1 Tuesday, 20 January 2004
2 [Closed session]
12 Pages 31063 to 31115 redacted, closed session
1 [Open session]
2 JUDGE MAY: And we'll ask the registrar to produce the various
4 If you would like to announce that.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, in order, the additional photograph
6 used with picture number 3 on the registry page number 02115539 will
7 be 636, tab 1. Tab 2 would be the additional graph similar to the graph
8 on registry page number 02115536 of the expert report. Tab 3, Your
9 Honours, would be the new graph titled relief of direction of flight.
10 Tab 4 will be graph that identifies the distribution of the fragments.
11 And tab 5 will be the photocopy of the X-ray of the projectile. Tab 5
12 will be the photocopy of the X-ray of the projectile. And tab 6, Your
13 Honours, will be the picture of the mortar.
14 Defence exhibit -- the diagram of the vehicle will be Defence
15 Exhibit 230, and the sketch showing the damage on the asphalt will be
16 Defence Exhibit 231, Your Honours. Excuse me. Yes, Your Honours. The
17 diagram of the vehicle will be Defence Exhibit 232, and the sketch showing
18 damage on the asphalt will be Defence Exhibit 233.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Call the next witness. Yes. Can you deal with
20 any matters we have to cover, first.
21 MR. KHAN: There are no protective measures for this particular
22 witness, Your Honour. No, there are not.
23 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
24 MR. KHAN: So the Prosecution would call Kerim Mesanovic.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. When the witness is ready, let him make the
2 objection in the usual way.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
4 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 WITNESS: KERIM MESANOVIC
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Khan.
10 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, this witness has already given evidence in
11 the Brdjanin and the Kvocka trials. So his transcripts have already been
12 admitted by 92 bis (D). So I kindly ask the witness.
13 Examined by Mr. Khan:
14 Q. Witness, did you give evidence in the Brdjanin and the Kvocka
15 trials before this Tribunal?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. Could I kindly ask Your Honours that these transcripts be
18 exhibited? They have already been admitted.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: 638, Your Honours.
21 MR. KHAN: The witness's evidence concerns the municipality of
22 Prijedor, and I shall read a brief summary to the Court of that evidence.
23 The witness grew up in Prijedor with his family and remained there
24 until 1992. Although he is a Muslim, his wife is a Serb. Prior to the
25 conflict, he worked in the Mobilisation Department of the secretariat for
1 the People's Defence which was in the same building as the police.
2 Prior to 1991, the mobilisation orders used to come from Sarajevo
3 via Banja Luka. However, after 1991, they came from Knin in Croatia.
4 Around the same time, the organisation of the old Territorial Defence was
5 changed with the creation of a new federal organ referred to as a VTO,
6 which had control over all military matters in Prijedor. This new TO
7 structure was headed by Serbs.
8 The Mobilisation Department became a part of the VTO, but the
9 witness believes that he was excluded because he was a Muslim.
10 In September and October of 1991, the witness was instructed by
11 the chief of the VTO to provide him with lists for mobilisation containing
12 the names of Serbs only. The units mobilised included the Banja Luka
13 rocket unit and the 5th Kozara Brigade and the 43rd Motorised Brigade.
14 In early 1992, weapons were secretly distributed to Serb
15 civilians, and in February 1992, the commander of the Prijedor War Brigade
16 was JNA Major Radmilo Zeljaja who said that he was going to level Kozarac.
17 The Serbs established their own separate Assembly in March and took over
18 power in Prijedor on 30th of April, 1992. Gradually the Muslims were
19 sacked from their jobs and replaced by Serbs. On the 23rd of May, the
20 village of Hambarine was shelled and attacked by Serb forces and shortly
21 thereafter Serb forces attacked Kozarac.
22 The witness was told by a colleague that the Stari Grad part of
23 Prijedor, which is almost entirely inhabited by Muslims, was attacked and
24 destroyed by Serbs using tanks, and they started by destroying the mosque.
25 At that time, Simo Drljaca was head of the Prijedor police who gave the
1 witness a freedom of movement pass. On the 24th of June, the witness was
2 arrested by the police and placed in the cell at SUP, and whilst being
3 removed to the Omarska camp was beaten and had four teeth knocked out. At
4 that time, Dr. Stakic was president of the Crisis Staff, and the Omarska
5 camp had been set up by Simo Drljaca on the orders of the Serbian Republic
6 of Bosnia Ministry of Interior.
7 The witness was detained in Omarska for about 3 months from June
8 1992 to August 1992. He was never charged with any offence and was never
9 told why he was taken there. Approximately 3.000 people were detained at
10 Omarska at any one time. Initially he was placed in the white house for
11 the first three days of his detention, with 45 others. Those others had
12 been badly beaten, and it was difficult to recognise them because they had
13 blood all over them. The walls were splattered in blood.
14 The witness helped carry a dead man out who had been beaten to
16 Zeljko Meakic was in charge of the camp whilst Ranko Mijic was in
17 charge of interrogators. According to the witness, Mijic was the most
18 responsible for the killings and beatings which occurred at Omarska since
19 he made the categorisation lists which were given to Meakic for
20 implementing the beatings and killings. The actual killings and beatings
21 were carried out by the guards on Meakic's orders.
22 The witness, since his family was related to Meakic, only spent
23 three days in the white house, after which Meakic ordered him to be taken
24 to the glass house where, according to Meakic, he could guarantee his
1 Whilst in Omarska, the sleeping and sanitation conditions were
2 inadequate. The detainees did not have enough to eat. They were often
3 beaten on their way to meals and many were afraid even to risk leaving
4 their cells to go and eat. They were afraid of being beaten.
5 Whilst the witness was in Omarska, he was permanently scared of
6 being beaten or killed.
7 After interrogation the detainees were placed in three categories.
8 According to the witness category 1 was the worst category to be in, since
9 these people were to be iced. The second category would be imprisoned and
10 the third category were meant to be released.
11 Category 1 generally consisted of the intellectual or wealthy
12 segment of the Muslim society in Prijedor at that time. Category 2 were
13 people who had supported the SDA, and those in category 3 were Muslims who
14 hadn't been involved in anything.
15 A number of those in category 1 disappeared and were never seen
16 again. They were taken to the Red House where the witness assumes they
17 were killed.
18 On one particular occasion, a hundred people who had been brought
19 to Omarska after the cleansing of the Brdo area of Prijedor were placed in
20 the white house and were shot during the night. In the morning, the
21 witness saw lorries being loaded from piles of dead bodies. The Brdo area
22 encompasses the villages of Hambarine, Biscani, and Jugovci. The witness
23 heard, after his release, that on or around the same day about 150 men
24 were also killed at the Keraterm camp.
25 Whilst he was at Omarska, the witness remembers on one occasion a
1 delegation of important people visiting. These people included Brdjanin,
2 Zupljanin, Drljaca and Stakic who had police and other bodies guards. The
3 witness on his release was taken to Trnopolje camp where he was detained
4 for only one day. He then returned to Meakic's village where he lived,
5 but again left there because of threats made against him.
6 Now, that is a very brief summary of the witness's evidence, and
7 with the permission of the Court, I'd like to ask the witness one or two
8 oral questions.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
10 MR. KHAN:
11 Q. Witness, you say that the Serb authority came into power on
12 Prijedor on the 30th of April. Before 30th of April, how many armed
13 attacks had the Muslims carried out against Prijedor?
14 A. Not one. Not one armed attack on the 30th of April.
15 Q. You also mention this word that people in category 1 were supposed
16 to be "iced"? What do you mean by this word "iced"?
17 A. What I mean is I myself was on that same list on the 2nd of April
18 to be put on ice. I just know what the driver told me. I know his
19 nickname. What he said was, "You're lucky, because you were supposed to
20 be iced yourself." So I suppose that means dead, icy cold dead.
21 Q. Now, before the takeover on 30th of April, you say you'd been
22 living in Prijedor. Did you know a person called Darko Mrdja?
23 A. Yes, but not well, just by sight.
24 Q. Did you see him at all whilst you were in Omarska camp?
25 A. Yes, I did see him on the last day, which was the 6th of August
1 when they escorted the buses to Manjaca. Him and another young guy whose
2 nickname was Baki. He was in Prijedor. I knew him as a sportsman.
3 Q. And were they -- was Mr. Mrdja working and Mr. Baki working for
4 any particular organisation or body?
5 A. I don't understand what you mean by that. You mean before the war
6 or what?
7 Q. Well, when you saw him at Omarska, was he a civilian? Was he in
8 the military?
9 A. Oh, I see. Well, he was in the military, a special unit or an
10 Intervention Platoon. That's what they said. Although Baki wasn't a
11 military-able man. He didn't do his military service. He was one of the
12 once people in command on that APC which arrived on the 6th of August,
13 arrived in Omarska.
14 MR. KHAN: I have no further questions, and that would complete
15 the examination-in-chief.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Aga, before we go on, let me clarify about the
17 content of the Exhibit 638. You are submitting only the transcript or you
18 are going to submit all the package with these exhibits? I cannot confirm
20 MR. KHAN: We are wanting to submit all the package.
21 JUDGE KWON: But you haven't produced even an index of them. I
22 don't know what's included in that package.
23 MR. KHAN: I apologise, Your Honours. There is no index included
24 there, but we will make one --
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
1 MR. KHAN: -- for the package.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, do that so that we have it.
3 MR. KHAN: Yes, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, we have one hour for you to
5 examine this.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I'll do my best
7 to ask a number of relevant questions.
8 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mesanovic, you've just said that the Serbs
10 took over on the 30th of April, took over power in Prijedor; is that
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Is it true that they took over power without a single bullet being
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So there was no violence, nobody was injured, or anything like
18 A. Not that night, no.
19 Q. Is it true that the area with majority Muslim population was
20 placed under the control of the militia made up of Muslims and some
21 Croats, and also under the control of the Patriotic League of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
23 A. No.
24 Q. For example, Kozarac, which is where there was a large armed
25 Muslim formation in place, and then Hambarine, Biscani, et cetera, all
1 that remained under Muslim control, did it not?
2 A. Yes, until the 23rd.
3 Q. All right. Now, was the immediate cause for the takeover a
4 telegram which the head of the public security station whose name was I
5 think Hashim Talundzic --
6 A. Talundzic, yes.
7 Q. He was the chief of police in Prijedor, and this telegram was sent
8 by Alija Delimustafic, the Minister asking for action to be taken to block
9 the barracks, seize the weapons from the JNA and similar acts, and that by
10 mistake it came into the hands of the Serbs in Prijedor too. Do you know
11 about all that?
12 A. No. I worked in the Secretariat for National Defence and not in
13 the SUP.
14 Q. Well, that dispatch was sent on the 30th -- or, rather on the 29th
15 of April, and on the 30th they took over the main institutions. Do you
16 know about that?
17 A. Yes. The Serbs took control on the 30th in the morning at around
18 5.00 a.m.
19 Q. Yes, that's right.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this telegram being tendered?
21 The date is the 29th of April, and it is signed by the Ministry of the
22 Interior, Alija Delimustafic, and it states the following, that a blockade
23 should be effected of military facilities, et cetera, and that the columns
24 of the former JNA should be prevented from leaving the barracks and
25 communicating on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that combat
1 action should be organised and affected throughout the territory of the
2 BiH and that this action should be coordinated by the headquarters of
3 Territorial Defence, the region, the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory within
4 the frameworks of planning combat action to plan protective measures for
5 the population, its property and so on, material goods, et cetera.
6 Massive obstruction on all roads in Bosnia-Herzegovina on which the units
7 of the former JNA would start to withdraw their equipment and materiel, et
8 cetera, et cetera.
9 So in Prijedor, everything was quiet. This telegram was sent on
10 the 29th, ordering combat action and attacks on the army, that the
11 barracks be blocked, et cetera, and then the Serbian Territorial Defence
12 assumes control of Prijedor; is that right? Are the dates correct?
13 A. The dates are, yes.
14 Q. All right. Fine.
15 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let the witness see this document.
16 If the witness would care to look at that and make any comment
17 about it.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see some dates here, the 11th
19 of May, 1992, and that's been written in hand.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. I'm talking about the date of the telegram itself, which is dated
22 the 29th of April.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You can see that in the upper left-hand corner?
25 A. It says the 29th of the fourth month.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we proceed?
2 JUDGE MAY: No. Give the witness the opportunity if he wants to
3 make any comment, do so, but if not, just hand them in.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think I heard this part
5 where it says: "Pursuant to a decision of the Presidency of the Republic
6 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, number so-and-so, of the 27th of April, 1992, with
7 respect to the withdrawal of the JNA units from the territory of the
8 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and because of the violations of this
9 order of the Presidency and the expropriation and looting of property
10 belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina by the former JNA, I hereby order the
11 following." I think that paragraph is essential. That goes before the
12 order itself, why this order was actually issued in the first place.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Well, how do you mean that the JNA pulling out its equipment is
15 looting Bosnia-Herzegovinan property?
16 A. I was a member of the JNA too, so it was my property too.
17 Q. All right, if that's the explanation, we needn't belabour that
18 point any more.
19 JUDGE MAY: Let the document be handed in to us to mark it for
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, to make a clarification for the
22 record, please.
23 JUDGE MAY: No, just give the number, please.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the Defence diagram of the vehicle
25 will be Defence Exhibit 231. The Defence sketch showing damage on the
1 asphalt will be Defence Exhibit 232, and this document, Your Honour, the
2 telegram dated the 29th of April, 1992, will be Defence Exhibit 233 for
3 the record.
4 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, may the Prosecution be provided with a
5 copy of that document to be marked for identification?
6 JUDGE MAY: It's only been marked in the usual way for
7 identification, and you will have a copy of it and indeed, can comment on
8 it in due course.
9 JUDGE KWON: And if the registrar can later check the number of
10 statement of Stakic and the letter or dispatch which was shown to the same
11 witness. Let's go on.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We noted a moment ago that areas with a majority Muslim population
15 remained under the control of the police consisting of Muslims, and we
16 mentioned Kozarac, Hambarine, Biscani, Carakovo. Is it true that at
17 Hambarine several members of the then-already existing Army of
18 Republika Srpska were killed on the 19th of May? No, the 22nd of May, at
19 a checkpoint manned by the Muslims? These were soldiers who were going by
20 unarmed, they were on their way home to Ljubija. Do you remember that?
21 A. Yes. On the basis of Radio Prijedor, these soldiers were armed,
22 and they provoked the incident at the checkpoint, and it was under the
23 control of policeman Aziz Aliskovic. That is what the shooting started.
24 Q. And that is when four of them were killed?
25 A. Not four, one of them.
1 Q. That is what you are saying.
2 A. That is what I know from Prijedor. That was the first shot fired
3 on the 22nd of May in the afternoon.
4 Q. And the killer is also known; right?
5 A. No.
6 Q. But this Aziz that you mentioned --
7 A. No, Aziz was the command of the checkpoint, Aziz Aliskovic.
8 Q. So he was in command of the people who killed this soldier?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. As you say, according to my information, four were killed. But
11 let us go back to you and your testimony in writing.
12 You were working in the mobilisation department of the municipal
13 Secretariat for National Defence in Prijedor; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And you stayed in that position until the 22nd of June, 1992; is
16 that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. So you remained in that position even after the Serbs took over
19 power on the 30th of April?
20 A. With a break since mid-May when we were all dismissed, and then I
21 was called back to work in June. Just before I left to Omarska, because
22 they couldn't find an adequate replacement for me.
23 Q. And is it true that six out of seven Muslims from your service
24 remained in the job after the takeover?
25 A. Until mid-May. Only Becir Medunjanin didn't come to work.
1 Q. So only Becir Medunjanin was replaced.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And do you know why he was replaced?
4 A. He was a member of the SDA, and he was a Muslim.
5 Q. A moment ago, we found that out of seven Muslims, six remained on
6 duty and that one was Medunjanin. Do you know that in the military
7 Tribunal in Banja Luka there were proceedings against him and he was
8 accused of having organised and participated with some others like Muhamed
9 Cehajic, Mujadzic Mirsad, Hasan Talundzic, that he had participated in the
10 procurement of weapons, the formation of paramilitary units and prevented
11 weapons being returned to the legal authorities?
12 A. I don't know of that.
13 Q. Here is the indictment. He was not replaced because he was a
14 Muslim. He is the only one who was replaced out of you -- seven of you,
15 and here is the indictment against him and the others relating to these
16 acts that I mentioned a moment ago.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I would like to tender this
18 into evidence. Not because he was a Muslim but because he committed a
19 criminal act.
20 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the 5th of September, 1992,
22 an indictment after he was killed.
23 JUDGE MAY: Let --
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know that he was killed.
25 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness follow it.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Crnkic, my former teacher, was
2 killed. Aliskovic Aziz was killed. Cehajic Muhamed was killed,
3 Medunjanin Becir was killed. That is as far as I know. And the
4 indictment was issued on the 5th of the September, whereas we were killed
5 in the month of June. So this is an indictment against dead people.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. If you'd hand that in, please.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And do you know that prior to an indictment certain acts have to
9 be done regarding the crime for which the indictment is issued?
10 A. But Becir Medunjanin's top of the head was cut off, and his chest
11 was wounded. So I don't know that such acts need to precede an
13 Q. But I couldn't have committed those acts as a dead person?
14 A. My opinion was he was killed first and then indicted because the
15 indictment is dated September and he was killed in June.
16 Q. I think one needs to read the whole document. It isn't a lengthy
17 one. I wouldn't dwell on it. Their Honours will be able to read it.
18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. We'll mark the next document for
19 identification. We will then decide if it has any relevance.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Defence Exhibit 235, marked for
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Mesanovic, is it true that no one forced you during that time
24 to sign any kind of loyalty oath?
25 A. It was offered.
1 Q. You say on page 2 of your statement, it is a statement the 4th of
2 February, 1999, that no one forced you to sign an oath of allegiance.
3 A. That is true. I said it was offered, but I didn't sign it.
4 Q. Is it true that your colleague in the department was
5 Stjepan Maric, a Bosnian Croat, Maric was sent to Manjaca in 1991 because
6 he didn't carry out the order on mobilisation? This is also in your
8 A. Stjepan Maric worked for the defence as -- department as a
9 computer expert. He went to Manjaca as a head of a regiment.
10 Q. Well, is the following true in your statement which may -- that he
11 had produced some false software programmes? He wasn't sent to prison
12 because he was a Croat but because he had committed some crimes?
13 A. Yes. He received a hundred thousand marks personally from
14 Mr. Franjo Tudjman.
15 Q. But that sounds rather unbelievable, doesn't it?
16 A. Yes, of course it does.
17 Q. You also say on page 2, paragraph 3, that people in Prijedor were
18 against the order on mobilisation taken at the federal level?
19 A. Which mobilisation? Which year and which month?
20 Q. On page 2, paragraph 3 you speak about it.
21 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, may the witness kindly be provided with a
22 copy of his statement?
23 JUDGE MAY: Why? Why?
24 MR. KHAN: So that he can see the parts which he's actually
25 alleged to have said and comment upon them. It's more easy for him to do
1 it that way.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let him.
3 MR. KHAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Tell me, please, in those days, and we're talking about 1991
6 still, didn't Yugoslavia still exist as a unified state and that decisions
7 by the federal authorities were legal?
8 A. Yes, but the hierarchy applied differed. It went Belgrade,
9 Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Prijedor. That is why we were opposed, because the
10 orders were coming from Knin, written in Cyrillic from Knin, which did not
11 correspond to any system of the country we had before the war. We were
12 under the military district of Banja Luka, and above Banja Luka was
13 Sarajevo, and above Sarajevo, Belgrade, and that is why we opposed it.
14 Q. Very well. You say that in the spring of 1991, the last regular
15 mobilisation of territorial units was carried out?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And you say when they distributed weapons they gave Serbs
18 automatic rifles and Muslims, M48-rifles.
19 A. That was true. That applied to the TO detachment mobilised at
20 Urije. Serbs received automatic rifles. Members of the Muslim ethnicity
21 received M-48s.
22 Q. Very well. Did you actually see that and you were mobilised?
23 A. No, I wasn't mobilised. I was at the airport.
24 Q. So you were not mobilised and you did not receive a rifle.
25 A. No, I worked in the national defence secretariat. I carried out
1 the mobilisation. I apologise, Your Honour, for speaking so fast.
2 Q. You say things started to change drastically after 1992; is that
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Tell us why?
6 A. Because drunken soldiers were coming back from the Croatian
7 battlefront with insignia which were insulting and provocative of the
8 non-Serbs. They were wearing cockades, White Eagles patches, patches with
9 the four Ss. I don't know whom they belonged to. They did what they
10 wanted around town. They drank and ate without paying for it. They broke
11 cafes up, and that is what happened.
12 Q. As you were working in the national defence, was there a JNA unit
14 A. No. Prijedor, as such, did not have any active military forces.
15 Q. Is it true that the situation deteriorated after the proclamation
16 on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
17 A. And even before. In November 1991, there was some shooting.
18 There was a carpet of bullets in the streets when they returned from the
19 Croatian front. Things worsened around the 4th of November, 1991.
20 Q. Well, what about the well-known statements by Alija Izetbegovic on
21 the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina? When were they made? Was it
22 before the 4th of November or after that?
23 A. Statements, yes. But these were just statements. There were
24 statements by Karadzic that one people would disappear from the face of
25 the earth too.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Very well. You know that the formation of an independent
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina was the aspiration of the Muslim population.
3 A. Of the non-Serb population.
4 Q. You are familiar with the Izetbegovic's statement that peace would
5 be sacrificed for an independent Bosnia?
6 A. I don't remember that.
7 Q. Reactions to all this started in November; is that right?
8 A. We had a mobilisation before that of the reserve forces and
9 sending them to Croatia. Strange things were happening. The Muslims
10 didn't go to the Croatian front either.
11 Q. Very well, Mr. Mesanovic. Now, tell me, please, what do you know
12 about the organisation of paramilitary units in those days by the
13 Patriotic League and other paramilitary formations of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
14 A. I'm unable to answer that question because I don't know.
15 Q. But you do know, for instance, that at the time of the events you
16 are testifying about, there were several thousand armed members of Muslim
17 forces in Kozarac, for instance?
18 A. I wouldn't say that they were that many. There was a TO unit of
19 Kozarac, but they didn't number several thousand.
20 Q. Well, there was information about this.
21 A. Simply I don't know that, because those were the Territorial
22 Defence. I was in the civilian Secretariat for National Defence.
23 Q. Do you know anything at all about the formation of paramilitary
25 A. No, because I wasn't involved for a moment, and I had no knowledge
1 of it.
2 Q. You don't know anything about the collection of weapons?
3 A. Yes, I do know about the collection of weapons as announced by
4 Radio Prijedor. I'm aware of the proclamations to hand in side weapons,
5 personal weapons, including pistols. Everything needed to be handed in.
6 I do know that.
7 Q. I am asking you about the arming, not the disarming.
8 A. Yes, I do know about the arming of Serbs in Prijedor.
9 Q. But you don't know anything about the arming of Muslims?
10 A. I lived in Prijedor, and I didn't live in the surrounding
11 villages, so I don't know that. And I know that weapons were distributed
12 publicly even to children in Prijedor in the spring of 1992. And I also
13 think that there is a figure as to how many weapons were seized from the
14 Muslims. I think this was a hundred or so. I saw the data in this
16 Q. Very well. When you're talking about the arming of Serbs, were
17 they arming themselves for the purpose of self-defence or for some other
19 A. It was -- it proved to be for some other reasons because they had
20 no need for self-defence.
21 Q. And you saw this dispatch from Alija Delimustafic. How can you
22 say that they had no need to defend themselves?
23 A. I think the area in which I lived there was that no need for an
24 indication of a need for self-defence.
25 Q. But it was peaceful until the dispatch arrived ordering attacks on
1 the military. Tell me, now can this function, as you just explained, that
2 you started receiving orders via Knin?
3 A. Yes. I can't explain that. Maybe you can explain it because you
4 were in the top leadership at the time.
5 Q. I believe that that is not true. That is why I'm asking you.
6 A. I don't know what I could say to that.
7 Q. Well, you say that by order of the federal government all the
8 weapons were taken from the local offices of the TO and placed under JNA
10 A. You know that the TO staffs were abolished and the weapons were
11 taken over by military territorial bodies.
12 Q. Very well. And do you know that on the 29th of May, 1990, so this
13 was prior to any kind of conflict, the 29th of May, of 1990, a decision
14 was taken by the Presidency of Yugoslavia on the takeover of weapons and
15 military equipment of the TO and their storage in JNA warehouses,
16 precisely to avoid uncontrolled use of such weapons and this applied to
17 the whole of Yugoslavia, that all the republics of Yugoslavia had to do
18 this, and they did?
19 A. Yes. And after that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia happened. Once
20 the weapons were taken from TO units.
21 Q. They were not taken, they were placed under JNA control, and this
22 happened in Serbia as well.
23 A. You call it what you like. I didn't even have an official pistol.
24 It was taken away from me in 1992. It was a 7.62 millimetre pistol.
25 Q. Is it true that the -- working in the Zarko Zgonjanin barracks was
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 not delivered a part of the weapons that should have been delivered to it?
2 A. We didn't have an active military in Prijedor, only the reserve
4 Q. But there was a barracks?
5 A. Yes, but there were no conscripts there, only the officers.
6 Q. And these officers didn't engage in any kind of wartime
7 activities. It was a commission that should have taken over the weapons
8 following orders of the Presidency of the SFRY. Isn't that right?
9 A. It was not a commission. The barracks always had a certain number
10 of active-duty officers who made up the staff of the unit that was being
11 established for a certain purpose. So it wasn't a commission of any kind.
12 They were just people there who were there parallelly. They had the same
13 function, organisationally speaking, as I did in the civilian section.
14 The regiment commander was the barracks commander at that time, and all
15 the other administrative employees, finance and so on, that was something
16 else. But there were no soldiers. When I say "soldiers," I mean the
17 young men doing their military service in the JNA.
18 Q. All right. Is it true that the Party of Democratic Action and
19 Izetbegovic himself at the beginning of 1991 made the decision that
20 Muslims should not go to the JNA and that he called all the soldiers and
21 officers born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, appealed to them to leave the JNA and
22 also prevented further recruitment of the JNA; is that right?
23 A. I know about an order not to respond to the reserve force and not
24 to respond to mobilisation so that they shouldn't be sent to the front in
25 Croatia. I know about that.
1 Now, we regularly enrolled in the JNA up to a certain month but
2 not afterwards. I can't remember the exact time. After what went on in
3 Croatia, they were no longer sent to the JNA and Croatia and Bosnia and
4 Slovenia, I think, too.
5 Q. Is it true that the Party of Democratic Action, the SDA party,
6 through its representatives appealed to the Muslims of Prijedor not to
7 respond to the appeal launched by the JNA?
8 A. Let me repeat. I wasn't a member of the Party of Democratic
9 Action at all, the SDA.
10 Q. But you know about their appeal?
11 A. I can't tell you about that either. I know there were rumours to
12 that effect. Now, whether it was the party's official position, I can't
13 say because I wasn't a member of that party.
14 Q. All right. Do you know that on the 12th of April, 1992, Alija
15 Izetbegovic ordered an all-out attack on JNA barracks?
16 A. No.
17 Q. All right. While you were working in Prijedor, you say on page 3
18 of your statement, the last paragraph, up until the 22nd of May, nothing
19 was going on in Prijedor.
20 A. Except for what happened on the 4th of May, I think, and that was
21 the killing -- the killing that took place in Dubica when three Muslims
22 were taken out of a regular bus line and this man was killed, and after
23 that a curfew was enforced.
24 Q. Yes. That is borne out by my information too. It was linked to
25 the killing of a soldier on the previous day, and then somebody out of
1 retaliation killed those three Muslims, and in order to prevent further
2 violence, a curfew was introduced which applied to everyone. Isn't that
4 A. Yes. As far as I was concerned, I didn't go out. I don't know
5 whether it applied to everybody, though, because you could hear shooting
6 after 10.00 p.m., and songs were sung, cafes were open, and underneath my
7 own window there was an all-night cafe.
8 Q. All right. Now since you're talking about the stay in Omarska and
9 you say that the white house was reserved for people from Kozarac, all
10 those who had taken part in the attack on Prijedor; is that right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. So there was an attack on Prijedor.
13 A. That's what they said. Because the question was why was I in
15 Q. Well, we'll come to that too. Didn't you confirm a moment ago
16 that on the 22nd of May there was a killing that took place at the -- at a
17 checkpoint by Muslim forces?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And you say that one man was killed, but my information tells me
20 that four soldiers were killed, and of those four, two were Croats and two
21 were Serbs.
22 A. The on-site investigation was conducted by the Serbs, so the
23 reports are drafted as befits that side.
24 Q. Now, we're not talking about an on-site investigation. That's not
25 the point. But the point is the document that I have in my possession,
1 perhaps you're going to say that somebody was accused and charged after he
2 was killed. And this is an official report that said that Amer Ceric was
3 apprehended. The 10th of June, 1992, is the date. And then it goes on to
4 say that in the village of Hambarine, two uniformed Serbs were killed who
5 were passing by in a car together with two Croats who were wounded. And
6 then it goes on to say,"Dado told me that the man was killed by someone
7 called Siki and that his real surname was Sikiric because he stopped a
8 soldiers' patrol in Hambarine."
9 And there's a lengthy statement to follow which speaks about the
10 whole event, and I think that it can be tendered into evidence as an
12 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it first. Yes. If the witness
13 would take a brief look at that and whether he can assist us or not.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Amer Ceric was killed. His father
15 is Jusuf and works in the Nafta gas company. And the name rang a bell
16 but, yes, he was killed after the statement. Mesic Halil, killed in
17 Omarska, and he was going to make a film about the attack on Prijedor. He
18 was killed after that.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Who killed one man and who killed the other? Do you have any
21 information about that?
22 A. Who killed them all. But Amir and Halim and Muhamed and all the
23 rest of them. Who killed them?
24 Q. Well, during the Muslim attack on Prijedor, according to what a
25 witness said here before you, 17 Serb policemen were killed. So who
1 killed them?
2 A. I couldn't tell you who killed them.
3 Q. But I assume you know that they were killed, because they were
5 A. They were policemen mostly from Bosanski Novi. Do you know that?
6 That most of the policemen were from Bosanski Novi? Now, what were they
7 doing in Prijedor on that morning and where were they killed? Were they
8 killed in Prijedor or somewhere else.
9 Q. Well, Mr. Mesanovic, as far as my information tells me, they were
10 killed during the Muslim attack on Prijedor, and you say you lived in
11 Prijedor throughout and that you knew about the attack?
12 A. Yes, I did hear shooting that morning, and it went on until noon.
13 And amongst them was my uncle with two of his sons. One of them is in
14 Australia and the other is in Switzerland. The house was razed to the
15 ground. It is across the road from Radio Prijedor on the pretext that the
16 attack came from this house and that it was launched by my uncle and two
17 sons, and he doesn't know about the whereabouts of his first son because
18 it was a son from a first marriage, but it is true that the house no
19 longer exists and it used to be across the road from Radio Prijedor.
20 Q. When was the house destroyed?
21 A. It was destroyed during the attack on Prijedor.
22 Q. And the attack on Prijedor was conducted by Muslim forces, was it
24 A. I don't know that. And my uncle was not in Prijedor at the time,
25 and the Tribunal can check that out. When my uncle and his son left for
1 Switzerland and when the first son disappeared and is probably living in
2 Australia but he haven't heard from him for 30 years. So official police
3 reports say that my uncle and the two sons worked in Prijedor, which is
4 not true, and the house was razed to the ground, and there were two shops
5 underneath it.
6 Q. I don't know about that.
7 A. Well, I'm telling you.
8 Q. When those soldiers were killed at the checkpoint, do you know
9 that in fact, Aziz Aliskovic and Crljenkovic, Sikiric, Ferid, and the
10 others were there and Mujadzic, Mirsad and Esef Crnkic joined them later,
11 as well as Husein Crkic, Jasmin Beharolic [phoen], Husa Pasic, Emir Paltak
12 and others.
13 A. I can't answer that. I don't know who came. I just heard that
14 Aziz Aliskovic was there but I don't know about the others. I think he
15 was from Biscani or Jugovci or somewhere like that.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It's time now for an adjournment. Before we do,
17 do you want the witness to produce this document or other that you
18 referred to? Do you want it produced? Do you want it, Mr. Milosevic?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, produced it. Very well. We'll give it the next
21 number for identification.
22 THE REGISTRAR: D236, Your Honours, marked for identification.
23 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes. We will remind
24 the witness, Mr. Mesanovic, not to speak to anybody about your evidence
25 until it's over, please.
1 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.
2 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.
4 JUDGE MAY: Fifteen minutes left, Mr. Milosevic. Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'll do my best to use them
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Is it true that after the killing at the checkpoint that the
9 Muslim forces did not want to hand over the killers and that an appeal was
10 made for them to hand over the perpetrators of the crime? The appeal was
11 made over the radio.
12 A. I don't know that that happened. All I know was that they asked
13 weapons to be surrendered.
14 Q. Is it true that the army took action only afterwards because they
15 wanted to block off that checkpoint, not to prevent any repetitions?
16 A. Well, two tanks of the Intervention Platoon from the Zarko
17 Zrenjanin barracks passed by that night.
18 Q. You mean after the killing at the checkpoint?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Is it true that two days after this event, that is to say on the
21 24th of May, in Jakupovici from a military checkpoint the army was sent
22 off and that the military column was shot at?
23 A. The same as in Hambarine, the cause for action.
24 Q. You mentioned a certain Zeljaja who threatened to raze Kozarac to
25 the ground. Is that a man from your local area?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. No.
2 Q. Where is he from?
3 A. From the surrounds of Sarajevo. And he came to replace Bosko
4 Divljak [phoen] to organise mobilisation and organisation with the
5 platoon. I think he was captain first class and later received the rank
6 of major.
7 Q. Is it true that the main road from Banja Luka to Prijedor was
8 blocked for a length of 15 kilometres?
9 A. No.
10 Q. And the checkpoint was set up by members of the Patriotic League
11 and the TO and the 3rd of May, 1992, as early as that; is that right?
12 A. The checkpoint was in Kozarac. I don't know where else it could
13 have been. After Kozarac, you have Serb villages, Lamovita, Omarska, and
14 so on.
15 Q. Yes. And all that was blocked; is that right?
16 A. Yes, that's right, but the -- that's what the Serb authorities
18 Q. You don't know about that?
19 A. Well, I wasn't there.
20 Q. Now, do you know that Sead Cirkin organised an attack on the
21 military column and he was the commander of the Green Berets in Kozarac?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Is it true that in Jakupovici the Muslims killed a soldier named
24 Zgonjanin with a sniper and set fire to a tank?
25 A. I heard about that.
1 Q. Is it true that the fighting went on for two days?
2 A. No.
3 Q. What is true then?
4 A. What is true is that they used multiple barrel rocket launchers
5 for two days to fire and if you respond with a shell when a bullet is
6 fired, then that's not a proper fight.
7 Q. All right. But the Muslims attacked on the 30th of May; is that
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Do you know that at Kurevo and Carakovo, Captain Muhic, Suad
11 Halilovic, Kemo Alagic, and Slavko Acimovic prepared and trained men and
12 devised a tactical attack for Prijedor?
13 A. All I know is that Acimovic was killed in Omarska.
14 Q. And do you remember that the group of Alagic, Kemo, and Suadic
15 nicknamed Suhi had the task of attacking from the bridge and attacking the
17 A. No.
18 Q. And do you know that Slavko Acimovic's group under the command of
19 Captain Muhic attacked the building and assumed control of the town?
20 A. No. I wasn't in the group for me to be able no know what
21 assignments who had, nor did I take part in the perpetration of any plan.
22 Q. Do you remember that from the direction of Puharska, for example,
23 where the 4th group started out to take over the bypass that a young man
24 was killed there?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Do you know the commander of the group whose name was Kemo Alagic
2 and his nickname was Divljak?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Did you hear that the 3rd group was commanded by man called
5 Rizvanovic and the fourth by Izet Mesic, Hadzija?
6 A. I knew Hadzija by sight but I don't know which group he commanded.
7 Q. According to you, how many Serb policemen were killed on the
9 A. I think it was the number you mentioned.
10 Q. All right. Fine. Now, do you know that a group of -- a group
11 escaped towards Sredici [phoen], Biscani, Kalajevo, and Donja Ljubija?
12 A. No, I don't know that.
13 Q. Do you know that that group, the one that secretly dispersed, were
14 given the task of resting up and three days later on the 2nd of June too
15 have a meeting in Studenac near Sisin Hrast [phoen] or Kurevo in order to
16 ascertain the plans of attack on Ljubija and the police station there?
17 A. No.
18 Q. You yourself were arrested on the 24th of June; is that right?
19 A. Yes, but I didn't leave my house until the 15th or 16th of June.
20 I didn't dare leave my house.
21 Q. You were apprehended by a policeman what's surname was Kovacevic
22 whom you knew from Prijedor?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did he tell you he was arresting you because somebody who had been
25 arrested mentioned you in one of their statements and this was to be
1 checked out?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You were first of all put up at that so-called white house and
4 then were you were transferred to the staklenik [phoen], the glass house;
5 is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Did Zeljko Meakic transfer you?
8 A. Yes, correct.
9 Q. Zeljko Meakic told you that the statement you gave during your
10 interrogations was not a good one and that you ought to amended it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Is it true that Meakic wanted to help you?
13 A. Yes, correct.
14 Q. You say that Meakic was the commander of the Omarska camp.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. However, you know that that is not correct.
17 A. No, no, that is correct. That is correct, sir. And you forgot to
18 say something. Zeljko Meakic had family ties with me. We were family; my
19 brother married his sister. So Zeljko was the commander throughout the
20 whole time.
21 Q. According to my information, he couldn't have been commander
22 because there were people who were senior to him. He might have been in
23 command of the group providing security, but he wasn't the camp commander.
24 A. He was the captain, the commander of the guards who beat people,
25 killed people and took people off for interrogation.
1 Q. All right. Now is it true that Meakic did not kill anyone or beat
2 anyone or take anyone off for interrogation?
3 A. I didn't see anything like that, but if he was the main person in
4 command, then I see no reason why he should do that, why that would be his
6 Q. That's what I'm saying. I'm saying that he wasn't the main person
7 in command and that is a wrong piece of information.
8 A. I know two men who were there: Ranko Mijic, the head of the
9 inspectors, and Zeljko Meakic, who was the chief. Now you can call him
10 what you like, whether of security for the camp or the detainees, I
11 wouldn't know, I can't say. I don't know what happened round about,
12 whether there was any third formation there, military, civilian or
13 whatever. Police or whatever.
14 Q. All right. According to my information, the War Presidency of the
15 Prijedor municipality made a decision according to which the members of
16 the reserve police force was to be decreased to provide security for
17 Keraterm, Trnopolje, Omarska to be taken over by the army but the army
18 refused to take on the obligation of providing security for those camps.
19 Do you know about that?
20 A. No.
21 Q. All of these people, ones that you mention in any capacity
22 whatsoever, whether being in the police force or in those camps were
23 people from your local area; is that right?
24 A. Well, from the Prijedor municipality. I don't know all the
25 people, but I know the people that I mentioned and Prijedor municipality,
1 when I came to Omarska and I heard from the inmates who came before me
2 because I came later on 24 hour -- days later in fact, and I heard from
3 them there were groups there and the army was Banja Luka Banija or
4 wherever. I really can't say.
5 Q. All right, you were released from Omarska on the 6th of August and
6 sent to Trnopolje from which you were released on the 7th of August?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. And then you went home to Prijedor; is that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Is it also true that after 24 hours in Prijedor, you went to
11 Petrov Gaj precisely to the house of the Zeljko Meakic family?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And you spent the next two and a half months there; is that right?
14 A. Until the 16th or 17th of September.
15 Q. You were there together with Zeljko Meakic's family, his wife and
16 child; is that right?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Who were you with then?
19 A. With the parents of my sister-in-law, and that is Zeljko's cousin
20 from the house across the road.
21 Q. So Meakic protected you; is that right?
22 A. I don't know from what.
23 Q. Is it true that Meakic got a forged identity card for you?
24 A. No. It is my sister-in-law from Novi Sad who obtained that ID for
1 Q. Meakic is a relative of yours.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. But this emanates from page 3, paragraph 5 of your statement. A
4 moment ago you said that you never saw Meakic hitting anyone or engaging
5 in any kind of violence.
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. The same applies to Kvocka?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. So neither Meakic nor Kvocka never hit anyone nor abused anyone or
10 engaged in any kind of violence?
11 A. That is what I saw and that's what I said at the trial of Kvocka
12 and others.
13 Q. And you were wife is a Serb?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. And after all this suffering, you found shelter and safety in
16 Serbia; is that right?
17 A. With a Serbian identity card that was the only way.
18 Q. Now, tell me, if you had wanted to, couldn't you have gone to the
19 territory under the control of the BH army?
20 A. Along which route?
21 Q. Any route going through the far west of Bosnia-Herzegovina to
23 A. Everything was under Serb control. You know that well. The only
24 route was through Serb-held territory with a false ID in Zdravko Lukic's
1 Q. Perhaps you didn't go to territory under Muslim control so as not
2 to come under the mobilisation order.
3 A. No. I never gave that a thought, because I had escaped from hell,
4 and I was thinking of how to save my family and pull them out.
5 Q. And you did, didn't you? You went to Serbia, and you stayed in
6 Serbia for how long?
7 A. Four days.
8 Q. And after that you went to Germany?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you have any problems in Serbia?
11 A. As a Serb, no.
12 Q. Do you know any Muslim who had problems in Serbia?
13 A. No.
14 Q. In your statement, you mentioned a certain Zoran Zigic.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Is it true that he was a local criminal?
17 A. I wouldn't describe him in those terms. Zoran Zigic grew up with
18 me in the same part of town. We were even together for our tonsils to be
19 operated. He had his life. I have mine. Now, whether he was a criminal,
20 I wouldn't really tell you.
21 Q. I have here a document dated the 1st of July, 1992, and it says:
22 "Instructions for the apprehension of Zoran Zigic to the prison
23 administration in Banja Luka, public security service in Prijedor, the 1st
24 of July, 1992, Zigic Zoran," et cetera, "from Prijedor," his address, "to
25 be arrested because of reasonable grounds to believe that he received
1 money, and it is in this connection that the order is issued for him to be
3 The Secretariat of the Internal Affairs in Prijedor, public
4 prosecutor informs under this number that he had started -- that he issued
5 a request for investigating procedures against Zoran Zigic for the
6 criminal act of receiving bribes.
7 So this is a person who did engage in criminal activity.
8 A. You read that out. Zoran Zigic was a taxi driver. Why could he
9 have received a bribe as a taxi driver?
10 Q. I don't know anything about that, but I have this document. You
11 can have a look at it.
12 A. I don't think it's necessary. This was on July 1st. I was in
14 Q. But you mentioned him in your statement?
15 A. Yes, I know him.
16 Q. And my question was whether he was a local criminal, and you said
18 A. There was a killing that he was charged with, but he was
19 acquitted. So I can't say that he was a criminal if the court acquitted
21 Q. And is it true that you received a special pass from Simo Drljaca
22 on the basis of which you were able to move around after the curfew?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Tell me, since a moment ago that you said you were not able to
25 move around, did you move about or did you not? That is one question.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 And my second question, why did you receive that special pass? What were
2 you doing? What were the activities you were engaged in?
3 JUDGE MAY: These must be the last questions. Yes.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did move about from my house to my
5 work in the presence of the driver of the Secretariat of National Defence,
6 Branko Milosevic. I needed this permission because I said I lived and
7 grew up in that town, and everyone knew who I was, and I just had confirm
8 that with a letter signed by Simo Drljaca, who was the big boss in
9 Prijedor. I never moved around alone without this driver who was armed
10 and with the presence of the head of the military territorial body,
11 Cedomir Zitovac, who was also armed, because the computer wasn't working
12 and we had to go to Zitopromet. And there were checkpoints all over town
13 at which we would be stopped. If one of the local Serbs recognised me, it
14 was necessary for me to show them this pass signed by Simo Drljaca and
15 that I wasn't driving around for the fun of it.
16 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just have a few
19 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mesanovic, you said a moment ago that via
21 Serbia you went to Germany, and you stayed there until when?
22 A. Until I went to a third country.
23 Q. Very well, but you also said during the examination-in-chief that
24 your uncle went to Australia and his children.
25 A. One son to Australia, and my son [as interpreted] and uncle went
1 to Switzerland in 1991. His son may have gone in 1990, but my uncle in
3 Q. They went there directly from Bosnia?
4 A. They went to work there as medical technicians.
5 Q. But I would like to know how many Muslims left Bosnia in the same
6 way as you did via Serbia and went abroad.
7 A. I couldn't tell you. I know that Emir Puskar used the same kind
8 of ID card under the same name and left, because that ID card was sent
9 back to Prijedor.
10 Q. About the events you testified about in the camp, you said that
11 you heard shots one night.
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. You said that that night that the fog was very thick and it lasted
14 all night.
15 A. Until morning.
16 Q. Until what time?
17 A. Until about 5.00 or 4.30.
18 Q. And how far was the white house from where the shots were heard?
19 A. Maybe some 50 metres.
20 Q. Could you explain to the Judges, since you mentioned that that
21 night 150 men were killed, on what basis did you come to that number?
22 A. That was the number that entered the white house as we counted
23 them when they came off the buses.
24 Q. Who counted them?
25 A. Not just me but those of us who were in the glass house.
1 Q. And why did you count those men?
2 A. Simply to know how many of us were there and how many had arrived.
3 Q. Yes, but you said in your statement that, "Later when I was in
4 Trnopolje, I learned that that night 150 men had been killed."
5 A. But I'm talking about Omarska, not Keraterm.
6 Q. And 150 were killed in Keraterm as well?
7 A. I heard that. Even Radio Prijedor announced that this was an
8 escape attempt in all those camps.
9 Q. And that that night in each of those camps that many people were
10 killed. So you're just assuming it?
11 A. Yes. Well, there were more than a hundred.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Does the Prosecution have any questions?
14 MR. KHAN: I'd just like to ask the witness a couple of questions.
15 Re-examined by Mr. Khan:
16 Q. Now, according to the accused, this dispatch was received on the
17 29th of April and then by 5 a.m. the next morning, the Serbian authority
18 had assumed power. Did you observe or notice anything to indicate that
19 the Serb community were getting ready to take over power before 29th of
21 A. No.
22 Q. And finally, can you confirm just for clarity whether there were
23 one or two killing incidents at camps? Were they separate instances that
24 you mentioned at Omarska and Keraterm, or only one?
25 A. I don't understand the question. In Omarska, as I said, that was
1 the first time that we heard shots. And I saw the killing of Crnalic. I
2 don't know his first name. He was killed in front of the white house.
3 That is the only shooting that I saw and heard, but in the night between
4 the 25th and the 26th, between Thursday and Friday, with Esad Sadikovic
5 and another two guys, I took out Mehmedalija Sarajlic, his body, and we
6 left him near the fence next to the red house. That is where they were
7 killed, beaten up to death. And they would be left there for days
8 sometimes, and then a yellow truck would take them away in the morning.
9 We used to call it Zuco. Because if someone were to see a killing, he
10 would just see it and that would be it.
11 MR. KHAN: No further questions.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. The Prosecutor's
13 question as to whether it was known, it wasn't known except that a new
14 parallel authority was established. That is the Serb Assembly was formed
15 in March, before the takeover. And all the administrative bodies of the
16 municipality existed in parallel. All the secretariats. They were --
17 there were all the directors who would replace the Muslims. And this was
18 even announced on Prijedor radio, the Serbian Assembly of Prijedor.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let us thank the witness for coming here to give
20 his evidence. We're grateful. It's now concluded. Mr. Mesanovic, if you
21 would like to leave now. Thank you.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you too.
23 [The witness withdrew]
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next witness is Dr. Ton Zwaan whose
1 report of November 2003 has been served. He's actually just outside the
2 door, so he can be brought in immediately. The Chamber has seen his
3 report already.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 JUDGE MAY: We have in mind, so it should be plain that we will
6 hear some brief questions by the Prosecution. We allow one hearing as far
7 as the accused is concerned. If he wishes to ask that length of question
8 of this witness.
9 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Ms. Aptel, who the Chamber hasn't
10 seen before, and Mrs. Tromp, who the Chamber has seen before, will be in
11 court, they having been involved in the preparation of this evidence. And
12 the Chamber should also have the curriculum vitae of Dr. Zwaan, where it
13 was served a couple of days after the report.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would please take his usual
16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
17 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd like to take a seat.
19 WITNESS: TON ZWAAN
20 Examined by Mr. Nice:
21 Q. Full name, please sir?
22 A. Anthony Zwaan.
23 Q. And Dr. Zwaan we will come to your curriculum vitae in a minute,
24 but you're a social scientist, and is the position as follows, that you
25 were asked by the Office of the Prosecutor to prepare a report on research
1 into genocides and other mass crimes which target specific groups?
2 A. Yes, that's correct.
3 Q. Such crimes or such events, if we use a neutral term, have only
4 been capable of being described as genocide since that word was coined in
5 the mid-twentieth century?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. But in fact have such events been the subject of academic study
8 before that word was coined?
9 A. Yes, certainly, but then other words were used like atrocities or
10 massacres or barbarous acts.
11 Q. Since the Second World War, has there been developing interest in
12 and research upon such events conducted by a wide range of social science
13 and other disciplines?
14 A. Yeah, that's correct, especially since the 1980s. The field,
15 so-called field of genocide studies has developed in which historians and
16 social scientist are active.
17 Q. If you could keep your voice up a little bit although, of course,
18 it's all amplified so we can hear you. You are now based at the recently
19 opened centre for Holocaust studies in Amsterdam?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And that centre is not unique. It's one of several or many
22 similar centres around the world researching into these events.
23 A. That's correct, yes.
24 Q. With that in mind, then, very briefly your curriculum vitae which
25 has been made available to the Court, the accused, and the amici, you set
1 out your history since 1970 as an academic, your qualifications most
2 recently being your doctorate in the year 2001 at Amsterdam, doctorate
3 being in civilisation and decivilisation, studies on state formation and
4 violence, nationalism and persecution.
5 A. That's correct, yes.
6 Q. You set out the other publications under your name. In the report
7 for this Chamber, were you asked specifically to omit all reference or any
8 reference to the former Yugoslavia?
9 A. Yes, I was asked that.
10 Q. And to draw the report on the basis of other research, and
11 focusing in particular on four events known as genocides in the 20th
12 century, the Armenian, the Nazi, Rwanda, and Cambodia?
13 A. Yes, that's correct.
14 Q. The underlying or one of the underlying interests and problems
15 that academics in your field are concerned with is how it comes about that
16 neighbour can land up killing neighbour, colleague, colleague, apparently
17 in pursuit of some other objective.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And to do so on a large scale?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Your study is focused by reference to earlier and other events on
22 whether there are common characteristics that can be discerned, whether
23 there are conclusions that can be drawn from such characteristics when
24 they occur?
25 A. Yes, I would agree to that.
1 Q. Your report, and I look now at the index, is in eight sections of
2 which the eighth is a summary of conclusions.
3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it's always helpful for those viewing to
4 have as good an understanding as they can of material dealt with in
5 writing. With the Court's leave, might page 38 and 39 as appropriate, the
6 summary, be laid on the overhead projector? And I have about one or two
7 questions to ask per sector, and I'll link the questions to the
8 conclusions that are to be found. If that's an acceptable course, I'd ask
9 the usher to do that.
10 Q. The first part of your report is by way of introduction, and if
11 goes from pages 3 to 7. Nothing I need cover with you in that.
12 Starting at page 7 and under, as it were, chapter 1 of your
13 report, you deal with the definitions and discussions of the term genocide
14 that has both a legal meaning, ultimately the only meaning of significance
15 here, but has a broader use and connotation; correct?
16 A. Yes, that's correct. I focused on historical and social scientist
18 Q. Very well. At your conclusion in relation to this part, we can
19 see on the passage on the overhead projector that you make the point
20 that genocide and other en masse crimes targeting specific groups should
21 be distinguished from war and civil war, although we should recognise that
22 war or civil war may contribute to the development of genocidal processes.
23 At page 11 of your report, and within this section, you draw to
24 our attention the problem, if it is a problem, of the Holocaust of being
25 the standard model. Could you just amplify that in a sentence for so for
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 A. Well, the murder of the Jews was the basis for drawing up the
3 United Nations Convention, and I think because it's the case of genocide
4 about which most people know quite something. It has become, so to speak,
5 the model against which people measure other or new cases of genocide, and
6 that has some advantages but also some disadvantages.
7 Q. The disadvantage being related to the scale of events?
8 A. Among other thing being related to the scales, yes, but I think
9 people tend to measure, unwittingly or wittingly, new cases or other cases
10 of genocide against the standard model, and then might easily conclude
11 that these new cases are not really cases or are not so very serious
13 Q. Although they may in fact demonstrate to the social scientist the
14 same constellation of events and circumstances that can be found in
15 genocides of the larger type?
16 A. Yeah, I would prefer here the term similar.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: On the scale, what are some of the other factors
18 that make the 1945 phenomenon not necessarily a good example, Witness.
19 THE WITNESS: I think that depends on what you want to argue. I
20 think it is a very important case to study over and over again, the murder
21 of the Jews but it is also, like every other case, a unique case with
22 certain unique features and then there are also some similarities, and
23 what I'm after in this report is looking for similar conditions and
24 similar causative mechanisms.
25 MR. NICE: It may be -- if I can add to His Honour's question. I
1 don't know if you wanted to -- am I cutting across Your Honour?
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not at all, no.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. It may be in amplification of that answer and to assist His Honour
5 you could, if it's helpful or appropriate, identify some of the
6 characteristics of the 1945 event that are not to be found generally and
7 are unique?
8 A. Well, a very important fact to my mind is that the Nazis went for
9 the complete genocide of every Jew within the reach of the German
10 authorities, and in other cases that does not have to be the case or is
11 not happened -- has not happened in that way. So it was -- it was an
12 effort at the really complete genocide, and that's one of the exceptional
14 Q. Within this same section of your report at paragraph 12, you set
15 out a list of conditions identified by a fellow academic, Helen Fein, and
16 it may be that the usher, as well as leaving the final page on the
17 overhead projector, can lay on other pages from time to time,
18 paragraph 12, coming your way.
19 This academic identified continuity of attacks by perpetrators,
20 collective organisation of perpetrators, victims selected by membership of
21 a group and being defenseless in circumstances where murder is favourably
22 sanctioned by the perpetrators as some of the identifying characteristics.
23 A. Yes, you can use these characteristics or these criteria to look
24 at specific cases and see whether they fit, yes or no.
25 Q. Having identified her standard or unexceptional list, you in fact
1 set out your report in slightly different headings, but let -- can you
2 help us with this: Your approach, as far as you can judge it, is it
3 within the main body of present research into these events or would it in
4 any way be eccentric or extreme?
5 A. No. I've done my best to formulate, let's say, the general
6 consensus within the field with regard to conditions and processes. So I
7 wouldn't judge it eccentric at all.
8 Q. Let's turn, then, to part 2 of your report which starts at page 13
9 and goes only to page 15, headed war, civil war, and genocidal crimes. It
10 finds its expression in your summary. Sorry. I already dealt with that
11 summary, I think.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. There's one point of -- I think you think great importance to be
14 found at paragraph 23 on page -- footnote 23 on page 14, and this is the
15 concept of monopoly of violence and its relationship to the monopoly of
16 taxation. Expand on that in a sentence or so, its significance for
17 potential perpetrators and victims and then we'll look at a modern
18 demonstrative example?
19 A. Well, I think the monopoly of violence is the most central
20 characteristic of any state and the monopoly of violence does several
21 things. It reserves the right to use violence to the state and usually
22 forbids it to groups of citizens. That's one aspect. Another aspect is
23 the formal basis of public order in the sense that the forces of monopoly
24 of violence, usually the police or military or judiciary, will take action
25 when groups of citizens or individual citizens will take recourse to
1 violence so the monopoly of violence is the guarantee of public order. I
2 think I should leave --
3 Q. Its relationship with the monopoly of taxation is probably obvious
4 but a sentence on that?
5 A. Well, they're both closely intertwined. If you do not have a
6 monopoly on violence you will not be able to levy taxes. And the other
7 way around. If you don't have taxes, you are not able to pay for a
8 monopoly of violence.
9 Q. Once the monopoly of violence is broken, penetrated by other
10 forces, disintegrates or whatever, what is the consequence for the sense
11 of impunity in wrongdoers? What is the consequence in vulnerability for
12 potential victims?
13 A. Well, if the monopoly of violence is not functioning any more or
14 when certain groups are deliberately excluded from the protection of
15 monopoly of violence, that will mean that some groups in society or some
16 organisations might take recourse to violence for their own private ends.
17 Maybe I could give as an example the functioning of the Mafia in Italy and
18 other countries. Mafia functions there where they can take recourse to
19 private uses of violence which a state is not able to repress or contain,
20 and similarly, in genocidal situations, the state will not try any more to
21 contain violence for certain political ends.
22 Q. Countries may like to think of themselves as absolutely civilised,
23 and the notion that they are dependent on something called or something
24 characterised as a monopoly of violence may be unappealing, but was there
25 example in a country that are proud of its civilisation, Canada, recently
1 that demonstrates exactly what you're saying?
2 A. Yes. When the police decided to go on strike there, you saw in a
3 very short period of time a fast increase in the uses of violence and in
4 crime. There are other another example, for instance, when the central
5 lighting broke down in New York, as you may remember a few years ago.
6 Looting, plundering and other criminal activities certainly increased.
7 So I could -- if I -- if I may, I could say the civilisation of a
8 society and also the civilised behaviour between people depends very much
9 on the guarantee of security, and security is guaranteed by an monopoly of
11 Q. I think the Canadian example again, lawlessness broke out within
12 hours, not days. Literally within hours?
13 A. Within hours, yes.
14 Q. Part 3 of your report from pages 15 to 17, headed crisis and
15 genocidal crimes, finds reflection in your second conclusion in the
16 summary to the effect that such crimes can only develop and take place
17 under conditions of serious and enduring crisis, destabilisation -- third
18 sentence the state concerned, polarisation processes, depacification and
19 increasing use of violence at the heart of such crises.
20 You address at paragraph 18 on page 15 the possibility that
21 genocides or crimes of mass targeting of groups can erupt spontaneously
22 from the bottom up as a normal aspect of society, and if so, what's your
23 conclusion according to all the research?
24 A. I think that just never happens. Genocide or genocidal crime is
25 a very exceptional thing in a society, and it never develops from the
1 bottom up nor out of the blue, so to speak, and that's why I've tried to
2 argue that to understand genocidal crimes or genocidal processes you have
3 to look at the crisis the whole society gets into before you can
4 understand what's happening.
5 Q. We turn now to part 4 of your report, which is between pages 17
6 and 21, finding expression in your conclusions in the third conclusion,
7 which is a long and central conclusion.
8 I'd like you to help us a little bit by expansion, perhaps, of
9 paragraph 29, and it may be this is a paragraph the usher could just lay
10 over the top of the conclusion for the time being, paragraph 29 on page
11 19. Can you link for us your conclusions about the monopoly of violence,
12 about factual dictatorships and impunity?
13 A. Yes. I will try to do that. Normally, the monopoly of violence
14 is under the command of central political authorities of a society so when
15 we have to do with situations in which genocidal crimes are developing, we
16 must conclude that the central authorities do no longer maintain the
17 monopoly of violence in a impersonal and lawful way, but that, in one way
18 or another, and this make take different forms, they have given
19 permission, directly or indirectly, to groups of perpetrators to go on
20 with certain forms of mass crime.
21 So there is a direct relation between the level of specification
22 of a society and the decisions central authorities make. I don't know if
23 I answered your question enough this way.
24 Q. Factual dictatorships?
25 A. It's very important for central authorities, for certain extreme
1 decisions, that they can dispose of enough power to make such decisions.
2 So that will mean two things. It will mean that they will try to -- to
3 withhold restraints from their own society and also that they will also
4 try to withhold restraints from other societies or other state
5 governments. So they will strive after a lot of power to put it simply to
6 be --
7 Q. Looking --
8 A. -- to be able --
9 Q. Looking at the particular events that you have considered, is
10 there any pattern of factual or de facto dictatorships being dressed up or
11 continuing to wear the clothing of democratic process?
12 A. One example I could think of is the sort of referenda Hitler used
13 to organise after he got power in 1933, in which he tried to get majority
14 votes from the German electorate for his policies and for certain
15 decisions. So I would say that there he tried, for instance, or the
16 National Socialist leadership tried, to show some democratic trappings to
17 what was already in fact already a dictatorship from the half -- halfway
18 through 1933. That would be an example.
19 Q. If we now focus, and this is the only time that I shall focus on a
20 paragraph in your report in detail, on paragraph 29 on the overhead
21 projector. Picking it up at the end of paragraph 28, you say how
22 sometimes under certain conditions - this is paragraph 28 - incidental
23 atrocities and massacres may result, or pogroms, but normally the state
24 and its law enforcement agencies, the police and the judiciary, and if
25 necessary the military, will contain, repress and sanction such forms of
2 You go on to say: "When the state authorities fail to do so, or
3 are not willing to do so, they are encouraging and contributing to the
4 development of a genocidal process. Such processes involve large numbers
5 of people as victims, and considerable numbers as perpetrators. That
6 shows again the crucial importance of the central political leadership in
7 committing genocidal crimes. Genocidal crimes are top-down affairs."
8 From the research into the events you considered and from the
9 learning of those and other such events, how clear are you on this
10 top-down conclusion?
11 A. I think I should state that we know of no case of genocide or a
12 genocidal process in which it had grown from bottom up. I think in all
13 cases I know of and other experts do too, you can draw the conclusion that
14 decisions of the central political and military authorities are of
15 decisive importance, whether a genocidal process developments, yes or no.
17 Q. And this conclusion -- we're using the word genocide but of course
18 the report relates to crimes, mass crimes, targeting individual groups or
19 groups that are picked on?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And that's your conclusion for that type of event?
22 A. Yes, certainly.
23 Q. If we look at the last part of this paragraph, you say as follows:
24 "From the researched cases of genocidal crimes in the 20th century,
25 structural and systematic series of forceful uprooting and violent events,
1 deportations and massacres over an extended area during an extended period
2 of time, the conclusion can be drawn that such crimes happen with
3 knowledge, approval, and involvement of the state authorities."
4 Is that an amplification of the conclusion you've just given me?
5 A. Yes, it is, it is.
6 Q. Does that in any way reflect the availability of information in
7 this part of the development of our world in contrast perhaps to analyses
8 that might have to be made of medieval, late medieval, or whatever you
9 like periods of our histories?
10 A. If you turn to earlier periods of history, you should recognise
11 that the structure of society was quite different from what it is now, so
12 you should specify then the conditions of the state and the monopoly of
13 violence at that time to understand the type of atrocities and massacres
14 which took place, for instance, at the end of the Middle Ages or in early
15 modern times, and they are partially different but also in these cases, I
16 think, the decision of the highest authorities in any society are of
17 crucial importance to understand large-scale violent crimes.
18 MR. NICE: If the usher would be good enough to remove that sheet
19 so we can see the conclusion of the summary paragraph, again the only one
20 I'm going to look at in detail.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask when you speak of the bottom up and the
22 top down phenomena, are you speaking principally about the genesis, the
23 start of the -- the beginning of the phenomenon? Because isn't there a
24 stage at which the two would coincide, would merge?
25 THE WITNESS: You're partly correct, I think. Once the decision
1 has been made that large-scale violence will not be stopped, it might be
2 so that certain groups from bottom down see opportunities or get impunity
3 to go on with their own mass crimes, violent crimes. Maybe I can offer
4 you an example. When the Germans occupied the eastern part of Poland, at
5 several locations, about 30 in all, local Polish leaders decided to
6 organise pogroms against the Jews, but that to my mind was only possible
7 because the German authorities, who had already initiated anti-Jewish
8 policies, gave them the opportunity to do so, but there you would have a
9 case in which you see a certain merging of large-scale violence from
10 bottom down with top -- top-down decisions or bottom-up and top-down
12 Did I answer your question?
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
14 MR. NICE:
15 Q. And I think you, in a sense, address this a little bit later, in
16 the next section or the next section but one, where we look at how these
17 processes develop. The summary of the passage you've just been dealing
18 with, the third conclusion, says that: "In the course of the crisis, a
19 radical and ruthless political elite may succeed in taking over the state
20 organisation. Political behaviours and decisions of this leadership may
21 be considered of decisive importance for the emergence of genocide. It
22 has been argued that a genocidal process does not develop from bottom up
23 but is typically top down although the precise involvement of the state
24 may take different forms. One corollary is that the highest state
25 authorities are always responsible for what happens during the genocidal
2 And then this: "Another corollary" - perhaps you'd just comment
3 on this last sentence and then we'll move on - "another corollary implies
4 that single acts of genocide should be considered against the background
5 of the prevalent power and authority structure within the state society
6 concerned." And it may be that that sentence can also connect to
7 His Honour's question. I'm not sure but could you amplify --
8 A. Yes, I certainly can. I'm convinced when you look at single
9 separate or isolated events during genocidal process that you will have
10 to -- if you want to understand these separate events, you will have to
11 connect them to a larger view of the power structure within the society
12 concerned, because many people on local and regional levels, for instance,
13 will only act in a violent way when they can be more or less sure that
14 they can get away with it and that they got some impunity. So that's
15 maybe --
16 Q. Thank you. Part 5 of your report between pages 21 and 26 is
17 headed, "The process of genocide, planning and the division of labour."
18 It's largely self-explanatory, and I don't need to ask you any questions
19 about it but one or couple -- save for two. At page 24, at the top of
20 page 24 - again this may, may a matter for you reflect back to His
21 Honour's question - line 3, you speak of genocides gathering speed like
22 flywheels, and that's a picturesque way of putting things. A sentence of
24 A. Well, I -- I used that image to convey the message that if you
25 look at the genocidal process and you look at the first phase or the
1 initial phase, you will usually find all sorts of obstacles or barriers
2 before getting it launched. It might be a very general decision of
3 central political authority to do away with such or such a category of
4 people, but then still the whole planning still has been -- has to be
5 done. Practical and realistic particular plans have to be drawn up, and
6 that will mean that initially a genocidal process will take time, energy,
7 investments to get going, but once it is organised and once it is running,
8 it might gather speed like a flywheel in the sense that it will be running
9 smoothly after some time and become routinised and it will -- people will
10 learn by doing, perpetrators will learn by doing, and they will find ways
11 and means to go on with genocidal campaign.
12 Q. Then following from that, the first two lines of paragraph 39 and
13 remembering that you said that there's no suggestion that these events
14 occur naturally in societies, or civilised societies, well, any societies,
15 you say that once under way they seldom or never be stopped by the same
16 people who set them in motion. This is your flywheel?
17 A. Yes, it's partly my flywheel, but it's also what has been said
18 under paragraph 38, that when people become involved in genocidal crimes
19 or mass crimes targeting specific groups, they will become involved in a
20 criminal career, and it's not usual for people who get into such a career
21 to have any further recourse to the law or to formal authority. So it
22 will be very difficult once they get in to stop, because they have to
23 cover up all the time what they have been doing, and they're connected to
24 each other also.
25 Q. And your conclusion, the fourth conclusion, puts it in a slightly
1 different way. It says that these events are usually -- the conclusion of
2 such events are usually brought about by forceful external intervention.
3 In any of the large events that you've particularly focused on, has there
4 been a process of natural cessation or has there always been --
5 A. No. In the four cases I have used as examples in this report,
6 they were all stopped from the outside by military intervention in
7 different ways, but it was never stopped by the perpetrators themselves.
8 Q. And at page 25 of the same section, paragraph 40 and then a line
9 from 42, you make the point in paragraph 40 that within the division of
10 labour you've covered in this part of your report, leadership
11 characteristically does or does not make detailed decisions about the
12 genocidal or similar process?
13 A. The top leadership usually only makes very general decisions and
14 thereby gives other people the means and the organisation and sometimes
15 also the money and the armed force to organise the process in a more
16 detailed way, in a more realistic way. We know, for instance, that
17 Hitler, to give that example, never witnessed any genocidal acts himself,
18 nor did he ever write down an order "kill all Jews," but we can be very
19 certain especially in discussions with Himmler and others, that he must
20 have stated the order, that is "kill all the Jews."
21 Q. Is that -- that is famous example -- or very famous exam. Is
22 there a reflection of that in the other of the cases you've studied?
23 A. Certainly. The facts are often difficult to ascertain, but we
24 know, for instance, that three main leaders of the Ottoman Empire at the
25 beginning of the First World War have decided that the Turkish state would
1 do away with the Armenian minority and also with a large part of the Greek
2 minority in Anatolia. Very often the evidence is circumstantial. Maybe I
3 could add that.
4 Q. And then at paragraph 42 of your report, the foot of the page, 25
5 and over to page 26, you make the point that the leadership, unlike the
6 lower-level perpetrators, typically are unlikely to be caught red-handed
7 or apprehended at all.
8 A. Well, the top leadership, at least as far as I know, very often
9 are aware of the extremist character of their decisions, and so they don't
10 leave traces usually. We don't have written orders in these different
11 cases that such-and-such category of people should become the victim of a
12 genocidal process. That's one of the reasons. One of the other reasons
13 is that in several cases, as you all know in Cambodia, for instance, or in
14 Indonesia in 1965, no process ever followed the happening of a genocidal
16 Q. Finally from the report and then one last question and I'm done,
17 but finally from the report, part 6 which is headed Genocidal Crimes and
18 Ideology, and which goes from page 26 to 31, nothing from the report
19 itself but drawing on that section of the report, what can you tell us,
20 please, about the significance of societies being divided in some way
21 before these crimes can be committed, about the use of propaganda, and
22 indeed about the perpetrating group casting itself as victim?
23 A. Well, a fundamental precondition for a genocidal process in a
24 society is that there are some divisions within the population. These
25 might be of an ethnic nature or a religious nature or a majority/minority,
1 but there should be some divisions.
2 Now, at a certain point in time, for instance by a radical elite,
3 these divisions might become a main point in an ideological stance which
4 might argue as follow -- as follows: We are threatened. We the national
5 majority, for instance, are threatened by certain minorities or other
6 groups. They do not belong to our nation. They should be excluded. And
7 in its most radical form, the conclusion might be they should be ousted of
8 our country or killed. And I think that's where ideology fulfils a very
9 important function and will also be actively used in propaganda to
10 convince part of the population, part of the perpetrators, to act with
11 violence against an innocent minority, for instance.
12 Q. Incidentally going back to His Honour Judge Robinson's question,
13 and paragraph 54 perhaps can pick up on this, although there can be this
14 consequence of a "top down" approach, others may, of course, be driven not
15 by those motives at all but might have entirely selfish objectives in the
16 crimes they commit. Isn't that right?
17 A. Yes, that's certainly correct. Research has shown that
18 participants in the perpetration of genocidal crimes harbour all sorts of
19 different motivations. Some might be devoted nationalists or devoted
20 national socialists, for instance in the German case. In other cases,
21 people might just be out for looting or plundering or money income. People
22 might want to make a career. But apart from these individual motivations,
23 I would emphasise, if I may, that the ideology gives a sort of overall
24 sense of direction to what should be done and imparts a sense of purpose
25 and intent to all the individual perpetrators apart from their personal
1 individual motivations which may be quite variated.
2 Q. Is the creation of a them and us culture characteristic,
3 essential, or what?
4 A. Yes, I think so. It's very important. It's very important that
5 the people of which the perpetrator wants to get rid are seen as "them"
6 and not "us." That's also connected in a dehumanising tendency to exclude
7 certain people from, let's say, the common universe of human obligation.
8 Q. And the need for dehumanisation or the incidence of dehumanisation
9 in all those cases you've studied?
10 A. They illustrate all the time the same mechanism between "them" and
11 "us," but it also makes clear, I think, that a certain degree of
12 dehumanisation is a precondition for large-scale killing. It's not so
13 very easy for people to kill on a large scale, so they have to be
14 convinced that those they are killing are evil and less than human, I
16 Q. And then within the general heading of Propaganda, probably my
17 penultimate question: Is the collective historical memory of any part of
18 a them-and-us culture of any significance?
19 A. Yes. That depends on the case at which you're looking, but to
20 give a few examples, I think for the genocidal process against the Jews,
21 the very widespread antisemitism was a very important condition. Many
22 Germans already believed that Jews were evil and conspiring against the
23 German nation.
24 In cases of Hutus and Tutsis, perhaps I can give that example too
25 from Rwanda, Hutus saw themselves, and also with some ground, as victims
1 of Tutsi supremacy for a long time. So in 1994, the organising
2 perpetrators could make use of collective memories among Hutus, collective
3 memories as victims and might turn that experience into a perpetrator's
4 wish to end the victimised status.
5 Q. Literally two last questions. It may be typically the them-and-us
6 culture is a bipartite thing. Would your conclusions be any different if
7 you were dealing not with a bipartite but a three-party or a four-party
8 them-and-us culture?
9 A. It would complicate the research questions, but I think you would
10 find similar mechanisms but in a more complicated way.
11 Q. And then outside your report but something that I wish you to help
12 us with, incidents of people characterised as perpetrators doing some good
13 to those characterised as victims, is that a feature, a common feature or
14 an exception in the studies you've done?
15 A. If I understand you well, you will find such cases, and even in
16 nearly every case you study. And that also has some reasons.
17 Perpetrators might realise what they are doing and might, so to speak, try
18 to make some capital for later on by, for instance, protecting certain
19 families out of the victim category or certain groups. And in all the
20 cases I know of, there are examples of such behaviour. So perpetrators
21 might be large-scale killers or organisers of large-scale killings and at
22 the same time protect a handful of victims out of the same category.
23 MR. NICE: Nothing else. Thank you, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE MAY: One moment while we consider tomorrow.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE MAY: For time tomorrow we have in mind one hour and a half,
2 the first hearing, for this. If you have some point, a useful point, if
3 you're going to argue for more time, it is open to you, but at the moment
4 you have an hour and a half, and we do not at the moment intend to
5 increase that. But it's -- if you wish to argue, then you can do that.
6 That's tomorrow.
7 Mr. Zwaan, thank you very much for coming. Please don't speak to
8 anybody about your evidence until it's over. Could you be back again at
9 9.00 tomorrow.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We will adjourn now until tomorrow
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 21st day
15 of January, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.