1 Thursday, 15 January 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 WITNESS: ANTE MARKOVIC [Resumed]
7 [Witness answered through interpreter]
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Markovic, thank you for returning to continue your
9 evidence. There's no need, of course, to take any formal oath or anything
10 of that sort. You took one earlier. There are three hours left of
11 cross-examination of the accused. We will, of course, have the usual
12 breaks. If at any time you would like to have a brief, do say so, a brief
13 pause, of course just mention it, but we would normally have the first
14 break in about an hour and a half.
15 There will be three hours, as I say, ordered for his
16 cross-examination. There will then be, I trust fairly limited, some
17 questions from the amicus and also from the Prosecution, but we have, we
18 understood, to take this position, that one way or another the evidence
19 will finish today.
20 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something, please? Is it
22 permissible or customary? I owe you an answer to your question and your
23 request regarding where and with whom and how Mr. Milosevic established
24 control over individual people and thus changed their opinion.
25 I thought this question over, though I don't have any original
1 documents with me, but on the basis of my notes and my own memories, I
2 remembered certain instances which I wish to convey to you.
3 The first case is that of Mr. Ivan Stambolic. When the time came
4 for Mr. Ivan Stambolic to be re-elected to his position, Mr. Milosevic
5 spoke to me to the effect that Stambolic should not be proposed for
6 re-election. I discussed the matter with my associates in the government
7 who were from Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the first place with Aco Mitrovic and
8 with Gacic as well. Both of them were of the opinion that Ivan Stambolic
9 was doing so well in his new position that people in the economy,
10 businessmen, have a lot of respect for him and felt that he was doing a
11 very good job.
12 After Mr. Milosevic had spoken to these people and sent a letter
13 to the Federal Executive Council, that is the government, saying that Ivan
14 Stambolic should not be re-elected and that Serbia did not agree with such
15 a suggestion - and this letter was signed by Mr. Milosevic - then both
16 these gentlemen changed their opinion, and both of them started persuading
17 me that we should not allow Ivan Stambolic to be re-elected general
18 manager of the Yugoslav Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In spite
19 of this and in spite of the pressure they made and despite the fact that
20 Ivan Gacic was the person who, at the 8th session of the Central Committee
21 of the League of Communists of Serbia had supported Ivan Stambolic and as
22 a result has lost his position as Secretary-General of the League of
23 Communists of Yugoslavia, regardless, therefore, of the fact that he was a
24 very close friend and associate of Ivan Stambolic, he felt that he should
25 vote against his re-election to the position of general manager of the
1 Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation.
2 These are the examples that I could recollect. There are others,
3 but perhaps not so convincing that I would be able to explain for you.
4 There's something else that I wanted to add.
5 Mr. Milosevic, as he himself said, came with some old documents
6 from my former office which say and which testify to all the things that I
7 had done during the three years that I was in Belgrade, and he said with
8 satisfaction, "Where did we meet? Let Mr. Markovic tell us." I looked
9 through my notes, and fortunately I managed to find a note saying that we
10 did meet when I had said. I said that it was three or four weeks prior to
11 my departure from Belgrade. I left Belgrade on the 21st of December, and
12 the meeting with Milosevic was on the 21st of November. So that is quite
13 in conformity with what I had said, three or four weeks.
14 Something else that I managed to establish was that there had been
15 another meeting prior to that, that is about a month prior to this
16 meeting, and it had to do with the bombing of the Banski Dvori where
17 Mr. Tudjman, Mesic, and I were. I forgot to mention this in the
18 investigation or in the interview. Mr. Milosevic can check this out as he
19 has the documents. I don't have them. It doesn't say what we discussed,
20 but at least it says when it is that we met.
21 Thank you.
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May. I hope that the
24 time used by Mr. Markovic for his explanations will be subtracted from the
25 time planned for me.
1 JUDGE MAY: Your time begins now. So let us get on with it.
2 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
3 Q. [Interpretation] I must say, however, that this fact about a
4 meeting between you and me on the 21st of November, you didn't see that in
5 the review of your duties but that you found this in some notes you had.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. So in the review of your duties, in the schedule, this meeting is
8 not mentioned.
9 A. Please look and see whether this meeting took place in November.
10 Q. This was the year 1991, and this is a schedule of your
11 obligations. I don't have that on me any more. I've handed it over.
12 Unfortunately, I didn't make a photocopy, but that doesn't change things.
13 It is quite clear that towards the end of the year, we did not meet.
14 A. It is quite clear that we did meet, and this can be checked from
15 that document. I don't know. The Court has it or the Prosecutor. That
16 can easily be verified that this meeting took place in my office on the
17 21st of November, which is four weeks prior to my departure from Belgrade.
18 Q. Very well. Did you come to see me or did I come to see you?
19 A. No, no. I came to see you, and I think I stayed for about two and
20 a half to three hours.
21 Q. Very well. But that again is different from what you said before,
22 because you say -- you've said that you had come to see me prior to your
23 departure. In fact, you now say it was a month prior to your departure?
24 A. I'm not changing my statement. In my statement I said that I came
25 to see you three or four weeks prior to leaving Belgrade.
1 Q. Very well. Let us continue where we broke off last time. In that
2 brief cross-examination, we covered the facts regarding your
3 responsibility for the war in Slovenia.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the stenographic notes that
5 we reviewed previously, that is the session of the 21st of August,
6 beginning at 11.00 in 1991, the first page ends with 082, ERN number 082.
7 I received it from the opposite side, and these stenographic notes clearly
8 show Mr. Markovic's responsibilities for the war in Slovenia, and could it
9 be tendered into evidence, please?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say anything in that
12 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Let's get this document. We'll find
14 Mr. Nice, perhaps you can assist us on that matter. It doesn't
15 appear to have been a document provided already. Yes. We'll get a copy
16 from the accused and see what it is.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't give you this copy now.
18 This is the copy that I received from the opposite side. You can get it
19 from them, because I wanted to refer to it again in continuation of my
20 cross-examination with reference to the war in Slovenia.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
22 MR. NICE: I may not be able to provide it immediately. I will do
23 my best --
24 JUDGE MAY: Give us the date again, Mr. Milosevic, and give us the
25 details of it.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is a session of the Presidency,
2 which was expanded in composition, attended by us from the republics, held
3 on the 21st of August, 1991, and these are stenographic notes, and the
4 first page has the ERN number 00526082. That is the first page, the ERN
5 on the first page. And the last page ends with numbers 204. That is the
6 document that we reviewed last time.
7 I wish to remind you that on the page with the number 244 of these
8 minutes, 00526137, the president of Slovenia at the time, Milan Kucan,
9 says in response to Mr. Markovic: "I don't need to persuade you that you
10 will not find anyone in Slovenia, including these two, that is members of
11 the federal government who will return to the Federal Executive Council
12 and work there." SIV, S-I-V, which means the Federal Executive Council.
13 It is a SIV which is known in Slovenia to have started the war in
15 So that is what we quoted. And why, in addition to other excerpts
16 that I don't have time to go into now because we covered them, but this is
17 the reason why I wish to tender this document into evidence as an exhibit.
18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's deal with one thing at a time.
19 Let's deal with the Prosecution. Do you think you can find that in the
21 MR. NICE: We can certainly find it. It won't take very long, and
22 we'll make it available and have it produced.
23 JUDGE MAY: Clearly, if you're going to ask Mr. Markovic any
24 questions, he must have the opportunity of seeing what the document is.
25 Now, the most sensible course - and it may be well that it will be
1 exhibited - the most sensible course may well be to find this document.
2 JUDGE KWON: I find some page numbers the accused referred to are
3 matching with the page numbers of Exhibit 427, tab 6, but if the
4 Prosecution can check it later.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will do that, and it may well be that we will
6 admit it, but we need first of all to check it.
7 Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
8 Yes, Mr. Markovic. If you want to add something, you can.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In any event, Mr. Milosevic
10 extracted a segment from the evolution of relations. Relations from the
11 beginning when I joined the federal government between Slovenia and
12 Serbia, or Serbia and Slovenia, and also between Milosevic and Kucan were
13 extremely tense. In the final analysis, Serbia blocked all goods that
14 were due to come from Bosnia to Serbia long before the war. All economic
15 relations were suspended.
16 Serbia also organised - and that means Milosevic - the visit of a
17 large group of people, most of them highly radical, to go to Bosnia and to
18 organise a rally there, a popular rally, and Slovenia prevented this.
19 There was constant conflict over the problem of Kosovo and what
20 was going on in Kosovo, so that in that context, if you review events and
21 the war in Slovenia, it becomes quite clear that this was only a marginal
22 aspect of what had happened until then as well as what happened after that
23 when the decision was taken to pull out the army from Slovenia, and who
24 took that decision and who immediately agreed with that decision prior to
25 that. And it is absolutely not true that the Federal Executive Council
1 took such a decision. I'm speaking from memory as I don't have the
2 document now. It says clearly that the federal Secretariat for Internal
3 Affairs would organise supervision over those facilities in Slovenia which
4 were in their possession and that to do so they would use units which the
5 army has deployed along the border, border units.
6 The soldiers that were in Slovenia in the so-called Slovenian war,
7 were not in the border barracks but soldiers that came out of their
8 barracks with tanks and cannon. Therefore, someone else had taken the
9 decision to use military force to pull them out of the barracks under full
10 military gear. Such a decision was not taken by the Federal Executive
11 Council nor could it have been taken by it, because if it could, then the
12 federal Presidency would not have tortured itself and had endless meetings
13 over the possibility of using the army. Such permission was never
14 granted. And that is why it was felt that the Presidency was incapable of
15 functioning in such a situation, and that is why efforts were made to
16 topple the Presidency, and even through me to disband that Presidency and
17 to use me to carry out a kind of state coup as proposed by Kadijevic.
18 So what Milosevic is now saying is not right, because when the
19 decision was to be taken to withdraw the army from Slovenia, that decision
20 was in fact taken by the army, Milosevic, and Kucan. The rest of us -- I
21 had no right to vote at the Presidency, but other members of the
22 Presidency were also extremely concerned over what was happening, and from
23 there the army was transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 I have to make myself quite clear: I was against the withdrawal
25 of the army. I wanted it to continue to be dispersed throughout the
1 country because it would have less opportunity of committing aggression if
2 it is not concentrated in one place, but this was not in my hands. I
3 couldn't take any such decision. Nowhere is there any possibility
4 envisaged for the federal government to have command over the army. It
5 was only the Presidency that could do that. Who negotiated with Kadijevic
6 in the Presidency for the troops to come out of the barracks, I don't
7 know, but it was never officially reported anywhere.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Markovic, that is the whole point. Even the president of the
10 Presidency at the time, Jovic, was not aware of your intervention in
11 Slovenia. So what you're now telling us at great length, quite
12 unnecessarily, is absolutely untrue. And to prove that to you, I will
13 quote from you this same stenographic report. It is on page 247 of that
14 report. The last digits of the ERN number are 6140. And trying to
15 respond to accusations against you by Kucan and others and myself to the
16 effect that you had provoked the war in Slovenia, you even quote from your
17 own decision, and you say yourself: "The Federal Executive Council took a
18 decision on the implementation of federal regulations regarding the state
19 border in Slovenia," et cetera.
20 And then in the next paragraph, you say, and you quote from that
21 decision: "Immediate enforcement of federal regulations will be achieved
22 by the federal Ministry of the Interior in direct cooperation with the
23 federal Secretariat for National Defence so as to engage border units of
24 the JNA to secure the state border at border crossings and in inhabited
25 areas in the border belt."
1 So it was by your decision that you obliged your two federal
2 ministries, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National
3 Defence, to intervene in Slovenia. No one else knew about it, not even
4 the Presidency of the SFRY.
5 A. That is not so. You read out correctly this segment. The police
6 of Yugoslavia was meant to get the cooperation of border units, those
7 protecting the border and who do not have tanks or cannon but only light
8 weapons, and to carry this out in cooperation with them.
9 In the first place, that was not done. Neither the police nor the
10 border units took part, but those that did take part were tanks and cannon
11 and units that came out of the garrison. There were even units that came
12 from Croatia. There were units from Istria, units from the surroundings
13 of Zagreb. Therefore, someone had taken that decision. These were not
14 border units but military units from several garrisons. We know that even
15 some generals had problems afterwards because they had taken people along
16 a 200-kilometre-long journey to reach Slovenia. No one else could have
17 taken such a decision except the person who had the army under full
18 control. And it was you, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, that had full control of
19 the army.
20 Q. That is not right, Mr. Ante Markovic. You were the federal Prime
21 Minister. You had the army under your control. And as for communication
22 with the military leadership, in your schedule of responsibilities you can
23 see how many times you met with the military or police leadership in the
24 course of 1991 and how you acted as the most responsible person, as the
25 president of the federal government of SFRY.
1 And as regards what you said about my especially tense
2 relationship --
3 JUDGE MAY: The witness must have the occasion to answer,
4 particularly important points which are made. The witness must have the
5 answer -- chance to answer the allegations.
6 Mr. Markovic, you've heard what the accused alleges. Perhaps you
7 would care to respond, however briefly.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I do not have all the
9 documents that Mr. Milosevic has, and I am completely in an inferior
10 position because I was unable to get anything from my office whereas he
11 got everything. However, certain things are abundantly clear.
12 If the government had been able to make decisions on how to use
13 the army, then it would have been unnecessary to hold multiple sessions of
14 the Presidency of Yugoslavia and take votes on using the army to calm the
15 situation down in Yugoslavia. The Presidency discussed umpteen times, as
16 well as at the closed sessions of the joint staff, this issue, and if the
17 government had been able to decide on this, nobody would have bothered
18 with the Presidency. So this is a blatant lie.
19 We didn't stand a chance in all this affair. We had no
20 communications with the army. If there had been communication between the
21 government and the army and General Kadijevic who was in charge of the
22 army and as such was accountable to the government, but in actual fact, he
23 as a commander was completely subjected to the Presidency. The Federal
24 Executive Council had nothing to do with it.
25 I repeat, you can take original documents and read them. The only
1 function according to which the army, or in this case General Kadijevic
2 were a member of the army, were in terms of finance and administration.
3 The federal government had no other competence over the army.
4 And I would like to say once again, as far as Slovenia is
5 concerned, units from garrisons with cannons, tanks, and other equipment
6 were used, even units from the environs of Zagreb and from Croatia were
7 used. And the phrasing in the decision of the federal government was that
8 units that were already stationed on the border crossings should be used
9 in cooperation with the police using only light weapons. But none of this
10 was implemented. What was effected was an invasion. Who could have
11 allowed this -- built this?
12 In March 1990 when a huge number of people came out into the
13 streets of Belgrade, over 100.000, to demonstrate against Mr. Milosevic,
14 somebody decided to bring out tanks to stop them. Who was able to
15 sanction this? Everything was done as it was done.
16 Of course, formally Mr. Milosevic did not take this decision, but
17 in actual fact he did. He was behind that, and he was behind what
18 happened in Sarajevo.
19 JUDGE MAY: Just help us with this so we can follow and make sure
20 it's clear, and if you could keep the answers short, please.
21 Did you have any control at all over the army?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, none.
23 JUDGE MAY: Did you have direct -- any communication with the
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did. I said, in
1 administrative terms and financial terms, I did have contact with the
2 army. Everything else was under the command of the Presidency of
4 JUDGE MAY: Were you in a position to get the army to do anything
5 or to ask them to do anything? Were they prepared to do it? Did you have
6 any control over them at all.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No. So help me God, no.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Markovic, what you're saying, is -- would
9 that be confirmed by the constitutional system?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Completely in accordance, in
11 conformity with the constitutional system. Anyway, it's very logical.
12 The army was financed from the budget of Yugoslavia. The budget of
13 Yugoslavia was under the control of the Federal Executive Council.
14 One item of this budget related to the army, and that was
15 practically the only communication between the army and the federal
16 government. There was no command or control communication, no information
17 as to where units were deployed was given to the government, because that
18 was not within our purview. Specialised functions of the army came under
19 the exclusive competence of the Presidency, and the Presidency held many,
20 many sessions to decide where and how the army would be used. All, all of
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Well, Mr. Markovic, that is precisely the point. It is not in
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 dispute that under the constitution only the Presidency of Yugoslavia has
2 the right to command the army, but in the instance of the war in Slovenia,
3 which Kucan himself says was caused by the Federal Executive Council, it
4 is obvious that you had abused and usurped the function of the Prime
5 Minister of Yugoslavia, bypassing the constitution, because you are
6 quoting your own decision in this shorthand notes when you say that: "In
7 the implementation of this decision, the Federal Executive Council will
8 immediately cooperate, directly cooperate with the federal Ministry for
9 National Defence in order to engage also the border units of the JNA."
10 Therefore, with this decision of the government, you directly
11 engage both the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of the
12 Interior. And you are not engaging them in the financial sense as you are
13 trying to represent. On the contrary. You are talking about using JNA
14 units to carry out this decision of yours.
15 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. So the fact that the constitution says --
18 JUDGE MAY: The witness must have the chance to answer these
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Mr. May. Would you kindly
21 refrain from switching off my microphone before my sentence is over,
22 because --
23 JUDGE MAY: No. I shall cut off your microphone at any occasion
24 when you abuse it, in particular by these over-lengthy questions which are
25 not allowing witnesses to answer. The witness must have the opportunity
1 to answer your question. You are simply to ask questions, not make
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Markovic.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I will have to repeat
6 what I have already said. Namely, in the conclusion it was written that
7 the police, which had full competencies, should intervene on the Slovene
8 border on behalf of the federal government and to reassert the governance
9 of the federal government, because it was still one country. And when the
10 police were doing their job on the border, they may also use certain
11 border army units which are normally deployed there anyway. There was no
12 mention of engaging army units on the border.
13 So what was written about linking up with the border units was not
14 actually -- did not actually happen, because the police never arrived on
15 the border and had no chance to link up with border units. What happened
16 was that the army came out of its border barracks and garrisons.
17 Moreover, some units from Croatia were moved in with tanks and even air
18 support. Somebody made a decision to do this. Who it was, I don't know.
19 I didn't even know that this happened, because at 4.00 a.m. in the morning
20 when all this took place, I was woken up by Milan Kucan who called me on
21 the phone and told me, "Tanks are on the march through Slovenia." I said,
22 "That's impossible. Why didn't you call the Presidency?" And Kucan says,
23 "I cannot get through to them, and I can't speak to them, I can't find a
24 common language with them anyway, but could you please try to put me
25 through to the army." And then I helped him speak with Kadijevic.
1 But I have to add one more thing. A couple of days later I
2 boarded my plane with some of my associates, although everyone including
3 Mesic, who was president of the Presidency, and the minister of foreign
4 affairs of Croatia, who met me at the airport, were begging me not to go
5 to Ljubljana, saying that I would be arrested there at the least and maybe
6 even killed. However, I still went to Slovenia to stop this completely
7 senseless war. And I think I succeeded in doing that.
8 Moreover, when the army made the decision to bomb Ljubljana, I
9 called up Kadijevic and told him, "You would then be bombing the Prime
10 Minister as well, because I'm going to Ljubljana."
11 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I just do a couple of things. The
12 exhibit that the accused was dealing with was indeed Exhibit 427, tab 6.
13 We looked at it on the last occasion, and although I see that I didn't
14 explain the problem to you, the problem is that it's only partially
15 translated into English in that exhibit.
16 The topics that the accused is raising now he actually raised on
17 the last occasion after dealing with that exhibit, and indeed the
18 questioning ended with Your Honour reminding him that we weren't directly
19 concerned with Slovenia and invited him to turn to other topics, so that
20 we parted from the exhibit at that stage. It remains only partially
21 translated into English in 427, tab 6.
22 JUDGE MAY: We seem to have moved on from that. Thank you for
23 that assistance to everybody. We'll move on.
24 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Markovic, you mentioned heavy weaponry, tanks, artillery and
2 so on and so forth. Where was it in Slovenia that the JNA used tanks and
3 artillery? Where was tank or artillery fire used to destroy anything, to
4 kill? Do you know of a specific instance of something like that
6 A. I am aware of more than one instance. There were many photographs
7 of armoured unit upon armoured unit coming out into the streets of
8 Slovenia. Armoured units accompanied by cannons, among other things,
9 surrounded the airport of Ljubljana. They also landed in other cities.
10 I, who was on my way to Ljubljana --
11 Q. Mr. Markovic, could you please be more brief in answering. The
12 airport of Ljubljana was a border crossing, and they did so following your
13 decision. Isn't that so?
14 A. No, it isn't.
15 Q. So it wasn't the case that they took over the border crossing, the
16 only airport in Slovenia which is on the border, and blocked it. They
17 were doing something else. That's what you're saying. Did somebody fire
18 from these tanks?
19 A. Yes. These tanks were fired from, and there were dead,
20 casualties. Not many, but there were.
21 Moreover, when I arrived in Slovenia, I found out that a large
22 number of tank units comprising young men had gone out completely
23 unprepared, without supplies of water or food. They did not have the
24 basic supplies of food or water, and they were completely left to their
25 own devices, stranded. And it was I who organised that they get a
1 shipment of food and water.
2 And that time when I stayed for one day and one night, accompanied
3 by other people because I wasn't alone, I tried to stop this war and save
4 those people, and the result of my efforts was a success. It was a great
6 Q. Mr. Markovic, this unfortunate war in Slovenia is your doing, and
7 that is written in these decisions. And I'm now going to ask you a
8 question relating to the alleged quarrel I had with Kucan. I never had
9 any quarrel with Kucan.
10 For instance, in these same shorthand notes, when Kucan is asking
11 for the floor, page 243, ERN number ending with 521636, he says: "I am
12 not going to be accountable to the Prime Minister," meaning you, "who now
13 that he has lost the war," he is again speaking of you, "wants to achieve
14 all this." That is in response to your advocacy of a certain programme.
15 He says three proposals were made, complete with arguments, and he
16 says that he agrees personally with the proposal and the economic plan
17 presented by Slobodan Milosevic.
18 So all this is happening after this unfortunate war where the
19 president of Slovenia is addressing you, telling you what you had done in
20 Slovenia. He's telling you that everyone in Slovenia knows that it was
21 you who caused the war. And regarding various proposals made, he agrees
22 with the one I made, not your proposal. How does that fit in with your
24 A. It fits in very simply. Mr. Milosevic should answer this
25 question: What had gone on before this? Is it true that Mr. Milosevic
1 blocked the sale of Slovene goods in Serbia? Is it the case that
2 Mr. Milosevic had severed economic links in Slovenia back in 1990? Is it
3 also the case that Mr. Milosevic maintained other relations with Slovenia
4 which considerably deteriorated other ties between Slovenia and Serbia
5 involving Kosovo?
6 When some units came from Slovenia to -- when Slovene people
7 refused to go to Kosovo, how did Milosevic react to that?
8 It all boils down to one thing. Mr. Milosevic maintained all the
9 time relations with Slovenia that were very, very bad, and all his efforts
10 were aimed at pushing Slovenia out of Yugoslavia for all practical
11 purposes. How can Mr. Milosevic explain this? Why did Milosevic,
12 Drnovsek, Jovic, and Kadijevic agree very easily that the army should pull
13 out of Slovenia, although there was no official legal act to justify it.
14 Q. Mr. Markovic, if possible let's try to speed things up, because
15 Mr. Markovic [as interpreted] is not going to caution you by saying that
16 you're making speeches. Since you're the one who --
17 JUDGE MAY: You know, you --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
19 JUDGE MAY: -- some 200 and -- I forget now how many witnesses
20 we're on now, 285, I think. You've allowed -- been allowed a great deal
21 of time for cross-examination, so it is not fair for you to try and
22 criticise witnesses in any way.
23 Yes. Let's go on.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May. I think that
25 the degree of protection that you afford witnesses is already a generally
1 known fact.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. In view of this decision of yours that you quoted yourself and
4 that I quoted to you only from these stenographic notes when you quoted
5 it, how can you possibly say that as regards the events in Slovenia that
6 took place on the basis of your decision were something that you heard
7 about from Kucan and that you knew nothing about before that? You passed
8 a decision. Your decision is being implemented, and you wonder over the
9 implementation of this decision when the person upon whom this decision
10 reflects calls you. Is there any logic in this, Mr. Markovic?
11 A. Yes, there is. If it is correct what I said a few minutes ago,
12 namely that the Federal Executive Council was not the one that passed this
13 decision. Somebody else passed this decision, as was indeed was the case.
14 Somebody else did pass this decision.
15 The extent to which you personally were involved in this is
16 something I cannot say, but your relationship with General Kadijevic is
17 very well known. At that time he was already doing everything in
18 agreement with you.
19 Q. That's not true.
20 A. The real perpetrator is not here. The real perpetrator sits where
21 you are sitting. And who then wanted to discredit the federal Prime
22 Minister who was the only one who still had some kind of a reputation and
23 who still had some support in the western world? This was a chance to
24 discredit him. So that is Mr. Milosevic. That is what he did through
25 Mr. Kadijevic. And that has nothing to do with the conclusions adopted by
1 the Federal Executive Council. That directly pertained only to the
2 borders that are protected by the police, and a border unit was supposed
3 to assist them.
4 In fact, what was carried out was an invasion of Slovenia with
5 troops that were in garrisons, and the troops from the garrisons had come
6 to Slovenia and started marching along Slovenian roads. They even put
7 obstacles on their roads and there was even shooting there. Fortunately,
8 not too many people were killed. As far as I can remember, there were 48
9 casualties altogether. But as far as I'm concerned, even if a single man
10 loses his life, that is unforgivable. There is not a single objective
11 that could justify or explain any such victim.
12 Q. Mr. Markovic, most regrettably tens of soldiers were killed, as
13 you had put it, quite innocent soldiers. They were killed in implementing
14 your decision. And if you wanted to discredit yourself through your own
15 decision, I don't know how you could link this decision up with somebody
16 else's accountability except your own, you as president of the Federal
17 Executive Council and head of the executive branch government at the time,
18 at that time of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
19 A. I have to repeat yet again that this has nothing to do with
20 anything. If anybody reads the decision that was passed by the Federal
21 Executive Council, they can see that it pertains to the police only and to
22 border units that are very, very few in number. And who ordered tanks and
23 cannons to appear? Who ordered the opening of garrisons? Who issued
24 orders for the army to march from Croatia to Slovenia? Who?
25 When Mr. Kucan called me, I had no idea whatsoever about this.
1 After that, I had conversations about this within the government. I also
2 talked about this to Veljko Kadijevic, and Veljko Kadijevic was then
3 attacked at the government meeting too. He was told then that he acted
4 outside any orders or approval. And who allowed him to do that? He
5 answered to that that it was his duty to defend the borders of Yugoslavia
6 and that no one had to instruct him to do that.
7 And the question I would raise is why did he not do the same thing
8 elsewhere? Why did he ask for the entire Presidency to give their
9 consent? So someone had reached agreement with him about this.
10 Q. Well, you're the one.
11 A. Heaven forbid. How could it be me? At the meeting of the Federal
12 Executive Council, I had a public debate with him about this. So no way,
13 it wasn't me.
14 Q. When you saw the consequences of your decision, of course you
15 criticised the consequences of the decision that you took yourself. But
16 let us establish some facts here, if possible, Mr. Markovic.
17 Is it correct that on the 4th of July, 1991, a cease-fire was
18 established and that, inter alia, a decision was reached to go back to the
19 original state of affairs; to deblock the JNA units, the units and the
20 institutions of the JNA, to return the resources of the JNA to the JNA, to
21 re-establish communications, to set free prisoners? However, in spite of
22 all of that, although the then-members of the Presidency from Macedonia
23 and Bosnia, Tupurkovski and Bogicevic, were entrusted with carrying this
24 out, do you recall that in spite of all of that the Slovenian leadership
25 practically evaded the implementation of most of these things that I've
1 quoted just now? Do you remember that?
2 A. I remember that, but I also remember that the Presidency of
3 Yugoslavia and you, Mr. Milosevic, took part in that particular meeting
4 too, and Drnovsek took part in it is well, that at that particular meeting
5 a decision was reached to have all troops from Slovenia transferred to
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis -- on the basis of an agreement, including
7 all the equipment they had.
8 Q. Let's try to speed things up. We'll get to that too. But let us
9 just look at something else. Do you remember something else? Do you
10 remember that three days after that in Brioni a meeting was held? I did
11 not attend that meeting in Brioni, but you did attend that meeting. So
12 this was a meeting in the presence of the three ministers of the European
13 Community at the time and a joint declaration was signed then. And it
14 says there, inter alia, that the peoples of Yugoslavia are the only ones
15 who can decide about their own future. So it's not the republics of
16 Yugoslavia but the peoples of Yugoslavia that will decide on their own
17 future. And what was agreed upon was that negotiations would take place.
18 In this declaration, it said that unilateral steps should not be taken; is
19 that correct?
20 A. At that meeting that you're referring to, on the basis of the
21 proposal of the Federal Executive Council that, by the way, I had drafted,
22 a proposal was made to have a three-month moratorium. As a matter of
23 fact, my first proposal was a six-month moratorium. However, it was
24 believed then that this would not be accepted so we reduced it to three
1 Through these three months we would actually carry out all the
2 things that you are referring to just now, Mr. Milosevic. This
3 three-month moratorium would make it possible for us to make the country
4 capable of resolving its problems without resorting to war.
5 As a matter of fact, this session that you've referred to just
6 now, this session was held about a month after the Federal Executive
7 Council had already prepared a proposal as to how the country would
8 function during this moratorium period, and that was on the basis of what
9 this discussion took place. And the borders were discussed in that
10 context as well as this withdrawal.
11 As a matter of fact, the core of this proposal went much deeper.
12 It was supposed to go back to the status of the country that had existed
13 before that, that people who had walked out of the Assembly should return
14 to the Assembly, notably Slovenia and Croatia, in order to make it
15 possible to reach decisions, any type of decisions that would be passed.
16 If everybody is going to go their own ways, let the Assembly decide that,
17 as was done later by the Assembly of Czechoslovakia. So let us part our
18 ways without a conflict. Let's create pre-conditions, after all, for
19 somehow bringing yet another kind of Yugoslavia together that would hinge
20 on a minimum. However, this was made totally impossible to have these
21 three months.
22 Q. All right, Mr. Markovic. Your answer is yes, I assume, in
23 response to my question, because I said that in the presence of the
24 European troika, this declaration was made, and what I quoted is written
25 in this declaration. I assume that your answer is yes; is that right?
1 A. I gave an expanded answer in terms of the total question.
2 Q. All right, Mr. Markovic. Is it correct that the leadership of
3 Slovenia did not fulfil their obligations from this declaration?
4 A. Yes, that is correct. That is correct irrespective of the fact
5 that you said before that that you agreed with them.
6 Q. I did not agree with them at all.
7 A. Aha. You did not agree with them.
8 Q. I said that I personally never had any quarrels with Kucan. That
9 is a completely different matter. I did not agree with their policy, of
10 course, because I did not agree with secession.
11 A. But I don't want it to seem now that it is only the Slovenians who
12 are to be blamed for that. Everybody is. You too. You also asked for
13 the moratorium to be carried out in the following way: If not
14 voluntarily, we are going to do what we want to do by force.
15 On several occasions that was pointed out during that session, and
16 I intervened and said, "These countries are --"
17 Q. Just tell me which session?
18 A. The same one you mentioned just now.
19 Q. Well, find it. Where is it written here?
20 A. Regrettably I don't have it. You have it.
21 Q. I said somebody should do something by force or would do something
22 by force?
23 A. No, no, no. Jovic said that several times, and I intervened and I
24 said, "Do you think that through force and punishment you're going to
25 resolve this?" And he said, "What's going to happen if you don't -- if
1 they don't pay customs duty again?" Then Jovic said, "You keep on
2 negotiating all the time." And I said, "But you are -- you are talking
3 about force too."
4 Q. Please answer my questions, Mr. Markovic. You answered one of
5 them, and you regretted that, and now you don't really want to answer.
6 JUDGE MAY: No. You can't --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
8 JUDGE MAY: That is not a fair comment as far as the witness is
9 concerned. Ask him proper questions and you can do it, but trying to make
10 scores off the witness, they don't assist you or anybody else.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm just trying to have the
12 truth revealed here. Fortunately, truth -- the truth is a very powerful
13 thing, and it will always prevail, here too.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is right.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Is it right, Mr. Markovic, that during the conflicts in Slovenia
17 44 members of the JNA lost their lives, namely six officers, six NCOs, 30
18 soldiers and cadets and one civilian employed in the army and one
19 unidentified person? And also, there were 184 wounded soldiers?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Do you remember what the gravest crimes committed against the JNA
22 soldiers were when the paramilitary formations were then established in
23 Slovenia, when they brought children of officers who were underaged to
24 five border posts and threatened to kill them unless their fathers
25 surrendered? And also, they subjected them to other kinds of pressures,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 psycho-physical torture. That's what happened vis-a-vis the members of
2 the JNA. Do you remember that?
3 A. I remember the first thing. I do not remember the second thing.
4 Q. The first thing, yes. The killings, you mean, the woundings.
5 And tell me then, at that time you were Prime Minister. What did
6 you do in order to have the perpetrators of these crimes brought to
7 justice? Did you make any effort aimed at that?
8 A. Yet again I will have to repeat that while no one, including
9 Mr. Milosevic, made any effort whatsoever in order to stop this war --
10 Q. That's not what I'm asking you.
11 A. I took a plane --
12 Q. You already talked about that, Mr. Markovic.
13 A. I have to answer. You're asking me whether I did anything.
14 Q. I'm not asking you whether you did anything. I am asking you in
15 relation to the crimes committed. Did you do anything as federal
16 Prime Minister in order to have the perpetrators brought to justice?
17 A. Yet again I have to repeat that I intervened in order to bring the
18 war to an end and not to have further loss of lives. I have to say
19 objectively now that my trip to Slovenia then bordered on death, but I did
21 Secondly, if people were supposed to be punished then, there were
22 appropriate judicial authorities to carry that out. There are military
23 authorities. There are civilian authorities, depending on who was under
24 which jurisdiction. I do not remember that any government in any part of
25 the world would try anyone.
1 Q. I do not recall any such thing either, but usually all of this is
2 being placed under some kind of responsibility of mine, although I was not
3 the judiciary or the legislation, and I did not command the army either.
4 So did you take --
5 JUDGE MAY: You can ask -- you can certainly ask the witness if he
6 took any action, but my recollection is that Mr. Kucan was asked about
7 these matters and gave evidence about them, who was able to do so.
8 Perhaps the witness can say if he's got anything to add.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Markovic, do you remember that when we were talking about
11 Slovenia, Slovenia in 1989, 1990 and 1991 adopted a whole series of laws
12 unilaterally actually undermining the legal order of Yugoslavia? For
13 instance, the amendments to the constitution of Slovenia in 1989, then the
14 constitutional law to implement the amendments in the area of national
15 defence, then the law to stop all proceedings that had been started if
16 they come under the federal laws. In other words, they annulled all
17 federal laws. Then there was the declaration on sovereignty of Slovenia,
18 then the plebiscite on independence and autonomy of Slovenia, then a whole
19 series of other documents. I don't wish to quote all of them because they
20 would take too much time. A whole page could be written listing all those
21 documents of which you are well aware.
22 Did the constitutional law review them all and establish that they
23 were unconstitutional and they had them annulled? Do you remember that?
24 A. Yes, I remember that, but I would like to tell you the context
25 within which I remember them.
1 In the first place, it was not Slovenia in 1989 or in 1990 that it
2 undertook those steps but later on.
3 Q. Wait a moment. Weren't the amendments to the constitution adopted
4 in 1989? Were they or not?
5 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer fairly.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The elections in Slovenia were
7 carried out sometime between the spring and the summer of 1990. So this
8 happened later.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I am not talking about the elections but the amendments to the
12 A. Do you remember when Serbia blocked Slovenian goods? When did it
13 block economic relations with Slovenia? When did Serbia, or, rather, you
14 personally made a breakthrough into the monetary fund, into the budget and
15 took, or not to say steal 18.2 billion dinars, which is two and a half
16 billion German marks? Don't you think that all this affected the other
18 Q. Mr. Markovic, the relationships between the central banks of the
19 republics and the central bank of Yugoslavia can be found in documents.
20 There can be no theft. Whether you go beyond a certain limit or not, this
21 becomes immediately visible. You will admit that all this is highly
22 transparent. It is not possible in -- to do anything affecting monetary
23 flow secretly. And then those relationships are later corrected,
24 adjusted, balanced out, et cetera. You were an economist; surely you know
1 A. I hope I do. But I also know quite clearly that you took a
2 decision to take 18.2 billion from the central bank to the Bank of Serbia
3 for which you had absolutely no right to do. You had no right. And by
4 doing that, you actually carried out a diversion, an act of sabotage
5 against the whole Yugoslav system.
6 Q. Mr. Markovic, let us not go into monetary issues. If somebody
7 makes a primary issue for the purchase of wheat, that is not a blow
8 against the monetary system. This is something that can later be
9 regulated through mutual relations between the central banks and the banks
10 of the republics, and this is something that happened frequently. It has
11 nothing do with your exaggerations describing it as Serbia's incursion, as
12 Serbia's theft, or anything like that. So let's not use such
14 A. If you think that 18.2 billion dinars is a small sum, and this is
15 a sum that was established -- tell me, was it established or not?
16 Q. I'm not quite sure of the figure that was involved, but I do know
17 that someone was repeatedly -- various republics in various conditions
18 went beyond their limits. Later on this was ironed out in mutual
19 relationships, but that can easily be established, because all those
20 monetary flows are transparent. Primary issue is evident, and this can be
21 traced in the documents of the central bank and nothing can be concealed.
22 A. No one until then nor since then, I would be bold to say, carried
23 out such a theft of money that it was not entitled to as the Republic of
24 Serbia had done, or, rather, Mr. Milosevic. The more so as even what you
25 say, that it could have been used for agriculture, that its primary issue
1 could be used for agriculture, in those days issues of the National Bank
2 of Yugoslavia could not be used for agriculture or anything else. We
3 financed those needs through the budget.
4 And thirdly, any decision regarding primary issue had to be made
5 by the council of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. And it was the only
6 body competent for such decisions.
7 Now, if you know that, when did this council meet to allow 18.2
8 billion to be transferred to your account?
9 Q. Of course those decisions of the council of governors cannot --
10 without such a decision of the council of governors, no one could do any
11 such thing. That is not in dispute. And it is also not in dispute that
12 what you are talking about was not known in public.
13 Why are you using such ugly words like "theft"? Why are you
14 demeaning yourself?
15 A. Thank you for considering my position, but that was not true. And
16 it wasn't known until I revealed it anyway.
17 Q. When we first spoke, you said you had no idea.
18 A. Well, what I said then was quite true.
19 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to in particular refer to the accused, that
20 you must allow a chance for somebody to interpret. Our interpreters have
21 a lot of hard work, they keep up very well, but they should be given a
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I will try to
24 speak more slowly for the benefit of the interpreters, but time is flying
25 and Mr. Markovic is explaining at great length some matters which I'm not
1 even asking him about.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Is it in dispute that the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia
4 annulled the decision taken by Slovenia? Just tell me yes or no.
5 A. Yes. Some of those, yes. They annulled them, yes.
6 Q. And is it true that during your term in office Slovenia ignored
7 the institutions, law and constitution of SFRY?
8 A. At first it didn't but later on it did. But also I wish to
9 mention here that the Federal Executive Council had proposed an amendment
10 to the constitution which would establish different relations and
11 elections throughout Yugoslavia, but the fact is that Serbia and Slovenia
12 from two different points of view prevented this.
13 Q. That is not true, but we'll come to that too. You say that the
14 decision on the withdrawal of the army was taken by the Presidency. When
15 I say the withdrawal of the army, I mean from Slovenia, that it was taken
16 by the Presidency under Milosevic's influence. That is what you said.
17 Now, my question is: Who voted in favour of pulling out the
18 Yugoslav People's Army from Slovenia? Do you remember that this was a
19 decision taken by the Presidency? So the presidents of the republics
20 don't have a vote. That the Presidency, all of the members except Mesic
21 voted in favour of the army being pulled out of Slovenia. Mesic voted
22 against the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia.
23 JUDGE MAY: The -- let the witness must have a chance. You've
24 been talking for at least a minute.
25 Can you answer that question?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can. A meeting of the Presidency
2 consisted of several parts, I would say. First there was some discussion
3 as to how to strengthen the position of the army in Slovenia, and then as
4 far as I remember, the proposal came from Mr. Jovic that the possibility
5 of withdrawing the army also be discussed. And this was immediately
6 accepted by the army, and they immediately elaborated on the idea. So
7 clearly such an agreement had already been reached by certain officials as
8 a final solution, for otherwise Kadijevic would not have so readily
9 accepted it. And then it -- an agreement was easily reached to pull out
10 the army.
11 At that meeting, it is true, as Milosevic says, that everyone
12 voted except Mesic. I think that Tupurkovski didn't vote either, as far
13 as I remember.
14 Q. Tupurkovski and Bogicevic agreed, being convinced that that would
15 avoid a conflict.
16 A. I said that I didn't agree with it but I had no right to vote. My
17 vote didn't count at that meeting.
18 Q. As you know, I did not attend, and I -- as I am not a member of
19 the Presidency, and I'm speaking on the basis of documents. Therefore all
20 the members with the exception of Mesic voted in favour of pulling out the
21 army from Slovenia; is that right?
22 A. I repeat: As far as I know, Tupurkovski voted against.
23 Q. Very well. That can be easily established. Even if Tupurkovski
24 had voted against, which he didn't, because he felt that was a way of
25 avoiding the conflict, the vote would still be 6 to 2. Therefore, is it
1 clear that your statement that the decision on the withdrawal of
2 Slovenia -- of the army from Slovenia was taken under Milosevic's
3 influence is completely unfounded?
4 A. I can't accept that, because certain things that are done behind
5 the scenes, and that was the case here, everything had been prepared
6 before people came to the session, things are not resolved at meetings.
7 Things had been prepared in advance.
8 Q. I see. So I had influence over all the members of the Presidency,
9 over a sufficient number except Mesic?
10 A. I don't even remember whether Bogicevic attended the meeting, but
11 I think Tupurkovski also voted against.
12 Q. Never mind. The things you don't remember, I won't ask you about.
13 Is it true that the JNA left Slovenia without armaments, without
14 its weaponry, that everything it had it left behind in Slovenia?
15 A. It isn't so.
16 Q. It is absolutely untrue that it took everything?
17 A. Yes, I agree with you. The army couldn't take everything. What
18 it couldn't take, it left.
19 Q. It is also untrue what you said in paragraph 13 of your statement,
20 that the JNA withdrew from Slovenia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNA
21 withdrew from Slovenia to all the other Yugoslav republics with the
22 exception of Croatia, because the leadership of Croatia at the time was
23 opposed to a part of the army staying in the territory of Croatia. So
24 then the troops from Slovenia went to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Serbia and
25 to Macedonia and to Montenegro.
1 Therefore, in a dispersed manner, it went to all the other
2 republics. Is that right, Mr. Markovic?
3 A. No, it is not right. Some smaller units did go to Serbia or
4 Montenegro. As far as I recall, none went to Macedonia. On the contrary,
5 the withdrawal of the army from Macedonia was under preparation.
6 Q. Perhaps you're right. Not to Macedonia but to all the other
8 A. May I finish? So no one went to Macedonia. Now, whether troops
9 went to Serbia, I believe they did, some to Montenegro perhaps as well,
10 but most of the bulk of the troops went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
11 there is plenty of evidence to be found of that.
12 Q. My question is one of principle. The army that withdrew from
13 Slovenia withdrew to other parts of the territory of the SFRY where the
14 JNA was at the time the only legal armed force; is that right?
15 A. Yes, that is right, but at the same time it was legal throughout,
16 not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the legal force. Why didn't
17 it all go to Serbia?
18 Q. Why should it all go to Serbia? Serbia and the SFRY was not one
19 and the same.
20 A. Why would Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SFRY be one and the same?
21 Q. But it did go to Serbia as well.
22 A. Some smaller units that were unimportant.
23 Q. Well, we can easily establish which units went where. We don't
24 have to do that today. But the point is that the army withdrew to other
25 parts of SFRY.
1 As for the army in Croatia, the part from Slovenia didn't go to
2 Croatia, but there was JNA -- there were JNA troops in Croatia there, and
3 they were legal.
4 A. Yes, they were there and they were legal. But those troops from
5 Slovenia didn't go to Croatia. That is a fact. And it is also a fact
6 that smaller units went to Serbia and Montenegro. And it is also a fact
7 that the bulk of those forces went to Bosnia, because it was known that a
8 war was in the offing in Bosnia.
9 Q. Perhaps you knew that because you were the federal Prime Minister
10 and Bosnia-Herzegovina was under your competence, but for the -- to say
11 that the army went to Bosnia to prepare war, I don't know anything about
13 A. You knew that better than me because you organised part of that
14 war in agreement with Tudjman.
15 Q. We'll come to that.
16 A. Excellent. I can't wait.
17 Q. It is also untrue what you say in paragraph 24 of your statement.
18 Boro Jovic was never consulted in connection with the JNA intervention in
19 Slovenia, nor was that ever discussed with you. He was never consulted
20 about that.
21 A. I don't know whether he was consulted, nor did I discuss that with
22 him. I just said that two of us had discussed that later and that he held
23 one position, I another. If you read that carefully, you would see that.
24 Q. Very well, Mr. Markovic. Is it in dispute that you had not only
25 de jure responsibility throughout that period, 1989, 1990, and 1991,
1 because you were throughout the federal Prime Minister, but in addition to
2 that de jure responsibility, you also had a number of meetings and engaged
3 in various activities in the federal government with all the important
4 departments of government throughout that period and de facto performed
5 those duties in 1989, 1990, and 1991?
6 Last time I provided that schedule for 1991, and similar ones
7 could be found for 1989 and 1990. So both de jure and de facto you were
8 the executive power at the head of the pyramid of executive powers in
9 SFRY. Is that right?
10 A. First of all, I would ask you kindly - and I apologise to the
11 Court for saying this - if I could have a copy of those documents which
12 actually belong to me and you have them. Maybe I will need them when I
13 decide to write my memoirs. I was unable to get hold of those documents.
14 It is a fact that my government -- I say "mine" of course in
15 quotation marks. I could say the Federal Executive Council, of which I
16 was the president, functioned well in the course of 1989 and 1990.
17 Q. We saw what happened in 1991.
18 A. Already at the end of 1990 certain things happened which seriously
19 jeopardised the already limited competencies that the federal government
20 had. Nowhere in Europe can you find a government with such modest and
21 limited competencies as was the case with the Yugoslav government, whereas
22 you, with your incursion into the payment system and the monetary system,
23 when you took 18.2 billion dinars, by doing this, the little authority the
24 government had, which relied on personalities rather than actual rights,
25 you called even those limited powers into jeopardy.
1 Regardless of the fact that I held that position and despite the
2 fact that I communicated a lot with other people, the truth is that my
3 ability, my capacities were reduced from one day to the next. I devoted
4 most of my efforts to preventing war and the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
5 To that end, I toured all the republics. I spoke to them. I went to the
6 Assembly of Slovenia. I held a speech there that is well known, which was
7 meant to convince the Assembly to change its decision. I went to the
8 Assembly of Croatia, and I spoke there for the first time in a way I never
9 spoke before, and I said some major things there. Let me not repeat those
10 things. If necessary, I can do that.
11 I also asked to be given the possibility to speak in the Republic
12 of Serbia. I was given that approval in principle, but I was not given a
13 chance of speaking in the Republic of Serbia. Though when I look back at
14 those events those were Don Quixotic events of mine, to save something
15 that couldn't be saved, but as an individual I even resorted to that.
16 Q. Mr. Markovic --
17 JUDGE MAY: The time has come for a break. We will try and ensure
18 that the witness has the document which he has asked to see. He should be
19 entitled to see that. We think we may have it, but we will, during the
20 adjournment, the half an hour break, we will see that he gets it.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, what is it?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I remember that several
24 days ago Mr. Nice asked you for permission to give the witness this 1991
25 schedule as the witness asked him for that, and you gave him that
1 permission. Now, why that didn't happen is perhaps an omission on
2 Mr. Nice's part, or maybe an omission on the part of the witness to pick
3 up the document, but I remember very well that this request was made of
4 you and that you granted it, because it was a document reviewing his
5 obligations and activities in 1991, and he obviously has that document.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll look at that. We're now going to adjourn.
7 We will take the usual break, 20 minutes. We've found, I think, I will be
8 grateful to the registry, the figure seems to be Defence Exhibit 207, and
9 the witness should have a copy that he can review during the break.
10 Yes, we will adjourn for 20 minutes.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
14 MR. NICE: I understand Mr. Markovic did not receive the document
15 that he sought and for which permission was obtained to provide him. I
16 don't know why that is. We certainly sent it. I'll find out what the
17 problem was. I'm sorry. I apologise to Mr. Markovic that he didn't
18 receive it.
19 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
20 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope Mr. Markovic will
22 receive it sooner or later, at least, for his memoirs.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. But the point I wanted to raise is this: It is not in dispute,
25 Mr. Markovic that at the time of the aggravation of the Yugoslav crisis in
1 1989 when Slovenia adopted its amendments and in 1990 and 1991, and on top
2 of that there was arming at the time, the creation of first paramilitary
3 formations and various conflicts. It is not in dispute that you had a
4 full overview of the events and the instruments available to you in the
5 form of state instruments.
6 A. It is not in dispute that the Federal Executive Council has an
7 arsenal of these powers, but this was a very modest arsenal, and in every
8 area related to the army, directly or indirectly, the so-called defence,
9 the federal government had no competencies whatsoever.
10 Q. Very well. Since my time is extremely limited, I will provide you
11 with an overview of your activities for 1989 similar to the one for 1991
12 as well as for year 1990. And if you compare 1989 and 1990 and 1991, you
13 can see that the method of work is the same, and the method of
14 communication with all the important factors that were subjected to the
15 federal government were the same in relation to both the police and the
16 army and all the other agencies. I am not able now to go through all of
17 these activities of yours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I want to tender them, Mr. May.
19 And since these are originals, I would like copies returned to me,
20 including the copy for 1991 that I already provided. And I absolutely
21 don't mind that Mr. Markovic should receive a copy of this overview,
22 because it will certainly be useful to him when he writes his memoirs.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I appreciate that very much.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And now in return, I would appreciate brief answers to my
2 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. If you want to put the papers in now,
3 we will consider the position, and we will consider them to -- just --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is 1990 and 1989. The one for
5 1990 I already -- the one for 1991 I provided already.
6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. What I shall do is -- Mr. Nice, if you
7 would look at those documents. They are not in English, but perhaps at
8 least the Prosecution can give us a view as to if there is any objection
9 to admitting them.
10 MR. NICE: Certainly.
11 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. From this we can see that in 1989, in 1990, and 1991 you had
14 regular meetings with the army, the police, the Presidency, with your own
15 members of the government, with officials of various republics, with
16 republican delegations, including those of Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia,
17 Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and so on and so forth. So
18 it is indisputable that over those three years you held executive power in
19 Yugoslavia at the time when these events took place. I don't think you
20 will challenge that, will you?
21 A. Thank you for showing that I have been quite active in this
22 period. This extensive activity of mine in this period does not mean that
23 I had actual power in whatever I was doing.
24 You characterised my own work as being of negotiating character.
25 Using my own methods, I was looking for a solution, trying to avoid
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 conflict and dissolution of Yugoslavia, and to that end I engaged all the
2 forces that were available to me. I toured, tested, looked for people who
3 were willing to help me to prevent a war, et cetera.
4 Q. For instance, you say with regard to the army that you only had
5 competencies in the administrative and financial sense, but I will now
6 show you a document that I received from the side opposite, which is an
7 excerpt from some sort of shorthand notes that I was not provided with in
8 its entirety. The ERN number is 01024563, and from this we can see that
9 General Kadijevic informs you, for instance, of the casualties in
10 Slovenia, of inter-ethnic conflicts, arming activities, et cetera. And
11 then he says, "Losses in Slovenia, 44 killed, 144 wounded." Ante Markovic
12 says, "First you said it was 298 in total." Kadijevic says, "In
13 inter-ethnic conflicts and other conflicts in Yugoslavia, the total was
14 298 only for this year." Markovic says, "How many were wounded?"
15 Kadijevic answers, "472, and the total is 770, and there are other
16 conflicts." He mentions Kosovo, the north of Macedonia, Sandzak.
17 And from this it is clear that you are discussing the security
18 situation with the minister of defence. And we can also see in these
19 agendas of yours various meetings to discuss the security situation, the
20 activities of the army and the police, not only financing aspects.
21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, please. If I may
22 assist the Court. This document was tendered through Mr. Mesic. It's
23 328, Exhibit 328, tab 16. What is now being shown to the witness is
24 contained in this document. So we can look it up.
25 MR. NICE: While we've interrupted the flow, there is no reason to
1 object to these documents on the grounds that they may not be what the
2 accused says they are. They're similar in category to the document that
3 should have been provided in copy to the witness over the adjournment, and
4 the Chamber will recall my observations on the last occasion about how
5 surprised I was that the accused had access to this original material when
6 it hadn't been available to us or to the witness, but there is no reason
7 to doubt they are what they are. Whether they merit becoming an exhibit
8 is a matter for the Chamber. They're quite voluminous.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE MAY: Well, in due course when we've had a moment we will
11 allow the witness to see those documents, but let us not for the moment
12 interrupt the flow of the examination.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I just quoted to you from the document I received from the side
16 opposite. I believe it is authentic. We can see that General Kadijevic
17 is reporting to you on all these events, that you are discussing them with
18 him. So there is no question that you are discussing the financing of the
19 army or anything else which would be in the exclusive competence of the
20 federal government. You are discussing military activities. Is that
22 A. First of all, I don't have this document. So as far as this
23 document is concerned, I cannot give any opinions.
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think I can be of
25 assistance again. This is another exhibit that has been introduced, and
1 it is available in the language Mr. Markovic understands, in B/C/S. I can
2 give him a copy.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can tell you that I don't need
4 this document now because I have no time to study it here. Mr. Milosevic
5 obviously studied it already. I can answer without looking at the
7 It is logical for a president of an institution, including the
8 president of a government, to discuss with his Ministers something that
9 falls under their purview. I did have such discussions with all
10 Ministers. And if Mr. Milosevic is consistent, he will admit that I had
11 such discussions with other Ministers much more often than I talked to
12 Mr. Kadijevic about his sphere of work.
13 Another thing, within the Presidency of Yugoslavia, there is a
14 sector that is in charge of security issues, and that sector comprises
15 representatives of various institutions, including representatives of the
16 federal government, and briefings are held there too in that sector for
17 the purpose of preparing Federal Cabinet meetings to discuss such issues.
18 It is also logical for the Prime Minister to be interested in the
19 progress of the harvest, the situation in tourism, the situation
20 concerning commodity reserves, monetary issues, financial situation, the
21 problems of banks, and various other issues including those that relate to
22 the army.
23 I don't see how a high official is supposed to lead his agency
24 without being informed of its work. But that is one thing. It is quite
25 another thing to have direct control and command over something.
1 When the army is concerned, things are defined very clearly in the
2 constitution. I suggest we don't waste much more time over this. The
3 army is within the competence of the Presidency of Yugoslavia under the
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. That is true. I'm just saying that you are discussing with the
7 Minister of Defence military activities, not those things which you claim
8 are your exclusive competence.
9 A. But that does not mean that I am taking military decisions. I am
10 only being briefed on what is going on, and that is very logical. I am
11 being briefed as the Prime Minister. But as far as decision-making is
12 concerned, heaven forbid. It was just an insinuation the way you tried to
13 put it.
14 Q. I said what I said about your role in the war in Slovenia, and I
15 need not go back to it.
16 But here is another thing relating to Dubrovnik, a report by
17 Hrvoje Kacic of the 1st of October, 1991, ERN numbers ending with 75129.
18 We all attended that conference in The Hague; you, I, representatives of
19 all republics, members of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. All of us were
20 there. And they say here there are problems around Dubrovnik, and they
21 say if you can't talk to Jokic, who came to replace Djurovic, who was
22 killed and who used to be the commander, here in The Hague they have
23 Kadijevic and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic.
24 So concerning this event in Dubrovnik, even those people who were
25 in charge of Croatia put you in the foreground. They say you have
1 Kadijevic here in The Hague and Prime Minister Ante Markovic, and they
2 rely on you to deal with these problems.
3 And then reference is made to the officials of Montenegro, because
4 this is in the immediate vicinity of Montenegro. And there is no
5 reference to Serbia. How can you comment on that?
6 A. First of all, I don't have this document either, and I don't know
7 what it says, so I cannot check whether -- what it really says is what you
8 quote or maybe it is something different, but it is a fact that the war
9 that was waged there in Dubrovnik but also in Vukovar, if you wish, and in
10 other parts of Croatia, this war was something that the Prime Minister,
11 the federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic had nothing to do with. Ante
12 Markovic took every possible measure to prevent this war. And in this
13 context, precisely at that session Mr. Milosevic referred to, I asked him,
14 "Can you see what's going on in Vukovar? Can you see that Dubrovnik is
15 being shelled?" He said, "Are you mad? Who would be crazy enough to bomb
17 Q. Who said that? Yes, that's what I said. It was madness.
18 A. And I replied, "Let's go and see Tudjman." And I said to Tudjman,
19 who was there with his escorts Saronjic and other people, I said to
20 Tudjman, "I'm speaking to Milosevic about the bombing, the shelling of
21 Dubrovnik, and he's telling me that Dubrovnik is not being shelled. He's
22 telling me it's not true." And I wrote in the end what Tudjman's answer
23 was: "Milosevic says it is not being shelled, otherwise, I would have
24 known about it." And the fact is that Dubrovnik was shelled. There are
25 photographs about that. There is even a brief film about it.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. I didn't say at any point I would have known if it was shelled. I
2 said, "Who would be mad enough to do that?"
3 A. There is a film about that. You said, "Who would be mad enough to
4 do that," but you also said, "If it were true, I would know about it."
5 Q. I only quoted to you one sentence from this report of Hrvoje
6 Kacic, the ERN number ending with 7529. Those who have it in front of
7 them can compare. The sentence reads, "If you cannot talk with Jokic who
8 came to replace Djurovic who was killed, you have here in The Hague
9 Kadijevic and Prime Minister Markovic."
10 A. In which way was Hrvoje Kacic competent? You could have named
11 anybody. Tell me who this Kacic is.
12 Q. Well, I suppose he was a Croatian official at the time, who is
13 relying upon you to resolve the problem.
14 A. He would have done better to rely on you. He would have had a
15 better chance of resolving it.
16 Q. Well, I am quoting him, and you know better than I do who Kacic
18 Now, look what it says further on. As Spegelj says, and I suppose
19 you know who he is, you were playing two cards. Here is what Spegelj said
20 to Vladimir Jagar. You not only provided Spegelj with data and
21 information saying that you don't like Serbia and you would not leave
22 Serbia until you managed to take over - that is ERN number 01112475 - it
23 says: "Spegelj told me he has a man in Belgrade who says he can effect an
24 arrest of him. He says army has the intention of arresting him. Spegelj
25 says he got this information from Ante Markovic who advised him on the
1 same occasion that he should leave Belgrade, otherwise the army would
2 arrest him."
3 So instead of preventing this illegal transport of arms that
4 Spegelj was involved in, you call Spegelj on the phone and warn him that
5 he should run away before being arrested by the army for this illegal arms
7 A. Can you tell me when this was?
8 Q. I hope I can. It's the minutes from the 18th February 1991.
9 A. There were times when telephone communication between Serbia and
10 Croatia, Belgrade and Zagreb did not exist at all. Very often I had to
11 phone through Sarajevo or through some other institution.
12 Another thing, I did not see or talk to Spegelj at that time at
13 all, and I had nothing to do with Mr. Spegelj at the time. I had no need
14 to have any communication with him.
15 Q. Very well. I'll quote to you very shortly again from page
16 01112478, where it says: "At this meeting somebody asked Spegelj, what's
17 the situation with Ante Markovic? And in this connection, Spegelj said,
18 Ante Markovic, Prime Minister, is a person playing two cards. He's very
19 fond of power. He said that he, Markovic, cannot stand Milosevic or
20 Serbia, and until he destroys Milosevic and Serbia, he will not leave
22 A. What do I have to do with the private opinions of Spegelj?
23 Anybody, Tom, Dick, or Harry could say here you have Milosevic and here
24 you have Markovic; Markovic hates Milosevic. This has no importance at
25 all. He is not someone who is close to me. I didn't socialise with him.
1 I had nothing to do with Spegelj so he cannot know what I thought. He
2 used this for some purpose of his own. This has nothing to do with me.
3 And anyway, I believe there are many other arguments, many other materials
4 that could clearly prove who advocated what.
5 Q. So you claim that what Spegelj says and what pertains to your
6 assessment in terms of your behaviour and attitude toward Serbia, that
7 that is all simply incorrect?
8 A. It is not correct.
9 Q. Now I'm asking you something else. Since it is being claimed here
10 that some kind of a plan for a Greater Serbia existed, and you say that
11 too, in the opinion of this other side it -- this was controlled. So now
12 I'm going to show you what you said at the session of the Presidency in
13 July 1991. This is a long document, stenographic notes. I was not
14 present at the session, but I am going to quote to you something from page
15 61. The ERN number is 02017995. Ante Markovic says --
16 MR. NICE: Before we do all that, the accused knows quite well we
17 can't just pull out ERN numbered documents, probably provided under
18 substantial Rule 68 disclosure, like that, and of course the documents
19 come with no observation as to their truth value. It would help the
20 witness probably, he doesn't seem to have any trouble with the documents
21 so far but it would probably help if he could at least see the document
22 and follow it. We can't produce it just on the spot.
23 JUDGE MAY: No, of course not. But so far we have in fact not
24 done too badly considering the difficulties which we're in, given an
25 accused in person, one who is liable to quote very large parts of --
1 voluminously from documents. At the same time, he is in person and we
2 have to bear that in mind.
3 MR. NICE: Well, we'll do our best to check --
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will ask him to quote it. We will ask you to
5 pursue it if you would.
6 Yes, what is this document you want to quote to the witness again,
7 Mr. Milosevic?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document is called Stenographic
9 Notes from the 125th session of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal
10 Republic of Yugoslavia, held on the 12th of July of 1991, starting at
11 10.30 a.m., and it also says that it's strictly prohibited to have this
12 document copied. It is a strictly confidential document. Of course Mr.
13 Nice has this. I don't.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And where was this session held?
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I assume in Belgrade. It doesn't say where it was held, but it
17 does say, "After using this document, return it to the general secretary
18 of the Presidency of the SFRY, Presidency of the SFRY, Stjepan Mesic," et
20 Now I'm quoting Stjepan Mesic, who is chairing the meeting, and he
21 says, "I give the floor to Ante," and then a brief quotation. "We noted
22 that actually things are progressing autonomously, in a spontaneous
23 manner, that they are getting out of control increasingly and that this
24 getting out of control applies to all segments, actually, not only in
25 terms of mutual conflicts. And on this basis, certain units are being
1 established. They have started to operate autonomously, but this also
2 pertains to the economic and social fields. There is deep erosion," and
3 so on and so forth.
4 So you yourself say that things are progressing in a spontaneous
5 manner and that they cannot be controlled. They're getting out of
7 And then on the next page you say --
8 JUDGE MAY: No, we can't possibly deal with this in that way.
9 It's very hard at all for the witness to be able to deal with it, and I'm
10 going to ask him if he can remember - he's remembered, remarkably, several
11 things - whether he can remember this and whether he can answer in order
12 to try and save time and get on. But we have a note from the Prosecution.
14 MR. NICE: I believe - I'm grateful to Ms. Dicklich - this is 328,
15 tab 16. It was something produced for identification and therefore is in
16 B/C/S but is not translated. It's a voluminous document.
17 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's ask the witness about it first of all.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember this, but it's a bit some
20 -- it's a bit different from what Mr. Milosevic just said. This is an
21 assessment of part of the process that was evolving at that time and that
22 was initiated from other quarters. It is also true that in the materials
23 I did write, I mean the ones that I worked on and that I wrote for the
24 OTP, Mr. Milosevic never advocated a Greater Serbia in my presence.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. All right.
2 A. But I also wrote that in fact he worked in favour of one, but he
3 never advocated it.
4 Q. All right. You stated here that things are developing
5 spontaneously, and then you're saying the situation is getting out of
6 control and the governments and republics and even individuals, highly
7 authoritative individuals, can no longer control various events and so on
8 and so forth. So you're talking about a general erosion. Is that right,
9 Mr. Markovic?
10 A. Yes. I would have to know which time period this refers to, where
11 this can be incorporated, because you see, when you extract a quotation
12 like this, it can be just out there hanging in the air. It can be about
13 anything. Since I do not know all the things that were being discussed
14 there and in connection with what, I would not be in a position to give an
15 accurate answer. If I could have the opportunity of studying this, I
16 could certainly be in a position to give an answer.
17 I do remember that this was discussed, but it was discussed in the
18 context of overall developments in Yugoslavia.
19 Q. All right. Markovic, as far as the time period is concerned, this
20 is a session of the 12th of July, 1991. I am not going to burden you with
21 quotations from this session any longer. This also has to do with your
22 quotation, but I don't want you to make any comments but -- in any other
23 way except for what you actually said.
24 A few minutes ago, I also quoted you, only I did not draw any
25 conclusions. You say: "In our assessment, there is a central issue which
1 is one of the basic issues in our country." That is what you say. And
2 that is the relationship between the Serbs and Croats or, rather, between
3 Serbia and Croatia.
4 So is your position clear, therefore? I also believed, and I
5 still believe today, that this was the key relationship, that this was the
6 central issue, as you had put it, one the basic issues in our country,
7 that is the relationship between the Serbs and Croats; is that right?
8 A. May I answer now? Several times I presented that point of view.
9 I would take up a lot of time now, so I can't go into all of this, and I
10 cannot explain what the first meeting between Tudjman and myself was like.
11 We had not known each other before. We met one evening in Zagreb, in the
12 offices that I had in Zagreb as federal Prime Minister, and we talked for
13 over two hours. There were five conclusions.
14 One of these five conclusions was Serbs should be talked to within
15 Croatia, not via Serbia itself and Milosevic.
16 Secondly, when I spoke in the Croatian parliament, I think it was
17 towards the end of May or beginning of June, but at any rate before any
18 decisions were made. I said then, because I went there to intervene, in
19 order to prevent the decisions that were being prepared then for the
20 parliament of Croatia. I made a long speech there, and I said that among
21 other things. And also, as far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned too.
22 So Serbs should be talked to in Croatia, not via Serbia and via Milosevic.
23 I thought that was a sine qua non.
24 Q. Yes, sine qua non. That is what I claimed too, that that was the
25 key issue, the relationship between the Serbs and Croats, and that is what
1 you say, or, rather, the relationship between Serbia and Croatia. That's
2 what you said.
3 A. Well, all right. After that, you reached a very nice agreement.
4 You did with Tudjman in Karadjordjevo. Milosevic and Tudjman agreeing in
5 Karadjordjevo that they would split up Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6 Q. That's not true but we're going to get to that as well. I just
7 wanted to clarify this particular matter, that the key issue in our
8 country is the relationship between Serbs and Croats or, rather, the
9 relationship between Serbia and Croatia, because here this is being
10 presented in a distorted fashion. I am glad that you explained it in the
11 same way.
12 Mr. Markovic, you said that I wanted to put everything under the
13 control of the army, and I had control over the army, and I had control
14 over the members of the Presidency. In this very same document, the
15 stenographic minutes, this is what one of the members of the Presidency
16 says. This is the member of the Presidency from Vojvodina, Jugoslav
17 Kostic. Jugoslav Kostic says: "I am not prepared to vote for that
18 solution which would give the army carte blanche to secure the state
19 border by force," and so on.
20 So isn't it clear that Serbia and what you called the Serbian bloc
21 was not in favour of giving the army a free hand so that it could secure
22 the state border? And then he adds: "When we see that there are flags of
23 the Republic of Slovenia on the state border and --"
24 JUDGE MAY: It's quite impossible for a witness to deal with this
25 length. Now, we've allowed some leeway because of the need for time, but
1 we must also be fair to the witness in order that he could answer what's
2 being put.
3 Mr. Markovic, I don't know if you could briefly deal with what is
4 being alleged at this stage.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very interesting that Milosevic
6 extracted only a very partial element that speaks of relations between the
7 army and Serbia and relations within the Presidency of Yugoslavia.
8 It is well known, and I believe there is no need to prove this,
9 that in the Presidency of Yugoslavia as the Supreme Commander that the
10 army was subordinated to there were two groups within the Presidency. In
11 one group was Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. And
12 the other group consisted of Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro.
13 That is four to four.
14 So why were these sessions held so many times in order to get a
15 majority? If that had been Kostic's vote, then it would have been
16 rejected. But the fact remains that sessions were held, even sometimes in
17 army premises where it was very cold. And they sought to break
18 Bogicevic's will and to make him vote in favour of giving the army a free
19 hand in order to deal with the situation in Yugoslavia. However, they did
20 not succeed in that. Bogicevic, although he was a Serb from
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was accused of being a traitor.
22 So this one example that Mr. Milosevic quoted doesn't really mean
23 much. As the Germans say, one swallow does not bring spring.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Well, the Serbs say the same thing.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes. I'm German oriented.
2 Q. But this shows no doubt that there was no agreement involved
3 within this Serbian Bloc, as you call it, because Kostic is opposing this
4 proposal to give the army a free hand to secure the state borders.
5 I'm not going to keep you any long with these stenographic notes,
6 but please, since my time is restricted, give me answers that are as brief
7 as possible.
8 Is it correct that at that time at the peak of your term of office
9 only Croatia and Slovenia opposed the quest for a constitutional setup of
10 Yugoslavia that would be reformed on the basis of the existing
11 constitution of Yugoslavia?
12 A. No. The Federal Executive Council also asked for a constitutional
14 Q. Well, that is what I'm saying, that only Slovenia and Croatia were
15 opposed to finding a constitutional solution for a future Yugoslavia on
16 the basis of the existing constitution?
17 A. That's not exactly the way it was. On the 18th of December, 1989,
18 when I presented my programme of reform, then the Federal Executive
19 Council presented as a prerequisite for carrying out this reform, and also
20 for continuing the reforms that were already taking place, requested that
21 the constitution of Yugoslavia be changed then, and this change of the
22 constitution was supposed to make it possible to carry out elections
23 throughout Yugoslavia.
24 Q. All right.
25 A. However, this was prevented by the delegates from Slovenia and the
1 delegates from Serbia. The delegates from Croatia were prepared to
2 support this.
3 Q. Please. That is not correct. The delegates from Serbia tried to
4 prevent this. Do you remember that the Presidency of Yugoslavia -- I'm
5 not talking about the Federal Executive Council now, your Federal
6 Executive Council. But the Presidency of Yugoslavia in mid-1989 launched
7 an initiative to change the constitution of the SFRY. Do you remember
9 A. Well, a change of the constitution of the SFRY had started already
10 in 1996 [as interpreted] when these governments were not even in place.
11 After all, I was a member of this constitutional changes commission. We
12 had been working on that for two years, so some changes had already been
14 Other changes that were being sought, well that is true, the
15 Presidency did ask for them.
16 Q. In 1989.
17 A. And also then in 1989, the Federal Executive Council sought
18 changes but the way they saw them, not the way the Presidency of
19 Yugoslavia saw them. And as for these changes that were sought by the
20 Federal Executive Council, a vast majority were in favour of most of them.
21 However, as regards multi-party elections throughout Yugoslavia, all
22 Yugoslav elections, the representatives of Slovenia and Serbia were not in
23 favour of that.
24 Q. On the contrary. The representatives of Serbia were in favour of
25 multi-party elections. And do you remember that on the 28th of May, 1990,
1 in the federal executive -- in the Federal Assembly, the representative of
2 Serbia asked for the right to secession to be regulated by law in order to
3 prevent any kind of tensions or to avoid chaos, to have all of this
4 regulated by law?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Do you remember that at the time the Federal Assembly, meeting on
7 the 29th of May, 1990, supported the right to self-determination,
8 including the right to secession?
9 A. Yes. And it was only then that the law was adopted enabling
10 elections at the level of the whole of Yugoslavia, only then.
11 Q. And do you remember what was the main idea behind that proposal;
12 to ensure protection of fundamental human rights, a peaceful settlement of
13 disputes, equality of all the Yugoslav peoples, and all this was built
14 into this proposal of the Presidency, as you know; is that right?
15 A. Yes, it was so, but very often what was written in documents
16 wasn't so important. What was important was the way they were
17 implemented, and they weren't implemented very well.
18 Q. And do you remember after extensive procedure in preparing the
19 amendments four republics and two provinces submitted a proposal on the
20 constitutional reconstruction of Yugoslavia to the Federal Assembly, and
21 four republics plus two provinces submitted a unified proposal on the
22 constitutional reconstruction of Yugoslavia, while simultaneously Slovenia
23 and Croatia submitted a proposal on confederation? An agreement was not
24 reached as there was no consensus. But it wasn't Serbia that had a
25 different concept than Slovenia and Croatia, but the ratio was 6 to 2. Is
1 that right, Mr. Markovic?
2 A. Mr. Milosevic, the discussion you are referring to took place
3 mostly at meetings of the presidents of the Presidencies of the republics
4 and provinces. And you moved from one town to the next, discussing these
5 matters. You excluded the rest of us from these discussions because you
6 were the actual people in power. That is, the republics rather than the
7 federal institutions.
8 None of us attended those talks, and that is where you differed.
9 Among other things, at one of those meetings, I think it was the
10 representative of Croatia or Slovenia, I don't remember exactly who, when
11 he proposed that a confederation be opted for, you used the well-known
12 expression "Malo Morgen." This could also be an indication who you're
13 close to. So you see, you showed an inclination that you accused me of a
14 moment ago, an inclination towards Germany.
15 Q. I don't speak German, but in Serbia very often the expression is
16 used, "Malo Morgen," meaning never, really.
17 A. Well, obviously there were two ideas, a loose confederation was
18 one option, and the other one. And you were in favour of the other
19 option. You headed that option and would not accept any kind of
21 Q. My question was a precise one. I am not talking about meetings of
22 the presidents of the republics, because when you say "you," you mean
23 presidents of the republics; not just me but all the presidents of the
25 A. Yes, that's right. You excluded the rest of us.
1 Q. Very well. But I was asking you about a proposal submitted to the
2 Federal Assembly by four republics and two provinces on the constitution.
3 So this was a proposal submitted to the Federal Assembly; is that right?
4 A. As far as I remember that never came up before the Federal
5 Assembly. I say that a proposal was submitted. I say it never happened.
6 Q. Mr. Markovic, that can easily be established. There are documents
7 about that.
8 A. Very well.
9 Q. Wasn't it quite clear already in 1990 that Slovenia had started
10 with the secession, followed by Croatia, and that armies started to be
11 formed in Slovenia and Croatia? Is that right or not?
12 A. I couldn't put it that way. In Slovenia, yes. In Croatia, no, as
13 far as I know. That's one thing.
14 And secondly, this was part of the evolution of mutual
15 relationships, relationships within which you were already manifesting a
16 tendency to rule the whole country. And this was clear, among other
17 things, from the way you crashed into the monetary system. You blocked
18 goods coming from Slovenia. You organised people to hold public rallies
19 in Ljubljana. So in a sense, you participated in the decisions made by
20 Slovenia. You forced their hand.
21 Q. Mr. Markovic, the fact that a group of people from Kosovo wanted
22 to go to Ljubljana to seek solidarity from the people of Slovenia with
23 their suffering was not organised by Serbia, and you know that very well.
24 And the fact that relations between the republican banks and the central
25 banks was certainly not within the competence of the president of the
1 Presidency of the republic but was within the competence of the national
2 banks. And you're highly sensitive when you're attributed competencies
3 that do not belong to you, but you are not so sensitive when you attribute
4 everything else to someone else.
5 A. Who could prevent the purchase of goods by Serbian companies in
6 Slovenia? No bank could do that. No administrative decision of Serbia
7 was taken. This was a kind of civil revolt because of their attitude
8 towards Kosovo and because of the way they treated the sufferers from
9 Kosovo who wanted to address the Slovenian public to tell them the truth
10 about their suffering and the persecution they were exposed to.
11 Q. So you're saying it was spontaneous.
12 A. It was partially spontaneous, but it certainly wasn't a state
13 measure or a measure taken by the republic or any kind of administrative
14 decision. It was simply generalised feelings of revolt because of such an
15 attitude towards Kosovo. You know that very well. And why didn't you
16 prevent the blockade of purchase of Slovenian goods?
17 Q. Mr. Markovic, let's go back to the question of secession of
18 Slovenia and Croatia in 1990. Is it true you were the federal Prime
19 Minister in 1990? You were informed that already in mid-1990 a meeting
20 was held between delegations of the HDZ and the Slovenian Demos, their
21 ruling party at the time, to coordinate their tactics towards the JNA.
22 You remember that? This was confirmed by Vasiljevic too, who in those
23 days was head of the military security.
24 A. No, I'm not aware of any such meeting.
25 Q. So you received no information about that.
1 A. No, I didn't receive any such information. I do know that in
2 those days the HDZ, headed by Tudjman, had constituted its authority in
3 Croatia, and as early as that date I don't think he could have done any
4 such thing. He was the head of a party that was of no interest to me.
5 What I was interested in was the work of state institutions.
6 Q. Tell me, is it true that early in October 1990 there was
7 intensified illegal arming of certain units in Croatia in cooperation with
8 similar such institutions in Slovenia? And do you remember that the JNA
9 discovered nine channels of illegal arming of Croatia and Slovenia in
10 those days? Is that right or not?
11 A. I must say that there were some indications I received about
12 arming in Slovenia. However, regarding arming in Croatia and what the
13 army discovered by filming Spegelj and the import of Kalashnikovs and
14 other weapons from Hungary, I learnt about it when it was broadcast on
15 television. Even General Kadijevic never told me a word about it. And we
16 asked him at a meeting why he hadn't informed the federal government of
17 this. Since this was his duty as a military man, he should have informed
18 the Presidency, but he should also have informed us so as to be kept
19 informed. Not in the sense of us as commanders. But he didn't.
20 Q. Is it true that it was in your term of office that the government
21 of Croatia, in July 1990, decided to form the National Guards Corps?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. At the same time the decision was taken to withdraw the weapons of
24 reserve police forces in areas where the majority Serb population which
25 caused conflicts there?
1 A. That has its certain genesis, a course of development. Most of
2 those weapons had already been handed over to the army, and the previous
3 government in Croatia had done this. That is, the weapons of the
4 so-called Territorial Defence. And all this had been handed to the army.
5 Q. Very well. You were the Prime Minister when the Serbs were thrown
6 out of the constitution of Croatia. What was your reaction to that?
7 A. As opposed to you who did not intervene to what the Serbs were
8 doing in Croatia, I did intervene in response to what the Croats were
10 Q. But that was your duty.
11 A. But that was your duty as well. I intervened by requesting a
12 meeting in the Croatian Assembly at which I spoke about this at length.
13 Among other things, I said what should be done to put an end to this. And
14 I said quite clearly and listed things, starting from revanchism, the need
15 to stop the army, to need to sit round a table and talk to the Serbs, et
16 cetera, et cetera.
17 Q. My question was: What was your reaction when the Serbs were
18 thrown out of the Croatian constitution? You were the president of the
19 Presidency of Croatia for a time. You know the constitution of Croatia
20 which defined Croatia as a state of the Croatian people, the Serb people,
21 and others. What was your reaction?
22 A. My reaction was that it was a bad thing.
23 Q. And what was your reaction when the police raided Pakrac,
24 Plitvice, or Borovo Selo and all the incidents that took place there?
25 What was your reaction? You were the federal Prime Minister.
1 A. All these things, via the army, was part of the competence of the
2 Presidency of Yugoslavia. One could also ask what was the reaction was of
3 the Federal Executive Council when the Serbs attacked Croatian villages,
4 and there were such instances too. That was not in your competence so it
5 was only within the competence of the Presidency and the army.
6 Q. Thank you for your answer.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could there be pauses, please, between question
8 and answer. I'm sorry.
9 JUDGE MAY: You know, the interpreters have really done remarkably
10 well considering the difficulties they've had. Particularly with the
11 witness and also the accused in particular taking up much room and time.
12 Would you bear in mind -- we'll ask Mr. Markovic too, to pause, if he
13 would, please. It's difficult, I know, because you're used to the
14 language, but give the interpreters time.
15 And you, Mr. Milosevic, you should also take time. You're not
16 really allowing time for everybody.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Markovic, please give me brief answers, because I have very
19 little time.
20 The agreement reached between the leaderships of Slovenia and
21 Croatia regarding joint actions towards the JNA on the 20th of January,
22 1991, and before that on the 6th of January, 1991, the Defence Ministers
23 met in Otocac to agree on coordinated action towards the JNA. Do you
24 remember that? Yes or no.
25 A. I don't remember that, but I do remember that the army or, rather,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the General Staff was preparing an attack on the leadership of Croatia and
2 Slovenia. That I remember.
3 Q. I don't remember that the army carried out any attack.
4 A. No, they didn't carry out an attack, but they were preparing it.
5 I said that clearly and wrote that in my report for the Prosecution.
6 Q. And is it true that Article 5 of the constitution of SFRY
7 stipulated that the borders could not be changed without agreement of all
8 the republics and provinces?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Is it true that the Yugoslav People's Army was absolutely
11 pro-Yugoslav in orientation?
12 A. Well, that depends on one's judgement.
13 Q. Well, is it true or not?
14 A. For a certain period of time that was true. Maybe up until the
15 end of 1990. After that, it became increasingly pro-Serb.
16 Q. And is it true that the JNA, which was multi-ethnic in those days
17 and which had a multi-ethnic leadership, was on the verge of intervening
18 militarily to preserve Yugoslavia?
19 A. Against whom?
20 Q. Against all those undermining the unity of Yugoslavia. That was
21 my understanding. Well, you said that just now.
22 A. From the end of 1990 onwards, the army was increasingly in the
23 function of implementing pro-Serb policies. I won't ask you. You're
24 qualifying things without answering my questions.
25 Tell me, what did you do as the number one man in the government
1 of Yugoslavia when there was illegal arming across customs borders? At
2 least that was within your terms of reference.
3 A. I did not know about them. I learnt about them when the army
4 published it, and meetings of the Presidency were held and instructions
5 were given to the federal government. The federal government responded to
6 the Presidency, and there was a session held sometime end of January 1991
7 when this was discussed for the first time in -- and what the powers of
8 the Federal Executive Council are are clear. Even when you crashed into
9 the monetary fund and took 18.2 billion dinars from it, we had no
10 instruments that we could use against you.
11 Q. That is not true, but I can't keep going back a hundred times to
12 what you call the monetary incursion.
13 Do you remember that in that atmosphere and under pressure of the
14 European Community Stipe Mesic, who had already declared himself as a
15 separatist, was elected president of the Presidency?
16 A. Stipe Mesic was due to be automatically elected president of the
17 Presidency because that is what was stipulated by the constitution. That
18 is the system of rotation for the President of the Presidencies. You
19 prevented Mesic's election to the position of president of the Presidency,
20 and for 45 days the Presidency did not have a president, which meant that
21 the army was without a Commander-in-Chief for 45 days.
22 Q. Mr. Markovic, when you say "you", I don't know who you mean, but
23 by secret ballot, members of the Presidency did not wish to elect him
24 because he himself clearly stated his intention to be the last president
25 of Yugoslavia and that Yugoslavia should be dismembered.
1 A. It was --
2 Q. Is that right or not? That is my question.
3 JUDGE MAY: No. You must give the witness a chance to explain
4 something. Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to say that the Presidency
6 was composed of eight members. Four members were either completely
7 Serbian; that's Serbia, Vojvodina, or Kosovo, or Montenegro. They were
8 hand-in-hand. They had identical positions. They were always able to
9 outvote everybody. You always voted in unison, because Mesic was alone.
10 The vote was 4 to 3. But the election of the president was never voted
11 on. It was supposed to run automatically under the constitution. Mesic
12 should have taken over from Jovic, just as Jovic in his time had taken
13 over from Drnovsek.
14 Q. Mr. Markovic, I asked you, was it true that even before he became
15 a candidate for the President of the Presidency Mesic made it abundantly
16 clear that he wanted to be the last president of the Presidency of
17 Yugoslavia and his latest statements on the break-up of Yugoslavia are
18 also notorious. Is that in dispute?
19 A. The latter is not in dispute. The first thing you said is.
20 Q. You warned against the danger of civil war. You spoke in the
21 Croatian Sabor or Assembly. That's true but that was only in June, 24th
22 of June, 1991. Is that so, Mr. Markovic?
23 A. Yes, it was in the beginning of June.
24 Q. I have the date here. It was on the 24th of June. It was
25 broadcast live from the Croatian Assembly. And you knew full well that
1 arming had been taking place in Croatia as early as 1990. Conflicts were
2 in preparation in territories where Serbs were in jeopardy. How come that
3 your reaction was so belated? It came only in mid-1991 when you spoke in
4 the Croatian parliament of this danger.
5 A. Regrettably I have again to give my standard answer to explain
7 My first meeting with Tudjman took place in Zagreb because my
8 family resided in Zagreb. I worked in Belgrade, and I came to visit them
9 over the weekend. And on one such occasion I asked to meet with him. We
10 had never met before. And he asked me if I could stay on in Zagreb until
11 Monday. I said I couldn't, so we met on a Sunday evening in Zagreb. I
12 will not describe the circumstances to save time.
13 My conclusion was that we could cooperate, one, if we can do
14 without tit for tat and without retribution. That's one.
15 Second, if we have negotiations with Serbs in Croatia and reach
16 agreement with them. Another conclusion was to keep hands off Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina, refrain from arming, et cetera.
18 Even at that time, those were my demands from them. I repeated
19 them many times in meetings with them.
20 Before that decision was made back in the spring 1991 I demanded
21 from the Assembly of Slovenia, the parliament of Croatia and the
22 parliament of Serbia permission to address them on this subject, even
23 though that was not my job strictly, formally, and legally speaking. And
24 when I was allowed to address these parliaments, I did. In Serbia, I was
25 never even allowed.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. There was no need -- there was no problem for you to address the
2 Assembly of Serbia. Anybody who wanted to could have done so.
3 Tell me another thing. Is it true that many garrisons were in
4 dire straits at the time and were waiting for the JNA to save them?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Is it true that as soon as the government changed in Croatia
7 Serbs, as an entity, were deleted from the Croatian constitution as a
8 constituent nation and their situation deteriorated?
9 A. That's true. I never agreed with that, and I didn't have the
10 right to vote.
11 Q. Okay, but is it true that Serbs had a good reason to be afraid?
12 A. You could say that, yes.
13 Q. All right. Is it true that Serbs lived together with Croats,
14 among Croats, that they were victims of mistreatment, and that they could
15 hope for no justice from the current courts and the judiciary whose
16 attitude was discriminatory?
17 A. You see, you are now making conclusions from something that is
18 already history. We can now talk about something else, why talks were not
19 held the way they should have been with Serbs in Croatia, not via Serbs in
20 Serbia and through you.
21 Q. We sought to have direct negotiations between Knin and Zagreb, and
22 we worked as mediators. But we will have opportunity later to see
23 evidence of that.
24 You say in paragraph 15 that I told you that we could not leave
25 Serbs without protection. I suppose that it was clear even to you that
1 they were undefended and unprotected in Croatia.
2 Now, I as the president of Serbia am asking you, federal Prime
3 Minister, and telling you that people should not be left in the lurch,
4 unprotected, isn't it clearly your duty to take care of it? What's so
5 strange about that?
6 A. First of all, I was elected federal Prime Minister not as a
7 Croatian but as a human being, and that's how I tried to act the whole
8 time. Therefore, you cannot put it that way that I was supposed to react
9 as a Croat. I was supposed to act as the president of a Yugoslav
10 institution, which I was. I emphasised more than once that I had
11 absolutely no powers, nor did the federal government, over the army, nor
12 could we intervene in that sense. We made various proposals. We even
13 sent our people there, various government cabinet members went. The
14 vice-Prime Minister, including Markovic, et cetera. But they tried to
15 deal with problems of turnover of goods, communications, normal supply of
16 commodities to citizens, normal management of social affairs, et cetera.
17 Q. Leave alone transactions and normal operations. You say in
18 another item: "The republics arrogated to themselves revenues from
19 various goods that they were supposed to pay into the federal budget."
20 A. That's true.
21 Q. Isn't it true that various republics stopped payments to the
22 federal budget that were due?
23 A. It is true that Slovenia did not pay its dues to the federal
24 budget, and it stopped paying even the revenues that came from levies,
25 customs levies that were charged at the borders that belonged to Slovenia.
1 That much is true. But at that session I said that Croatia is paying its
2 dues. Then Greguric took the floor and said that they would not be paying
3 contributions to the army which is waging war on their territory.
4 Macedonia did pay contributions. Bosnia and Herzegovina did too, but
5 Serbia didn't. Look at the record of that session and you will see.
6 Q. I assert that Serbia paid its contributions to the budget and
7 demands were made in view of increased costs of the army resulting from
8 failed contributions from other republics. Demands were made for Serbia
9 to stop paying too.
10 A. No, that's not true. And if I could get the document, I could
11 show it to you.
12 And at that session which you quoted from several times, it is
13 written very clearly what I said. I enumerated all those who were paying
14 and who were not paying, and I said Serbia was among those who were not
15 paying. You can find that document.
16 Q. Of course we can find it. And you can get it. We were talking
17 about financial institutions. You mentioned this Bank for International
18 Economic Cooperation, JUBMES, and you spoke about Ivan Stambolic. You
19 know very well, Mr. Markovic, at the time when he was appointed to that
20 office, he was appointed at my request. In other words, he begged me to
21 give him that post. And I achieved that in agreement with Branko Mikulic,
22 then Prime Minister, not with you. Branko Mikulic, the Prime Minister
23 before you, was in charge and he was able to do that because he was a
24 candidate from Croatia.
25 A. Did you ever ask me to intervene?
1 Q. Not that I remember. But it is possible that I asked you, too, to
2 support his nomination, although it was not done, as you say, so that he
3 should be removed from Serbia. He had already been removed from Serbia
4 anyway. The truth is that at his request, I agreed with Branko Mikulic
5 that he get that office. Do you admit that?
6 A. Can I briefly describe our conversation on the phone on the
8 Q. You can describe whatever you want. But the fact is that at that
9 time, Branko Mikulic was Prime Minister, not you.
10 JUDGE MAY: There seems to be some difficulty with this particular
11 microphone because that is supposed to cut the accused off so he doesn't
12 take up so much time.
13 Now, Mr. Markovic, if you want to respond, of course you should be
14 able to and to describe the situation. You shouldn't be harried in any
15 way by the accused in what you're trying to do. Now, if you would like to
16 answer, do.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I wish to say, and I
18 remember this very well, at that time I got a call from Mr. Milosevic, who
19 asked me kindly if I could arrange that Mr. Ivan Stambolic be appointed
20 somewhere outside Serbia, because for various reasons it was not good for
21 him to stay in Serbia, both for his sake and for our sake. And he asked
22 me if we could talk to Mr. Ilija Marjanovic, who was director general of
23 the JUBMES, Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. He was just a candidate, a nominee.
1 A. No. He was general director. He asked me, therefore, if we could
2 talk to him and ask him to cede his position to Stambolic. I did call
3 Stambolic. I explained to him the situation. Sorry, I called the general
4 director and explained to him the situation and asked him to accept that
5 he be replaced by Stambolic. That indeed happened. Stambolic was made
6 general director and the previous director became his deputy.
7 That was not the end of the matter, because after that Ivan
8 Stambolic, who had not done this work before, had done his homework and
9 did very well, he gave a great contribution to the development of this
10 Bank for International Economic Cooperation until the time when his term
11 of office was expiring.
12 He -- Mr. Milosevic then talked to me again tete-a-tete and asked
13 me to not support Stambolic's re-election. I refused, and I wrote a
14 letter instead to the federal government suggesting -- excuse me. He
15 wrote a letter to the federal government asking the federal government to
16 withdraw their support for the re-election of Mr. Stambolic. I did not
17 agree with this letter. And there were two cabinet members who were in
18 favour of this letter, although they were his personal friends.
19 I went to the Assembly instead and expressed my support to
20 Stambolic. After that, Mr. Milosevic stopped all communication with the
21 federal government and with me personally as its Prime Minister for
22 several months.
23 Q. That is not true at all.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What it's matter with the
1 JUDGE MAY: I brought this to an end because it is time for an
2 adjournment, and the witness should certainly have one.
3 You have, Mr. Milosevic, 25 minutes to conclude your evidence.
4 MR. NICE: Your Honour --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
6 MR. NICE: I know that Mr. Tapuskovic is going to refer to -- I
7 know Mr. Tapuskovic is going to refer to Exhibit 328, tab 16. At least, I
8 think he is. The accused has been asking the witness questions about it.
9 We've found the document. It's very extensive. There is in fact an
10 English translation. I've marked the tabs with which I believe the
11 passages the accused has asked him about. If the witness wants to see it
12 at the break may he have it, to save time?
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness wants to see them, he may.
14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may I have one minute private session?
15 Nothing to do with the witness, just ongoing administrative matters but
16 preferably now rather than to squeeze in at the end of the day.
17 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
18 [Private session]
4 --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Markovic, you heard that I have been given only 25 minutes
10 more, so please give me brief answers to my questions because I have a
11 considerable number of questions left for you. But let us finish with
12 Ivan Stambolic.
13 I presume that it is not in dispute that he became president of
14 the Yugoslav Bank for International Economic relations in 1987 at my
15 intervention. I said that I intervened with the then-Prime Minister
16 Branko Mikulic, and you say that I intervened with you too, or perhaps
17 with you too. But anyway, is it in dispute that he was appointed at my
19 A. No.
20 Q. So he was appointed upon my intervention. Now, do you know, since
21 you were friends, as you say, that he remained in that position until
22 1998, until he retired?
23 A. I know, but it is also well known that you asked me to have him
24 dismissed from that position and that you wrote an official letter to the
25 Federal Executive Council that his reappointment not be supported but to
1 look for another person.
2 Q. I do not know about these personnel, current personnel matters
3 from 1991, but isn't it clear that he remained in that position until
5 A. But not thanks to you. It was thanks to me. I went to the bank
6 Assembly, and I on behalf of the Federal Executive Council and in my own
7 name supported his reappointment and he got a large number of votes during
8 that re-election. As a matter of fact, a large number of Serbian votes
9 were in his favour, although these people had been instructed not to vote
10 for him. And some people even left the building so as not to be in a
11 position to vote.
12 Q. But in 1987, he was not appointed at your initiative.
13 A. But I cannot talk about this time when I was not Prime Minister.
14 Q. He certainly did not remain until 1998. The remaining seven years
15 at your initiative.
16 A. He remained for another four years when he was re-appointed upon
17 my initiative and against you.
18 Q. All right. All right. And then again he remained until 1998.
19 A. I have no idea what happened afterwards.
20 Q. Now, tell me, what does this have to do with anything, Ivan
21 Stambolic with the war in Croatia, with the war in Bosnia, with the war in
22 Kosovo and so on and so forth? And this is why you came to testify here.
23 Was it this other side that instructed you to speak about this or are you
24 doing this on your own initiative?
25 A. During the interview in respect of these questions that are
1 related to you, the question of Ivan Stambolic was brought up, and I said
2 what I said.
3 Q. Oh. Thank you ever so much. So this other side is interfering in
4 matters that are of no concern to them. They won't let me be involved in
5 the elections in Serbia and now they ask you about Ivan Stambolic and --
6 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]... by the accused, and
7 tolerant though I am, I'm not going to put up with that. This was a
8 proper range of inquiry with this witness, and he answered the questions
9 that were raised with him.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. All right. Let us move on to other matters then. I have here
12 before me a newspaper from Croatia. Let me just look at the exact date.
13 Feral Tribune is the newspaper. The 8th of November, 2003. It has to
14 do --
15 JUDGE MAY: Wait a minute. What is the relevance of this? The
16 Prosecution are quite entitled to object to this -- just a moment. It's
17 just the sort of objections that you have been raising. What is this
18 before we get any sort of question about something as recent as that.
19 He's dealing with matters ten years ago. That's the evidence that he's
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'm dealing with the next topic,
22 Mr. May, the one that the witness spoke about during his
23 examination-in-chief when he said that he was endangered in Belgrade, that
24 his life was in danger, that he slept with a gun underneath his pillow.
25 So I have here an interview with Suvar, a Croatian politician, who
1 also held an office in Belgrade at that time, and he says: "Before that,
2 I also lived in Belgrade, and I was subjected to various accusations and
3 threats and also when Ante Markovic, together with Slobodan Milosevic and
4 Veljko Kadijevic, was breaking bread when the Serbian constitution was
5 being adopted. I did not feel physically endangered. Therefore, I do not
6 believe that Ante Markovic's live was physically in danger."
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So Stipe Suvar did not feel physically endangered and you lived in
9 the residence of the federal Prime Minister in front of which there is
10 police in uniform and you claim that you felt physically endangered in
11 Belgrade. Can you say anything about that?
12 A. I could not give a response to that at all, because what makes
13 some Stipe Suvar competent to deal with what I lived through? First of
14 all, Stipe Suvar at that time was not in Belgrade. He had left Belgrade
15 much earlier. So he absolutely could not have known anything about that.
16 How I lived then I know the best. From the house where I lived,
17 over the last several months of my life there, I did not take the same
18 streets going to work. And as for people guarding me, many people were
19 killed by persons who guarded them, precisely by them.
20 Q. Who was killed?
21 A. I'm not openly talking about Yugoslavia. I'm just saying that so
22 many people anywhere in the world were assassinated by people who were
23 supposed to guard them and protect them.
24 Q. And what about Belgrade 1989, 1990, 1991 when you feared for your
25 own life? Who was killed then?
1 A. I'm sorry, I did not talk about 1989 or 1990 or 1991. I was
2 talking about the last few months of my stay in Belgrade, and that is the
4 Q. Do you have a single example of anyone threatening your life in
5 any way?
6 A. Of course I do. They organised demonstrations against me, and
7 people were there against me.
8 Q. Oh, demonstrations. The other thing that Suvar speaks of here is
9 this alleged missile that was fired at Banski Dvori. He says: "In
10 Banski Dvori no one ever saw a crater or took a picture of one. It was a
11 generally known fact that this had been rigged and that nobody targeted
12 Banski Dvori, let alone JNA aircraft." And he says, "On the basis of
13 everything that could be heard or read until now, it shows that a JNA
14 aircraft that had taken off from Bihac had fired at Martin Spegelj's
15 residence at Tuskanac." At his residence there. He was then minister of
16 defence. This missile had fallen on Dubravkin Put but at Banski Dvori
17 nobody saw a crater or took a picture of one. Is that true?
18 A. Listen, now I could say that I'm not interested in entering a
19 debate with Mr. Stipe Suvar. He is absolutely in no position to say
20 anything about this. He had no access there. He could have invented
21 anything, that Americans had come and done the bombing. What I can say
22 here has nothing to do with Stipe Suvar. I'm not interested in him at
23 all. But what I can say is the following: That I was in Zagreb between
24 the 5th and 10th of October. The reason was purely personal. My first
25 grandson was born then, and I was trying to find a way of getting to
1 Zagreb. At that time, all the communications between Belgrade and Zagreb
2 had been severed, so I travelled via Austria.
3 When I arrived in Zagreb, Tudjman called me and asked for a
4 meeting. He had found out that I was there. He wanted to talk to me
5 about the initiative to have this moratorium, and during that period
6 relations in Yugoslavia, in the former Yugoslavia, were supposed to be
7 worked out without any bloodshed, and he wanted to discuss this with me,
8 and he was trying to tell me that I should speak to Stipe Mesic so that he
9 would return to Belgrade. So the three of us, Mr. Tudjman, Stipe Mesic,
10 and I had a meeting and discussed this. And we had agreed about certain
11 matters that Stipe Mesic should return to Belgrade, that the ministers and
12 I should return to Belgrade, and also we agreed that people who were in
13 the Federal Assembly, some of them should also return to Belgrade. Then
14 we also agreed that Kucan should be called. Tudjman lifted the receiver
15 wanting to call Kucan, and at that moment the missiles exploded. I was
16 actually present, I was there at the place where the missiles exploded.
17 One of these missiles exploded precisely in the dining room where
18 perhaps a minute or half a minute before that we had been having lunch.
19 And there were craters there. And the door was torn down and the
20 staircase. And we tried to get out in all conceivable ways.
21 In other areas that are close to this building, there were other
22 craters, all the way to Dubravkin Put. So that's the truth.
23 Q. All right. In Hrvatska Ljevica, October 2003, this is a newspaper
24 also, it says in connection with you, "Perhaps he will say something about
25 the rigged explosion in Banski Dvori when he had talks with Tudjman. We
1 can say with full reliability that Banski Dvori had not been attacked.
2 Any military expert who wanted to do so could have done so at the time.
3 For example, it can be seen quite clearly in the photograph that the
4 chandelier in Tudjman's study --"
5 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Wait a moment. We will see whether
6 the witness can give any evidence at all about this newspaper report.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know about these newspaper
8 reports, who wrote them, and who is competent to write them.
9 Mr. Milosevic is using materials that are totally incompetent.
10 The fact remains that missiles were fired, seven or eight of them,
11 and one man was even killed.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Where was this man killed?
14 A. These missiles hit the building that we were in, two of them.
15 Q. Was somebody killed in that building?
16 A. Then on the other side facing a street called Visoka and two were
17 down there in Dubravkin Put, the street of Dubravkin Put. So that is what
18 I can say in this regard. One really had to live through this kind of
19 thing in order to know what it was like. And now that I should debate the
20 issue with people that I don't know at all who could have written anything
21 about this, that is pointless, absolutely pointless.
22 The fact remains that General Tus, who had been a pilot for years
23 himself, and he was commander of the Yugoslav air force, it was his
24 assessment that these missiles were fired from a particular aircraft and
25 from a particular altitude, and this could have been done only by three
1 pilots in Yugoslavia. I think that General Tus is an expert in these
2 matters as opposed to others who write about it this way or that.
3 Q. I wanted to read the last sentence out to you, and it says:
4 "Perhaps Markovic himself simply did not know about the trick that was
5 supposed to be performed before the Yugoslav and foreign public." Because
6 nobody got killed in Banski Dvori; isn't that right? The missiles were
7 fired and nobody got killed. Is that right, Mr. Markovic?
8 A. The missiles were fired, but there were some who had been injured.
9 I cannot say who exactly. I know that one man got killed. I know that
10 for sure, and I know that others were injured. It was not my job to deal
11 with that. I had been bombed.
12 And on the other hand, I don't believe that it would be credible
13 for Tudjman to have bombed himself. I don't believe that.
14 Q. But there was no bombing or shelling of Banski Dvori as you say.
15 That is what it says here.
16 A. I'm not competent to engage in this kind of debate. It would have
17 to be somebody else. And I think that the person who wrote this is
18 certainly not competent. Anything can be written on paper. I'm surprised
19 that Mr. Milosevic uses such arguments.
20 Q. Well, I have Croatian newspapers here.
21 A. What do newspapers mean? All sorts of things are written in
23 Q. Well, you're right about that. All sorts of things are written in
25 And is it also true, the other thing they say here, it is
1 interesting that perhaps the greatest support enjoyed by Mr. Markovic was
2 among the JNA General Staff, and it is also said that when Kadijevic,
3 towards the end of 1990, suggested that after the military coup you as the
4 legally elected Prime Minister should take over the position of president
5 of the country; is that correct?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Oh, so on this very same page there are some things that are
8 written that are correct and others that are not correct.
9 A. This is because this was copied from what I said myself. Until
10 then, nobody had known about this except for Kadijevic and myself. And if
11 somebody wrote about this, they wrote about it only on the basis of what I
12 said right here, and that is the truth, that Kadijevic did come to me with
13 a plan that had been elaborated in the General Staff to arrest the
14 leaderships of Croatia and Serbia and that this should be done separately
15 from the Presidency, and then the Presidency, since it had been
16 sidestepped, would be replaced and somebody would have to take over that
17 function. And when I said, "Where does Milosevic fall within all of this
18 and everybody else?" He jumped to his feet and said, "He is the only one
19 who is struggling for Yugoslavia and he is the only one who supports
21 Q. I'm the only one who is struggling for Yugoslavia.
22 A. And you're the only one who supports the arrest of these men.
23 Q. Oh, so why did he not arrest them?
24 A. Because he had not have any political back-up.
25 Q. So I did not back him up politically either.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Well, perhaps he could have if he wanted to. Mr. Markovic,
2 rather, could have if he wanted to. Mr. Markovic was supposed to be your
3 weapon, your tool, yes, your tool, your weapon, Mr. Kadijevic's tool,
4 Mr. Kadijevic's weapon in order to arrest these two leaderships.
5 Q. You say that we were not on good terms and then you were supposed
6 to be my weapon?
7 A. Who was on bad terms?
8 Q. You and I.
9 A. It doesn't matter. I was just supposed to be used as your weapon,
10 your tool, so that you would rule over all of Yugoslavia.
11 Q. Oh, all right, Mr. Markovic. Very interesting. Most interesting
13 Now, tell me please, since I quoted this report of Suvar's, there
14 is a question that he himself raises here and that I would like to put to
15 you. You claim that Tudjman and I agreed in Karadjordjevo on splitting up
16 Bosnia; is that right?
17 A. It's not for me to claim. Both of you confirmed that to me.
18 Q. It is not true that I ever confirmed this to you. Now, whether
19 Tudjman ever said something like that to you, that's different.
20 Do you know that stenographic notes were presented here from
21 Tudjman's meeting with his closest collaborators, and they commented upon
22 Mesic's testimony at the Blaskic trial, saying that this is a blatant
23 falsehood. That's what he said to his closest collaborators. How do you
24 think he would tell you something different, something that he did not
25 even tell his closest collaborators?
1 A. I cannot go into who said things to other people. What I wrote
2 down in my private notes was about a meeting with Mr. Tudjman and with
3 Mr. Slobodan Milosevic about Karadjordjevo and the split-up of
5 Q. This is absolutely false. Now, what Tudjman could have said to
6 you, I don't believe that. After all, we denied it in public, but I
7 certainly never told you any such thing. This is what Stipe Suvar says,
8 because the journalist put the following question to him: "Milosevic and
9 Tudjman allegedly confirmed to Markovic that they had agreed on splitting
10 up Bosnia." And he answers: "All right. But Markovic did not have to
11 wait for 12 years in order to tell us about this." If this had really
12 been the truth, why did you wait for 12 years in order to tell the story
13 that Tudjman and I had reached agreement or that Tudjman and I had said to
14 you that we had reached such agreement?
15 A. When the Prosecutor asked me to appear here in this court, then I
16 said everything I knew. Before that, I did not speak up. I spoke up
17 because the court in The Hague asked me to be a witness here, and that is
18 when I spoke about this.
19 JUDGE MAY: The hearing is due to come to a halt fairly soon.
20 There is five minutes left for you, Mr. Milosevic. Then We will divide
21 the time, the last half hour, between the remaining parties.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm really sorry. I mean, during
23 five minutes. Well, anyway, this is completely false, this about the
24 split-up of Bosnia. And after all, there are stenographic notes of
25 Tudjman's confidential talks.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. But you mentioned, as far as I could see from your statement, you
3 say that there were two items on the agenda of the meeting between Tudjman
4 and myself. You say one was the split-up of Bosnia and the other one was
5 the dismissal of Ante Markovic. Doesn't it seem to you that - how should
6 I put this? - that you are attaching too much importance to yourself, that
7 we are discussing your dismissal? What do I care about your dismissal?
8 A. I did not discuss it. You both attached this importance to me,
9 and you said to me, Mr. Milosevic, that this was a proposal made by
10 Mr. Tudjman, not myself, and I did not have any reason to disagree with
11 it. As a matter of fact, you said that you gave it a certain deadline.
12 Q. That's not true.
13 A. And I was told that this was your proposal but that it would be
14 postponed for a while. So see, I even remember the details.
15 Q. I remember the details too.
16 A. No. You suffer from amnesia now.
17 Q. No, Mr. Markovic, I never suffer from amnesia, but since you on
18 certain occasions used Boro Jovic's book, then perhaps you can find that
19 in the book too.
20 Since your dismissal was Tudjman's issue, not mine. It's not that
21 I think that he raised it but simply he was head of Croatia, and you were
22 an appointee from Croatia. So it was not for me to --
23 A. Sorry for interrupting, but it was not for Tudjman to say
24 anything. I was not elected according to any kind of republican criterion
25 to head the federal government. That was the only position that did not
1 fall within that category.
2 Q. On the contrary. Every time an effort was made to get a Prime
3 Minister from a different republic. And there is also an anecdote that
4 Tudjman said to me, of course not in Karadjordjevo, because in
5 Karadjordjevo no one thought of mentioning you at all. When I asked him
6 what job he'd give Ante Markovic, he said since he is an electrician I'm
7 going to let him to fix fuses. So that is what Borovic wrote down in his
8 diary. I suppose you remember that too?
9 A. No. A different official from Croatia during the elections in
10 Croatia in 1990, his name is Djodan, and there is a text to that effect.
11 That's what he said. He said: "Ante Markovic should not delve into
12 politics. He is an electrical engineer. Let him fix fuses."
13 Q. All right, Mr. Markovic. Is it correct that you established a
14 political party of reformists, but it was only after the multi-party
15 elections in Croatia were held?
16 A. It is correct. I established it when I could establish it on the
17 basis of Yugoslavia law. Before that, I could not have established it.
18 The Yugoslav law was passed in the month of June 1990, and it was only
19 after that that I could have done this.
20 In the proposals that were presented by the Federal Executive
21 Council towards the end of 1989, I proposed a change of the constitution
22 which would make it possible to have multi-party elections held throughout
23 Yugoslavia. Since this was not the case, then I could not have any
24 elections either in Croatia or in Slovenia because they held their
25 elections before this law was passed.
1 Q. Mr. Markovic, but your party of reformists did take part in the
2 elections in Serbia and in the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the
3 elections in other republics. I assume that this is not a fact you're
4 going to deny.
5 A. No, no, no. On the contrary, of course I participated.
6 Q. And you suffered a total loss in all these elections.
7 A. No, that is not true either. It wasn't a total loss. It was a
8 partial loss.
9 Q. What does that mean?
10 A. For example, if there are 29 seats in the Macedonian Assembly,
11 then that is not total defeat, or if there is a number of MPs in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, then that is not a loss either.
13 Q. How many MPs did you have in the Assembly of Serbia?
14 A. None.
15 Q. You said that you were very popular and that we were jealous of
16 you because you were so popular in Serbia. How come you did not win a
17 single seat in the Serbian parliament?
18 A. At the time when I was the way I was, as you had put it, you made
19 it impossible to have elections.
20 Q. But you did take part in elections in Serbia. These were the
21 first multi-party elections.
22 A. Excuse me, but elections were allowed only after the law was
23 passed towards the end of June 1990. I think it was the 25th of June or
24 something like that. It was only after that that this was possible.
25 Before that, that was not possible.
1 Q. That only confirms that we in Serbia did hold multi-party
2 elections in accordance with the law and after we had changed the
3 constitution and after we introduced a multi-party system.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And then you took part in the elections in accordance with federal
6 law and the constitution of Serbia that had been changed.
7 A. I did not take part. It was people from Serbia who took part,
8 those who organised the alliance of reformist forces of Serbia.
9 Q. All right. Mr. Markovic, tell me --
10 JUDGE MAY: This is bringing your examination to an end. You have
11 two more questions.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. All right, Mr. Markovic. Since you talked about some kind of
14 major reform programme of yours, is it correct that you explained that
15 there was a great deal of foreign currency around, according to your very
16 well known, unrealistic exchange rate, a lot of foreign currency was sold,
17 and that is how you destroyed the foreign exchange reserves totally.
18 A. That's not true. Those like you destroyed them, those who robbed
19 the National Bank of Yugoslavia, who robbed 18.2 billion dinars.
20 Q. It wasn't foreign exchange.
21 A. Those who had dinars could buy foreign exchange, and you know that
22 full well.
23 Q. Is it true that you exaggerated the foreign exchange reserves and
24 then when the so-called succession was discussed, then these so-called
25 foreign exchange reserves were sought from Serbia and Montenegro? And
1 since there weren't any, then what was divided was the gold that Serbia
2 and Montenegro had brought into the first Yugoslavia. You as former Prime
3 Minister should be aware of these facts.
4 A. It is true that the National Bank of Yugoslavia controlled the
5 foreign exchange reserves. It wasn't done by the government. And these
6 reports are reports that were presented either in the public or for
7 internal use by the National Bank of Yugoslavia.
8 JUDGE MAY: The time -- the time is up. Yes. We will have to
9 divide the time, as I say, between the amicus and the Prosecution. So
10 they've each got about 15 minutes.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in view of the
12 great host of facts covered in the summary, I would like to ask if we
13 could link -- clarify some matters linked to paragraph 45 regarding para
14 armies and paragraphs 37, 38 and 39. And I will focus on these matters
15 only, these being matters that have not been touched upon.
16 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] But I would like to begin with paragraphs 37, 38,
18 and 39. Mr. Markovic, I will let you see everything I refer to. This is
19 an exhibit that was admitted through Mr. Mesic. We mentioned the number
20 today. It is Exhibit 328, tab 16. And I have a copy in B/C/S, and I have
21 highlighted the passages I intend to refer to.
22 Could you please look first at page 74. Page 74, please. In the
23 English version it is page 62, paragraph 3. Of the English version, page
24 62, paragraph 3. I say this for the benefit of Their Honours and the
1 Have you found it? It's highlighted.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You said this today: "As regards the competence and functioning,
4 I've already noted it is a fact that the Presidency, after the 15th of
5 May, up until the 1st of July when it was constituted with the help of the
6 Troika, it was not functioning. It didn't function during a time period
7 in which some dramatic events happened for the fate of the country."
8 Is that right? You said that today?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And on page 75, last paragraph, please. You said -- this is page
11 63 of the English version.
12 "The Presidency must be in session continuously, just as the
13 Federal Executive Council. There isn't a day doesn't go by without us
14 meeting, because every day some new developments occur and we need to
16 Is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note they don't have this text.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. If I refer to certain things that were common knowledge, can I ask
21 you, were you following those events between the 24th and the 27th of
22 June, which were critical, and did you know that Croatia had declared its
23 independence on the 25th as had the Assembly of Slovenia?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And did you know that Slovenia had decided to take over all
1 functions of the federation on the state border towards Austria, Italy,
2 Hungary and also to establish a state border towards the rest of
3 Yugoslavia, which means towards Croatia?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Is it true that on that day Slovenia implemented that decision
6 that very day?
7 A. In principle, yes. I'm not quite sure whether it could have done
8 everything in one day, but in principle, those were the decisions.
9 Q. And the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
10 in the absence of delegates from Slovenia and Croatia, did it conclude
11 that both decisions of Slovenia and Croatia were unconstitutional asking
12 the appropriate federal authorities to restore things to normal?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And did you as the Federal Executive Council take any decision or
15 order on that day?
16 A. What day? What do you mean? On what page is this referred to?
17 Q. I'm asking you whether you took two decisions on that day.
18 Mr. Markovic, I do not -- I'm not in a position to conduct my own
19 investigation, but I have a book by Janez Jansa, Slovenian Defence
20 Minister in those days, and both of these two decisions are published in
21 the book. I have photocopies of those decisions. If you could look at
22 the book and the photocopies of these decisions, could you confirm whether
23 those are the decisions that you took, though they're not signed?
24 A. Show them to me and I'll see.
25 Q. Here you are. They're not lengthy. One is one page long and the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 other half a page long.
2 Are those the decisions that you signed? They're not signed in
3 this copy.
4 A. This is a decision that we took and signed, and this order, I
5 don't recollect it being drafted or signed by me. The order was not
6 signed by me. That I'm sure of.
7 Q. So you're claiming that this order --
8 A. I don't remember. I remember the decision, and it is correct.
9 Q. In this order, it says --
10 A. I've seen what it says.
11 Q. The order on the prohibition of establishing frontier crossings.
12 A. I've read it, and I said I don't recollect.
13 Q. Do you remember that it says, "The federal Secretariat for
14 Internal Affairs and the federal Secretariat for National Defence will
15 implement this decision."
16 A. If I don't remember the decision, I can't remember that either.
17 Q. Do you remember on the basis of the book written by the Defence
18 Minister of Slovenia Janez Jansa --
19 A. I haven't read that book and I don't have time for it.
20 Q. Very well. But my question is do you know on the 22nd of June a
21 meeting was held between Tudjman and Kucan and the top leadership of both
22 republics on taking over borders immediately following the proclamation of
23 independence? And when complete agreement was not reached, then Tudjman
24 and Kucan agreed at least not to allow the army to pass through the area
25 which the Slovenian forces would take control of.
1 A. I'm not aware of that meeting or that agreement.
2 Q. And do you know that this decision that you admit you signed was
3 taken on the 26th in the morning, about 4.00 a.m.? Did you take that
4 decision about 4.00 a.m. -- 4.00 a.m. on the 26th of June?
5 A. On the 25th of June the decision was taken. That is what it says.
6 Q. And not on the 26th?
7 A. It says here the 25th.
8 Q. But it's not signed. Let me draw your attention to what he said
9 in the book, and I'm asking you whether it is correct. "On the 26th of
10 June at 11.10 in our information centre a fax arrived from Joze Slokar --"
11 who was a member of the Federal Executive Council at the time; is that
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. "-- for Milan Kucan in which he sent us the gist of two decisions
15 adopted by the federal government during a night meeting that went on
16 until 3.30. We had the official military order on our table."
17 Is it true that the decision was taken early in the morning on the
19 A. I don't remember. The session was held on the 25th, and anyway, I
20 don't know why that is important.
21 Q. Because in this statement that you gave to the Prosecution, in
22 paragraph 37, you said that you spoke with Kucan on the 26th of June in
23 the morning, and it was that morning that you took the decision, and the
24 military action started the following night, so you couldn't have spoken
25 to him the next day, the 27th. And that is what Jansa says too.
1 A. Listen, now whether it is one day or the other, in any event, it
2 is a fact which has not been denied by Kucan either, and it has been
3 registered. I wanted it to be registered, the fact that he called me
4 early in the morning at 4.00 a.m. -- three minutes past four, and that he
5 spoke about this. And I noted that the attack took place on the 26th. It
6 may have been the 27th, I can't guarantee that 100 per cent, but it is not
8 Q. It is very important, because on the 26th, there were no conflicts
9 in the territory of Slovenia, only the following night.
10 A. Very well, then, maybe the next night, if that's what you say. I
11 would have to review all my documents to be able to confirm that.
12 Q. Now, if it says in that order that you were supposed --
13 A. I'm telling you, I do not recollect any such order being issued.
14 You're taking me back to the order.
15 Q. But look what it says in this decision.
16 A. But I read it. You don't need to waste time.
17 Q. But I have to. In point 3, it says -- and this is what you signed
18 -- "If at the frontier crossing physical or any other kind of resistance
19 is put up or such resistance can be expected, officers of the federal
20 Secretariat are duty-bound to assist them upon their request."
21 Does that mean resort to force?
22 A. That is the Secretariat for National Defence. No, for internal
23 affairs and not national defence. The -- this refers to the police,
24 because in the previous paragraph it says: "The federal Secretariat for
25 the interior hitherto the Federal Secretariat." So if you read that
1 carefully, you should know that.
2 Q. Of course I've seen that. But my question is: Who opened fire
3 first? Was the order first issued by the command of the Territorial
4 Defence to fire at the soldiers when soldiers were killed or were there
5 any victims among the civilians? Who was the first to open fire during
6 the events on the 27th?
7 A. I don't know. It is hard to say. But judging by what reached me,
8 the army came out of the barracks, started marching with tanks and cannon
9 across Slovenia. That is what I learnt from Milan Kucan, and that is what
10 General Kadijevic later confirmed when I asked him. When I asked him at
11 the federal government meeting, "Who gave you permission for this." He
12 said, "No one. We acted on our own."
13 Q. Mr. Markovic, in paragraph 38, somewhere halfway, you said the
14 following: "The military intervention in Slovenia was carried out with
15 the agreement of Borisav Jovic," who was, of course, Milosevic's man.
16 This is an order that you signed of your own free will. Nobody forced
18 A. But that is not an order to use the army in Slovenia. It's
19 something quite different. The reference here is only to the border, the
20 function of the police on the border and of frontier units on the border.
21 I don't have evidence in my hands that Jovic issued such an order, but
22 conversations between him and me showed that he was aware of it.
23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, I'm afraid your time is coming up.
24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do appeal to you
25 to give me a few more minutes. I promise not to take more.
1 JUDGE MAY: I'm afraid the time has had to go to the accused first
2 of all. I'm afraid we have to give the others time to fit in, I'm afraid.
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this would be very
4 useful. It is -- it relates to paramilitary units.
5 JUDGE MAY: If you want to put something in writing to us, yes,
6 but time has really run out on everybody. We had to try and do the
7 fairest we can. We said 15 minutes, and that's the time.
8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is a key to
9 the problems that arose at the time.
10 JUDGE MAY: No.
11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [No interpretation]
12 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
13 Q. Mr. Markovic, much has been built by the accused on your role in
14 Slovenia, not a matter on which evidence was focused in the
15 examination-in-chief. The matter has been touched on in Exhibit 427,
16 tab 6, which is somewhat unhappily photocopied. If the usher would be
17 good enough to lay the English version on the overhead projector and to
18 hand to you these pages, can we deal with this very swiftly.
19 The material is in tab -- Exhibit 47 [sic], tab 6. It's hard to
20 find, thus I've placed it on the overhead projector.
21 Mr. Markovic, did you say, bottom of the page 2: "It is possible
22 that the situation at the border was actually fine but we don't know that.
23 What I want --" bottom of the page, please, Usher. "But what I want
24 to say is that the institutions --" down a little bit, please. That's
25 fine. Thank you. "What I want to say is that the institutions which have
1 international obligations and are responsible for that cannot bear that
3 "Third, since it's been repeated over and over again regarding war
4 between Federal Executive Council and Slovenia, I must say that this is an
5 absolute lie because Federal Executive Council made no such decision, and
6 as far as the decision that was made by the Federal Executive Council is
7 concerned, the members of the Federal Executive Council from Slovenia took
8 part in the decision-making, the same members who handed in their
9 resignation now. The decision was made after Slovenia had taken over the
10 borders by a unilateral act after it had taken over the customs by a
11 unilateral act, as well as flight control also by a unilateral act with no
12 consent. Federal Executive Council made a decision on direct securing of
13 realisation of federal regulations on trespassing the state border in the
14 territory of the republic..."
15 And you went on to say, and I'm going to read this now in two
16 paragraphs: "In order to secure execution of the federal regulations on
17 trespassing the state border and movement in the border area in the
18 territory of the Republic of Slovenia. And also in order to secure the
19 execution of Yugoslavia international obligations and free traffic..." and
20 right at the top, please: "... and movement of people over the state
21 border, the federal Secretariat of the Interior will directly take over,
22 that is secure realisation of controlling the passing of the state border.
23 That means that the federal Secretariat was assigned this task. Second,
24 while directly providing execution of federal regulations on trespassing
25 the border, Secretariat of Interior will establish direct cooperation with
2 Now, just very briefly, and preferably in a sentence or even a
3 word, did that amount to your commanding the army or did it amount to your
4 taking steps to secure the borders and seeking the cooperation of the
5 army? But very briefly.
6 A. I think it is very clearly stated. Our conclusion was that the
7 federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs needs to secure everything that
8 relates to Yugoslavia's borders, and accordingly, the federal Secretariat
9 was allowed to communicate with the federal Secretariat for National
10 Defence so as to engage border JNA units, because this had to do with
11 crossing the border.
12 Q. Thank you. We only have ten more minutes. I must cut you short.
13 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm advised you will find in the 1974
14 constitution at paragraphs 158, 161, and 213 the limits of the power in
15 respect of the army. His Honour Judge Robinson asked about those.
16 Q. Because you've been asked a large number of questions about
17 Slovenia and the suggestion has been put that you had something to do with
18 the use of the army, I will have to expand the evidence in due course to
19 be given by the military expert. Please help us with these three points:
20 If evidence shows that the JNA on the 28th of June delivered cluster
21 ammunition in an area of Slovenia, Trebnje, did you have anything to do
22 with that? Just yes or no.
23 A. God forbid. Trebinje, after all, is a long way from Slovenia.
24 Q. No, there's a small town of Trebnje in Slovenia. Next question.
25 If the 140th JNA unit left the Tito barracks on the 2nd of July, 1991, and
1 fired on the Slovenian town of Gornje Vas, did you have anything to do
2 with that?
3 A. How could I have anything to do with it? I had nothing to do with
4 it at all.
5 Q. Can we now please look at two intercepts very briefly. They've
6 been produced. I'll hand them, for the overhead projector, on English
7 versions with the B/C/S versions available for the witness. The first is
8 Exhibit 613, tab 9. The underlying question is whether the accused had
9 the intentions he implies, to keep Slovenia in federal Yugoslavia.
10 The admissibility of this, as all intercepts, is pending. This
11 one is the 17th of June. It's between Karadzic and Milosevic. And
12 halfway down the first page, we see Karadzic speaking of Croatia and
13 Slovenia. We then see Milosevic saying: "You see that they want to step
14 out... They are carrying out these things exactly the way we planned it."
15 "Yes, that is right." "Exactly the way we planned it," said the accused.
16 Karadzic: "My only fear is that he --" and this is, I think, a reference
17 to you -- "might get carte blanche from the army, i.e., the army might
18 support him; if he imposed the measures, he would impose them
19 symmetrically -- there where they should be -- where they should and there
20 where they should not be imposed."
21 I want you to look at the next one. Perhaps we can briefly look
22 at the third page of this one, please, where it has, halfway down, the
23 accused saying, "Well, I think that things are going exactly the way we
24 predicted." Karadzic: "Yes, yes." "We will see how this Federation will
25 --" Karadzic: "Yes, yes, that will be interesting. So you're meeting
1 with Markovic tonight."
2 If you could look at the next intercept and then I will ask for
3 your comment. The next intercept is Exhibit 353, tab 28. We need only
4 look at the bottom of the first page, having seen in the middle of the
5 first page the topic of the conversation between Karadzic and the accused
6 is Croatia and Slovenia. You can see that exactly in the middle of the
7 screen now, but at the foot of the page, please, Usher, and right down to
8 the bottom of the page.
9 "That's clear," says the accused. "They should be allowed to
10 separate." Karadzic: "Yes."
11 Then over the page, please, Usher.
12 The accused: "Now there's only one question left, to have
13 disintegration in line with our inclinations."
14 About six lines down, the accused: "Well, they mustn't wait for
15 him, no. Concerning Slovenia, I would let them go immediately."
16 Karadzic: "Yes." The accused: "Let them go immediately and the others
17 as well after they've settled the issues of borders with us," and then he
18 deals with some other particular matter.
19 Just help us, please, Mr. Markovic: Were you aware at the time of
20 what the accused's genuine intention was in relation to retaining Slovenia
21 and Croatia within the Federation or letting them go?
22 A. In any case, as far as Slovenia was concerned, it was clear that
23 they wanted to let Slovenia go. As for Croatia, as a part of the Serb
24 people were there, I can't say that they were ready for it, but I did
25 listen to a part of these telephone conversations between Mr. Karadzic and
1 Mr. Milosevic, that is true, and I fully recognise their voices. That was
2 what they discussed.
3 Q. I'm wrong in the attribution of the number. This was 353, tab 30,
4 I'm told. Alternatively, it's Exhibit 613, intercept 15, for the record.
5 You've been asked questions --
6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I may seek your indulgence. A great deal
7 of matters have been raised and I have got a couple of points that may be
8 of value to the Chamber.
9 Q. You've been asked questions about the revenue. There is an
10 exhibit in this case, Mr. Jovic's statement under 89(F), it's Exhibit 596,
11 tab 1.
12 MR. NICE: If the usher could place paragraph 45 on the overhead
13 projector, please, for me. Bottom of the page. Thank you very much.
14 Right at the bottom of the page, please, paragraph 45.
15 Q. Evidence has been given to this effect: On the 8th of January,
16 during a conversation with Radmilovic, Jovic criticised him for everything
17 they were doing with the primary issues of money and with the revenues
18 that belonged to the Federation. He explained without it they, the SPS,
19 certainly would have lost the elections because more than half of the
20 republic would not have received wages and pensions. He said that Ante -
21 you - were surprised and flabbergasted that we were not bankrupt but we
22 outwitted him. Milosevic was obviously avoiding informing me because I
23 could not have justified that as president of the PSFRY. At the end of
24 our conversation, Milosevic appeared and Stanko said please defend me
25 against the criticism of the president of the SFRY Presidency. To that
1 Milosevic responded, I will defend you for taking the money, but I will
2 not defend you for proposing the adoption of laws and resolutions in order
3 to carry this out.
4 What do you say to the evidence that's been given by Jovic about
5 the taking of the money? Accurate or inaccurate?
6 A. Yes, it's accurate.
7 Q. Stambolic and his appointment and dismissal, was that within the
8 competence of the president of Serbia, as the accused was at the time?
9 A. No.
10 Q. The accused subsequently wanted Stambolic out of that office. Why
11 did he want him out of that office?
12 A. Yes. He wanted him replaced. He replaced him politically from
13 the position of president of the Presidency of Serbia, and then he took
14 care to appoint him somewhere else outside Serbia so that he wouldn't
15 bother him. He wouldn't stand in his way.
16 Q. [Previous translation continues]... right at the end of the
17 examination about Karadjordjevo, the meeting, and your discussion of that
18 with the accused. The accused claimed to the Court that he had a full
19 memory of the incident but declined to put that recollection of the
20 meeting to you, turning instead to an observation about your training,
21 your original training in electrical skills.
22 So you haven't been challenged. Is your account of the
23 Karadjordjevo meeting, the description of it by the accused, is it
24 unchanged and unaffected by the evidence -- by the questions you've been
25 asked? Do you stand by your original version, please?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Fully, 100 per cent.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. You have been asked questions --
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, what's your point?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that I stated quite clearly
7 that it is absolutely untrue that there was any discussion in
8 Karadjordjevo between Tudjman and me about the division of Bosnia and that
9 it is absolutely untrue that I spoke about that with Ante Markovic, and
10 that is what I said. Despite this, Mr. Nice says that I didn't challenge
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we hear that.
13 MR. NICE: Finally, two other points and that's all.
14 Q. You made the observation about Bogicevic being led on to vote in a
15 certain way in a room that the army intimidated people in.
16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there is a short clip from The Death of
17 Yugoslavia film which is available. I don't know if the Chamber has seen
18 the film generally. I'll just, with your leave, play this and see if this
19 is the passage that the witness is referring to.
20 [Videotape played]
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. And if we --
24 A. That is the session that was held. I didn't attend. None of us
25 others attended, regardless of the position I held. And that is where
1 pressure was brought to bear to take a decision to proclaim a state of
2 emergency in the country, and such a state of emergency would give a free
3 hand to the army. And that decision was not taken because Bogic
4 Bogicevic, even though a Serb, he represented Bosnia and Herzegovina at
5 the meeting, he voted against it. And Tupurkovski also, whom we see now,
6 he voted against it.
7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I see the time -- the clip lasts about
8 seven minutes. I'm happy to make it available to the Chamber.
9 JUDGE MAY: On another occasion.
10 MR. NICE: I should say that it shows all the participants wearing
11 their coats. It was indeed the cold exercise referred to.
12 Q. A matter of detail to correct the record, I suspect in my last
13 question, Mr. Markovic: In speaking of Kadijevic's offer to you, you
14 spoke of his plan to arrest the leadership of two states. Which two
15 states -- the leadership of which two states did he propose arresting?
16 A. He proposed arresting Franjo Tudjman and his associates and Milan
17 Kucan and his associates.
18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the record at page 23 and at the time
19 13:03:32 speaks of Croatia and Serbia. I think that the witness misspoke
20 rather than there being a misrecording by the stenographer, but he's now
21 made it clear it's Slovenia and Croatia. I shan't seek your indulgence
23 There is one other unrelated and private session matter that will
24 take 30 seconds to deal with, with your leave.
25 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
1 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish his evidence because he's
2 waited with patience for a rather long time.
3 Mr. Markovic, we're going to release you.
4 We'll come back to exhibits in a moment. We'll come back to any
5 submissions, but we're going to allow the witness to go instead of having
6 to wait here.
7 As I say, Mr. Markovic, thank you for coming back and thank you
8 for giving your evidence all today, but you are now concluded. You go
9 with the thanks of the Court.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 JUDGE MAY: We'll deal with the various matters which we need to
13 do. We'll start with various items of exhibit we should deal with. We
14 have two items which I think the accused has given us. Is there any
15 objection to any of these? The Prosecution can have a look at them during
16 the adjournment briefly and then hand them back. I don't anticipate there
17 will be.
18 MR. NICE: These are the agendas. I've made the point. They
19 appear to be originals.
20 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you. They can have the next exhibit
21 number. D numbers.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour the agenda for 1989 will be Defence
23 Exhibit 223.
24 JUDGE KWON: 224.
25 THE REGISTRAR: 224. And the agenda for 1990 will be 225, Defence
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Tapuskovic.
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, these are these two
4 documents. The first is the decision on immediate ensuring of
5 implementation of federal regulations on the state borders on the
6 territory of the Republic of Slovenia that Mr. Ante Markovic says he
7 signed. This copy is unsigned, but it was submitted to the Slovenian side
8 in that form.
9 And the second, which he doesn't recall signing, is the order
10 prohibiting the formation of frontier crossings within the territory of
12 Both documents are brief. One is a page and a half, the other
13 half a page, and I believe that this could be marked for identification,
14 translated, and probably used later on in an endeavour to get hold of the
15 originals of these documents.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll give that the next number for the Court,
17 its own numbers.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Court Exhibit 27, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MAY: Marked for identification.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, perhaps you omitted to
23 mention, because in addition to these two exhibits, that is the agendas
24 regarding Mirko Markovic's [as interpreted] activities for 1989, 1990,
25 there are several other documents that have their ERN numbers and which I
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 received from the side opposite when I challenge some of the statements of
2 Mr. Markovic. So I have here part of the minutes, 01044526, for -- which
3 has to do with General Kadijevic's reporting to Prime Minister Markovic in
4 connection with Slovenia, losses, casualties, hotbeds, et cetera, in other
5 words, about military issues. So I should like to tender that into
6 evidence as well.
7 And I also have a report by Kacic, 01075129, and I quoted this
8 sentence: "If you can't talk to Jokic, you have here in The Hague
9 Kadijevic and Prime Minister Markovic. With reference to Dubrovnik, he is
10 placed in the most prominent position as someone who should intervene."
11 And the third document is Jagar's statement, ERN number 01112475,
12 which says how Ante Markovic is using two cards and that he will not leave
13 Belgrade until he destroys Serbia and Milosevic. This is ERN number
14 01112478 which I'm tendering into evidence.
15 And finally, the shorthand minutes from a session of the
16 Presidency of Yugoslavia from which I quoted Markovic who speaks about the
17 spontaneous, chaotic movements, out of control in all areas of life,
18 saying that no one is able to control events any more, and again I quoted
19 a member of the Presidency from Vojvodina, Jugoslav Kostic, who says he
20 will not vote in favour of giving the army a free hand. It is a very
21 lengthy report, but I've highlighted the parts, the relevant parts.
22 JUDGE MAY: No. We've got -- we've only got a limited time.
23 There's no need to go over it again. What is the date of that final
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 12th of July, 1991.
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, you hand those documents in first of all.
2 MR. NICE: May I make two observations? First of all, the witness
3 had to deal with these things without being given the documents to look
4 at, and did deal with them.
5 Secondly, we still haven't had a chance to review them for any
6 purpose, really, and certainly not to see the context.
7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will ensure for the moment that -- the time
8 is limited. We will mark them for identification, and we will try to make
9 sure that none have in fact already been introduced, which they may have
10 done. It may be simpler to deal with this over the time. Yes. One by
11 one, please, briefly.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the minutes dealing with General
13 Kadijevic is Defence Exhibit 226 marked for identification.
14 The report is Defence Exhibit 227 marked for identification.
15 Jagar's statement is Defence Exhibit 228 marked for
16 identification; and the shorthand minutes of July 12, 1991, is Defence
17 Exhibit 229 marked for identification.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may the short extract from The Death of
20 Yugoslavia be an exhibit? It's about --
21 JUDGE MAY: At some stage I think we must make a decision about
22 this particular document. Have we -- have we not admitted it already?
23 MR. NICE: No, it's not been admitted. It's been the subject of
24 recurring discussion but it hasn't been formally admitted.
25 JUDGE MAY: Let us the mark this part also as a Prosecution
1 number, mark it for identification.
2 MR. NICE: This particular part is, like so much of it, it is live
3 footage of events interspersed with commentary. Curiously or
4 interestingly, they actually photographed and filmed the actual meeting so
5 you see the voting and the men cuddled up in their coats, but of course
6 that comes with commentary in between from Mesic and Tupurkovski and
7 people like that. But I don't see that as a principal objection. But if
8 it can be marked certainly at this stage we'll review it later.
9 JUDGE MAY: How long is that?
10 MR. NICE: This section is seven minutes. The programme itself is
11 three television programmes long. I think it's about three hours. And
12 very interesting viewing, if I may so. With a great deal of
13 contemporaneous, or more contemporaneous interviewing.
14 JUDGE MAY: And tomorrow, before we go into private session, what
15 is the position?
16 MR. NICE: Tomorrow we'll continue with the private session
17 witness first and conclude that witness.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, provided that's the case, then that
19 involves no problem about --
20 MR. NICE: No problem.
21 JUDGE MAY: -- go on with the witness we've already started.
22 MR. NICE: Yes. And then we have another witness who has been
23 served as an expert. There's some concern about the position of his
24 evidence, but we're advised, and I understand that it is entirely
25 expertise and there's room for one more witness should we reach him, a
1 short witness, called Soldal at the end of the session.
2 JUDGE MAY: The important thing is that we finish the witness
3 we've already started.
4 MR. NICE: Yes.
5 JUDGE MAY: And that we do deal with any particular witness we
6 have to deal with tomorrow or he will have to be prepared to come back the
7 following Tuesday.
8 MR. NICE: I hope we can deal with him tomorrow. And then there's
9 one short matter in private session.
10 JUDGE MAY: What we'll do is we'll mark the part that was just
11 played, the short part played today.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Exhibit 635.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now let us go into private session.
14 [Private session]
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Friday, the 16th day of January,
8 2004, at 9.00 a.m.