realms of the United
25 Nations Charter?" To which you replied: "I would like to pose a counter
1 question - why this is all being done? If somebody wants to admit you,
2 why do you have to cease to exist first? What is being interpolated then,
3 what it stands, and then, The King is dead, long live the King, what dies
4 with the King".
5 Does that remind you at all?
6 A. No. No. Let me say there was talk about membership, so maybe on
7 certain occasions -- and I had a very clear-cut stand. If we're insisting
8 upon continuity, then we can't ask for membership because Yugoslavia's
9 membership -- Yugoslavia did not forfeit its membership in the United
10 Nations, it was just suspended. So insistence upon continuity meant
11 lifting the suspension.
12 Q. Very well.
13 A. And agreement to seeking membership meant to give up on
14 continuity, and that was a clear-cut stand. And I could not have had a
15 different opinion at all.
16 Q. In which case, and just to give a little flavour of these meetings
17 that may have to be considered carefully and in detail at a later stage,
18 if you go to 62, it may be balance, but in any case I put it in to -- to
19 assist and to encourage, perhaps, a general review of these documents.
20 The accused, Professor, is recorded in this same meeting as saying
21 the following: "Many others are creating serious problems. I think this
22 has to be clarified --"
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Nice.
24 MR. NICE:
25 Q. "The treatment of so-called ethnic cleansing. The statements
1 have been given about how the ethnical cleansing will be prevented in
2 Serbia. There is no ethnical cleansing in Serbia. There is no programme
3 against ethnical cleansing, nor could it be because there is no ethnical
4 cleansing. The deputy minister of the interior was replaced because he
5 opposed the programme that does not exist..." and so on.
6 Do you remember a discussion along those lines, or very
7 approximately, in this meeting dealing with ethnic cleansing?
8 A. I never heard of any mention made of ethnic cleansing. It was the
9 assessment made by journalists and people dealing with science connected
10 to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
11 Q. Very well.
12 A. But that this was discussed, that ethnic cleansing was brought up
13 in any official capacity in any official body, I didn't hear about that.
14 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honours, I've used the opportunity of a
15 witness who was present at the meetings to remind you of their existence.
16 There's a series of them of which, as I said, two are missing, and they
17 will at some stage have to be explored by the Prosecution, if by no one
18 else, in some detail.
19 Your Honours, just give me one minute.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do you plan to re-examine?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I understood it that we have
22 no time and that we have to close now. If you give me time, I do plan it.
23 If you don't give me time, then I don't. So it's up to the physical
24 feasibilities. But if there is time, I would like to see the documents
25 that he's quoting from, because it appears that everything he's quoting
1 from goes to our advantage. Of course there was no ethnic cleansing in
2 Serbia ever, except in Kosovo, and that was exerted by the --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not time for you to comment now, but you
4 couldn't resist the opportunity.
5 MR. NICE: There is only one other topic that I'm going to deal
6 with -- we have until ten past 12; is that correct?
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, until ten past.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. There's only one other topic I have time to deal with, and that
10 very briefly, Professor, and that's your economic evidence or your
11 evidence about economics.
12 MR. NICE: For the Chamber, in our submission, this is of
13 tangential, if any, relevance, and I'm going to deal with it very briefly.
14 Q. One point in general: The notion, Professor, that Serbia is a
15 victim of the oppression -- of the economic oppression of the other
16 republics is one that doesn't fit comfortably, does it, with the reality
17 that since the separation of the former republics of the former
18 Yugoslavia, the divergence in economic performance between Serbia and
19 Slovenia and Croatia has actually increased rather than decreased?
20 A. I didn't comment at all on trade between Slovenia and Croatia.
21 Q. Not trade between them but --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, what do you mean by the divergence has
23 actually increased? Do you mean that --
24 MR. NICE: The per capita wealth, the performance of the economy
25 measured to all international standards, the difference between Serbia and
1 its former republic neighbours has increased over time rather than
3 Q. Is that correct?
4 A. Between Serbia and who?
5 Q. Slovenia and Croatia.
6 A. Of course there was an increase. There was an increase even
7 before, and especially afterwards, after the application of the
8 sanctions. Of course.
9 Q. And it's continued to this date?
10 A. I'm not quite clear on what you want to say by that. I said that
11 there was a constant increase and that the trend carried on until the
12 breakdown of Yugoslavia. The differences between Slovenia and Croatia on
13 the one hand and Serbia on the other increased, the gulf increased to the
14 detriment of Serbia.
15 Q. Very well. I can't take it further in the time.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
17 MR. NICE:
18 Q. You have not in your report -- no, two things. First, you accept
19 that your economic opinions as expressed in the memorandum haven't
20 particularly changed because indeed they may well find expression in
21 similar terms in your present expert report; yes?
22 A. Well, it's like this: I wrote a book, Yugoslavia's Economic
23 Reality, and of course I present my economic convictions in the book and
24 in the memorandum as far as I took part in it. And I stand by my
1 Q. But what you have now before you is, I think, a document with
2 which you will be familiar or of which you will know. That is it's an
3 article by a highly respected and well-known economist, Ljubomir Madzar,
4 or at least -- do you know him?
5 A. Yes, I do know him.
6 Q. And if we go in the pages of the book to the top right-hand
7 corner, page 179, we see in an article generally entitled Who Exploited
8 Whom, we see reference to the SANU Memorandum, Expressions of
9 Traumatisation in Economic Relations, and we see his expressions of
10 opinion there.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, this has to be the last question I'm
13 MR. NICE: Yes.
14 Q. And we see that this expert reaches radically different
15 conclusions, as you will know, Professor, from the economic conclusions of
16 the memorandum itself.
17 A. It is the trait of a good economist to anticipate matters. I
18 anticipated that you would bring this question up and ask your question
19 and use this article. Let me say that the article contains only two
20 tables, and they were borrowed tables, at that. And Mr. Madzar is a very
21 good economist himself but he would have to settle accounts with himself
22 because, and I can provide you with his text in Serbian written in 1989 in
23 which he speaks quite differently on all these subjects, and he did so
24 within the frameworks of a journal with a set political orientation, might
25 I say.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: That has to be --
2 MR. NICE: ... that document be exhibited. The position is that
3 we remain of the view that the economic issue is marginal, if relevant at
4 all. To have cross-examined this witness on matters of expertise would
5 have taken far longer than the time available this morning at all.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can we just deal with your exhibits.
7 MR. NICE: And so we ask that this document be available to you
8 for consideration on the economic issues.
9 JUDGE KWON: We declined to admit tab 19 of this professor's
10 binder. What's the difference with this one?
11 MR. NICE: This one, first of all, it's a document that contains
12 contrary opinions. He's acquainted with it. He hasn't referred to it in
13 his own report, and he's now dealt with it, and it's very important, where
14 we are so confined in time, that there is some material available to the
15 contrary effect. I would, of course, if there had been more time
16 available to deal with the witness who, as you now discover, could cover a
17 very large amount of evidence because he was a fact witness on all sorts
18 of things, I would have covered this, but it simply wasn't possible.
19 And in our respectful submission, it would be entirely appropriate for his
20 evidence to be -- not his evidence, his report to be before you.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: You did spend a fair bit of time, Mr. Nice, asking
22 pretty pointless of questions of the witness rather than concentrating on
23 this kind of thing, with all respect.
24 MR. NICE: I'm sorry you take that view.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Especially when he made it clear he couldn't answer
1 many of the questions that you tried to pose to him.
2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I must, if I may respectfully say so,
3 resist that observation. This is one of the only witnesses capable of
4 dealing with these meetings, and if we wish to draw your attention the
5 contents of those meetings, we have to give the witnesses available an
6 opportunity to deal with them.
7 We don't know if this accused is going to give evidence himself.
8 We don't know if the only other person listed as somebody who can give
9 evidence of these important meetings is going to be before us, and the
10 alternative between asking questions of witnesses like this who were
11 there, even if his memory is now faint, and not asking them at all is that
12 it could be said to be unfair. So I respectfully differ from Your
13 Honour's opinion on that.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It will be an act of irresponsibility on
15 the Chamber's part if we don't stop at the time, because the Appeals
16 Chamber has to come in.
17 Mr. Kay.
18 MR. KAY: Our submission is none of these documents should go in.
19 My biggest mistake, the massive section of text there, not a single bit of
20 it was adopted in cross-examination. It just serves as a platform to get
21 over the contrary views of another politician who is in opposition to the
22 accused. It wasn't material or relevant to this witness, and the other
23 documents that were put forward weren't adopted by him in any way, and we
24 ask what relevance did they have to do with him?
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we admitted Mr. Milosevic's documents on
1 the basis of a reference, so I think parity would require that we do the
2 same here.
3 We don't have the time to deal with the exhibits now. We'll issue
4 an order on that, as well as the four outstanding exhibits from the
5 previous witness.
6 MR. NICE: The Council for Harmonisation are, of course, already
7 exhibits. They've already been exhibited by the Chamber.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Okay.
9 MR. NICE: And in -- I must press the issue, if I get a chance to
10 argue it, that these documents fall very squarely within the parameters
11 being applied to the accused, and all of them.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Perhaps we can just exhibit those -- the
13 four from the previous -- yes, the previous witness.
14 THE REGISTRAR: From the previous witness, there were two maps.
15 They will be marked as D267. The Cutileiro Plan will be D268. And the
16 Vance-Owen Plan will be D269.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
18 We will have to adjourn on that basis, and I wish everybody a
19 Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask just one question, please?
21 Well, if you've adjourned, never mind.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very quickly. Go ahead.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At the beginning of the
25 cross-examination, Mr. Nice told you that in the delegation from --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm sorry. I thought it was a comment of an
2 administrative nature, but I don't think we'll have to time to --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Just administrative,
4 then. Just one administrative point. If you have accepted this article
5 by Professor Madzar, where Mr. Nice strives to show that he had a
6 differing opinion, then please accept professor articles -- Professor
7 Madzar's article dating back to 1989 where Professor Mihailovic says that
8 the same author has quite the opposite opinion in 1989, quite opposite to
9 the opinion stated by Mr. Nice, and then you can see just how well-founded
10 or not well-founded is his scientific thinking.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will consider all these matters when we come
12 to decide.
13 We are adjourned until the 11th of January.
14 Thank you, Professor, for coming to the International Tribunal and
15 you may now leave. Thank you very much.
16 [The witness withdrew]
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.12 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 11th day of
19 January, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.