Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 13616

1 Monday, 2 December 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.27 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: We're starting rather late due to some problems,

7 construction problems, apparently, that were taking place at the Detention

8 Unit, and we will ask that in future we start at 9.00. For the rest of

9 the day, we will take the normal breaks, but we'll go on sitting until

10 2.00, to try and make up time.

11 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, we left off before the

13 weekend break discussing a report by the command of the 9th Corps. I

14 think we can read it out in open session without jeopardising your

15 protective measures for this witness. Because I'm only going to ask him

16 whether what it states in the document is correct or not. I'm not going

17 to go into any other details.

18 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps I can be reminded where we'll find that. Have

19 we got that? I think there was a report which was being dealt with.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. We started discussing the

21 document just before we broke. It is the 20th of February, 1992 report of

22 the 9th Corps, and it relates to the state of affairs in Krajina, the

23 referendums, and other questions.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's a very long report, but I'm

Page 13617

1 just going to look at certain passages and quotations for the witness to

2 be able to answer. He can give simple yes or no answers.

3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll see how we get on, if you would like

4 to start asking questions about it.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm going to quote from

6 the document. The passage is brief, from page 1 of the report, and it

7 talks about the fact that a referendum was announced for the United

8 Nations Peace Plan, and under point 1, that it should be adopted, along

9 with proposals and recommendations by the government of the Republic of

10 Srpska Krajina, and that it should follow the lines of Vance's plan

11 completely. And then we come to what it states further: The concept of

12 Babic's and Vance's concepts in the leaflet, most of voters who are not

13 fully informed of the developments, brings us into a situation that when

14 we look at the leaflet at first glance, the voters reject the B variation

15 and give full support to the first option. On the other hand, all the

16 citizens of Krajina unconditionally advocate peace and the arrival of the

17 Blue Helmets. So the referendum posters introduce -- baffle the people so

18 that the people no longer know who to believe.


20 [Witness answered through interpreter]

21 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued].

22 Q. My question for this witness is as follows: Was that how it was?

23 A. That is the assessment of the person who wrote the report. The

24 situation was that as of the month of November 1991, and then all through

25 December and January and into February, the stands were published, made

Page 13618

1 public, the stands of the government and assembly of the RSK, first of all

2 the government, that is to say, and the assembly of the SAO Krajina, what

3 the stand points were and positions with regard to the Cyrus Vance Peace

4 Plan and what requests were made for the plan to be modified. The

5 referendum was planned -- they planned to hold a referendum, but it wasn't

6 put into practice because of the obstructions by the authorities that you

7 yourself established, and the commands of the units of the JNA. The well

8 known example is that of Stojan Spanovic, who was the commander of the

9 brigade, who did not permit that the Cyrus Vance Plan be expounded and

10 explained to the public along with the proposals for its modifications.

11 JUDGE MAY: Before we go on, the document has been traced. It is

12 Exhibit D59, not yet translated.

13 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. The passage I read out states that the leaflets introduce

16 confusion, so that the public no longer knows how to act. So my question

17 is: Is that correct or is what you just said correct, when you said that

18 the army and some kind of authorities from Belgrade did not allow them to

19 state their views?

20 A. The people didn't have an occasion to discuss this publicly under

21 those conditions, nor to state their views about the plan.

22 Q. All right. Fine. You said a moment ago that you had the

23 positions of the government and the Assembly. However, in this same

24 report, on page 2, it says the following:

25 "In Glina, on the 16th of February," that is to say, four days

Page 13619

1 prior to the publication of this report, "an assembly of the RSK was held

2 under the --" The Presiding Officer was Mile Paspalj. I assume he was

3 president of the Assembly at that time. And it made the decision to

4 release Milan Babic of his duties as president of the Republic and not to

5 give a vote of confidence to the entire government of Krajina, and this

6 took place when the government of Krajina refused to adopt Vance's plan.

7 Isn't that right?

8 A. The first Assembly to discuss this issue, the government positions

9 with respect to Vance's plan was held on the 8th of December, 1991. It

10 was the Assembly of the SAO Krajina and in Glina, under the presidency

11 chairmanship of Milan Paspalj, part of the assembly met, part of the

12 Assembly of the RSK met on that occasion.

13 Q. All right. But as it says here, that the meeting was attended by

14 85 deputies of which 74 were in favour of the decision, 8 against, and 3

15 deputies refrained from voting. Is that correct or not?

16 A. There were different reports as to the number of deputies who

17 attended and how the voting went.

18 Q. So it's not true what this -- what it says in this report; is that

19 what you're saying?

20 A. There were different -- there was different information as well.

21 Q. Then it goes on to say that at 1855 hours, over Serb radio in

22 Knin, because it says at 1830 hours the meeting was concluded, so 15

23 minutes later there was an announcement broadcast over the Serb radio

24 station of Knin and a telephone conversation was conducted with Dr. Milan

25 Babic, in which he states that the meeting in Glina was unlawful and that

Page 13620

1 it was held on the basis of instructions received from Belgrade. Was that

2 how it was?

3 A. Well, I heard that on the 9th of February, when Kostic, Hadzic

4 were there, and it was proposed that Babic be replaced. And then Branko

5 Kostic said, "Wait for us to leave."

6 Q. Well, I don't know what that means. I don't know what that means,

7 that they should wait until they leave. I don't suppose they wanted to

8 meddle in your internal affairs. That must be it.

9 But anyway, tell me this: Is this part of the report in keeping

10 with the facts? Because it states afterwards:

11 "Milan Babic endeavours at all costs to retain power in Krajina.

12 When he saw that he would not gain the support of the Assembly, he took a

13 summary decision to set up new municipalities in those villages in which

14 he has loyal representatives. Especially evident is the fact that some

15 large places in the RSK which, until the reorganisation of the

16 municipalities in the 1960s, were municipal seats, headquarters of the

17 UDBA, the internal -- the UDBA in Kistanje did not receive these

18 municipalities, although most of those places have more inhabitants than

19 there are in the newly established municipal communities. And to convene

20 the Assembly, he relates to Article 87 of the Constitution of the RSK, by

21 which the president has the right to convene an assembly."

22 Was that how it was or not?

23 A. This is what happened, according to the best of my recollections:

24 It was an assertion of what was called the pink zones, or rather, that was

25 a way for areas which were not incorporated by the Vance Plan to be

Page 13621

1 represented in the political structures and for their stands and positions

2 to be heard. So that was the basic political reason for which the

3 municipalities were established in the area of Velika, Petrovo Polje,

4 towards Drnis and at Skradin, and Vrhovine, et cetera. That's how they

5 came into being. It is true that there were discussions about the

6 formation, possible formation, once again, of the Udbina municipality. As

7 far as I know, Babic did endeavour to remain in the realm of politics.

8 Q. All right. Very well. However, it further states here that

9 cadres policy, which was waged according to the system of placing his

10 loyal men in each of these seats, this is boom ranging back on him, and

11 the best example of this is the example of Mile Paspalj, who, as president

12 of the Assembly after Babic's replacement, and Velibor Matijasevic, came

13 back from anonymity, because Babic thought that everybody would be the

14 subject of his manipulations, but this proved to be incorrect. Is that

15 right or not?

16 A. Mile Paspalj came to the post of the president of the Assembly of

17 the SAO, being proposed by the regional board of the SDS for Banija and

18 Kordun. Mile Paspalj was the president of the regional board of the

19 Serbian Democratic Party for Banija and Kordun and it was from that post

20 that he took up the position of the president of the assembly of SAO

21 Krajina on the 21st of November 1991. And on the 2nd of February, 1992,

22 with Budimir Kosutic - that was my information anyway - he was under the

23 influence, or rather, my information informed me that he went to Milosevic

24 to change the -- his opinions of the Vance Plan. Because on the 31st of

25 January, at an expanded session of the meeting, and on the 1st of

Page 13622

1 February, he advocated the opinion of the government and of the Assembly

2 of the SAO Krajina, and then on the 2nd of February he changed his

3 opinion. And my information was that this was under the influence of

4 Budimir Kosutic, and my information was that he had a secret meeting with

5 Milosevic to discuss the issue.

6 Q. And is what it says further on in the report correct. It says:

7 "Milan Martic, through his actions, showed that he remained loyal

8 to the principles with which he set out at the beginning of the Knin

9 events in August 1990, in the interests of the people that he wanted to

10 see the Blue Helmets arrive as soon as possible and for peace to be

11 restored. Therefore, Martic supported the urgent arrival of the United

12 Nations mission and the deployment of the Blue Helmets, or rather, the

13 creation of conditions to bring peace back to the area."

14 Is that correct or not? Please give me a yes or no answer.

15 A. Milan Martic supported the policies of Slobodan Milosevic.

16 Q. All right. He supported the policy of having the Vance Plan

17 accepted and the Blue Helmets arrive and peace be established. That's

18 right, isn't it?

19 Now tell me this: Is it true --

20 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer the question.

21 A. Martic, in December, or rather, January, the beginning of January,

22 Martic was opposed to the application of the unconditional implementation

23 of Vance's plan, and he advocated the positions of the government of the

24 SAO and the Republic of Srpska Krajina for the plan to be modified. Later

25 on he too accepted as Slobodan Milosevic's endeavours to apply the plan in

Page 13623












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Page 13624

1 Krajina unconditionally as Slobodan Milosevic had agreed to in the first

2 place.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. All right. And do you remember your own statement, what you said

5 on the 18th of January, 1992 for Finnish television?

6 JUDGE MAY: Let's go into private session.

7 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

8 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. My question to you is as follows: Is it true, as we're in private

11 session - that you endeavoured that by refusing Vance's plan to represent

12 yourself as a victim of some kind, a victim of the regime, and that you

13 believed that you would be able to mobilise popular opinion in Serbia to

14 your own ends, with the assistance of various opposition parties and

15 thereby to destabilise the victims in that position and the relationship

16 towards the problems of Krajina on the part of the authorities in

17 Belgrade? Is that so or not?

18 A. That I was a victim of your dictatorship, that is correct.

19 However, in that context, the context you're talking about, linked to

20 Vance's plan, the priority was security, the security and the future of

21 the people living in Krajina.

22 Q. All right. You wrote that famous letter that does not speak about

23 security but speaks about all kinds of political -- very serious political

24 qualifications, criticising me for the fact that I advocated the adoption

25 of the Vance Plan, and I think that you remember that very well. So the

Page 13625

1 weight of that letter did not lie in its security aspect and component but

2 in its political sense; isn't that right?

3 A. The letter was designed to emphasise our positions, first and

4 foremost, with respect to the engagement and involvement of the UN forces.

5 That was our priority.

6 Q. All right. I don't want to quote your own letter back to you

7 again. But take a look at it. You said that Boro Rasuo in fact wrote the

8 letter for you, or rather, a draft --

9 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the letter. My recollection is

10 92, but I could be wrong about that.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It should be 79, tab 79 of the --

12 JUDGE MAY: Tab 79. Yes. Let the witness have it.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may be of

14 assistance. They are newspaper articles, and in tab 9 of the letters, or

15 rather, tab 80 contains the letters. And these are excerpts from

16 newspaper articles in which those letters were published, whereas tab 80

17 contains both these two letters.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let him have 80 too.

19 The point that was made to you, Mr. Witness, was that the letter -

20 and we're looking at tab 80 - that you wrote did not contain an emphasis

21 on security. Perhaps you'd like to comment on that.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In paragraph 3 of this letter that I

23 signed says:

24 "I want to use this imposed opportunity merely to clarify of use

25 to you and the world public and at the same time disprove your arbitrary

Page 13626

1 allegation that I am against peace, that I am in favour of war, and that

2 my position stems from my alleged love of power and desire for political

3 prestige."

4 And then I go on to elaborate on the version of the Cyrus plan,

5 Cyrus Vance Plan.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Perhaps you can help us: Where do you deal with

7 the question of security there?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's reference to the term of six

9 months, and we ask that this period be extended. That is at the end of

10 the fourth paragraph. For any continuation of the use after six months, a

11 new decision by the Security Council is necessary, together, of course,

12 with the approval of the all parties in the conflict. In this specific

13 case, this also includes Croatia.

14 So that is an expression of our fear that after six months the

15 mandate of the peace forces would not be extended, and as a result our

16 security would be called into question.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Is there any other reference to the security aspect on this

20 five-page letter?

21 A. I go on to explain our positions regarding the confrontation

22 lines, then again about the duration of the UN mandate, then also the

23 possibility, if security were to be in jeopardy and the JNA would get

24 involved, that that would be qualified as aggression.

25 Q. I'm afraid you won't find it. You can read it again, you can read

Page 13627

1 the whole text once again. This letter was intended to discredit the

2 authorities in Belgrade, or rather, me personally. And you were

3 conducting a major campaign. Let me take you back to this interview with

4 the Finnish television. Gentlemen, in English, it is RO 30-4565. It is

5 dated the 18th of January, Belgrade. "Dr. Milan Babic, president of the

6 Republic of Serbian Krajina [In English] having had a meeting with Serbian

7 president Slobodan Milosevic, explaining Babic said that the letter has

8 frozen his relations with us because he thinks that we have a duty to

9 carry out resolutions that he adopts and imposes. Babic added that he did

10 not seek contacts with Milosevic and that he expects Milosevic to

11 apologise for the way he treated me, as a Serb and as a president of the

12 Republic of Serbian Krajina. It is up to him to respond first."

13 [Interpretation] Let me leave out some parts. "He also voices his

14 suspicion that the Serbian president has entered [In English] some

15 agreements that are not in our favour." [Interpretation] Into some

16 agreements that are not in our favour. [English] "Slobodan Milosevic

17 appropriated the right to make decisions on behalf of the Serbs from

18 Krajina and to sign agreement to their detriment. We therefore must state

19 clearly that he had no such right," Babic specified.

20 [Interpretation] I assume that you know that I had emphasised --

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's not an exhibit yet. It's a

23 document presented as a Rule 68 material.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you.

25 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

Page 13628

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Are you aware that Cyrus Vance insisted that Serbia agree with

3 this plan and that he did not believe that Serbia was deciding on your

4 behalf but was agreeing in its own name with this plan of his and was

5 putting its political influence behind it, the influence that it had over

6 the citizens of the Republic of Serbian Krajina for the plan to be

7 adopted? Were you aware of that or not?

8 JUDGE MAY: Before you respond, that -- since the interview was

9 put to you, you can comment on that, if you disagree with anything that

10 has been attributed to you. So perhaps you'd like to deal with that

11 first, and then you can deal with the point which is made about Serbia

12 having to agree. So is there anything you'd like to say about the

13 interview, or do you agree that that's what you said?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A number of assertions were made. I

15 gave a number of interviews, and as far as I can recollect, this could be

16 and is in harmony with what I was saying in those days.

17 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Just a moment. Let the witness deal with

18 the next point which you made about Cyrus Vance's insistence that Serbia

19 agree. Now, you were asked whether you were aware of that or not.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We knew that Milosevic, Tudjman, and

21 Kadijevic had adopted the plan and that we were being forced by Milosevic

22 to accept the plan in the version in which they had accepted it. I

23 remember that about a month or a month and a half of discussions over the

24 plan, Mr. Cyrus Vance declared in New York, over the media, that Babic was

25 Milosevic's problem, which meant that Milosevic should deal with the

Page 13629

1 problem with Babic.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. As to that statement, that Babic is Milosevic's problem, I think

4 Cyrus Vance was right. Babic was a problem for all the people of Republic

5 of Srpska Krajina and for Serbia, and that by his extremism, he caused a

6 lot of trouble. I assume you will not deny that.

7 A. Babic came to the official posts he held by legal means. At the

8 elections, he was elected to those positions, and he performed a public

9 office on the basis of a legal procedure whereby he had been appointed to

10 it. So he enjoyed public support.

11 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish, since what is being put is a

12 serious allegation. What's said is that the witness was a problem for all

13 the people of the Republic of Serb Krajina and for Serbia, by his

14 extremism, caused a lot of trouble.

15 Now, Witness, what is your answer to that?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I think that I was not

17 an extremist but was simply performing my public duties, which implied

18 reflecting public opinion and expressing that public opinion on which my

19 political office depended. I took over that office through the election

20 procedure, after legal elections. As regards my positions regarding the

21 Vance Plan, I won the support of the government and the Assembly of SAO

22 Krajina, and a part of the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, and

23 after a three-day session in Belgrade, I was also given the support of the

24 citizens of Knin, 10.000 inhabitants of Knin, who supported my decisions.

25 On the 3rd of February, 1992, there were 5.000 people. I wanted to check

Page 13630












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Page 13631

1 out the positions I advocated through the referendum for the public to say

2 whether they agreed with those positions or not. The referendum was not

3 carried out because it was prevented by people over which Milosevic had

4 influence in Krajina. At the elections in 1993, as a presidential

5 candidate, in the first round, according to all reports, or rather, the

6 results of the first round, I got over half of the votes, more than all

7 the other candidates put together. And then the elections were repeated

8 several times. They were delayed unlawfully, so that Milan Martic,

9 Milosevic's favourite, could win the elections.

10 I believe that I did get support of the public opinion and the

11 voters in Krajina for my positions, and I do not think that these were

12 extremist positions. But from -- in retrospect, I think it was

13 ethnoegoistic and that is why I look upon the period differently today,

14 and with my present-day wisdom and from this distance, I would certainly

15 not advocate the policy that you drew us into and that is a policy of

16 national divisions, separatism, rifts, and interethnic conflicts.

17 Q. Yes. I drew you all into that during my holidays in Kupari, when

18 all this was going on; is that right?

19 JUDGE MAY: I don't think we're going to get much further with an

20 exchange of that sort. No need to reply.

21 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Your next question.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Was it clear to you that, apart from the fact that Serbia had to

24 accept and support the Vance Plan, that the Vance Plan could not possibly

25 be implemented without your agreement? Isn't that right? Were you aware

Page 13632

1 of that, that it couldn't be implemented and that it would not be approved

2 by the Security Council unless you also gave your approval?

3 A. That is why we made our objections. We were the party that was

4 invited to state our views on the plan, and that is why we voiced our

5 objections and took part in the discussions with the international

6 mediators, and there were chances of the plan being partially modified,

7 and it was partially modified, because we were asked to state our views

8 about it.

9 Q. Very well. Can we then make it clear and agree that that plan

10 could not be implemented without your approval and that your allegation

11 that I had usurped the right to decide on your behalf is simply not

12 right?

13 A. I could not decide on your behalf. I could only decide to support

14 the plan and to use my political influence towards you for you to support

15 it as well. You decided in your own name, because you were a party to the

16 conflict. You held the army in territory that should have been

17 demilitarised, and that, I think, was the main reason. And the second was

18 that you wanted to force us to agree with it too.

19 Q. Mr. MILAN BABIC, Serbia was in the a party to the conflict in Croatia.

20 Croatia was in conflict with the JNA and not with Serbia. Serbia was

21 never a party to the conflict in Croatia. But we'll come to that a little

22 later.

23 So have we cleared up this point, that it was up to you and that

24 you were fully aware at the time too that you had to decide about it, and

25 that it was only our political influence that suggested you accept that

Page 13633

1 plan? Is that right?

2 A. Yes. We had to also state our positions about it, us as well.

3 That is why we were invited. But you were the one who agreed with it at

4 the very outset.

5 Q. I'm not denying that I supported the Vance Plan and that I did

6 everything I could to bring my influence to bear over you for you to

7 accept it too. I'm not denying that. But as you yourself said that you

8 took part in all this, look at this interview of yours, another one, that

9 was as you were waging a full-fledged campaign at the time. So this is RO

10 304566, Belgrade, the 20th of January. The heading is: "The UN mission

11 is condemned to failure." "'Without our consent,' [In English] says Milan

12 Babic, president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, [Interpretation] in

13 an interview published in today's edition of Borba. Borba was a leading

14 federal newspaper in Yugoslavia in those days. 'It is certain that the UN

15 Security Council and, above all, the Secretary-General will not set a

16 precedent by sending in his forces to our territory and disarming the

17 armed forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina without obtaining our

18 consent,' Babic says."

19 So, you see, it was clear to you that without your approval, this

20 could not be. And surely that is why the Assembly of the Republic of

21 Serbian Krajina, and not any people from Belgrade, decided, as it says in

22 this report and as it has been recorded everywhere, that it decided, on

23 the 16th of February, to accept the Vance Plan, and that the acceptance of

24 that plan was carried out by the competent organ in the Republic of

25 Serbian Krajina. Is that right or not?

Page 13634

1 A. After your campaign and pressure, yes.

2 Q. But my campaign was a political one?

3 JUDGE MAY: The witness must have a chance to deal with these

4 matters. If you're going to put interviews to him, he should have a

5 chance to deal with them and then deal with any subsidiary questions.

6 You heard what it's alleged was said in the interview. Do you

7 accept that that's correct or not? That's the first question.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally was aware that we too

9 had been invited to give our approval to the plan, namely, as the

10 Presidency, the Rump Presidency of SFRY and Slobodan Milosevic were

11 competent, or rather, the command of the armed formations in Krajina were

12 under the command of the JNA, and through those forces they were also in

13 command of the Territorial Defence, and through that they had control over

14 the police in Krajina as well. So the point was that should the JNA

15 withdraw from Krajina, the armed Territorial Defence would remain, and

16 Milosevic would no longer have a command position through the JNA, via the

17 JNA.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. I really don't understand what that has to do, these nebulous

20 explanations, which mean nothing, what that has to do with what I've just

21 quoted. So please, let's be more specific. What does it go on to say in

22 this interview.

23 [In English] "We find the concept of involving UN peace forces

24 unacceptable, according to which the territory of Krajina and Eastern and

25 Western Slavonia are to be under UN protection as Croatian areas. The way

Page 13635

1 Tudjman, Kadijevic, and Milosevic arrived at an agreement amounts to

2 imposing a certain political solution that resembles or is identical to

3 The Hague conference proposal about our special status within Croatia,

4 Babic added."

5 [Interpretation] Therefore, you were shooting from all weapons.

6 I'm now speaking figuratively, referring to your politics. It was against

7 the interests of Krajina. And here you explain indirectly why you

8 rejected the special status that was offered you at the international

9 conference and why you were waging a campaign in Knin against the

10 authorities in Serbia, headed by me, saying that we were pushing you into

11 this special status. Is that so or not?

12 A. There are two things here. The first thing is that the essence of

13 the plan was to demilitarise the area, and it was treated as different

14 districts within Croatia. Secondly, the Croatian government and President

15 Tudjman had already announced that with the arrival of the UN force they

16 would establish their authority and had already appointed commissioners

17 for each area in Krajina. So this was in this context that I gave these

18 statements. The consequence of these statements was that the General

19 Secretary of the United Nations acknowledged my objections and remarks,

20 and in his reports that was adopted by the Security Council said that

21 Croatian law would not apply in these territories, but rather, the

22 legislation currently in force would continue.

23 Q. Those who were drafting this plan were well aware that it was not

24 adopted as it was agreed. But answer this: You personally were given the

25 explanation that the term is defined according to the usual rules of the

Page 13636

1 Security Council, to be extended as required until the issue is resolved.

2 So the term for which the UN forces are deployed, as I explained to you a

3 number of times, believing, of course, the words of Cyrus Vance, who spoke

4 the truth, that it would be extended as long as necessary.

5 A. There are two things here again. First, in the initial stage, in

6 initial negotiations it was agreed that it would be six months, a term to

7 be extended. However, we expressed our misgivings, saying that it's a

8 short term, and eventually UN forces were deployed for an initial period

9 of one year.

10 Second, when references began to be made, when talks began about

11 the Vance Plan, the international community had not recognised Croatia by

12 that time. In the month of January, already a great number of countries,

13 and on the 15th of January, all countries of Europe, and after that the

14 United States, recognised Croatia as an independent state, and our fear

15 that Croatia, as a future member of the United Nations, could obstruct the

16 extension of the UN force mandate before the political solution for this

17 area is found.

18 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt for a moment.

19 Mr. Milosevic, you referred to two documents: One the interview

20 with Finnish television on the 18th of January; second, the interview with

21 Borba on the 20th of January. Do you want those documents exhibited?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, certainly.

23 JUDGE MAY: Let us do that now. There are translations available,

24 and perhaps the registry would give them numbers, please. Separate

25 numbers, I think. Just a moment.

Page 13637












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Page 13638

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the time being --

2 JUDGE MAY: Just wait for that to be done.

3 THE REGISTRAR: The document dated January 18th will be D60, and

4 the document dated January 20th will be D61.


6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the time being, I'm using only

7 the papers that I have received from you. Generally speaking, those

8 interviews and verbal attacks were showered on me, in all the press, in

9 all the media. But let us see what it says in this interview a little

10 down below. [In English] Latest development in relations between the

11 Republic of Serbian Krajina and Serbia, Babic pointed out the fact that

12 there is dissatisfaction and disappointment among a large number of people

13 who think that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Serbian people have

14 been abandoned by Serbia and the Serbian people in Serbia. It seems to me

15 that the Serbian people's sentiments in Serbia do not correspond with

16 Slobodan Milosevic's letter, Babic said."

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thus, you were trying, in a way, to turn the public opinion, on

19 the basis of people's feeling of solidarity, to manipulate public opinion

20 in order to destabilise authorities in Serbia; isn't that so?

21 A. Well, it is a fact that you were turning your back on us. It is a

22 fact - at least I saw it that way - that until then, you had been doing

23 everything to keep everything under control, to wage the war, to keep us

24 within Yugoslavia. You stirred up hatred between the Serb and the

25 Croatian peoples. And then you were trying to pull out of this and

Page 13639

1 abandon us. As for the political discussions and the vocabulary used,

2 they were as they were.

3 Q. So it was not disputable that I insisted that you go to Paris and

4 other places to negotiate for peace. It wasn't disputed that I suggested

5 you accept the decisions of The Hague conference. It was not disputed

6 that I ultimately succeeded in getting the Assembly of Krajina to accept

7 the Vance Plan. And still, I am the one who instigated you and stirred up

8 hatred between Serbs and Croats, I, from Belgrade.

9 A. You waged the war and you created this hatred.

10 Q. We'll get to those facts some time later.

11 Tell me this, coming back to the Finnish interview, where you say:

12 "Deceiving the public [In English] there are no disagreements in

13 the government of Krajina, and while answering the question of the support

14 for Milosevic in Krajina, he said that it was negligible..."

15 [Interpretation] Thus, you were trying to persuade the public that

16 you will by all means succeed in rejecting the peace plan. These are only

17 two interviews that you gave at that time. And you keep on asserting that

18 the letter was written by Rasuo, did Rasuo also write these interviews and

19 statements for TV and the press?

20 A. No.

21 Q. And how do they differ from this letter which, when you were

22 quoting it some time ago, taking out only one neutral passage, you said:

23 "I wrote it myself." Why are you trying to put a distance between you

24 and the letter, to disassociate yourself from it?

25 A. I'm not trying to disassociate myself from it.

Page 13640

1 Q. Well, then, I don't know if it is still necessary to continue in

2 private session.

3 JUDGE MAY: We'll go into open session.

4 [Open session]

5 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Now, from these events, let us come back to Jovan Raskovic,

8 president of the SDS and founder of the Serb Democratic Party. I suppose

9 you are not going to dispute that Professor Raskovic was a well-known,

10 renowned psychiatrist; isn't that so?

11 A. He was. He was a well-known doctor, academician.

12 Q. And even his research and work as psychiatrist elevated him to the

13 position of member of the academy of sciences, and he was one of the most

14 renowned psychiatrists in our country, well known throughout the world;

15 isn't that so?

16 A. What's your question?

17 Q. Well, is it disputed that Professor Jovan Raskovic, in addition to

18 being an honourable man who was trying to resolve everything by peaceful

19 means, was a very well-known, very competent, and very famous

20 psychiatrist?

21 A. As far as I know, he was well respected as a doctor and

22 academician.

23 Q. Precisely. And is it true that on several occasions he emphasised

24 having noticed in you a schizophrenic, narcissistic tendency? Is that

25 correct or not?

Page 13641

1 JUDGE MAY: This is not a proper question, any way, shape, or

2 form. It's merely a comment, and sounds like a pretty cheap one at that.

3 Yes. Next question.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is a very appropriate

5 question, in the light of the issues we have been discussing in private

6 session, because only a personality characterised by these features --

7 JUDGE MAY: No. You're not a psychiatrist. You're supposed to be

8 asking questions. I doubt whether that's -- you could call evidence about

9 it. I doubt it very much, and it's not a proper question, from you or

10 probably anybody else. And as I say, it sounds more like a cheap jibe.

11 Now, you ask some proper questions of the witness, please.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then, let me be more specific.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Do you think that these characteristics of yours have some

15 influence --

16 JUDGE MAY: That is not a proper question. I've just ruled on it.

17 Now, move on to something else.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I suppose that you will not allow this. Could we perhaps in this

21 connection just hear a comment from that intercept? I will remind you,

22 because I don't want to look for it now in this heap, the one where the

23 witness is not going to a meeting, a very important meeting for the

24 interests of the people he was representing, only because --

25 JUDGE MAY: Private session.

Page 13642

1 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

2 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honour.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. So he's refusing to go abroad to attend a meeting because he is

5 not being treated with enough respect as head of the government, president

6 of the Republic, or whatever he was at the time, and that it is not only a

7 display of vanity, but a complete lack of responsibility towards the

8 people he was representing, because this was a peace conference. And you

9 had been quoting this intercept.

10 A. What's the question?

11 Q. Well, the question is whether this was a matter of prestige and

12 treatment that was more important to you than the need for peace

13 negotiations, that it was a matter of prestige and whether you would be

14 treated with the proper respect for head of government or head of state.

15 That was more important to you than the need to make peace?

16 JUDGE MAY: Before you answer, we'll get a reference for this.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. It's tab 15 of the

18 intercept binder.

19 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

20 Yes, if you'd like to answer that.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The situation was as follows: My

22 political stance was that the SAO Krajina should be represented on an

23 equal footing as a party involved in the peace conference, and not

24 participate just in the committee for national minorities. So it was not

25 about personal prestige.

Page 13643

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. All right. Is this claim made by people who then occupied leading

3 positions correct? After the conference in The Hague, he convened a

4 session of the government of Krajina, and most of the people were leaders

5 from Knin. So you convened a session of the government in Krajina, you

6 were furious with me, and you told them, your colleagues in the government

7 of Krajina, that I was forcing you to accept the special status. You told

8 them that all I wanted was to get rid of you and to leave you in Croatia,

9 which you would never accept. Is this claim of your colleagues and

10 members of the leadership and government of Krajina at that time correct?

11 Was it indeed the case?

12 A. Well, you had two different approaches to me and to the

13 representation of our political position at The Hague conference. One was

14 displayed on the 20th of October, when you were forcing us to accept The

15 Hague documents, and later your position changed; it was a bit different.

16 Those four items that you proposed did not fit in well with The Hague

17 documents, the ones that were envisaged for discussion for my third

18 meeting with Wijnaendts. I don't know which one you are referring to now.

19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've got past the time for a break, so

20 we should adjourn. You can return to this afterwards.

21 We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

22 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

23 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

24 THE REGISTRAR: We're resuming in private session, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

Page 13644

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. To avoid confusion, the two points around Carrington's plan, the

3 second was my public speech at The Hague conference, when I stood up in

4 opposition to the attempt to have Yugoslavia, and that's what I said on

5 the occasion, be abolished with a stroke of the pen. So I was opposed to

6 the abolition of Yugoslavia, and that has nothing to do with what I've

7 just asked you, which relates to the question of Krajina and special

8 status for it.

9 So your associates say that he was angry at me, furious at me,

10 that I was forcing him to accept this special status and that I said that

11 I just wanted to get rid of you and to leave you in Croatia, which would

12 never be accepted; is that how it was?

13 A. Up until the 20th of October, you prevailed upon us to accept

14 special status, according to documents of The Hague conference, as

15 stipulated there, and on the 23rd of October, you told me that we should

16 accept special status on Yugoslav soil.

17 Q. That's not correct. But never mind. Let's continue with what I

18 was saying.

19 Your associates at that time, the people around you, said we know

20 that none of us commented on that because we had respect towards me and

21 considered that that was probably a good thing when it came to special

22 status. Therefore, that Babic, on his own, in the name of that

23 government, made the decision to reject the special status. Is that how

24 it was or not?

25 A. No, that's not how it was. I always consulted the government, or

Page 13645












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Page 13646

1 rather, I presented my views to it. And what happened was that I did not

2 reject the special status but it was always noted that we would continue

3 negotiations on that issue.

4 Q. All right. I'm asking you now about what people claimed, and

5 they're ready to testify here to that effect, and they say the following:

6 "On his own initiative, on behalf of the government, that never

7 met, he proclaimed himself member of the Territorial Defence of the SAO

8 Krajina and Milan Martic, without his knowledge, appointed him deputy

9 commander."

10 Is that correct or not?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Well, we have here a decision signed by you appointing Milan

13 Martic deputy commander of the Territorial Defence.

14 A. That was on the basis of authorisation from the Prime Minister,

15 pursuant to the law on National Defence of the Republic of Serbia which

16 the government of SAO Krajina, on the 1st of August, 1991, made a decision

17 to apply as a law which was in force on the territory of the SAO Krajina,

18 and of course he agreed with that, with that appointment, I mean.

19 Q. And is it true that in the autumn of 1991 you forced the command

20 of the TO for Lika, Colonel Pero Trbojevic, to effect mobilisation over

21 night in the Gradacac municipality and Donji Lapac municipality, in the

22 Municipal Assemblies there, and to expel all the Croats, armed and

23 unarmed, from Gracac, towards Gospic, or rather, Medak. Is that true or

24 not?

25 A. No. I've already spoken about that. I said and explained how

Page 13647

1 Colonel Trbojevic arrived -- went to Colonel Vukovic and asked him to

2 assist mobilisation of the 1st Light Brigade or the 1st Territorial TO

3 Brigade, as it was referred to. So what is true is that I launched an

4 appeal for people to respond to mobilisation for that particular brigade.

5 Q. Well, they say differently. They say that the JNA's intention was

6 to free the Sveti Rok warehouse at Medak, which was a military facility, a

7 military storehouse near Medak, but that the plan almost fell through

8 because of your -- the fact that you were in a hurry, you personally,

9 because people moved towards Gospic who were not trained properly. And

10 what happened was that the Croatian policemen fled and then you yourself,

11 together with your volunteers, most of them criminals, set fire to those

12 villagers and Lovrinac was the largest of them. Is that what happened,

13 and that's how you took Sveti Rok too?

14 A. No.

15 Q. And you ascribed this as being a success of yours. Is that right

16 or not?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Very well. And is the following correct, what was also claimed:

19 That in order to play up to the Chetnik organisation in Chicago and the

20 Vojvoda Chetnik leader Momcilo Djujic, whom you expected to get money from

21 in 1991, you played up to them and you personally brought in a law to ban

22 the work of the Communist Party.

23 A. On the 7th of January, 1992, a decree was passed which I myself

24 signed in the capacity of President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, to

25 ban communist parties, organisations, movements, on the territory of

Page 13648

1 Srpska Krajina, not in order to play up to Momcilo Djujic, but because

2 this was a political assessment. We thought this was a way to distance

3 ourselves from you and your policies.

4 Q. All right. So you did distance yourself from Serbia all the time

5 and did what you did. So this is in contradiction, considerable

6 contradiction with what happened to your distancing from the Republic of

7 Serbia and for what you claim happened following orders and instructions

8 from Serbia. However, now you said it wasn't a law but a decree.

9 A. Yes, it was a decree that was passed --

10 Q. That's right. That's right. You're quite right.

11 I have here, pursuant to Article 78, "the President of the RSK

12 enacts a law to ban the work," et cetera, et cetera, "and functioning of

13 all communist parties, organisations and meetings on the territory." And

14 then it goes on to say: "Their work is banned and political activities

15 banned, and Article 2 of the law comes into force immediately." So that

16 has only two articles. So you personally passed a law and you even took

17 over powers of legislation.

18 A. On the basis of a general article of the Constitution of the RSK,

19 it was interpreted by experts that by following this article and by

20 relying on that article, invoking it - it was of a political nature - we

21 could pass such a decree. It had no legal form. It was, rather, a

22 political one.

23 Q. All right. And is it true that in order to rid yourself of Jovo

24 Raskovic, you proclaimed professor Raskovic to be a traitor who

25 collaborating with Tudjman for the sole purpose -- only because he

Page 13649

1 negotiated and talked with Tudjman about a peaceful solution, just for

2 that?

3 A. No. While Professor Raskovic was negotiating with Tudjman, I was

4 on very good terms with him, and I said that a faction did indeed exist

5 which was opposed to this, and entered into polemics with Professor

6 Raskovic. The first polemics I had with Professor Raskovic was around the

7 17th of February, 1991, with respect to the way in which the Serbian

8 Democratic Party was being organised, or rather, this was a polemics to do

9 with changes in the statute of the SDS and with respect to the

10 constitution of regional boards. Up until that time, I don't recall

11 having any public polemics with him.

12 Q. All right. So you say you didn't lead a campaign, wage a

13 campaign, of compromising Professor Raskovic for the meetings he had with

14 President Tudjman; is that what you're saying?

15 A. There were people who made statements with respect to that. I did

16 not.

17 Q. All right. Why, then, for what happened in Dubica are you

18 accusing Milan Martic, are you holding him responsible for the Dubica

19 events, when you know full well that the perpetrators were criminals from

20 the SDS, as it says here in the claims made by your then associates?

21 A. Well, I don't know who carried that out. I said what I knew about

22 the matter.

23 Q. And do you know that at that time Milan Martic did not even

24 take -- had not taken control of those areas yet and that your main man,

25 the principal man for Dubica in the SDS at that time was Kostar [phoen],

Page 13650

1 Mile Misljenovic, Kostar. Is that right or not. He was a postman, Mile

2 Misljenovic, the postman?

3 A. What event are you referring to?

4 Q. About the events in Dubica.

5 A. I said exactly what I knew about those events.

6 Q. Well, I wouldn't say so, judging by what they claim here. And is

7 it true that before the conflict in Kijevo near Knin you exerted pressure

8 constantly on the command of the corps, that is to say General Spiro

9 Ninkovic, Ratko Mladic, and that it was your village, your native village

10 of Kukor at Vrljika that was blocked and that an attack had to be launched

11 in order to free that area? Is that correct or not?

12 A. I talked to you about that.

13 Q. Do you know -- when I asked why that attack -- that they told me,

14 their answer was to me that they had to liberate Kumrovec.

15 A. When I spoke about the events around Vrljika and Kutusa [phoen].

16 You said: "Hasn't that been settled already?" And I learnt later on on

17 that particular morning there was indeed an attack on Kijevo.

18 Q. So you're saying that you learnt what happened, although you were

19 actually there?

20 A. I was with you on the 26th, one day before, rather, on the very

21 day the attack took place. I arrived in the evening of the previous day.

22 I arrived in Belgrade. I was told to go and see you, and I went to your

23 offices on two occasions and we talked about Frenki, Spiro Nikolic, and

24 about the problems related to Vrljika, and then I left. And you commented

25 on that, and you said, "Hasn't that been settled already?" Just as what

Page 13651

1 you said about Frenki, that he should be in Krajina because he's a good

2 man. And you asked about Spiro Nikolic, what kind of commander he was,

3 and I said, "Well, his conduct is proper." I had nothing for or against

4 him. So that was on that particular day, when the JNA, with all its units

5 under its command, attacked Kijevo.

6 Q. And is it true that in that attack on Kijevo, there were no

7 fatalities?

8 A. I don't know exactly. I don't know the number the people who were

9 killed or wounded or anything like that.

10 Q. Well, it says here that there were no casualties at Kijevo and the

11 Croatian police had previously killed a young man from the village of

12 Polace, whose name was Vaso Pecer, several days before the attack?

13 A. Vaso Pecer died around the 2nd of May, 1991, in some incidents

14 that took place there and which were caused by a DB group and police from

15 Golubic, which means at the random shooting at Kijevo, in May 1991, and

16 the JNA attacked Kijevo on the 26th of August, 1991.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, is it possible -- may I

18 read out, in an open session, a denial which was sent in by Marko

19 Dobrijevic, secretary of the Serbian Democratic Party and director of the

20 communal enterprise in Knin during the war and a deputy of the last

21 Assembly, when it convened, the Assembly of Serbian Krajina, which he

22 signed. The denial is signed by him, and underneath he says that he

23 agrees that this statement be made public here in the trial against me.

24 He makes mention of MILAN BABIC. He doesn't mention his name anywhere in text.

25 But I should nonetheless like to ask, and I do believe that it is your

Page 13652












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13 English transcripts.













Page 13653

1 wish too, that the proceedings here are public. So I would like to read

2 this out in public, in open session, if I may, so that we may comment.

3 JUDGE MAY: You can put to the witness what has been given to you

4 in that statement. You can't exhibit it, for the reasons you know about.

5 You must let the witness have the opportunity to respond to the various

6 allegations that are made, no doubt, in it. As for whether it should be

7 in open session, provided it doesn't identify the witness, then it can be

8 in open session. But if at any stage it does, then we must go into

9 private session to do it. But you can begin in open session.

10 [Open session]

11 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. I have here a statement with respect to the testimony of witness

14 MILAN BABIC, and the statement was sent by Marko Dobrijevic, secretary of the

15 SDS and director of the communal enterprise in Knin during the war and a

16 deputy of the last Assembly of Serbian Krajina. And along with his

17 acquiescence, he has signed the document with his name and surname. He

18 signed it in full and he would like me to make it public. It says here as

19 follows --

20 JUDGE MAY: Listen, whatever he wants, whether he wants it made

21 public or not, it doesn't matter. All that's relevant is that you can put

22 to the witness something which you say contradicts him. Now, it's his

23 evidence which matters, not what's in the document. Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. May, I think that it is in

25 the interests of the truth that this statement be read out, and the

Page 13654

1 witness will answer my questions once I have read out the statement, with

2 your permission.

3 JUDGE MAY: No. You're not going to read the statement out,

4 because it's not evidence. But what you can put is sections of the

5 statement to the witness for his comment. He must be allowed to comment

6 as you go through. You can't simply read the statement out as though it

7 was evidence. Yes. Now, put what's in the statement to the witness.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Well, in the statement, it states that everything that the witness

10 did was wrong and that now in The Hague he is accusing others. He claims

11 that he never even met some individuals and that he's either putting them

12 in one bag of tricks that existed only in his mind. And this is what he

13 mentions. You mentioned Jovica Stanisic, for whom you've heard only on

14 television. Do you know that Jovica Stanisic has married, from Javrsak,

15 near Knin, and that he's with his in-laws, or he went to visit his in-laws

16 before the war and during the war. Is that so or not?

17 A. I saw Jovica Stanisic on many occasions, at your office for the

18 first time, in 1990; in January 1991 as well; I also saw him in your

19 offices in March 1991; I saw him in his own office in March 1991, and

20 February too; and I think I saw him on quite a number of other occasions

21 as well. And I said that here in Court, that Jovica Stanisic is married

22 to a woman from Javrsak, he told me that in the Seher restaurant in August

23 1991 when he introduced me to his wife and when he said that Captain

24 Dragan owed them some money which they had paid out for some DB services,

25 and he went off with that money.

Page 13655

1 Q. So he came to his in-laws, to visit them before the war and during

2 the war; is that right or not?

3 A. I don't know that.

4 Q. And it says here in your sick imagination, everyone who came from

5 Serbia came there because they were sent by the DB of Serbia.

6 JUDGE MAY: That's simply an allegation. You needn't bother to

7 answer that.

8 Yes. Next question.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. He says as follows: All the structures, Mr. MILAN BABIC, all the

11 structures that you call parallel structures were created precisely by

12 you: The staff in Golubic was created by you. Without anyone's knowledge,

13 on your own initiative you proclaimed a state of war on the 17th of

14 August, 1990. Is that true or not?

15 A. The staff in Golubic, which functioned for a certain period of

16 time at the end of August until the beginning of September, in 1990?

17 Golubic was formed at a session of the Serbian Democratic Party chaired by

18 Dr. Jovan Raskovic on the 18th of August, 1991. That session was held in

19 Padjene, and the initiator for forming that staff was Maruo Dobrijevic,

20 Jovan Opacic, Dusan Zelenbaba, Branko Peric, and Milan Martic. The state

21 of war was proclaimed in Knin in 1990, in August 1990, as I have already

22 testified here in this court.

23 Q. Very well. Is it true what he says, that you were seriously

24 criticised by the Federation to conceal your responsibility, you shifted

25 the blame on Snezana Stamatovic, a journalist in Radio Knin? Is that

Page 13656

1 true?

2 A. No, I didn't mention that lady.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we are going now in a lot of

4 details and I think we should be in private session for all these details.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think there's no need to go into

6 private session.

7 JUDGE MAY: If we are going to approach anything which may

8 identify the witness, we should go into private session. But we'll go on

9 for the moment in open session.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. He says that you were lying by accusing Serbia and the leadership

12 of Serbia for the creation of parallel authorities in Krajina, whereas all

13 the appointments were done personally by you and, unfortunately,

14 arbitrarily. Is that so or not?

15 A. Regarding parallel structures in Krajina, what their function was

16 and who did it, I've already testified about that here in this courtroom.

17 Q. As far as I was able to notice when I asked you to list at least a

18 few names from Serbia, you managed to name four people, some of whom could

19 not have been there because they were working in Belgrade.

20 JUDGE MAY: We've been over that. We've no need to go over it

21 again.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

23 Q. The parts that may be identifying, we'll avoid reading, not to

24 prompt the other party to ask for a closed session.

25 So I'll refer to that later on in private session.

Page 13657

1 He goes on to say here:

2 "You are claiming that Croats were expelled from Knin, and you

3 know very well that those are lies. The truth is that those people who

4 had responded to Tudjman's invitation to leave Krajina were leaving. My

5 driver was Andrija Butkovic from Knin, who was employed in 1993 when the

6 war was in full swing and he was a Croat. Bosiljka Curko, working in the

7 public utility company in Knin, when she was leaving Knin, at Tudjman's

8 invitation, I personally appealed to her to stay and said if she was

9 afraid, her whole family could stay with my family. And she said that was

10 not the point. 'Others are leaving, so I'm leaving too.' She bid

11 farewell to everyone and brought me a bottle of whiskey and of course we

12 embraced upon parting. Throughout the war, up to 1995, the main water

13 tank was guarded by a Croat, Stipe Gambiroza. Also a Croat delivered food

14 to the kindergarten in Knin throughout the war.

15 Is this true?

16 A. I have testified to the best of my knowledge about those events

17 here in this Tribunal.

18 Q. Very well. At a competition for the best balcony in Knin, three

19 awards were distributed, 300, 200, and 100.000. The first two prizes were

20 won by Croatian women and a third by a Serbian woman. And all this was

21 announced on Radio Knin. What kind of expulsion are you talking about?

22 So I'm asking you the same question.

23 JUDGE MAY: Do you know anything about the best balcony

24 competition?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember, Your Honour.

Page 13658

1 JUDGE MAY: Was it right that there were some Croats who remained

2 in Knin, or not?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there were. I know them.

4 There was my neighbour, Grandmother Kaja. Let me mention her. There were

5 others too. I don't want to mention names. I spoke of the serious

6 suffering of Croats in Kijevo, when the JNA attacked the village with

7 artillery. I spoke about the terrible, awful expulsion of Croats from

8 Vrpolje in 1993. I spoke about the fact that the Croats in Knin did not

9 feel at ease in an atmosphere of interethnic and political conflict. And

10 I also mentioned the events from April 1991.

11 JUDGE MAY: No need to go over those events again. It's just that

12 question of whether some remained.

13 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. That's very, very good, because the next quotation from this

16 statement denies precisely what you are saying. He says: "If that had

17 been so, would the Knin Croats, in 1996, that is, after Storm, would they

18 have signed a petition calling on the Serbs to return to Knin?

19 Unfortunately, Mr. Curko, who handed the petition to the Sabor in Zagreb

20 was met and beaten up by HDZ members."

21 Is that true or not?

22 A. I don't know of the details, but I do know that many Croats from

23 Knin were sorry that the Serbs had left Knin and that they did express

24 their wish for them to return.

25 Q. Let me go on. In a location Rupe, in which, according to the

Page 13659

1 witness, Croatian civilians were killed, everyone knows that these are

2 fabrications. Those civilians who remained ate together with the army

3 members, the JNA. There's a case of Ivan Tepic, from Rupe, who asked to

4 join his family in Sibenik, which of course he was allowed to do, but

5 after arriving in Sibenik, he said how the Serbs hadn't hurt him but, on

6 the contrary, they had given him food which they themselves were short of,

7 and he was killed by Croats in Sibenik.

8 I will not go on to read what relates to you in person.

9 A. But regarding this particular event, I was talking about the trial

10 to the -- of the perpetrators of crimes, and I recall that there was a

11 trial of a group from Zelenik, for an event that took place -- Drvenik,

12 I'm sorry. I think the reason was that one of their men was killed

13 somewhere around Rupe and that they took revenge for this over their

14 neighbour Croats. They killed them, and that is why they were put on

15 trial. So I referred to this in that context.

16 Q. Probably you mixed something up.

17 A. No. I'm not quite sure whether the crime evented near Rupe or in

18 Drvenik, Ervenik, and then I corrected myself.

19 Q. So you don't even remember where your testifying about what

20 happened.

21 A. I remember they committed a crime against their neighbours and

22 that is why they were put on trial.

23 Q. He asked: "Why he is not testifying about the 10.000 missing

24 civilians that were withdrawing from the Croatian army together with

25 American instructors who were sowing death on innocent, old men and women,

Page 13660












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Page 13661

1 some of whom did not wish and some of whom could not leave their homes."

2 JUDGE MAY: That's not a question that the witness can deal with.

3 That's a comment by whoever wrote the letter. Yes.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. "Dobrijevic says that the SDS was formed near a pit in Lika,

6 where, during the Second World War the Ustasha criminals, with the help of

7 Hitler, were building the statehood of Croatia based on crimes."

8 JUDGE MAY: Totally irrelevant. Yes, move on.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Is that where the SDS was formed, Mr. MILAN BABIC?

11 A. On the 27th of January, 1990, Television Belgrade broadcast that

12 Academician Raskovic had announced the formation of a Serb party in

13 Croatia. Later on, from the participants in that meeting in Serb, I heard

14 that there was a ritual performed over the pit, a religious ritual, at the

15 pit Kuk, near Lapac, where the Ustashas in 1941, had killed and thrown the

16 killed Serbs into that pit. A strange ritual took place to mark the

17 beginning of the formation of the Serbian Democratic Party.

18 Q. Well, can you comment on what Dobrijevic says? "As regards a

19 witness hidden by a screen, I would just ask him where all those

20 fabrications come from. He's testifying about areas on which he never set

21 foot."

22 JUDGE MAY: That is a worthless comment, completely worthless.

23 Now, let's move on, and relevant questions. Your time is going,

24 Mr. Milosevic. Unless you ask proper questions, it will come to an end.

25 Yes.

Page 13662

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. In that case, I'll shorten this to a maximum degree. Dobrijevic

3 says here, and there are many explanations here relevant to this

4 witness -- he says: "I'm writing this on behalf of the slaughtered

5 children of the Konevi [phoen] Bridge on behalf of those in Jasenovac --"

6 JUDGE MAY: No. These are totally improper questions. Whatever

7 he thinks he's doing, it is of no relevance to this Trial Chamber. Now,

8 if there's anything -- you can put anything which is relevant, which

9 contradicts the witness's testimony. What you can't put is abuse from the

10 writer of the letter. It doesn't matter at all.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not someone. It is

12 one of the closest associates. It is just not anyone, but one of the

13 closest associates of this witness, who has carried out this about-turn,

14 for the reasons that are well known.

15 JUDGE MAY: You can call the witness in due course. Meanwhile,

16 all you can do is to put anything relevant to him which contradicts his

17 evidence. But facts only, not abuse.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well. I think it is not

19 abuse if we're establishing untruths. But as we're in open session, I

20 will not go into any details that identify the witness.

21 Q. My next question, therefore, would be, on the basis of what we've

22 been saying here over the past several days and partially on the basis of

23 what I've just read to you, and also on the basis of the explanations you

24 yourself gave to the investigators, it follows that you had one thing on

25 your mind, you did another, and spoke a third, whereas in fact, as you

Page 13663

1 yourself are saying, you advocated peace and life within Croatia. Now,

2 tell me, please: Did you say to me, or anyone in Serbia, what your

3 peaceful efforts were? Because neither I nor anyone else could undermine

4 your peace-seeking efforts when, to this day, neither I nor anyone else in

5 Serbia, and to tell you the truth, in Krajina too, knew nothing about your

6 peace efforts. So tell me, please --

7 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]

8 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

9 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.

10 JUDGE MAY: Witness MILAN BABIC, that was a lengthy comment or question.

11 Perhaps we'll hear -- what is the question, put shortly, please,

12 Mr. Milosevic?

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Did you tell me, or anyone else in Serbia, or anyone in Krajina --

15 ever present an idea about any peace efforts of yours whatsoever?

16 A. The last one was on the 8th of August, 1995, the proposal, that

17 is, my agreement with the Z-4 plan and the other elements of the

18 conversation I had with Mr. Galbraith, and I asked for your support.

19 Before that, I also spoke to you about the Z-4 plan. We also discussed

20 with Borisav Jovic, in August 1990, questions of security and a political

21 settlement for the crisis that was looming. And he supported our

22 propositions on your behalf, because you were influencing him, and you

23 told him to tell us that you would support our political struggle and that

24 the JNA would protect that political struggle. You gave us instructions

25 how to carry out the political referendum, on what legal basis. You said

Page 13664

1 that a law was in preparation for the self-determination of nations, that

2 that was a legal model, and this was a model that we supported. That was

3 your model, and we supported that model, believing it to be a legal one

4 that would bring peace to the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

5 Q. Why are you involving the JNA, when there were no conflicts in

6 1990 and the role of the JNA in those days was not of current interest?

7 Didn't you construe all that solely on the basis of the fact that you

8 established that, by coincidence, there were several people on holiday at

9 the same time? Isn't that evidence of your narcissism, if you're sending

10 me a message for me to receive you and I tell you that someone in the SFRY

11 Presidency should receive you, that you come to the conclusion that I have

12 a military staff meeting to decide who would receive you; that whenever

13 somebody announces that he wants to receive me, that I have to have a

14 top-level conference to make a decision about it?

15 A. I'm not making any constructions; I'm just conveying what I know.

16 Q. Well, according to that knowledge, for instance, Hamdija Podzerac

17 was on a holiday at the same time, who was then a member of the Presidency

18 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Muslim. Maybe I consulted him too whether I

19 should receive Milan Babic or whether somebody from the Presidency should

20 receive him, and another 3.000 or so other people holidaying there. Who

21 knows how many of them could have been consulted as to whether Milan Babic

22 should be received.

23 A. I told you what I knew. We went to see you, not the others, not

24 the other 3.000. You didn't come to see me. You went to see Jovic.

25 Through Slobodan Bukatic [phoen], we contacted you.

Page 13665

1 Q. We will have occasion to discuss that later. In this paper

2 written by Dobrijevic, which I didn't want to read in open session, it

3 says you personally amassed so many functions upon yourself that people

4 called you "Little Tito," "Little Tito," alluding to our former

5 president. I'm explaining in case you don't understand what it means in

6 our language. And it says statistics experts from that time counted 32

7 positions that you held, the most important of them being president of the

8 National Council, president of the Republic, head of government, president

9 of the municipality, president of the Serb Democratic Party. Is it true

10 that you held all these positions?

11 A. I already said in this courtroom about all the positions I held --

12 maybe not all. I don't know. At various times I held different posts. I

13 was president of the municipality for about four years. I was president

14 of the Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party. I was president

15 of the National Council from the 31st of July, 1990 until the 28th of

16 February of 1991, approximately, when this council ceased to exist. I was

17 president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina from 19 December 1991 until

18 the 16th February 1992. Was there any other position that you asked me

19 about?

20 Q. Well, judging by all I know, these positions were held by you in

21 succession, not at the same time. If you were four years president of the

22 municipality of Knin, you were also president of the SDS simultaneously.

23 A. I was president of the Municipal Assembly of Knin for the longest

24 time, and this position coincided with various other functions for a

25 while. I was head of government from the 29th May 1991 until 19th

Page 13666

1 December 1991, when this position was held by --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Vice-president. He was acting in this position.

3 A. I was president of the Municipal Assembly of Knin and president of

4 the Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party for the longest time.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. So head of government until end 1991, then you were president of

7 the Republic, and then you became head of government again, president of

8 the Serbian Democratic Party. A moment ago you were saying that you

9 always followed legal procedure throughout your political career. Is it

10 therefore indisputable that nobody appointed you to these positions from

11 Serbia? Is that at least undisputed?

12 A. I was elected to my posts by citizens, public positions such as

13 president of the municipality, president of the Executive Council, Prime

14 Minister, president of the Republic. From this position, I was replaced

15 through an intervention from Serbia. Then to my positions in the party I

16 was elected by party organs. I was elected president of the National

17 Council by the members of that council, headed by Jovan Raskovic, who was

18 a member of that council.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Jovan Raskovic, president of that council.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. So you were elected by the electorate, and my pressure only caused

22 you to be replaced from some positions. Or pressure from Belgrade. As

23 you wish. And the reason was your rejection of the peace plans.

24 A. You used my rejection of the Vance Plan, as you had adopted it, to

25 replace me from that position and put Mihajlo Markovic instead, in 1991.

Page 13667












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Page 13668

1 He said he used the Vance Plan to get rid of Babic, and then he suddenly

2 realised what he said.

3 Q. So the Vance Plan was rejected and the intervention of the UN

4 force was required to replace Babic?

5 A. Markovic told me that about a year later. The conflict with you

6 was used to replace me from my post.

7 Q. It was a matter of personal sympathy or antipathy, not any

8 objective reasons, I suppose.

9 Tell me now, since you were not afraid, you were not in the least

10 frightened by all these radical acts that your associates are talking

11 about, and even in your statement to the investigators you say that you

12 had become an ethnoegotist, that you were overcome by vanity, that you

13 neglected the suffering of others. We have this on tape. Tell me now:

14 How could I, or anyone else, have influenced a man like you, a man

15 overcome by vanity, fear, self-love, desire to please - these are all

16 things you said yourself - rather than striving to resolve the problems of

17 the people you represented?

18 A. As for fear, I even said, in the beginning of March 1991, that

19 Croats are threatening us, jeopardising us, and instilling fear. After

20 the Spegelj affair, you frightened us with Ustashas, genocide, and you

21 made me believe that self-determination of peoples after secession is a

22 legal way out, a legal path. With your political position and the

23 authority you held - and I believed you - convinced me that it is the

24 right way to go. The right of peoples to self-determination is something

25 I accepted from you, and thus entered this vicious circle, this condition

Page 13669

1 of ethnocentrism, which I was unable to shed until 1995.

2 Q. Are you now questioning the right of peoples to

3 self-determination?

4 A. At that time, Yugoslavia was made up of peoples who exercised

5 their rights within republics as federal units of Yugoslavia and on the

6 federal level in matters in which republics were supposed to agree on,

7 such as the constitution of Yugoslavia. You explained, and you convinced

8 us, that if somebody wishes to leave Yugoslavia, they have the right to.

9 But administrative borders within Yugoslavia cannot be the borders

10 defining this division. You said that the prevailing authoritative

11 borders were the ones determined by referendums. Borisav Jovic explained

12 that the smallest unit is a municipality, and he said that after a

13 referendum on self-determination of people, the municipalities from a

14 republic which opts for leaving Yugoslavia -- municipalities wishing to

15 stay should remain within Yugoslavia. Borisav Jovic explained that it was

16 your position. And it is precisely this option that led us to war and

17 misfortune for all the peoples of Yugoslavia.

18 Q. So in your opinion, it was not the violent secession of Slovenia,

19 Croatia and Bosnia that caused the war, it was the right of people to

20 self-determination; is what you're claiming now? I have to ask you this.

21 A. The war was caused by your position.

22 JUDGE MAY: One at a time. Now, let the witness answer.

23 A. The war was caused by your way. You caused the war, because you

24 wanted, by violent means, through the JNA and other armed formations that

25 you controlled, to take over parts of the territory of other republics

Page 13670

1 which you believed should remain within the new state that you were in the

2 process of establishing. The rationale and explanation for this that you

3 put forward was the right of peoples to self-determination. However, you

4 did not respect this right. You waged war even on those territories which

5 were not majority-Serb territories and where people had not declared

6 themselves in favour of Yugoslavia.

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I believe that these are

9 questions of vital importance. They do not reveal the identity of the

10 witness, and these things should, I believe, be heard in public session.

11 All of these things that the witness is saying, in the opinion of the

12 amici, are things that should be heard by the public.

13 JUDGE MAY: The danger is that some form of his identity may be

14 revealed.

15 Mr. Milosevic, are you going to deal with matters now that will

16 reveal the identity of the witness or can we go back into open session?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is the witness who opened the

18 door to an issue which certainly requires a private session. He's putting

19 things upside down here, and he's overestimating his intelligence and his

20 knowledge, which again proves --

21 JUDGE MAY: Let us not go into it now. We'll remain in private

22 session. Now, your next question, please.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. You say that you feel repentance and shame for your part in all

25 these events. You are saying things diametrically opposite to the things

Page 13671

1 that you were telling us when we were discussing issues of peace and war?

2 A. I repent for having become an ethnoegoistic, for accepting your

3 thesis that people of the former Yugoslavia should separate. That kept me

4 convinced for a long time that all that Serbs were doing for

5 self-determination was right. But you yourself soiled even your own

6 thesis. I repent forever accepting that policy, for embracing it, for

7 having liked it. That's true. I am sorry that I was an egotist at the

8 time. I'm sorry because I am now fully convinced that it was the primary

9 cause for all the things that eventually happened, and especially the way

10 in which you did it. It was horrible.

11 Q. All right. I think this particular question could be asked in

12 public session as well. I'll ask it and leave it to your judgement.

13 Since it is not disputed that you repent, you hold yourself out to

14 be a person who always advocated and worked for peace, why didn't you

15 return to Knin? Because authorities there would meet you with

16 understanding, in view of all your peace efforts. You say that peace was

17 always on your mind, although it was not on your lips.

18 A. You convinced us that it was necessary to wage war with Croatia.

19 The Croat people suffered, and since they could not take their revenge on

20 you, they would take their revenge on someone else, certainly.

21 Q. I believe this question could be asked in public session, Mr. May,

22 couldn't it?

23 JUDGE MAY: Which one?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The one I just asked.

25 JUDGE MAY: No, I think not. Very well it revealed his identity.

Page 13672

1 It was a personal question.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, then. Let us move back

3 into open session and refrain from personal questions.

4 [Open session]

5 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Could we note that you claim that the war in Yugoslavia was not

8 caused by the violent secessions, first of Slovenia, then Croatia, and

9 finally Bosnia and Herzegovina, not even the illegal secessions? It was

10 caused, rather, by an interpretation of the right of peoples to

11 self-determination?

12 A. As far as I can remember, the war, the armed conflict in Slovenia,

13 began when the Republic of Slovenia assumed control over border

14 crossings --

15 Q. Let us not talk about Slovenia. I'm just asking you: Was the war

16 caused by the violent secessions of these republics or by the right of

17 peoples to self-determination?

18 A. The war in Croatia was caused by you, by creating incidents, by

19 involving the Yugoslav People's Army into the conflict, and by commanding

20 the JNA against the Republic of Croatia and inflicting damage upon the

21 Croatian people, as well as the Serbian people, whom you had pushed into

22 war.

23 Q. This is not going to identify you. You said a moment ago that

24 this happened because of the right of peoples to self-determination. Tell

25 me: Have you read the constitutions of Yugoslavia that existed throughout

Page 13673

1 Yugoslavia's existence? Do you know that it says that the peoples of

2 Yugoslavia had united to create Yugoslavia using their rights to

3 self-determination, peoples, not republics?

4 A. I believe that's what the constitution says.

5 Q. So what does it mean, then, to invoke the right of peoples to

6 self-determination, a right that every people in Yugoslavia shares? Why

7 does it mean that this right caused the war rather than the violent

8 secession of other republics who didn't wish to stay?

9 A. Yugoslavia was made up of republics, as far as I understand, and I

10 am not a lawyer competent or qualified to interpret the constitution. The

11 constitution also said that peoples exercise their rights within

12 republics, and on the Yugoslav federal level, they exercise it through

13 republics.

14 Q. All right. Since you really aren't an expert in constitutional

15 matters, I don't wish to abuse your lack of knowledge, your ignorance on

16 that score. But you said that it was my thesis to separate the peoples.

17 Anybody who has read any one of my speeches would have concluded right the

18 reverse. I said that I considered that Yugoslavia was the best possible

19 solution for all the Yugoslav peoples, in which they lived together,

20 freely and on a footing of equality. And I advocated the preservation of

21 Yugoslavia. Isn't that true, Mr. MILAN BABIC?

22 A. You strove for the fact that the Serbs from Croatia and the Serbs

23 from Bosnia-Herzegovina should enjoy the right to remain within

24 Yugoslavia, that is to say, in the kind of Yugoslavia that you were

25 reorganising. That was your public stance. What you in fact did was that

Page 13674

1 in the areas inhabited by the Serbs, not only where they were the majority

2 but where they were the minority as well, you caused incidents to take

3 place and then deployed the Yugoslav People's Army in order to retain

4 those territories by force of violence within that state, sidestepping the

5 decisions of the majority in the territories where they were living, and

6 by creating incidents and waging a war, you fanned the flames and you

7 incited Slovenia and Croatia to step down from the state of Yugoslavia and

8 the state that you were creating. That is how I understood your

9 conceptions of the matter.

10 Q. Well, others didn't understand it in this way. Now, what your

11 understanding was under the circumstances in which you find yourself

12 today, I'm not wondering about that now. But let's be a little more

13 specific with respect to your accusations and the fabrications and the

14 fact that dangers were conjured up to which the Serb people were exposed

15 to in Croatia.

16 During your examination-in-chief here, you claimed, and I think

17 that we even saw an excerpt played from the film, the tape, about Spegelj,

18 this film of Spegelj was a fabrication. It was a forgery. And that the

19 Federal Secretariat for National Defence played it. That was what was

20 claimed, that it was played as a sort of propaganda device, in order to

21 incite clashes and conflict. And that it was just propaganda, pure and

22 simple. So please answer me this: Do you know what weapons, if it was

23 indeed a forgery, what weapons were they using to shoot from at that same

24 JNA in Croatia and at the Serbs in Croatia, and whether or not those

25 soldiers and those compatriots of yours that were being killed from some

Page 13675












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Page 13676

1 sort of forged or falsified weapons as well that had been conjured up that

2 you saw heard about in this falsified document and tape about Spegelj?

3 A. Well, I said with respect to the Spegelj tape two facts: First I

4 had heard that Spegelj himself had denied certain statements and

5 observations made in the film; and second, I said, and I can repeat that

6 if you like, that the film itself caused a frightening effect on the Serb

7 people, especially the Serb people in Croatia and in Knin itself, because

8 it was in that film and via that tape that it was stated that the Croatian

9 government, the Croatian authorities, would slaughter the Serbs in Knin,

10 that it would kill the officers of the Yugoslav People's Army, their

11 wives, and that this would be a general slaughterhouse. And this caused

12 great reaction and hostility towards the Croatian government. And the

13 Croatian government, or rather, its special police force, and especially

14 its guard corps, used real weapons against the armed formations and units

15 of the Yugoslav People's Army and all the other units which were under its

16 control and command.

17 Q. So this was, then, a propaganda campaign, was it, to frighten the

18 Serbs? Or was it a taster of -- by the Federal Ministry of Defence of

19 what was to come, the dangers in store, the dangers that threatened,

20 because of illegal arming and the threats that were being made and the

21 wave of nationalism that was rampant in Croatia and the violent

22 secessions? Is that what you're claiming? That's what you're saying,

23 isn't it?

24 A. Information put out in this way resulted in the hostility of the

25 Serb people towards the Croatian government.

Page 13677

1 Q. All right. In view of the fact that the other side has pulled out

2 of context just one segment, a brief segment of that film, it was a brief

3 excerpt, which wasn't live, but we had a still photograph of it, and just

4 heard the voice. I'm now going to play that same tape which the other

5 side tendered as a piece of evidence. It is a brief excerpt, once again.

6 But other parts of that same tape. And they don't last more than two

7 minutes altogether. So may we have a look at that tape? Let's look at

8 that forgery, then.

9 JUDGE MAY: When we have the exhibit number.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the Spegelj tape.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, tab 170 from Exhibit 352.

12 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, we'll have it played.

13 [Videotape played]

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] That same night in which the previous

15 conversations took place, eight [Indiscernible] trucks intended for the

16 terrorist army of the HDZ on the 20th of October crossed our borders.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise, but they do not have the

18 transcript of this excerpt.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Here you have the illegal introduction of weapons from Hungary.

21 Look at Spegelj live and see what he says here.

22 [Videotape played]

23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, but they're not able

24 to follow.

25 "SPEAKER: ...throughout the territory of 5th Military District

Page 13678

1 Solvenia, the whole of Croatia and part of Bosnia, we now have armed

2 800.000 with Kalashnikovs. Let only 10.000 of them get arms. The army

3 has nothing to look for there. We cut down. I have a problem now to

4 protect you, the two of you, not from the army but from others. Fuck

5 you. Each officer is covered by five in Virovitica and they will be cut

6 down at their own homes. I have to give a list. You'll get it tomorrow.

7 I have to quickly state now that this will be Virovitica. There's no

8 question of that. Nobody must leave the barracks alive, nobody. I know

9 that we -- I must now quickly inform those lads in Virovitica who to

10 spare, who not, absolutely not. No one is to be allowed to reach the

11 barracks, no one. One of the two men I know, for example, we make

12 those --"

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] These were brief excerpts. This

14 is the original tape that was filmed as it was explained by the Military

15 Intelligence Service of the day. Spegelj, without a doubt, is the man

16 talking, and he was brought to trial in Zagreb later on. You saw in the

17 first portion there was the illegal introduction of weapons from Hungary,

18 with all the lists and records and documents necessary. And in one of

19 your -- I don't want to identify the conversation you had, because we'll

20 have to go back into private session once again, but you claimed that I

21 armed you with some sort of weapons from Hungary, and the whole of

22 Yugoslavia knows very well who imported weapons from Hungary and who it

23 was that armed themselves from Hungary.

24 Q. Tell me now: Did you ever receive any kind of weapons from

25 Hungary whatsoever?

Page 13679

1 A. About the 20th of April, 1991, you said that you had purchased

2 20.000 pieces of weaponry in Hungary for us. This was a little strange

3 and a little funny because the public was informed in this way that

4 weapons were bought by the government of Croatia in Hungary, and later on

5 I learnt that this was not so, that you had bought weapons in Hungary, but

6 that you in fact distributed weapons from the warehouses of the

7 Territorial Defence in Yugoslavia.

8 Q. Well, this would seem to me to be nonsense too, this matter of

9 Serbia purchasing weapons in Hungary. And secondly, have you forgotten

10 what you yourself said earlier on, that you procured weapons from the

11 Territorial Defence warehouses in Krajina, and from the TO warehouses in

12 Western Bosnia and you even mentioned the name of a lieutenant colonel who

13 supplied you with the weapons, that the TO warehouse had somewhere around

14 Bihac or wherever. Have you forgotten about all that?

15 A. I said that the Serbs in Krajina were armed from two sources. One

16 source was from Serbia, via the DB of Serbia, the state security of

17 Serbia, and the second was by the JNA in the Krajina area.

18 Q. So you claim that you never said that you got your weapons from

19 the Territorial Defence warehouses in Krajina and in Bosnia; is that what

20 you're saying? But that you were supplied exclusively from Serbia and by

21 the JNA?

22 A. As far as Bosna and Krajina are concerned, I mentioned the Bihac

23 airport, which is partially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and partially in

24 Croatia, or rather, Krajina. Now, where the Bihac airport base is located

25 in more specific terms, I said I don't know, but I said I know that

Page 13680

1 weapons came in through two roads into Krajina, one from Serbia, the

2 Grahovo direction, and the other was from Bosanski Novi.

3 Q. All right. So you were not supplied from the Territorial Defence

4 warehouse in Krajina, you were not supplied by -- from the Territorial

5 Defence warehouse in the Bihac region, but you were supplied by Serbia and

6 the JNA; is that what you're saying?

7 A. The JNA supplied us with weapons, that is to say, in concrete

8 terms, the Bihac area, Sveti Rok, and also in part the Knin Corps

9 distributed weapons, I don't know where from.

10 Q. So did you organise demonstrations in front of the Knin Corps to

11 call for weapons to be distributed to you and the army refused to give you

12 the weapons, supply you with those weapons? Wasn't that how it was?

13 A. The first demonstrations in front of the Knin Corps took place in

14 January 1991 and with respect to the incidents that were taking place in

15 the Vrljika area, the fact that people were arrested by the Croatian

16 police, the demonstrations were held in front of the Knin Corps building

17 to block the passage between Knin and Cetinje because of the fact that a

18 funeral was taking place to bury a person who had died under strange

19 circumstances. He was killed in Sibenik but was to be buried in Cetinje.

20 Now, what you have in mind when you're referring to --

21 Q. Well, I'm thinking about the part of the report that we read out

22 in private session --

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I understand, we're in

24 open session now, are we? Is this a public session?

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, open session. So stick to what you can deal with

Page 13681

1 in open session.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am bearing in mind the fact that

3 we're in open session.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. As I was saying, part of the report which belongs to the documents

6 supplied by the opposite side, a document I quoted from with respect to

7 your activities, where mention is made of those particular activities, the

8 ones that General Mladic reacted to, and he did so quite rightly and in

9 conformity with the rules of service, and he endeavoured to thwart them.

10 That's what I'm talking about, and that's what it says in the report

11 itself, the report from the Knin Corps.

12 A. Several reports were quoted here by Mladic. I think that to the

13 second army in Sarajevo that was, in 1992. I don't know what the -- the

14 one you're thinking about.

15 Q. All right. So avoid going into a closed session again, let's

16 round off this Spegelj matter. Is this a forgery, what you just saw, when

17 Spegelj is talking about the fact that they have 80.000 men who are armed

18 with Kalashnikov rifles and that he goes on to enumerate several more

19 thousand officers of the army of Yugoslavia who should be killed, and that

20 nobody should be allowed to reach the barracks alive, and so on and so

21 forth? You saw several of these excerpts. Are they falsified material?

22 Is it just propaganda on the part of the Federal Defence Secretariat or,

23 as you say, my propaganda? I saw this tape when you did yourself. But

24 quite obviously it was not a forgery of any kind. It wasn't a falsified

25 tape. Do you still claim that it is a forgery?

Page 13682












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Page 13683

1 A. At that time we all believed in it, and I did too. We all

2 believed that it was the truth and that there would be a great pogrom and

3 slaughterhouse of the Serbs slaughtered by the Croatian authorities. I

4 just said that Spegelj himself, publicly, or rather, the Croatian

5 government, denied some of the allegations from this film, this tape.

6 Now, whether it's a forgery or not, and the background of it and how it

7 came into existence, I really can't say. I don't know. I just spoke

8 about the effect it had on the Serbs in Krajina and in Knin specifically.

9 Q. In the film about Spegelj, there was no mention made of Knin at

10 all. Knin was not mentioned at all, and your assertions, your claims that

11 in the Spegelj film it was rigged to the effect that Spegelj was

12 threatening the Serbs in Knin is not true?

13 A. Whether Boljkovac or Spegelj was speaking, it was a conversation

14 between Spegelj and Boljkovac. That's what it was.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, what Mr. Milosevic said is not

16 correct. What we played here in the courtroom was actually someone

17 referring to Knin and that the people should be slaughtered there.

18 JUDGE MAY: I don't recollect that, but no doubt you can refer us

19 to the passage.

20 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Very well. Now, do you consider that the events at the Miljevacki

23 Plateau and Maslenica Bridge in Rani Koperi [phoen], in Peruca, Zemunik,

24 Borovo Selo, the Medak pocket, Gospic, Pakrac, Petrinja, Vukovar, and then

25 the Storm and Flash Operations, were they forgeries too, or, as you are

Page 13684

1 saying, for the most part --

2 JUDGE MAY: No. That's not a sensible question. How can they be

3 forgeries? It's no good running together a series of events and then

4 trying to ask a question about them. Rephrase that in relation to one

5 particular matter. What do you want to ask the witness? And then we'll

6 adjourn.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Well, I want to ask him how he can claim that the Serbs in Croatia

9 were disturbed through propaganda put out from Belgrade and not by the

10 actual events that took place, the arrests that took place, the killings

11 that took place, the discrimination, the dismissal from jobs, the

12 pressures exerted on the them, and everything that happened to them under

13 the impact of the new Croatian authorities from the moment they came on

14 the scene, and even before that, in that wave of nationalism that engulfed

15 Croatia.

16 A. The Serbs were afraid. They were afraid of the intentions of the

17 Croatian government and the intentions, as you yourself represented them

18 as being. Secondly, because of the incidents that you implemented and the

19 counterreaction on the part of the Croatian government to those events and

20 the war that you waged, and the fear for reprisals.

21 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. It's after a quarter

22 past.

23 Yes, Mr. Nice.

24 MR. NICE: Just a small administrative matter. The witness lists

25 served last week has had to be changed to a limited degree because of

Page 13685

1 witnesses not being available, so there will be a further letter available

2 for the accused by the close of this morning's session. It's going to be

3 very helpful to us to know whether there's going to be any time for

4 witnesses on Friday, and the earlier we can know that, the better we can

5 plan to ensure that your time is fully used.

6 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

7 Yes. We'll adjourn now, 20 minutes.

8 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume we are in open session,

12 Mr. May.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. In your interview with the investigators, you emphasised several

16 times that you were making your own free interpretations. I was able to

17 see this from the tapes that were played. Is that right?

18 A. I was answering questions.

19 Q. Well, when you say you are making free interpretations, does that

20 mean that you don't remember everything with precision? Because you were

21 testifying about events that took place 12 years ago.

22 A. I was saying things that I remembered with precision, and also my

23 views of events in retrospect, from a distance. But I was expected

24 primarily to speak about things I remember from those days.

25 Q. Very well. You claim that I was in command of the Yugoslav

Page 13686

1 People's Army, and do you know who was the Supreme Commander of the

2 Yugoslav People's Army in 1990 and 1991? And then we'll move on.

3 A. In formal and legal terms, it -- the supreme commander should have

4 been the Presidency of the SFRY. However, I understood that as of July

5 1991, you took over the Supreme Command over the Yugoslav People's Army

6 and that you were in command of it through the Presidency, the Rump

7 Presidency of Yugoslavia, and I had information that you had direct

8 contacts with the General Staff, the Generals Kadijevic and Jovic.

9 Q. You mentioned Generals Kadijevic and Jovic?

10 A. I beg your pardon. I meant Adzic, Kadijevic and Adzic.

11 Q. Very well. Do you know that before I took over my post there was

12 a command staff of the army which reached these high ranks of generals and

13 colonels and who constituted this top leadership of the army?

14 A. And what is the question?

15 Q. This entire structure that you are referring to was established

16 before I came into office.

17 A. As far as I know, General Kadijevic, in 1990, was the Federal

18 Secretary for National Defence, and in 1991, I know that General Adzic was

19 Chief of Staff of the JNA. The President of the Presidency, Borisav

20 Jovic, he was in office until May 1991. Cedo Bajramovic, I think, was

21 elected --

22 Q. Very well. We don't have to be so specific about those dates.

23 A. Branko Kostic was elected to the Presidency at the end of May

24 1991. So those were the men who, as of May 1991, that is, Branko Kostic,

25 Borisav Jovic, Nedo Bajramovic, and Jugoslav Kostic were members of the

Page 13687

1 Presidency of Yugoslavia. And as of October 1991, they became the Rump

2 Presidency because certain members did not take part in the work of the

3 Presidency. Members of the Presidency from other republics did not take

4 part. So together with you, that was the Supreme Command of the JNA.

5 Q. Do you know that when those military districts were formed in

6 Yugoslavia, there was a total of four strategic groups, or army districts,

7 the commanders in three of them were Croats: General Spegelj, General

8 Lukasic [phoen], General Grubesic, and only in one was General Avramovic a

9 Serb, and the air force and anti-aircraft defence was also headed by a

10 Croat, Tus. Do you remember that?

11 A. I remember the people I spoke about here. Who was in those

12 positions before that, I don't know all of them. I met General Raseta the

13 commander of the Zagreb Corps, of the Knin Corps. I know that in the Knin

14 Corps, the commander was a Macedonian, the Chief of Staff was a Slovene,

15 the head of artillery was a Croat. But in the course of the summer of

16 1991, Serbs took over all those positions.

17 Q. Do you know that from the moment of the armed secession in

18 Slovenia and Croatia, the commander of the military district in Zagreb,

19 whose area of responsibility covered Slovenia and most of Croatia and part

20 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the general in charge was Konrad Kolsek?

21 A. I know from the media that that was his position. But I know of

22 General Raseta, who I don't know whether he was a deputy or was in the

23 staff.

24 Q. I'm asking you about the command of the military district. At the

25 same time, command of the 1st Military District in Belgrade, the largest

Page 13688

1 military district, was headed by a Macedonian, Aleksandar Spirkovski?

2 A. I know that General Spekovski was commander in Knin for a while,

3 and later he took up duty in Belgrade. Which, I don't know.

4 Q. And do you know that the commander of the air force and the

5 anti-aircraft defence after General Tus, another Croat took over, Colonel

6 Zvonko Jurjevic?

7 A. I heard of those two generals from the media. I don't know the

8 exact time periods when they were in office.

9 Q. Do you know that Kadijevic, Brovet and Adzic, and the others that

10 you listed, were not cadres from Serbia?

11 A. I know from stories that General Kadijevic came -- was a native of

12 Imotski, and General Adzic from Herzegovina.

13 Q. Is it then logical and normal to conclude that I was not the one

14 who was appointing these people to leading positions of the Yugoslav

15 People's Army, as it was still at the time?

16 A. You asked me in July 1991 where you should deploy the army. You

17 asked me where you should deploy it. So you were speaking as if you were

18 the commander of the army.

19 Q. That is not true.

20 A. That is true.

21 Q. You can say that whatever you like as being the truth, but I'm

22 saying that that is not true. And there are a whole series of positions

23 in the army held by people who took over those positions before I was

24 elected.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to stop you. The witness has

Page 13689












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Page 13690

1 given his evidence. You contradict it. You claim that it's not right.

2 Now, there's no point going over the evidence to try and establish your

3 point. You can call evidence in due course, but it will be for the Trial

4 Chamber to determine where the truth lies. There's little point arguing

5 whether he's telling the truth or not.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Very well. Is it true that as early as 1990 -- is it true that as

8 early as 1990, the president of the Presidency was a Slovene, Janez

9 Drnovsek?

10 A. Until the 15th of May, 1990, I think it was Drnovsek who was

11 president of the Presidency. I know from the media reports.

12 Q. And in 1990 and 1991, when you say I was in command of the army,

13 there was a presidency headed, in addition to Drnovsek, for a time by

14 Stipe Mesic?

15 A. From May 1990 until the end of May - I don't know the exact date,

16 whether it was May or June 1991 - the president of the Presidency was

17 Borisav Jovic, and after the crisis over the election of the president of

18 the Presidency, it was Stipe Mesic, until the autumn. I don't know

19 exactly until when, the autumn of 1991, when he ceased to be that, or

20 rather, when Croatia became independent.

21 Q. Very well then, do you know that there was a Federal Secretary for

22 National Defence who was Veljko Kadijevic in that period, who was also a

23 cadre from Croatia in the top army leadership at the time?

24 A. Yes, I do know that. I met him personally, at the end of

25 November, maybe December, in 1991, when he said that the JNA, in

Page 13691

1 connection with Vance's plan regarding withdrawal from Croatia, that the

2 JNA would comply with the political decision.

3 Q. So he told you what was right. And do you know that in the course

4 of the whole of 1991, they were major provocations and mistreatment of

5 individuals, units, and facilities of the JNA in Croatia? So I'm not

6 talking exclusively about Krajina. I'm talking about the whole of Croatia

7 now.

8 A. The crisis started in January 1991, after the SFRY Presidency had

9 taken a decision on the disarming of paramilitary units in Croatia and

10 after the Spegelj affair was revealed and broadcast by the media, arrests

11 started. The JNA, or rather, the institutions, the competent institutions

12 of the JNA, would issue indictments and start proceedings against

13 individual officials of the government of Croatia. I think two of them

14 were put on trial, but Spegelj was not accessible. And from that moment

15 on, demonstrations started in Croatia against the JNA. Later on there

16 were blockages of barracks, and in August an open war started between the

17 JNA and armed formations of the Croatian government.

18 Q. And are you aware of the attempts of the Presidency of SFRY to

19 halt the escalation, for example, at a meeting on the 22nd of July, that

20 was also attended by Tudjman, the demand was made to cease all

21 hostilities?

22 A. I know that a cessation of hostilities had been agreed on, that a

23 commission was formed, headed by Branko Kostic, and that commission, and

24 members of that commission would go to Croatia, to Krajina, and to

25 Slovenia to insist on respect for the truth.

Page 13692

1 Q. Do you know that the first serious conflict between JNA units and

2 National Guards occurred in Dalj on the 1st of August, 1991?

3 A. I know that there was fighting in Dalj. Exactly who was there, I

4 don't know.

5 Q. The National Guards, were they a paramilitary unit?

6 A. The National Guards Corps, the ZNG, were an armed formation of the

7 Republic of Croatia.

8 Q. And do you know that Vladimir Seks, president of the Crisis Staff

9 for Eastern Slavonia and Baranja in August 1991 informed the public that

10 units of the JNA would no longer be supplied with electricity, water,

11 food, et cetera?

12 A. I am aware of those events. And it wasn't just Seks who spoke

13 about that, but others as well. Others were saying that too, from the

14 Croatian authorities, and that is what they did.

15 Q. And is it true that military facilities and units were constantly

16 exposed to armed provocations and attacks?

17 A. First there was a blockade, and I'm not aware of the situation

18 with all the facilities, but I do know that the JNA facilities were

19 blocked in Sibenik, Zadar, Sinj, Split. There were media reports about

20 the events in Varazdin, Bjelovar, then also there were television reports

21 over demonstrations and blockades of the barracks in Zagreb.

22 Q. You just mentioned a series of towns all over Croatia, and was it

23 obvious that the suspension of supplies for barracks and other military

24 facilities and constant attacks called in question the very physical

25 survival of members of the JNA?

Page 13693

1 A. There was a blockade. What the exact situation was inside the

2 barracks, I don't know, but I do know that they were blocked.

3 Q. Do you believe that JNA units were forced to break through, to get

4 out of that blockade, and to respond to such attacks?

5 A. As far as I know, some JNA units undertook to deblock those

6 garrisons, as in Zadar, for example. The deblocking of the garrison in

7 Sibenik, and the JNA would announce those actions taken against the

8 Croatian guards, and they were explained by the need to deblock those

9 barracks. But I don't know exactly what happened.

10 Q. Do you believe that the explanation that it was essential to

11 deblock the garrisons that were blocked was a correct explanation, or was

12 it a fabricated one?

13 A. That was the explanation of the JNA.

14 Q. And do you know that finally in November 1991, when all those

15 barracks all over Croatia were blocked, and when clashes broke out, an

16 agreement was signed in Igalo on the cessation of hostilities and on the

17 need for all sides to cease all armed actions of all kinds for people to

18 be able to sit around a table and find a peaceful solution, in the

19 presence of Lord Carrington, in November 1991, in Igalo?

20 A. As far as I know, there were many agreements on the cessation of

21 hostilities. The last, I suppose, was agreed in Sarajevo, and you took

22 part in some of those, I think the agreement in Geneva, which was

23 mentioned in those days, and your approval of the Vance Plan. That also

24 implied a cessation of hostilities.

25 Q. But the agreement in November occurred prior to these questions

Page 13694

1 that we have discussed the link to the Vance Plan. I should now like to

2 play an audio cassette which you call an intercepted conversation, simply

3 for you to see to what extent it confirms how correct what I am saying is.

4 It is in the technical booth. Could it be played please. It is a

5 conversation between the then Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and the

6 Federal Secretary for National Defence, General Kadijevic.

7 [Intercept played]

8 THE INTERPRETER: I'm afraid the interpreters do not have a text

9 and the sound is very bad.

10 [Voiceover] They're always looking for a way of blaming others for

11 what he has done. Can peace be established or not? If it can be stopped

12 until 10 hours, and secondly, if the military barracks can be deblocked

13 and everything else by 12.00, if that is done, then after that we can

14 continue what we have started. If that cannot be done, then the two of us

15 will no longer hear one another. We'll not be in contact any more. You

16 know what we should perhaps do? Maybe we should try that -- before we get

17 together by fax to confirm, because of Croatia, a written truce, which

18 means an agreement that would deal with the army in the way that suits the

19 sovereign Croatian authorities and it's also in the interest of the army.

20 Does that mean, Franjo, that you put what is second in first place and

21 vice versa? No. We have agreed with Carrington on the order of things.

22 If we haven't let stop -- discontinue any further conversation. What if

23 we are unable to achieve that? What do you mean if we're not able to

24 achieve that? If in Sibenik things worsen. I can guarantee that not a

25 single bullet will be fired. We have the deadline up to 10.00, 1000

Page 13695

1 hours. Let fire be ceased, deblocking by 12.00. We will continue this

2 conversation tomorrow. A solution must be found. If you agree. If you

3 are not capable of doing that, say so. It's up to you. Then everyone

4 will go back to his own positions and we'll see what will happen. Then

5 there will be a disaster. Of course there will. I'm doing this for the

6 last time, for the last time, with the great responsibility that I bear,

7 and you also have that responsibility. The worst should be avoided. You

8 can avoid it by fulfilling each of these points. Today is the turning

9 point. I will do as much as I can. Stop these developments in Sibenik.

10 Cease fire everywhere and let the troops get water and food and everything

11 they need, and tomorrow we can sit at a table and talk openly about

12 everything. Otherwise we'll go back to hostilities. I think that is a

13 disaster. But I'm sure a solution can be found. If I didn't believe

14 that, I wouldn't be talking to you in this way. And I believe that you

15 are doing the same. Let's try. That would be disastrous. Stop the fire

16 in Sibenik by 1000 hours. Order a ceasefire. If you're not capable of

17 doing that -- if Letica is working over there, he's worse than that

18 Spegelj. You must do something about it. We'll see. I didn't mention

19 Grubesic as well. It's Grubesic, not Letica. Grubesic is not Letica.

20 He -- when he left, I knew that he wouldn't come back. That is up to him.

21 You conclude from that that this is generalised -- these feelings are

22 generalised. Well, if that is so, then go to war. I'm just asking for a

23 ceasefire, nothing more. What we have already signed, that's all. I'm

24 going to act along those lines. But you think of whether there's a way of

25 getting out of this hell. There must be an absolute ceasefire by 1000

Page 13696












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Page 13697

1 hours, absolute ceasefire, so that people can live. You must -- they must

2 be given water. They have to live. Would you let them die in that way?

3 And this thing that Anto Markovic is preparing, it's very dangerous, this

4 business. He's a son of a bitch that you know well. I've told you that

5 many times. Get hold of these two and then we've solved everything.

6 Because he wasn't there when the signature was required, because no one

7 is -- has any respect for him anyway. Okay. Goodbye.

8 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment, Mr. Milosevic.

9 First of all, our thanks to the interpreters for managing. Very

10 difficult.

11 Now, that's not a tape which has been produced so far, I take it.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, would you like that tape

14 exhibited? You've had it played. Very well. The next number, and we

15 will order a transcript for it.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That will be Defence Exhibit

17 62.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. There is no doubt that the conversation was conducted after a

20 meeting and the signing of an agreement on a cessation of hostilities with

21 Lord Carrington. There is also no doubt, this is indisputable, isn't it,


23 A. I did not take part in that agreement.

24 Q. Very well, then. Is it also clear that the conversation is being

25 conducted in connection with the generalised blockade of JNA barracks in

Page 13698

1 Croatia and that it relates to relationships between Croatia and the JNA?

2 A. From the conversation, one could conclude that they were referring

3 to the blockade of barracks, specifically, the one in Sibenik.

4 Q. They were also talking about other barracks, about the blocking of

5 barracks, about the fact that they are being cut off by refusing them

6 water and other supplies, and the request, as you can see, was made by

7 General Kadijevic only to respect the agreement made with the old, wise

8 Lord Carrington, as he put it; isn't that right?

9 A. Well, that was the contents of the conversation we heard.

10 Q. Is it then clear from this that General Kadijevic insists that any

11 solution is wiser than war, insisting that his barracks be deblocked? Did

12 you hear him say that?

13 A. Yes, I heard Kadijevic say so on the tape, something to that

14 effect.

15 Q. Did you hear Kadijevic guarantee that not a single bullet would be

16 fired if they would only stop shooting at the army? Did you hear him say

17 that?

18 A. Yes, I heard it on the tape.

19 Q. Did you hear him say: Once you stop, once we sign a ceasefire,

20 we'll sit around a table? Did you hear that?

21 A. I did.

22 Q. So who is working for a cessation of hostilities and for peace

23 there?

24 A. I know specifically about events related to the lifting of the

25 blockade of the barracks in Zadar from General Vukovic. I heard from him

Page 13699

1 about the way he accomplished that and his signing of an agreement with

2 the authorities in Zadar and the pulling out of troops from that barracks.

3 Q. Did you hear anything about the number of times that troops were

4 being shot at while being pulled out of their barracks?

5 A. No.

6 Q. You never heard of Sarajevo, Tuzla, about any other place in

7 Bosnia, when troops leaving in an orderly fashion their barracks, being

8 shot at?

9 A. I heard two things in media reports. One concerned a blockade of

10 a convoy of military equipment that was blocked by Croatian authorities,

11 and I heard about events in Sarajevo, when the staff of the 2nd Army was

12 leaving. I was told that by General Kukanjac, who spoke about that on

13 television.

14 Q. Let's talk about these other events, from the times which you

15 mention, calling it testimony. Is it true that in that period, in 1990

16 and 1991, the president -- or rather, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia was

17 Ante Markovic, a Croat?

18 A. I know that.

19 Q. And that Veljko Kadijevic, whom we heard on tape, was Minister of

20 Defence in his government?

21 A. Veljko Kadijevic was Federal Secretary of Defence.

22 Q. Do you know that in 1992 the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, when

23 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established, was Milan Panic, my

24 opponent?

25 A. There was talk in the media and in the public that you appointed

Page 13700

1 him to that position.

2 Q. Well, you know, he was my political opponent, that he was

3 supported by the then president of the SFRY, that he was also my rival at

4 elections for the president of Serbia in 1993?

5 A. According to statements one could hear at the time, he was

6 advocating peace, and that was the point of conflict between you and him.

7 Q. Let us then stick to what you say.

8 A. I heard about that at that time in the media and from rumours. I

9 have no personal, direct knowledge.

10 Q. I don't see how anyone can talk about something that they have no

11 personal knowledge about. I'm now asking you about various positions held

12 within the Yugoslav government: Minister of Defence, Prime Minister, et

13 cetera. What is the connection, then, of Serbia with the military

14 legislation, with rules of procedure, with transfers of people from one

15 place to another? You even brought here, as some kind of document, a

16 paper referring to a woman from your bureau being allocated for temporary

17 employment in a military-medical section, probably to keep records about

18 refugees, the wounded from Krajina. What has that got to do with

19 decision-making in Serbia, the transfer of some woman from your bureau to

20 the military medical academy, an army medical institution, and God knows

21 what else you brought here among those papers?

22 A. Two things I want to say, beginning with July 1991. I realised,

23 and you told me, that you are the Supreme Command of the JNA, and the

24 staff of the Supreme Command consisted of the General Staff and the

25 Defence Secretary. And you were also member of the supreme military

Page 13701

1 council of the FRY and the de facto leader of that council. In addition

2 to Zoran Lilic, who was your yes-man. I don't know how long Bulatovic was

3 a figure there.

4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters couldn't hear the accused.

5 A. I don't know when you replaced him.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Do you know when Lilic became president of the Federal Republic of

8 Yugoslavia?

9 A. After you replaced Dobrica Cosic.

10 Q. And do you know that it was in 1993 that he assumed this position?

11 A. That's when you replaced Dobrica Cosic.

12 Q. I'm not talking about the replacement of Dobrica Cosic. I'm

13 telling you that Lilic became president of the FRY in 1993 and that his

14 term of office was until midsummer 1997, for four years.

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. So Dobrica Cosic was president until mid-1993, this yes-man of

17 mine that you mentioned. All these events that you're testifying to

18 happened before 1993, wherein I am the commander of the army, as you put

19 it.

20 A. You asked me a question from the period when the SFRY existed and

21 some questions about FRY.

22 Q. I was asking you about things from 1990, 1991, until 1993. When

23 was I commander?

24 A. You commanded from July 1991, using your personal clout over the

25 General Staff --

Page 13702

1 Q. Judging by what you say, it was I who explained to you that I have

2 influence over the General Staff. Is that what you're saying?

3 A. You asked several questions. In fact, you noted several things

4 first, one of them being: Until July 1991, although it was also in 1990,

5 that you were saying that you would protect us, that JNA would protect our

6 right to stay within Yugoslavia and guarantee that right of ours. In July

7 1991, you came forward with a question: Where should you deploy the army?

8 That means that from that moment on, you showed that you were able to

9 command the army and that you were commanding it, as of that moment. As

10 for the Presidency of Yugoslavia, it was partly disabled, that is, the

11 Presidency was normally made up of eight members, and starting with

12 October there were only four left. The JNA got involved in military

13 actions, or rather, started the war in Croatia, in October, and until

14 then, on orders from the Presidency, or even only on the initiative of

15 Borisav Jovic, because he said the JNA, as decided by him, got involved in

16 Pakrac. Anyway, as of July, together with Kostic, Cedo Bajramovic, you

17 were the commander of the JNA, and Veljko Kadijevic and Adzic were the men

18 whom you controlled in the General Staff of the Supreme Command.

19 Q. MILAN BABIC, you know for how long this Presidency was disabled,

20 precisely because four members voted always against the other four

21 members, and they were never able to make a decision.

22 A. That Presidency made a decision to introduce a state of immediate

23 threat of war. I don't know how many members were active at that time,

24 but it was made in October 1991. And that decision was followed by

25 adoption of some new rules that enabled the remaining four members to

Page 13703












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13 English transcripts.













Page 13704

1 command the army in the absence of the other four, and you were the boss

2 of the remaining four.

3 Q. You know that it was a time when Yugoslavia was being exhausted

4 and tortured under the pressure of great powers, and as for your claim

5 that I commanded the army, I wish I had. We would have been able to avoid

6 the war.

7 A. You were the one deploying the JNA troops as of October 1991.

8 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to intervene to say this: We've been over

9 this point really for some time. The witness has explained why he has

10 come to the conclusion which he did, and it will be for us to determine on

11 the evidence. Now, I don't think we should spend more time going over the

12 same point.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] All right. All right.

14 Q. I think that your explanations, judging from the tape of your

15 interviews with investigators and the lady on the opposite side,

16 explanations related to the appointment of General Mrksic, as commander of

17 the Serbian army of Krajina, these explanations would very graphically

18 show how riddled with contradictions they are with your own personal

19 statements and with other facts as well.

20 JUDGE MAY: If you want to put a specific point, you can. It

21 sounds as though it's a point which should be put in private session. But

22 you can't make generalisations of the sort so far that you are making.

23 If you want to make a specific point about this, it sounds as though we

24 should go into private session.

25 We'll go into private session.

Page 13705

1 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

2 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

3 JUDGE MAY: What's the point that you want to make to the

4 witness? Because so far it's so generalised, it's not to be worth very

5 much.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, are we in private session

7 now?

8 JUDGE MAY: We're in private session, yes.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here, during examination-in-chief,

10 the witness told us one version of the alleged meeting he had with me,

11 related to his request for a new commander of the Serbian army of

12 Krajina. You will now see the first version, which is brief, and you will

13 then see the second version, also his, and we'll see how it actually

14 happened, and then I'll ask him some questions.

15 I would kindly ask you to play that tape. It is your own tape

16 from the interview with MILAN BABIC, when he speaks of a meeting with me, when

17 Prime Minister Mikelic attended, he and Minister of Foreign Affairs, none

18 of them being competent to discuss the issues at hand, and he came to me

19 to request a new commander of the Serbian army of Krajina, and you will

20 see what it looked like.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can we please have the date of

22 the tape so that we can find the transcript?

23 JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we can --

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 19th February.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let us have the passage played.

Page 13706

1 [Videotape played]

2 "MILAN BABIC ... took place. I have no assertions concerning

3 this. I would like to give this my free interpretation. So Mikelic had

4 prepared an information on the situation. He prepared a speech. Then he

5 read out this lengthy speech, study. I don't know -- I cannot remember

6 exactly what he read out, because he was always very lengthy, went into

7 great detail. Nor do I remember exactly what he concretely said in that

8 speech of his. But what I do remember is the following scene: At a

9 certain point, Milosevic said, "Wait a minute, please," and he moved to

10 the other room, where his desk is, and to the inner office. And he stayed

11 there a short time, I believe, probably a minute, a couple of minutes. So

12 he went out and he was absent a few minutes. And he came back and he

13 said, more or less, 'The new commander will be Mile Mrksic.' Now, some

14 two or three years ago I talked about this event with [redacted].

15 "MR. HARDIN: Before you go into that, let's finish first with

16 what was said in the meeting.

17 "MILAN BABIC: Well, this is in connection with the meeting,

18 but ...

19 "MR. HARDIN: I know, but I mean within the meeting itself. What

20 else was said in the meeting?

21 "MILAN BABIC: I don't remember anything in particular. So I

22 remember that when we were going out, exiting, there was Goran Hadzic, and

23 I think he was there at that meeting. And I think it was on that

24 occasion, because there was no other such occasion that I could have

25 witnessed it. He said, 'Mr.. President, can I remain with you, the two of

Page 13707

1 us alone, for a short while?' Then we went out in the hall. He stayed

2 there a short time and then he came out after us. That is what I remember

3 of that scene and that meeting.

4 "MR. HARDIN: Okay. Do you know if Milosevic mentioned during the

5 meeting -- had he talked to anybody about the selection of Mrksic?

6 "MILAN BABIC: This is what I wanted to say.

7 "MR. HARDIN: Okay. Just a minute. Okay. Okay. Just a

8 minute.

9 "MILAN BABIC: I don't remember whether he said it.

10 "MR. HARDIN: Okay. Subsequent to the meeting, did Mile Mrksic

11 become the commander?

12 "MILAN BABIC: Yes. The Assembly approved his appointment at the

13 end of May of that year. I don't remember what the exact proceeding,

14 procedure was, but he did become the commander.

15 "MR. HARDIN: Okay. Go ahead.

16 "MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Let me ask: Why were you there? You are

17 not involved with military. Why were you there?

18 "MILAN BABIC: No. I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

19 Mikelic formed the delegation.

20 "MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you run the delegation when you were

21 there? Did you have your own proposal who you wanted to be the commander?

22 "MILAN BABIC: Personally, no, but -- and I don't remember that

23 any one of us spoke about that.

24 "MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Did you -- did any of you, when

25 Mr. Milosevic said he, this guy Mile Mrksic, is the commander, did anyone

Page 13708

1 respond to that? Did you say either say, 'Well, great,' or did you oppose

2 it? [Inaudible].

3 "MILAN BABIC: I don't remember. Probably no. I don't know. I

4 can't remember when and where, but it was after this meeting that

5 somewhere Martic told me. It was after this meeting. I was in some

6 company, with people. I can't remember [inaudible] that Jovica Stanisic

7 went and had a talk with General Celeketic. I remember that I heard this.

8 Somebody conveyed it to me. This was a piece of information which remains

9 something interesting to me, and that's why I remember it, but I cannot

10 remember under what circumstances I heard that.

11 "MR. HARDIN: When you guys went to the meeting with Mikelic, did

12 he make a proposal for someone to be the commander?

13 "MILAN BABIC: I couldn't -- I cannot remember.

14 "MR. HARDIN: You don't recall if any names were discussed?

15 "MILAN BABIC: No, I don't think that any names were being

16 discussed. Well ...

17 "THE INTERPRETER: Could you ask him to repeat that?

18 "MR. HARDIN: Yes. You need to repeat.

19 "MILAN BABIC: Yes. [redacted]

20 [redacted], about this event, he mentioned that the

21 Supreme Defence -- that Milosevic mentioned that the Supreme Defence

22 Council has -- had chosen, had appointed this man. And he probably

23 thought of the Supreme Defence Council of Yugoslavia, that he was there,

24 that it was agreed that Mrksic become the commander, but I personally do

25 not recall that.

Page 13709

1 "MR. HARDIN: Okay.

2 "MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Is Mrksic from the Krajina?

3 "MILAN BABIC: It was said that he was -- he had his roots in

4 Kordun. Whether he was born in Kordun or whether his -- the previous

5 generations came from Kordun --"

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can go on. You have the tape,

7 and I don't think it's necessary.

8 JUDGE MAY: We need to finish the topic.

9 [Videotape played].

10 MILAN BABIC: Yes. That is what was said, that he's a member of

11 the JNA. I cannot remember whether that was being said then or later.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The army of the Krajina, didn't they have any

13 candidate that could fulfil this position?

14 MILAN BABIC: I don't know.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And this --

16 MILAN BABIC: Well, the Supreme Council of Defence of Krajina

17 could probably discuss that, but whether they discussed it or not, I do

18 not know, and I was not a member of this body.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And this General Celeketic, was he also a

20 member of the Yugoslav army?

21 JUDGE MAY: That seems to be moving on to another topic. We'll

22 finish it. Yes.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll come back to this topic, but I

24 think that the questions which I am able to ask this witness in connection

25 to the tape can be asked in open session, because they -- the audience

Page 13710

1 can't see the tape. So can I ask my questions in open session?

2 JUDGE MAY: It depends whether you can ask them without referring

3 to the tape, since the tape has been played in private session, any

4 reference to it or anything referring to his responses, possibly need

5 playing. Let me consider that.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. On reflection, there's no secrecy about the fact

8 that there was an interview, as I recollect. The only matter which is

9 secret is the identity of the witness, and therefore, that was the reason

10 that the tapes were played in private session.

11 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, that's right, isn't it? There's no reason why

12 the questions about the content of the interview can't be asked in open

13 session, provided they don't identify the witness?

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And what also should not be identified is

15 that it was a suspect interview, because that was discussed in private

16 session, that it was a suspect interview.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, it can be referred to as an interview with

18 the Office of the Prosecutor.

19 Mr. Milosevic, you get that? So no reference to -- which might

20 identify him, and it can only be referred to as an interview with the

21 Prosecution.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to refer back to it.

23 JUDGE MAY: No, but just refer to it as an interview. Don't

24 describe it any more fully. So that what you can't say is that it was a

25 suspect interview. That's the point.

Page 13711












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13 English transcripts.













Page 13712

1 Yes. Let's go into open session.

2 [Open session]

3 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Is it clear from the tape that has been played, from this

6 interview, that the delegation, or rather, the members of the delegation,

7 its structure, was not in conformity with the alleged subject that you

8 were alluding to?

9 A. The Prime Minister was a member of the supreme council of defence

10 of Krajina, and you couldn't see this on the tape, but he had his own

11 proposal as to the command of the Serbian army of the RSK, Milan Novakovic

12 was mentioned, but very briefly.

13 Q. That's not what I'm asking you now. Please answer my questions

14 and we'll get to that. We'll come to that part of the tape in due course

15 to see the contradictions that you stated in respect of what you're

16 saying.

17 Did you happen to note, to notice, that you yourself speak about a

18 long speech made by your head of delegation, which was made up in the way

19 it was? Isn't that right? There was a long address made by him.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you said that you couldn't remember to what it referred, to

22 what it was all about, but that you assumed that he touched upon many

23 vital issues for the economic, political, public life of Krajina, and

24 cooperation with Serbia, and so on and so forth?

25 A. At that point in time, the priorities discussed were the events in

Page 13713

1 Western Slavonia, the Croatian Flash operation, the exodus of the

2 population, the question of the army, of the RSK, to stand up to the

3 Croatian army. So at that time, those were the main topics discussed.

4 Q. All right. You said a moment ago that you can't remember at all

5 what was said in, as you termed it, the very long speech made by the head

6 of your delegation.

7 A. I said what the priorities were of the discussions at that time.

8 Q. So you consider those to be priorities indirectly?

9 A. Yes, because that was the only specific topic discussed at the

10 meeting.

11 Q. All right. Very well. Now, is it clear from the interview that

12 you asked me a question, and that question was whether I knew anything

13 about the newly appointed commander of the Serbian army of Krajina?

14 A. I don't understand your question.

15 Q. Well, you asked whether I knew who was going to be appointed,

16 because it didn't come under your competency. I assume it was the

17 competency of the President of the Republic, or rather, your Supreme

18 Defence Council and the president of your republic. Isn't that correct?

19 A. As far as I know, linked to that event, in his presentation, the

20 Prime Minister mentioned one name, and that was the name of General Mile

21 Novakovic.

22 Q. Wait a minute. I'm asking you about your own interview. In the

23 whole of your interview, you never said that. You never stated that.

24 What you said was that I told you to wait and that I went into my office

25 to speak over the telephone, which means I went to ask, I went to inquire

Page 13714

1 of somebody who was supposed to know about those matters.

2 A. I said what my knowledge was in concrete terms about the event.

3 Q. Well, I told you to wait. I went into my office to ask and

4 inquire, because you had asked me something that I wasn't able to answer

5 myself at that point, so I went to inquire.

6 A. You had determined that General Mile Mrksic should be the new

7 commander of the RSK army.

8 Q. All right. If you drew that conclusion yourself, your interview

9 speaks otherwise. But let's move on to the next question.

10 In the interview, did you happen to notice that you were first

11 asked by the lady sitting opposite whether you had a proposal to make of

12 any kind? Isn't that right? And your answer was that you did not.

13 A. Well, I didn't remember everything on that occasion and all the

14 details at that particular point.

15 Q. All right. I'm just talking about what we all had occasion to see

16 a moment ago. Then the investigator went on to ask you whether you had

17 discussed any of the proposals before the meeting, and your answer there

18 again was no, that you did not, that you had not. And then once again the

19 lady opposite went on to ask you: Did you not have in Krajina somebody

20 who could be put forward as a candidate? And your answer to that question

21 too was no; no, you did not.

22 A. I don't know.

23 Q. Yes. You said you didn't know. So you were asked three times in

24 the course of the interview whether you had a candidate, whether you

25 discussed a candidate, whether any names were mentioned; and your answer

Page 13715

1 to all three questions was that you did not remember, that you do not

2 know, and that no names were mentioned, that you don't know if there was a

3 candidate or not, et cetera.

4 A. I remembered the names subsequently.

5 Q. We'll come to that. We'll come that part of the tape where you

6 remembered and the circumstances under which you remembered, but that's

7 another matter for the moment.

8 Then you go on to say that you heard from - I don't want to

9 identify the person. I suppose that is not allowed either - that this

10 took place at the Supreme Defence Council for the defence of Yugoslavia.

11 Well, all right. At that Supreme Defence Council meeting, in view of the

12 fact that I'm a member of the Supreme Defence Council, would we be able to

13 assume that I know about that and that I don't have to go and tell you:

14 Wait a moment, for me to go and ring somebody up and inquire and then come

15 back to you and give you an answer as to what it was.

16 JUDGE MAY: That was what the witness said happened. Now,

17 explanations you can give in due course, if you want. But assist us with

18 this: In that part of the interview, there was no mention of Novakovic;

19 rather, you said there wasn't a candidate. Now, if you want to give an

20 explanation of why you said that, you should be able to do so.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He will have an opportunity of --

22 Mr. May, to save time, I'm going to --

23 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to show you a part of the

25 tape on which you will see how this actually happened. So I do have an

Page 13716

1 answer for you, on the basis of what he said.

2 JUDGE MAY: Let him give his explanation now. The matter is being

3 put to him. He should be entitled to answer.

4 Yes. Can you give us -- if you want to, give a brief explanation.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that moment when I was asked, I

6 didn't remember all the details. I just remembered the main event.

7 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

8 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we able to conclude, therefore,

10 that in that interview you were asked three times: Twice by the lady

11 sitting opposite and once by the investigator, whether you had a proposal,

12 whether any proposal was discussed, whether it was possible that there was

13 no solution in Krajina itself, suitable solution, but that you had to go

14 to Belgrade; and to all those questions your answer was negative: No, no,

15 and I don't remember?

16 Q. Isn't that so?

17 A. I wasn't in the structures that decided on issues at that time, at

18 that stage.

19 Q. You weren't afterwards either?

20 A. Not in that stage.

21 Q. You don't even know whether Mrksic was from Krajina. You said

22 that he might have been born there.

23 A. People said that he was born in Kordun, that his origins were in

24 Kordun. What that meant -- whether he was born there or his parents were

25 born there, I don't know what that means.

Page 13717

1 Q. Well, I originated from Pozarevac, which means I was born in

2 Pozarevac, and not that some of my people were born in Pozarevac. I am a

3 native of Pozarevac, which means I was born there.

4 Now, do you know that he was born in Vrginmost, or rather, the

5 Vrginmost municipality, that he completed elementary school there and

6 indeed secondary school as well, on that territory, and that he only left

7 the Republic of Croatia when he enrolled in the military academy, like

8 anybody else who enrolls in the military academy, because the academy is

9 located in Belgrade? At least it was in Yugoslavia, in the Yugoslavia of

10 the day, the one in which Mrksic lived. So not only was he a native of

11 the area, but he lived there right up until the time when he left to

12 attend his higher education at the military academy, and that was the

13 profession he had chosen. He was a man from Krajina.

14 A. He didn't know about those details.

15 Q. Well, fine. You didn't know those details, but you do know the

16 other details that you cannot recollect.

17 Now, the second part of this same conversation held on the same

18 day, but I do wish to draw your attention to the fact that you will see at

19 the very beginning that a different story is being told now, after a break

20 for lunch and after the witness was warned that he hadn't done his

21 homework properly and now he has to tell a different story. So we'll now

22 hear that different story after the instructor gave him instructions as to

23 how he should tell that story. So please play that second excerpt.

24 JUDGE MAY: We'll certainly do that. We'll come back to any

25 allegations that you are making and explore what they are.

Page 13718












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Page 13719

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. And I would like to object against this

2 way that he actually indicates there was an instructor telling him what he

3 has to tell.

4 JUDGE MAY: No. He can put it to the witness in due course. Yes,

5 a matter for the witness.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge May, please.

7 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry. Let's play the tape. The witness, in due

8 course -- private session. The witness, in due course, can deal with

9 these allegations that are being made.

10 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

11 THE REGISTRAR: Okay. We're in private session.

12 [Videotape played]

13 "MR. HARDIN: The time is approximately 1422 --"

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please -- I apologise for the

15 interruption. Will you stop, please. I asked you to start this second

16 clip from 1249, 12 hours, 49 minutes, please, and not 1422 minutes, as it

17 says on the tape. You have the time indicated in the top left-hand

18 corner. From 1249, please.

19 It is indicative of what I am saying and claiming, and it takes

20 very little time, because in the meantime there was a lunch break.

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't understand why this is

23 taking so long. It was just a minute prior to what was played a moment

24 ago.

25 [Videotape played]

Page 13720

1 "MR. HARDIN: The time right now is approximately 1422, on the

2 19th of February. We just had a lunch break. And Mr. Babic, I need to

3 remind you of your warnings again. Do you have any questions about your

4 warnings?


6 "MR. HARDIN: Okay. All right. I will move on to the area of

7 Western Slavonia.

8 "MR. MUELLER: Let him make a short remark, please, he's going to

9 make a short remark.

10 "MR. HARDIN: Apparently you wanted to say something, according to

11 Mr. Mueller.

12 "MR. MUELLER: But short, but short, please.

13 "MILAN BABIC: Yes, in reference to our previous talks concerning

14 my meetings with Mr. Milosevic. And when I spoke of that meeting in May

15 1995 with Milosevic, I remembered, in connection with one of your

16 questions, whether the people from -- the members of the delegation from

17 Krajina, whether they have any proposals, names for a new commander of the

18 army of Serbian Krajina, I remember, I recollect, and I can answer yes,

19 there was this proposal. Borislav Mikelic asked that the newly appointed

20 commander be Mile Novakovic, General Mile Novakovic. Then Milosevic made

21 a negative comment in connection with this person and stopped this

22 discussion.

23 Secondly, what I would like to add --"

24 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll stop the playing.

Page 13721

1 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You've got a minute or two more, and then if

2 you're going to suggest that this witness has been instructed in some way,

3 you must do so.

4 And we'll go back into open session. We are in open --

5 [Open session]

6 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.


8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. In this interview, do we see that there was a lunch break after a

10 certain period of time and that after that lunch break the investigator

11 asks his collocutor, in this case Witness Croat MILAN BABIC, whether he has

12 anything to add, and he says that he hasn't? And then we see his

13 representative, attorney, telling him - his legal representative - that he

14 has something to say, that he has forgotten to say something. I don't

15 want to mention the name of his legal representative, as this is the only

16 witness we have had so far with an attorney sitting in the courtroom while

17 he's testifying. And then he makes a statement that he has remembered.

18 So during the lunch break he remembered something that he answered three

19 times in the negative, that he didn't know and that couldn't remember,

20 that he suddenly remembered.

21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've just seen all of this. Why don't

22 you come to the point?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The point is that those two

24 statements are in complete contradiction with one another, Mr. May.

25 JUDGE MAY: The question is: How did the witness come to make the

Page 13722

1 second statement? That's the question.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume, and I'm asking him: Did

3 that happen because in the meantime he was advised and cautioned that he

4 hadn't said what had been planned for him to say and that he hadn't

5 answered three questions - two put by the lady opposite and one by the

6 investigator - that he had answered no, but really he should have said

7 yes, and he should have offered, proffered, a name which now his legal

8 representative had to remind him to give that name after the lunch break.

9 So he is correcting himself because suddenly his memory has been

10 refreshed, so he now has a completely different story.

11 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer the question. Let the witness

12 answer what's being put to him.

13 You've heard what's being suggested now, Witness, and you can

14 answer the question.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, the investigator asked

16 me whether I had anything to add regarding the rights that were read to

17 me. It was in that connection. That is one thing.

18 Secondly, the answer that I had something to add in addition to

19 what was previously discussed was correct. Because my first reaction was

20 a visual picture of the incident. I have a very good visual memory, and I

21 recounted on the basis of that visual memory. Then I thought about the

22 event and remembered some other details in connection with it, and that is

23 what I added after the break. There was no pressure, there was no

24 suggestions as to what I should say; only what I really remembered.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as this tape is concerned,

Page 13723

1 and there are any number of tapes of this kind, that they could be

2 used as evidence for false testimony on the part of not only this witness

3 but obviously --

4 JUDGE MAY: You've heard the answer. There's no question of

5 that. You've heard his answer. It's something he remembered. Now, time

6 has come for us to adjourn.

7 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if the accused wishes, arrangements should be

8 made for those extracts, at least to be exhibited so the Court has them

9 before it. We seem to have them already.

10 Mr. Milosevic, do you want us to have these extracts?

11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

12 JUDGE MAY: I'm being told it's D57. The only point that I make

13 about that - and you may want to consider this - is D57 is a particular

14 exhibit relating to a particular date, whether it would be more sensible

15 to go on to D57A perhaps for this one. Yes, we'll make that D57A.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Mr. May. But I would

17 also like to request from you that you institute proceedings --


19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- as there are grounds to believe

20 that this is false testimony.

21 JUDGE MAY: No. We hear what you say, but you've heard what the

22 witness has said. He's given his explanation. Now, it will be a matter

23 for us to determine whether the explanation holds water or not. Certainly

24 no question of any proceedings or anything of that sort.

25 Thank you very much. We've now got this passage exhibited, D57A,

Page 13724

1 under seal.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And Your Honour, just to add: It's only the

3 first part, because the second part we just heard, and we supply

4 tomorrow.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That part can be added to D57A, since it's all

6 the same interview.

7 We are, as I say, going to adjourn now. Before we do, one or two

8 administrative matters.

9 Mr. Tapuskovic, if you have any questions -- I don't know if -- do

10 you have any questions of this witness?

11 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I had intended to

12 raise that matter tomorrow morning and to tell you that this time I would

13 really like to ask to have time -- of course, it is up to you to decide,

14 but it seems to me that in this case I should not be put in a

15 position - even though I do my very best to select only the matters of

16 professional importance - that I be spared of being rushed. I don't know

17 exactly how much time I would need, but I think I need at least one-third

18 of one day, of one working day.

19 JUDGE MAY: So we're talking about an hour and a quarter,

20 something of that sort; is that right? Seventy-five minutes.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would do my best to complete it

22 within that time limit, but I really do think that in view of the

23 significance of this testimony, I should be allowed that much time, maybe

24 a couple of minutes more.

25 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that in due course.

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13 English transcripts.













Page 13726

1 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we think the Prosecution should have another

2 witness available for Friday. We would ask you, too, to bear in mind,

3 having regard to the length of this witness's evidence, the length of your

4 re-examination, and keep it, if you would, to the bearest minimum.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I will do so, and I think at the moment it

6 will not be longer than half an hour, probably less.

7 JUDGE MAY: That's the sort of time which we had in mind. Thank

8 you.

9 Very well. We'll adjourn now.

10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.07 p.m.,

11 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day of

12 December, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.