Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 13060

1 Wednesday, 20 November 2002

2 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. I understand we're in closed

7 session for a matter you wish to raise.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. The Prosecution would like

9 to raise a serious matter in relation to this witness. Through the

10 Outreach Programme of the Tribunal, we have received information that the

11 name of the witness was reported in the VIP Daily News Report. It's a

12 Belgrade-based press agency. And we have prepared the document for

13 everyone to be available.

14 On page 5 of this Daily News Report, there is the item "The Hague

15 Tribunal and the trial of Milosevic continued after the recess," and it

16 reports about the open parts of the testimony that the witness gave. But

17 then in the third-last paragraph, it says: "Peter Michael Mueller, legal

18 representative of Witness C-036, who is, according to documents of

19 Prosecution, accused himself and is soon to be indicted, is present as

20 Witness MILAN BABIC giving evidence in the courtroom of The Hague Tribunal."

21 And the last paragraph says:

22 "Former officials of Krajina who are living in Belgrade say that

23 it is possible that under the code of protected Witness MILAN BABIC is Milan

24 Babic, Prime Minister of the SAO Krajina government at the time when these

25 events happened."

Page 13061

1 First of all, the Prosecution wants to state that there are no

2 documents that the Prosecution is actually accusing this witness. The

3 only documents that exist are the indictment, where the witness is

4 mentioned as a co-perpetrator. And there was also this document, the

5 conviction from the Croatian courts, that was discussed in private

6 session. In addition to that, the status of the witness was also only

7 discussed in private session.

8 Therefore, the Prosecution is very much concerned and alarmed,

9 because the Prosecution, of course, did not inform anyone outside of the

10 Tribunal about the status of the witness. The Prosecution is not only

11 alarmed but will also try to find out which reporting is actually the

12 basis of the information in the press agency, because there must be a

13 source for this information in the press agency, and we try to find out.

14 But we wanted to put the Trial Chamber on notice of this problem.

15 At the moment, there is only the speculation who the Witness C-036

16 is, and the Prosecution is determined to keep his identity hidden and

17 would like to proceed in the way that we did before, that is, parts only

18 in open session, and everything that relates to the identity of the

19 witness in private session.

20 The Prosecution hopes that this event does not discourage the

21 witness to give testimony further on, and hope he's not scared to continue

22 to tell the truth. This is what the Prosecution wanted to inform the

23 Trial Chamber.

24 JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Investigation should

25 continue, and when you have further to report, you can do so in closed

Page 13062

1 session to us.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE MAY: We'll go into open session.

4 [Open session]

5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're now in open session.


7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

9 Q. Good morning, Witness.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Yesterday we concluded discussing a meeting, and we spoke about

12 the unification, or the attempts of the unification of the two Krajinas

13 and what was discussed. And just to conclude this, I would like to put

14 two documents to you, and that is Exhibit 352, tab 46 and 47. Tab 46 is

15 the contract on the cooperation concluded between the Serbian Autonomous

16 Region of Krajina and the municipalities of Bosnian Krajina of the 24th of

17 June, 1991; and tab 47 is the declaration of the unification of the

18 community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina and the Serbian Autonomous

19 Region of Krajina of the 27th of June, 1991.

20 We do not need to discuss this further. It's just -- can you

21 authenticate that these are the documents, underlying documents, to the

22 events that you described?

23 A. Yes. Both these documents refer to the events that I have

24 testified about, the contract on cooperation from Banja Luka, and a

25 declaration on unification from Bosansko Grahovo.

Page 13063

1 Q. And the unification, the second document, was then not signed, as

2 we can see, by Mr. Kupresanin. Is that due to the intervention of

3 Mr. Karadzic that you spoke about yesterday?

4 A. Yes, that's right. Karadzic prohibited it. He even asked

5 deputies from the Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina to go back and to

6 vote again against the declaration. However, they refused and they left.

7 Q. I would like to put a third document to the witness in this

8 context, and it's tab 45 of Exhibit 352, and it is a letter of Radovan

9 Karadzic. And in this letter, it -- I quote:

10 "Along with the congratulations, accept our assurances that the

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina Serb National Council will always by the spiritual,

12 cultural, political and state unity also mean state unity of the Serb

13 Autonomous Region of Krajina and all the other Serb regions with the

14 Serbia mother-country within a free, democratic and federative Yugoslavia,

15 regardless of its site -- size." Sorry, "size."

16 We do not need to discuss this because it speaks for itself. Can

17 you tell us -- there is no date on this document. Can you tell us when it

18 was sent? Do you know that? Approximately.

19 A. It was after the 21st of December, 1990.

20 Q. And how do you know that? Is it because of the congratulation?

21 A. Yes. On the 21st of December was the date when the Serbian

22 Autonomous District of Krajina was proclaimed in 1990.

23 Q. We have yesterday spoken about the goal "all Serbs in one state,"

24 and you have testified about how Mr. Seselj understood it and what was

25 supposed -- what was planned or what was not addressed in relation to the

Page 13064

1 non-Serb population in this territory. What did you see happen on the

2 ground to the non-Serb population in the SAOs in Croatia?

3 A. In August 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army entered into the war

4 with Croatia. The JNA engaged in combat operations in such a way that by

5 moving the front line closer to the opposing party, using heavy artillery,

6 it forced the population and members of the armed forces of the Croatian

7 government and the entire population to withdraw and retreat from those

8 territories. In this way, the JNA, as of August 1991, engaged in a war so

9 that the territories that it captured would be left without any Croatian

10 inhabitants, or very few of them. Houses and buildings were destroyed in

11 the combat operations and subsequently. Property was looted. And in this

12 way, JNA gained control of territory together with other armed formations

13 that were within its ranks.

14 Q. Which other armed formations do you mean?

15 A. They were units of the Territorial Defence under the command of

16 the Yugoslav People's Army and the militia or police of Krajina, as well

17 as volunteer units, so-called volunteer units, under the control of a

18 parallel structure of state security and the police of Krajina and units

19 commanded by the state security of Serbia.

20 Q. Where did you see such activities unfold? Can you give us the

21 names of the location where you saw that happen?

22 A. I saw that in the area of Kijevo around Vrljika, the area around

23 Drnis, the area around Obrovac, that is Maslinica, around Kostajnica,

24 around Glina, Vidusevac, Petrinja, Slunj, and other places in those

25 areas.

Page 13065

1 Q. In the Kostajnica region, were the villages Dubica, Cerovljani,

2 and Bacin attacked in this way?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. In the region close to Plaski, were the villages Saborsko,

5 Poljanak, and Lipovanic attacked in this way?

6 A. They were.

7 Q. And in the region near Knin, were Skabrnja, Nadin, and Bruska

8 attacked in this way?

9 A. They were.

10 Q. Were these villages that I just mentioned, were these Croatian

11 villages?

12 A. Yes, Croatian or majority Croatian villages.

13 Q. Did these villages pose a threat to the JNA or the Serb people in

14 the region?

15 A. They didn't.

16 Q. You mentioned that various formations were involved. Did they get

17 involved in a certain pattern so that one formation went first, did

18 something, and then others follow? Can you describe how these forms of

19 attack actually were conducted?

20 A. As far as I know, there was a rule, and that was that the first to

21 take part in attacks were police units or volunteer units or units under

22 the control of the State Security Service. They would engage in

23 provocations, provocative shootings, individual opening of fire towards

24 Croatian settlements, and then they would open fire with mortars. In

25 other words, they would provoke the other side, upon which the JNA would

Page 13066

1 join in with its artillery and all the units under its control.

2 Q. You mentioned state security. Which state security did you mean

3 was involved?

4 A. The state security of Serbia.

5 Q. When the JNA had joined and attacked, what happened afterwards

6 when a village was taken?

7 A. As a rule, there was looting and torching of property.

8 Q. Who did this, which formations?

9 A. This was done also by the JNA, while it held control, especially

10 in Drnis. I know of a case there. And then the JNA would hand over

11 control, or rather, it would leave the area without any control for a

12 certain period of time. The police would not establish its control there

13 and then the looting would become generalised.

14 Q. Those -- you said that -- what did the Croatian population do when

15 this attack occurred?

16 A. They fled.

17 Q. Did anyone stay behind? Did any people stay behind, and if so,

18 what happened to them?

19 A. Very few people stayed behind, mostly elderly people. After that,

20 there would be individual killings, which in most cases would not be

21 elucidated.

22 Q. Were people also detained?

23 A. Yes, there was detention as well.

24 Q. Detained people, were they mistreated in detention? Do you know?

25 A. I heard stories that there was mistreatment of people in prison.

Page 13067

1 Q. Were prisons actually established in Knin, and do you know whether

2 people were mistreated there?

3 A. There were two prisons in Knin. One was controlled by the police,

4 and another by the JNA. I heard that there was mistreatment in the prison

5 controlled by the police.

6 JUDGE KWON: When did you hear that?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Towards the end of 1991/the

8 beginning of 1992. I was told this by the Minister of Justice, Risto

9 Matkovic. He was the first to tell me. And then later on, in 1992 and

10 1993, there was quite a lot of talk about this by ordinary people, and

11 that was the reason why the Minister of Justice, Risto Matkovic, sought

12 for the ministry to take over control of the prisons that were held by the

13 police.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 JUDGE MAY: Just clear up something. You said -- see if I can

16 find it - after the population fled, some people stayed behind, mostly

17 elderly. After that you said there would be individual killings, and then

18 this: "... which in most cases would not be elucidated." Now, that's not

19 clear. What did you mean by "elucidated"? It may be a translation

20 problem, but perhaps you could just clarify it, please.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That an investigation was not

22 conducted to discover the perpetrator of the killing.

23 JUDGE MAY: Very well.


25 Q. Witness, I would like to play now a few intercepts dealing with

Page 13068

1 the matter, but I forgot to ask you something. Were people also -- those

2 who stayed behind, these elderly that you said, were they also deported or

3 forcibly transferred to other places outside of the control of this

4 Serbian territory?

5 A. I heard that there were cases of individual local officials having

6 to shelter these people, to protect them from people in the police or the

7 state security so that they wouldn't kill them, but that this was not

8 sufficient. And I was told of a group that they had to help leave the

9 area under their control so that they could cross over into the territory

10 under the control of the Croatian government. I heard this over the

11 media, that there were large-scale deportations, such as the one in Ilok.

12 I also heard stories that people from Kostajnica, Croats, left the town

13 after the town had been captured by the Serb forces.

14 Q. You said that local officials had to shelter these people, and you

15 mentioned in this context the police and the state security. They had to

16 shelter them from the police and the state security. Is that the parallel

17 structure again that you mentioned earlier on, around Milan Martic and

18 Frenki Simatovic?

19 A. Yes, and the people linked to them and under their protection.

20 Q. Which official --

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think, Your Honour, we have to go into

22 private session.

23 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in private session.


Page 13069

1 Q. Which official told you that?

2 A. [redacted]

3 [redacted], told me, after those events, when we arrived

4 in Belgrade. He told me that he had to protect people from people who

5 were under Frenki's protection, [redacted], to put them in a house,

6 where he fed them, so that they wouldn't be killed by people within

7 Frenki's circle, but that this was not sufficient, but that he had to

8 escort them towards [redacted], that is, territory under the control of the

9 Croatian government.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go now into open session.

11 [Open session]

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We want now to play a part of an intercept,

14 and it's the Exhibit 353, tab 16. And we actually split this intercept

15 into two parts: track 2 and track 3. First we play a part of this. It's

16 track 2.

17 [Intercept played]

18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, but it is impossible

19 to follow this.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can the transcript be put to the witness, the

21 transcript? The sections played are marked in the transcript, and in the

22 English it is also marked in the translation. Can we try it again?

23 JUDGE KWON: If you could tell the page number. I don't see any

24 mark.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. The first section that is played is on

Page 13070

1 page 2, and it starts with "Where does he ..." and it ends with "You

2 offered them what I would never offer."

3 JUDGE MAY: So that everybody can follow this, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff,

4 I think it may be an idea to put some foundations down. Perhaps you can

5 deal with the witness. He heard the voices. Who do we have speaking on

6 this tape, so that we can --

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I actually wanted to let the witness

8 hear it first. And as it is not possible to translate it, I don't think

9 that it makes any sense to continue playing it.

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters apologise, but they can't find

11 the exact section.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's actually marked for you too, but ...

13 Okay.

14 Q. Witness, who is speaking?

15 A. I recognise the speakers -- the voice of Radovan Karadzic, but I

16 didn't recognise the other voice. So just one voice: Radovan Karadzic's.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Maybe we can put the English translation on

18 the overhead projector so ...

19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if I can assist you. You

20 distributed the separate binder for the --


22 JUDGE KWON: -- for the intercepts to be played in the Court.


24 JUDGE KWON: The order -- the binding order is out -- is not

25 orderly manner, and the first document is that -- I think this is the

Page 13071

1 first document.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No. It's the second one. We have already

3 played one, and it's actually exactly in the order that they are played.

4 It's now the second document.

5 JUDGE KWON: First document. So the interpreters may be mistaken

6 with the order. You can check with this.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I believe you. The problem is,

8 I personally do not have this binder, and therefore --

9 JUDGE MAY: Well, could you get it during the adjournment? Could

10 you get it during the adjournment, and then at least we'll be speaking

11 from the same sheet.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I actually have it here.

13 The interpreter should have that copy.

14 THE INTERPRETER: We have a copy, but it's unmarked, so we're

15 unable to find the exact portion, and we can't translate from the tape.

16 JUDGE MAY: I don't think we can waste any further time.


18 JUDGE MAY: Will the witness be able to identify the second

19 speaker if more is played, do you anticipate, or does he simply not know

20 who this man is?


22 Q. Do you know who the second man is? Could you identify the second

23 speaker to speak in addition to Mr. Karadzic?

24 A. From the conversation that I listened to and from the transcript,

25 this one here, and from the information that the other participant in the

Page 13072

1 conversation referred to, it is Vojko Djogo [as interpreted], the

2 president of the Association of the Serbs in Belgrade. Serbs from

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina in Belgrade.

4 Q. And did you know this person?

5 A. Yes. I met him on several occasions.

6 Q. I think we simply follow now the transcript on page 2, and you can

7 see it now on the ELMO. There it says:

8 GOJKO DJOGO: Where does he ... where does he mean to start a war

9 in Sarajevo? Is he a madman?

10 RADOVAN KARADZIC: He is. I think that they should be beaten if

11 they start the war. They will be ... they will ... well, they will

12 disappear, that is...

13 GOJKO DJOGO: There will be a lot of blood, but ...

14 RADOVAN KARADZIC: They will disappear, that people will disappear

15 from the face of the earth if they, if they insist now. Their only chance

16 was to accept what we had offered them. It was too much, we did offer

17 them too much.

18 To which people is Mr. Karadzic referring, and what does he mean?

19 A. The Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslim people.

20 Q. And I would like -- I would like to direct you now to the page 6.

21 That's the second marked, the second marked part. If it could be put on

22 the ELMO so that I can read it.

23 GJOKO DJOGO: Oh, my God, let them cleanse this down there ... let

24 them, just one night ... here, they killed them 8 people, why didn't

25 they ... 8 people, why didn't they attack Dubrovnik after last night,

Page 13073

1 man!?

2 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Well, yes. And they killed them on Bosnian

3 side.

4 GJOKO DJOGO: First 8 people in Ravno, man. Well, that's ... that

5 Ravno in Popovo?

6 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Of course, on Bosnian side, that is in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 GJOKO DJOGO: Well, you know what should be done ... that is good

9 enough reason to raid Dubrovnik tonight.

10 And Mr. Karadzic said: "Yes."

11 To which Ravno are they referring, and to which killing of eight

12 people? Do you know that?

13 A. Ravno is a place in Herzegovina, on the territory of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina near Dubrovnik, and it was there where there was

15 fighting, and some people were killed, Serbs.

16 Q. And -- yes. Thank you. And we now go further, to the next

17 section that is marked. It starts on the same page, and it starts with --

18 A. I beg your pardon. From the text here, they were killed -- eight

19 people were killed, but I can't say exactly who. I know that there was

20 fighting there, but I don't actually know who it was who was killed.

21 Q. The next -- the next quote:

22 RADOVAN KARADZIC: There isn't. They, they incite the

23 irresponsible MPs to follow that idea, that they have to get a state.

24 They scared them with Serbs, as if Serbs did any harm to anyone. And then

25 they made the commitment that now ... and then this Milos ... this

Page 13074

1 what's-his-name made, Izetbegovic towards Tudjman, and Tudjman towards

2 him, and one encourages the other, you know. Since ... this ...

3 Izetbegovic has promised Tudjman the whole Bosnia, and Tudjman

4 encourages ... and he promises him that the Muslims will rise against the

5 Serbs to fight.

6 GJOKO DJOGO: You just keep on lying them a little more there,

7 do ... you give them milk and honey until this, up there this job has

8 accumulated until they determine, until they were cleansed this terrain in

9 order to ...

10 And then Mr. Karadzic says:

11 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Aha. Well, no. They must know that there are

12 20.000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo, man. This is not normal, they will,

13 they will disappear! Sarajevo will be a melting pot in which 300.000

14 Muslims will die. They are not normal. I don't know. I'll have to tell

15 them openly now: people, don't push your fuckin' luck - there are three,

16 four hundred thousand armed Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What do you

17 think? In addition, there is the army, technical equipment and all. What

18 do you think you can do, secede like Croatia did? And they do literally

19 go ... yesterday, they told us during these negotiations, I mean at the

20 Assembly session, that the sovereign Bosnia means independent Bosnia, in

21 case that Yugoslavia ends ...

22 Can you comment on this?

23 A. This is a conversation about the positions of Alija Izetbegovic

24 and the SDA party and the Bosnian Muslims and the relationship of Karadzic

25 towards them.

Page 13075












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 13076

1 Q. Were there 20.000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo? Do you know that?

2 A. I don't know exactly how many there were, but I do know that the

3 Serbs armed themselves around Sarajevo.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, Mr. Tapuskovic is standing.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic -- I'm sorry. Mr. Tapuskovic,

6 yes.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that we've

8 already cleared this point up, that is that the witness is just there to

9 say whether he recognises the voices and not to say what he thinks

10 somebody thought when he said what he said. I don't think that that is

11 the object.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. He can't say what he thinks somebody is

13 thinking. That's for the other person to say. He can, however, give

14 evidence about factual matters about which he knows which arise from

15 what's said on the tape.

16 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Let us move on.


18 Q. We go to the next marked quote. It's on page 8 in the English,

19 and Mr. Radovan Karadzic says there:

20 RADOVAN KARADZIC: We will not force them into anything, but they

21 do not have a way to secede. I think this is clear to the army, to

22 everyone. It will be bloodshed. The army will not, well, use 2 planes

23 but will use 20 in every action ...

24 I go now to another part that is marked. It's on page 10, and

25 there is a reference to Vukovar, and Mr. Djogo says:

Page 13077

1 GJOKO DJOGO: That damned Vukovar, it's a stick in the throat,

2 man!

3 RADOVAN KARADZIC: OK, that is not important. It is under siege.

4 There are just some rats in the holes. However, what is most important is

5 that Bos ... Bosnia is full of soldiers, you know.

6 Was Bosnia at that time full of soldiers, and if so, what kind of

7 soldiers?

8 A. Yes, the Yugoslav People's Army.

9 Q. What is said here about Vukovar, does that match with your own

10 knowledge of the events?

11 A. Yes. I do know that Vukovar was in an encirclement for several

12 months, encircled by the JNA forces and the armed units under its command

13 or working together with the JNA. Up until the 18th of November, that is,

14 1991.

15 Q. Then on page 14 there is another section where references are made

16 to territories, and Mr. Djogo says.

17 GJOKO DJOGO: Sorry, they should say that is strategic, you

18 know - two or three villages, as well as these do here. Hats off to what

19 they have done in, in ... barbarian act, burn everything - the end of

20 story! Certain territory, the one around the border, has to be cleansed.

21 Do you know to which this refers? Actually, there is also a quote

22 before that where they speak about Dubrovnik. Do you know to which part

23 of the conversation this refers to?

24 A. Well, the area around Dubrovnik.

25 Q. Who is cleansing what, do you know?

Page 13078

1 A. The JNA is taking control of that area.

2 Q. Mr. Karadzic continues in relation to Dubrovnik. He said:

3 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Dubrovnik was never ... never Croatian.

4 GJOKO DJOGO: Eh, to shorten this ... of Dubrovnik ... to end them

5 and exactly there, where they have stopped now, near the little bridge

6 near Cavtat.

7 And a little further down they speak about the Dubrovacka River

8 and everybody should be killed there, and Mr. Karadzic says:


10 And Mr. Djogo says:

11 GJOKO DJOGO: Kill everyone.

12 To whom does this refer? Who should kill everyone, and which

13 region is meant?

14 JUDGE MAY: I think Mr. Tapuskovic's comment is right there.

15 That's for us to determine from what is said in the conversation. The

16 witness can say what he knows of his own knowledge, but this is just a

17 matter of interpretation of the document.


19 Q. Who at that time -- where -- who was in Cavtat securing a region

20 up to Cavtat? Do you know that?

21 A. The enemy side. The enemies to the JNA, that is to say the army

22 of the government of Croatia.

23 Q. And where was at that time the JNA? We're talking of October

24 1991.

25 A. In the area around Dubrovnik. They were deployed there. Cavtat

Page 13079

1 is right by Dubrovnik. Dubrovacka Rijeka is to the north of Dubrovnik, so

2 that's it.

3 Q. This is all in relation to this intercept, and I would like to

4 turn now to the next intercept. We actually had planned to play a part of

5 it, and I wonder if we should give it another try.

6 JUDGE MAY: Which tab are we on? Which tab?

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's tab 30, and the witness should have the

8 B/C/S transcript, and on the overhead projector we should put the marked

9 section.

10 For the technical booth, it's track 4.

11 [Intercept played]

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think we can -- we can't hear this properly

13 and should not do it. I'm a little bit surprised because the quality was

14 very well during the --

15 JUDGE KWON: Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff, if we cannot hear -- we cannot

16 play the video, how can you confirm the content of the transcript? By the

17 witness?

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The witness actually heard this, these

19 intercepts in the preparation for his testimony.

20 Q. Witness, did you hear this intercept and could you actually listen

21 to it?

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Witness, did you assist the translators providing

23 the transcript of this intercept?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, he listened to the intercept,

Page 13080

1 and at the same time had the transcript, the B/C/S transcript, to check

2 whether it is the text that is spoken.

3 Q. Could you listen to the intercept, or was it also so disturbed?

4 Can you say?

5 A. The conversation was much clearer, much more discernible, when I

6 listened to it the first time.

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I understand that the booth haven't got the

8 original. Is that right?

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: They should have the CD that we actually also

10 had, and it was clear, clearly -- you could hear it clearly, and there was

11 no noise in it like this.

12 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It was actually --

14 JUDGE MAY: There seems to be a problem with this CD. We cannot

15 waste further time on it now. I suggest that during the adjournment,

16 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you deal with the booth and see what the problem is,

17 and we can return to it in due course.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We can play this intercept

19 at a later stage and give it another try.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

21 JUDGE KWON: You have to also note, the pagination is different

22 between the separate binder and the original binder. The pagination is

23 all different, in a special document also.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE MAY: Pagination is important in all these bundles. The

Page 13081

1 Prosecution should have every bundle paginated, or otherwise we are in

2 total confusion.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We will check in the

4 break. We will check on these matters.

5 Q. Witness, you have described this pattern of events, and you

6 described the regions in Croatia where you saw this happen. Was this

7 pattern restricted to Croatian territories only or did you see that being

8 repeated elsewhere?

9 A. I saw, first of all in August 1992, and then later on as well, in

10 the subsequent months and years that followed, that the same thing

11 happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 Q. What did you see when you -- and how -- did you go there, and what

13 did you see?

14 A. When I passed by that way, I saw that the settlements in which

15 Croats and Muslims had lived before the war were devastated, completely

16 empty and destroyed.

17 Q. And through which regions did you pass?

18 A. I passed through Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most, Prijedor, the area

19 around Banja Luka, towards Brcko and Bijeljina, the area around Zvornik,

20 towards Han Pijesak and Pale.

21 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic know what was happening on the ground? Can you

22 say?

23 A. He must have known his service was present there, and I met the

24 head of his security service down there.

25 Q. Witness, we have to go into private session for the next

Page 13082

1 question.

2 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in private session.


5 Q. Witness, you said you met the head of his security service down

6 there. Whom did you meet, and when?

7 A. Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic. Jovica Stanisic I met in

8 the area for the first time sometime in May 1991. It was April or May of

9 1991. And then I met him again in May 1995, together with Franko

10 Simatovic, nicknamed Frenki. Mile Grbic from Bosanski Novi told me that

11 he had firm links and contacts with Jovica Stanisic.

12 Q. Where did you meet Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic in -- No.

13 I mean, where did you meet Jovica Stanisic in May 1991? What kind of a

14 meeting was it?

15 A. In Radovan Karadzic's flat. It was a meeting in Radovan

16 Karadzic's flat, and also present were Milan Martic and Velibor Ostojic.

17 Q. Who is Velibor Ostojic?

18 A. He was in the Executive Board of the SDS for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 He was Minister of Information for a time and a close associate of

20 Karadzic.

21 Q. What was the purpose of this meeting? What did you discuss there?

22 A. In fact, the people who led the conversation were Ostojic,

23 Stanisic, and Karadzic, and they were discussing some maps, where the

24 Serbs were in control and areas where they should establish control, or

25 rather, the SDS, Karadzic's SDS party.

Page 13083

1 Q. And why were you and Mr. Martic there? Why were you taking

2 part --

3 A. Martic told me that Jovica Stanisic had asked us to come. It was

4 my impression that we were just supposed to make "un acte de presence"

5 there in Karadzic's flat. After that, we went to the SDS club in

6 Sarajevo, which means we had dinner, actually. So he just wanted us to be

7 present. That was my impression. We didn't have any great role to play

8 in the conversation at all. We weren't asked, actually, about anything.

9 We weren't asked our opinions. We just passed through Sarajevo and some

10 of the settlements around it.

11 Q. You also mentioned that you met Mr. Stanisic in May 1995 in

12 Bosnia. What was the -- what were the circumstances?

13 A. En route to Vukovar, and an Assembly of the Republic of Srpska

14 Krajina was being held there in May 1995. I was invited to stop by in

15 Bijeljina, to go to the municipality there, and from the municipality,

16 they escorted me to the centre of the security service, or whatever it was

17 called, the CBS in Bijeljina, and that was where Jovica Stanisic was, as

18 well as Franko Simatovic, "Frenki", and Radovan Karadzic. Momcilo

19 Krajisnik was also there. And I was accompanied by Rajko Lazajic,

20 president of the Assembly of the RSK. Where he actually entered the hall,

21 the room itself, I can't remember, but I think he went in together with

22 me. And they had asked for me, because Stanisic and Karadzic had an idea,

23 that is to say, through the social accounting service in Vukovar, the

24 branch in Vukovar, to have fictitious payments paid into an account for

25 military materiel and equipment, for weapons and ammunition which the

Page 13084

1 Republika Srpska had procured in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

2 Q. Was it discussed which military materiel were received when?

3 A. Well, not exactly. They just spoke about weapons and ammunition.

4 I don't know what ones precisely. But it was a large quantity. I can't

5 remember exactly how much, but quite large. According to my assessments

6 at the time and the insight I had into matters of that kind, there was an

7 inflation in May in Serbia, so there was a large money mass that was

8 discussed. As to the type of weapons, I don't remember them specifying

9 what kind of weapons and ammunition.

10 Q. Was it discussed from where -- you said the Federal Republic of

11 Yugoslavia. Was it said in which way the weapons were received and from

12 which factories or source?

13 A. They mentioned Kragujevac or Krusik.

14 Q. Kragujevac is in -- is it in Serbia?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Who is in control of the factories in Kragujevac?

17 A. It was a so-called special purpose plant used for military

18 purposes, and it was controlled by the army, that is, the Ministry of

19 Defence; the army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of Defence, that is, the

20 government of Yugoslavia.

21 Q. Witness, why were you asked to get involved and make fictitious

22 payments?

23 A. At the time, the Prime Minister of Srpska Krajina was Borislav

24 Mikelic, and Stanisic was in the Serbian Security Service, and they had a

25 disagreement about the distribution of oil and of petroleum derivatives,

Page 13085

1 and maybe that's why they didn't discuss it with him. He was in charge of

2 such things.

3 JUDGE MAY: The witness will have to make plain what the plan was,

4 because it's not at all clear.

5 What was the plan - just explain it to us so we can understand

6 it - that they were discussing.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were discussing -- or rather,

8 they were asking that, through the branch of the public accountancy

9 service in Vukovar on the territory of the Republika Srpska Krajina, a

10 fictitious payment should be made, on paper only, to factories in Serbia

11 producing military equipment, and this equipment was purchased from Serbia

12 by Karadzic, by the authorities of Republika Srpska.


14 Q. Witness, why couldn't the -- why could Republika Srpska not simply

15 pay for the weapons they had gotten?

16 A. Because -- well, it couldn't pay because I assume they had no

17 money, and they couldn't make this fictitious payment from Republika

18 Srpska because there were no payments and no transactions between

19 Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia. They had been cut off.

20 Q. Was there an embargo imposed on Republika Srpska at that time?

21 A. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposed, because of the amounts

22 from the international community, an embargo, but this was only a

23 pretense, and these were ways of actually getting around the embargo.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we actually have left a little

25 bit the proofing summary, the order of the proofing summary, in relation

Page 13086

1 to the limited time that I have. We are now talking about paragraph 272

2 in the proofing summary, the relationship with the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia

3 Bosnian Serbs.

4 Q. Did you actually assist in the way that you were asked to assist,

5 that is, fake payments?

6 A. First of all, I was not in charge of this, and secondly, I didn't

7 like this. I didn't see any reason why I should be asked to do this. I

8 was the Minister of External Affairs, and Stanisic had complete control

9 over Vukovar. I didn't go into any explanations, but I said it couldn't

10 be done. And Krajisnik said, "Yes, yes, it can be done. I know. I'm an

11 economist." However, I did nothing in this regard. I simply knew that

12 this would be an inflationary move against Serbia and that we would suffer

13 the consequences for it.

14 Q. You mentioned that there was a disagreement with Mr. Mikelic --

15 between Mr. Mikelic and Mr. Stanisic in relation to oil. Was the

16 Republika Srpska at that time also supported with oil deliveries?

17 A. Yes. The State Security Service transported secretly over the

18 River Sava petroleum derivatives for the Republic of Srpska Krajina.

19 Q. From where to where?

20 A. I know that in this way, distribution of oil from Mirkovci,

21 Eastern Slavonia, which was then processed in the Pancevo refinery near

22 Belgrade, was transported, and I also heard there had been some illegal

23 purchases going against the embargo, imports of oil into Yugoslavia, and

24 then it was distributed from Yugoslavia.

25 Q. And what was the problem with Mr. Mikelic in this regard?

Page 13087

1 A. In regard to the distribution of quantities, what was for Serbia

2 and what was for Republika Srpska Krajina, because Mikelic was authorised

3 to distribute the oil taken from Mirkovci and processed in the Pancevo

4 refinery.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, there is a mistake in the

6 transcript, obviously. There is a reference to -- there is a reference to

7 Mr. Krajisnik, that he said, "Yes, yes, it can be done." I do not think

8 that the witness actually said that.

9 Q. Who said -- who confirmed that it could be done, this fake

10 payment?

11 A. It was Stanisic and Karadzic who asked me to do this. When I said

12 it couldn't be done, Krajisnik said yes. He said he knew it could be

13 done, because he was an economist.

14 Q. Yes. Thank you.

15 In relation to the matters that you just referred to, that is, the

16 oil deliveries, I would like to put two documents to you.

17 JUDGE MAY: We're still in private session. Do we need to be in

18 private session?

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go now into open session.

20 [Open session]

21 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to put to the witness two

23 exhibits from Exhibit 352, tab 93 and tab 94. The first document, tab 93,

24 is a document listed under the title "Ministry of Defence of the RSK," and

25 it's dated the 2nd of August, 1994, to The President of the Republics. In

Page 13088

1 this document, there is referred to a dramatic situation in relation to

2 the fuel needed by the army and the limited amount that they actually get.

3 Q. Witness, this document, looking at the stamp and looking at the

4 signature, is this a -- is that how you remembered the stamp and the

5 letterhead?

6 A. Yes, yes, and the content as well.

7 Q. This shortage, who decided, actually, who received the deliveries

8 of oil? Who made this decision about the deliveries of the oil that was

9 provided to the RSK and the RS? Do you know that?

10 A. Jovica Stanisic, Mihalj Kertes, and Boro Mikelic. They controlled

11 the flow of oil.

12 Q. How do you know that?

13 A. I know because Boro Mikelic told me. Radovan Stojicic "Badza"

14 also told me, and so did people from Mirkovci.

15 Q. And the other document that I would like to put to you, it is a

16 petition in relation -- to the president of the RSK and other officials of

17 the RSK, in relation to the state of affairs in the Krajina Petroleum

18 Refining and Sales Enterprise, seated in Mirkovci, and that is dated the

19 15th of July, 1994, and it's also again about the distribution of

20 petroleum and petroleum products. Can you comment on this document in

21 relation to the letterhead and the contents?

22 A. First of all, it says who received this and what the date was and

23 under what number it was registered, and the signatures are those of

24 people from Mirkovci.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we go in private session for one

Page 13089

1 question?

2 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in private session.


5 Q. Witness, you are listed here as one of the persons who received

6 this document. Did you receive this document?

7 A. Yes. And I was also told orally about these requests by people

8 from Mirkovci.

9 Q. Are these also the people who informed you about the role of

10 Stanisic and Kertes in relation to the oil production there?

11 A. That's correct. That's correct.

12 Q. Thank you. Witness, I would like to return now to what we

13 discussed about --

14 JUDGE MAY: Open session?

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour.

16 [Open session]

17 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.


19 Q. We have -- we did speak about the events that unfolded, and you

20 described the pattern of attacks that occurred and what happened to the

21 non-Serb population in the territories. When you saw the events develop,

22 did you realise what the plan was for the non-Serb population in the

23 regions that were to become part of the joint Serbian state?

24 A. As for the SAO Krajina, I understood that this was a consequence

25 of the way in which the war was waged rather than part of a plan.

Page 13090












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 13091

1 However, in my view, this -- it was simply that the manner in which the

2 war was waged was the same in all areas, and those were the things that

3 happened. As for the interests of the Serbian people in the SAO Krajina,

4 this went against the interests of the Serbian people in the SAO Krajina.

5 It was a disaster for the people in the SAO Krajina as much as it was for

6 the Croatian people.

7 Q. When did you -- when did this pattern start to be -- to become

8 clear to you? Which time period?

9 A. Up to November 1991.

10 Q. You said up to November. When did it start?

11 A. It started in August 1991.

12 Q. You had --

13 A. Excuse me. It started even earlier. It started in May 1991.

14 Q. You had said on the first day of your testimony, you actually had

15 mentioned that you believed in the beginning that the Serbs in Croatia

16 were endangered in their position. At that time in May 1991 and up to

17 November 1991, did you still believe that the Serbs in Croatia were

18 endangered?

19 A. I personally believed it, up until the moment the JNA joined in

20 the fighting.

21 Q. The state -- the state for all Serbs that you mentioned to be the

22 goal, was it ever given up until 1995 or was it pursued further?

23 A. The idea was not given up, but the territory was revised on which

24 the state would be created.

25 Q. Through which events was it revised?

Page 13092

1 A. There were many events. President Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic

2 changed their plan. The Serb territories in Croatia were to be given over

3 to Croatian authority, and the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to

4 be divided between the Serbs and the Croats -- rather, between Croatia and

5 Serbia.

6 Q. Witness, I would like now to turn to a different issue.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we have to return to this as

8 soon as we have sorted out the intercept problem, because we have several

9 intercepts related to this situation, but I will now move on.

10 Q. Witness, you have mentioned that you met Mr. Milosevic on a lot of

11 occasions, but we have no time to go into all these occasions. We have to

12 discuss just a few of these meetings.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: First of all, private session.

14 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

15 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


17 Q. First in general terms, you said you met him, Mr. Milosevic, about

18 30 -- around 30 times. When you met him, how did you address him, and how

19 did he address you?

20 A. I addressed him as Mr. President. He addressed me by my name, my

21 first name.

22 Q. Did that ever change? Did you ever get close?

23 A. No.

24 Q. You also saw him together with Mr. Karadzic. How did Mr. Karadzic

25 address Mr. Milosevic, and how did Mr. Milosevic address Mr. Karadzic?

Page 13093

1 A. Karadzic also addressed him as Mr. President. Milosevic addressed

2 him by his name.

3 Q. First name or last name?

4 A. He called him Radovan.

5 Q. When did you meet Mr. Milosevic for the first time and for the

6 last time?

7 A. The first time I personally met him in October 1990. The last

8 time in August, around the 8th of August, 1995.

9 Q. When you -- when you saw him for the first time in October 1990,

10 what was the topic of the conversation that you had?

11 A. I had been given the task by the president of the Serb Democratic

12 Party, Mr. Raskovic, who gave me Milosevic's telephone number, to call him

13 and to go and see him and ask him whether he would oppose the idea of the

14 Serb Democratic Party with its seat in Knin but which is also active on

15 the territory of Serbia, whether he would oppose its participating in the

16 elections that had been scheduled to be held in Serbia.

17 Q. Does that mean you had to ask him for his consent or what?

18 A. In a way, I was to test the ground to see whether he would oppose

19 this. So yes, to see whether he would oppose it or not. I was to get

20 from him his non-opposition.

21 Q. And did you get this non-opposition?

22 A. Yes, I did. He said, "Well, in Vojvodina where the SBO has some

23 influence, yes, it could participate."

24 Q. Witness, when you met him on this first occasion and on later

25 occasions, did you speak with him about the situation in Croatia and what

Page 13094

1 was happening on the ground?

2 A. It was the usual topic of conversation during every visit. I told

3 him of my fears and anxieties as to what would happen to us, the Serbs in

4 Croatia and the Krajina.

5 Q. And what was his reaction to those kind of talks when you told him

6 those things?

7 A. That we would be protected by the JNA. That's what he kept

8 repeating. "The JNA will protect you." And he said the Serbs had the

9 right to self-determination and to remain in the same state.

10 Q. You have already mentioned a meeting with Mr. Milosevic in which a

11 financial matter in relation to the screw factory was discussed. When you

12 discussed this with Mr. Milosevic, was someone else present?

13 A. Djoko Majstorovic, the administrative secretary of the Main Board

14 of the SDS.

15 Q. We do not have to repeat the financial matter, but on this

16 occasion, was anything else said by Mr. Milosevic, in particular in

17 relation to his position as a party leader?

18 A. Yes. He said he would have to find someone younger and appoint

19 him president of the SBS. I found this rather funny, because he appointed

20 Borislav Jovic to that position, and he wasn't really young.

21 Q. Mr. Jovic is older? Do you mean he's older than Mr. Milosevic?

22 A. Yes. In terms of years, yes.

23 Q. What was the reason that Mr. Milosevic stepped down as the party

24 president? Do you know that?

25 A. According to the constitution of Serbia, because he was elected

Page 13095

1 president of the Republic, he could not perform any other public

2 functions. Formally, it had to be someone else or, rather, it was really

3 supposed to be someone else, but as far as I could see, it was purely a

4 formality.

5 Q. Do you mean he actually stayed in power no matter which function?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. You have already mentioned that you were in Belgrade in January

8 1991, and did you meet Milosevic in this time period?

9 A. At least on two occasions.

10 Q. What was the first -- first of all, why were you in Belgrade at

11 that time?

12 A. In January, I visited Belgrade several times. There was a crisis

13 around the order issued by the Presidency of Yugoslavia about the

14 disarming of paramilitary units in Croatia. On the first occasion,

15 Borivoj Rasuo told me that the JNA was planning a coup d'etat, and he told

16 me how to act if this happened.

17 Q. What did he tell you? How --

18 A. I apologise. Are we in closed session?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. Is it closed session?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Well, he said I should obey orders, offer no resistance. I asked

23 whether I would be arrested, and he said no. He just told me not to offer

24 any resistance and to be obedient.

25 On the second occasion, I went there because Mile Grbic and Zika

Page 13096

1 Rakic from Bosanski Novi had told me to go to Colonel Djigurski, who was a

2 colonel of the KOS.

3 JUDGE MAY: I have to interrupt because I'm not following this.

4 Borivoj Rasuo. Now, who is he? How does he fit into this matter? I

5 gather it's he who is telling the witness these things. You will have to

6 explore these things, if you would.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Your Honour, we have actually already

8 spoken about Boro Rasuo and his position. But just to remind Your

9 Honours...

10 Q. What was Boro's position at that time?

11 A. Before that, he was an expert advisor in the Marxist Centre of the

12 Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia while it existed.

13 In late 1990, he left this centre, and then he became the director of the

14 Yugoslav Institute for Journalism. In the meantime, he had some sort of

15 public post, but I don't remember exactly what. He was close to Mihajlo

16 Markovic, the ideologue of the SPS and various political figures, and in

17 1994 and 1995, I realised he was also close to Jovica Stanisic. At that

18 time, he became a close friend of mine. He originated from Knin. He

19 often visited Knin. He would transmit information from Belgrade to me.

20 We had a similar background, similar education. He became my political

21 advisor.

22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.


24 Q. Since when was he your political advisor? At the time we are

25 talking about now, that is the end of 1990, was he your advisor?

Page 13097

1 A. He formally became my advisor later, in the second half of 1991,

2 and a Minister of External Affairs in the government of the SAO Krajina.

3 But at that time, he was informally my advisor.

4 Q. You said that he was close to Jovica Stanisic. How do you know

5 that?

6 A. In April 1994, when talks were held about establishing a

7 government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Milan Martic's residence

8 in Belgrade, Jovica Stanisic was present. So was Brana Crncevic and other

9 people; Borislav Mikelic. And my proposal was because I was the president

10 of a party that had a large number of MPs in the parliament, that Borivoj

11 Rasuo should -- well, I apologise. First I proposed Lazar Macura as

12 Minister of Information. Martic opposed this. Then I nominated Borivoj

13 Rasuo. Martic opposed this too. And then Jovica nodded his head and said

14 yes, and then Martic said, "Yes. All right."

15 Before that, during the election campaign in Mirkovci, when we

16 were in Mirkovci, Rasuo said that he had talked to Stanic and that I

17 should call him, but I didn't. Later on --

18 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt for a moment. I see we've gone

19 beyond the time for an adjournment. No doubt you could look into the

20 tapes and we'll go on then.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

23 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

Page 13098

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we -- the Prosecution will play

2 the intercepts a little bit later, in a context where they fit better than

3 where we are now. And we are still in private session, and I would like

4 to clarify something with the witness.

5 Q. Did I understand you correctly: Boro Rasuo told you in January

6 1991 that a coup was planned and that you should not resist it? What kind

7 of a coup did he speak about, and who planned that?

8 A. He was saying that the JNA would carry out the coup, and that with

9 respect to Knin and me, as the president of the Knin municipality, he said

10 that they would appoint a governor of the municipality and that I

11 shouldn't resist. So this referred to Croatia. Whether he meant anything

12 more than that, I don't know.

13 Q. And when he said "a coup," a coup against the Croatian authorities

14 or against whom?

15 A. Against the authorities. There would be a change of government.

16 Q. And you also mentioned the persons Mile Grbic and Zika Rakic.

17 What did they tell you, and who were they?

18 A. They are two Serbs from Bosanski Novi. In 1990, in August, they

19 brought weapons to Martic in Knin, and in 1991, they also supplied with

20 weapons that they had obtained in Serbia through Jovica Stanisic, and

21 distributed those weapons in SAO Krajina. Zika Rakic was later on

22 Minister of the Interior of Republika Srpska.

23 Q. And how do you know that Stanisic was involved in this weapons

24 transfer? How do you know that? Did any of these two men tell you about

25 it?

Page 13099

1 A. Mile Grbic told me that.

2 Q. What was his relationship with Stanisic? Do you know?

3 A. They were close, in business and political terms. He mentioned

4 him regularly.

5 Q. And when you say "he," you refer to Mr. Grbic?

6 A. That's right.

7 Q. And in relation to that situation in January 1991, you mentioned

8 the two of them. What did they tell you about the situation?

9 A. That they had information from the army that the army would

10 intervene in Croatia against the Croatian government, and that I could get

11 more information from Colonel Djigurski, a KOS colonel who was in Zemun.

12 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry to interrupt, but, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I'm

13 concerned about the value of the evidence of this sort. These are

14 reports, at best secondhand. Although we allow hearsay, there must be a

15 limit really to what we can admit and the value of these reports. It may

16 be that there is some particular value that you want to rely on, but given

17 the time, I wonder if we need spend too much more on this.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, what the witness is telling us

19 now explains why he actually ended up in Belgrade and how he met

20 Mr. Milosevic and what Mr. Milosevic then told him.

21 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's perhaps move on to that.


23 Q. You mentioned Mr. Djigurski, a KOS member. Did you meet

24 Mr. Djigurski then in January 1991, and did he tell you something about

25 the coup?

Page 13100

1 A. That was a meeting that I had with him in January 1991, but he

2 didn't speak to me about a coup. He inquired about relations within the

3 SDS.

4 Q. Witness, on that occasion in January 1992, did you also meet

5 Mr. Milosevic, and how did that come about?

6 A. Yes, on two occasions. The first time, somebody told me - I can't

7 remember exactly who in Belgrade - that I should send a request to be

8 received by President Milosevic in connection with the crisis in Croatia

9 and Yugoslavia, and I went. Mile Dakic was with me, the vice-president of

10 the Serbian National Council, and on that occasion we had a conversation.

11 The second time was upon the invitation of President Milosevic,

12 and I came. And he said that he would arrest Martin Spegelj and that I

13 must remain in Belgrade, that I shouldn't be in Knin, so as not to create

14 any problems for the army, that is, the JNA, so that the Croatian

15 government wouldn't arrest me and that would complicate things. And he

16 gave me police protection of the state security and the public security

17 service. So I spent about ten days in Belgrade under that protection,

18 maybe longer.

19 Q. This second meeting with Mr. Milosevic, when was that that he told

20 you about the arrest of Spegelj and that you should stay for security

21 reasons?

22 A. This was around the 25th of January, 1991.

23 Q. And when you met him on that occasion, did you also meet people

24 from the security section and the MUP Serbia?

25 A. Yes. Milosevic advised me to contact Radmilo Bogdanovic and

Page 13101

1 Jovica Stanisic so that they should provide protection for me.

2 Q. Where were they? Were they in that same building as

3 Mr. Milosevic, or where were they?

4 A. In another building, in the Knez Milos Street, in the Ministry of

5 the Interior of Serbia, the building of the Ministry of the Interior.

6 Q. And Mr. Bogdanovic, what position did he have at that time?

7 A. He was Minister of Internal Affairs in the government of the

8 Republic of Serbia.

9 Q. And Mr. Stanisic, what was his position then?

10 A. One of the officials in the State Security Service of Serbia.

11 Q. Did they provide security then for you?

12 A. Yes. Security was provided by the state security, that is,

13 plain-clothes officers, and public security, in the apartment in which I

14 lived, and they also gave me an escort, permanent escort.

15 Q. You mentioned the arrest of Spegelj. Was that at the same time

16 planned when the Spegelj tape that we talked about earlier was actually

17 shown, broadcast?

18 A. That's right, at that time, around the 25th of January, 1991.

19 Q. While you were in Belgrade, you said you were there for ten days.

20 Were you allowed to leave Belgrade or actually did you have to stay?

21 A. Milosevic told me that I musn't leave Belgrade without his

22 permission. And then, about ten days later, Radmilo Bogdanovic called me

23 and waved his hand and said, "Nothing will come of it. You go back to

24 your people." And that is how I left Belgrade.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we can go into open session

Page 13102

1 again.

2 [Open session]

3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.


5 Q. Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic, was he dismissed at some point in time

6 from his position?

7 A. Yes, in March 1991, after the demonstrations staged by the

8 opposition in Serbia.

9 Q. Did Mr. Bogdanovic remain in some functions after that? Do you

10 know?

11 A. Yes. As far as I can remember, he had several positions in the

12 Commission for Security of the Assembly in the Assembly of Yugoslavia. He

13 became an official of the SBS and a public servant.

14 Q. Was he close to Mr. Milosevic? Do you know that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How do you know that? Do we need to go into private session for

17 this or can you answer it?

18 A. Yes, private session, please.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, private session.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

21 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

22 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in private session.


24 Q. Please, how do you know he was close to Mr. Milosevic?

25 A. I met him in Mr. Milosevic's office about the 20th of March,

Page 13103

1 1991. Milosevic had called him. And this was during one of my encounters

2 with President Milosevic.

3 Q. What was this meeting on the 20th of March? How did this meeting

4 come about?

5 A. It came about because Rastovic, president of the Minicipal

6 Assembly of Donji Lapac and vice-president of the Executive Council of SAO

7 Krajina, wanted us to go to Milosevic - his name was David Rastovic - to

8 see how he would protect us in Krajina. So Rastovic and myself went to

9 see Milosevic.

10 Q. And what did you ask of him, of Mr. Milosevic?

11 A. Precisely that; how was he intending to protect us, because he was

12 always saying the JNA would protect us. And there were the events in

13 Pakrac and other events. And he said, "I have already purchased for you

14 in Hungary 20.000 pieces of weapons." And I said I knew nothing about

15 that. And Rastovic also said that he knew nothing about it. Then we

16 called a third person, Janko Cvetan, who was with us but he had remained

17 in the Moscow Hotel in Belgrade. He was an official of SDS and he was

18 close to Bogoljub Popovic of the SDS, and they were always talking about

19 weapons. So we called him to come to Milosevic's and say whether he knew

20 anything about it. Janko Cvetan came and said that he didn't know

21 anything about it either.

22 Q. Let me interrupt you. When this person, Janko Cvetan, came and

23 spoke about weapons, did he actually openly speak about weapons or did he

24 use other words?

25 A. Everybody was openly speaking about weapons, Milosevic and

Page 13104

1 Cvetan. That was the issue, weapons.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And Your Honours, just for your orientation,

3 we are now in paragraphs 124, 125 of the summary. Would have moved a

4 little bit forward.

5 Q. What was Mr. Milosevic's reaction to this conversation about

6 weapons and that you didn't know anything about the weapons he had

7 purchased?

8 A. He said something like a swear word, and he said, "These people of

9 mine have cheated me or misled me." And then he left to go to the

10 secretary's office. And not long after that, Radmilo Bogdanovic and

11 Jovica Stanisic came, and he asked them, "What about the weapons?"

12 Radmilo Bogdanovic said, "We have already sent 500 pieces to Banija." I

13 said I knew nothing about it. Bogdanovic said, "You don't have to know

14 everything." And Milosevic added, smilingly, "Yes, yes. Milan should

15 know these things." And then Bogdanovic just made a face to the effect,

16 "What are you saying?" Jovica Stanisic didn't say anything. He just had

17 an angry expression on his face.

18 Q. And did actually weapons arrive afterwards, or how was this

19 situation solved?

20 A. The weapons arrived. However, I learnt that the weapons were

21 coming from the warehouses of the Territorial Defence of Serbia.

22 Q. How did you learn that?

23 A. Milenko Zelenbaba told me, Martic's assistant in the Krajina

24 police. He took me to the village of Raducic, close to Knin, sometime in

25 May 1991. He showed me the weapons, rifles, mortars, and so on. And he

Page 13105












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 13106

1 said that Braco, meaning Mihalj Kertes, was kicking open the doors of the

2 TO warehouses in Serbia.

3 And then in July or the beginning of August in 1991, Mile Grbic

4 told me also that weapons were being brought in from Serbia. He showed me

5 a warehouse with mortars.

6 Q. Witness, returning to the meeting of the 20th -- of the 20th of

7 March, was anything else discussed except for the weapons? Did you raise

8 other matters in relation to the police?

9 A. Yes. I complained that I felt that the secretariat of internal

10 affairs of SAO Krajina was not capable of performing these duties, that we

11 needed an expert, somebody -- a professional, somebody who understood

12 these things and who knew how to deal with them, some kind of instructors

13 or legal assistants, and Milosevic said that that would be resolved.

14 Q. And was that matter resolved, and if so, in which way?

15 A. Yes, it was resolved, but not in the way that I assumed it would

16 be and expected it would be done.

17 Q. What had you expected and what actually was done?

18 A. I had expected legal assistance, professionals who would work on

19 the organisation of the secretariat of internal affairs in SAO Krajina,

20 that would organise the services within the internal affairs sector.

21 However, instead, officials of the state security arrived, headed by

22 Franko Simatovic, who got the nickname "Frenki" in Knin. And they

23 organised a military camp in Golubic and formed their paramilitary

24 formations, paramilitary army. And they exerted control over the

25 secretariat of internal affairs of Krajina.

Page 13107

1 Q. Witness, I would like to return to the meetings with Mr. Milosevic

2 and later come back to Frenki.

3 Did you have a meeting with Mr. Milosevic on the 17th of February,

4 1991, after returning from Geneva?

5 A. That was before Geneva and also after Geneva. I think there were

6 two meetings, one before and one after Geneva. I remember when he spoke

7 in negative terms about Jovan Raskovic when he said, "Replace him."

8 Q. Did he tell you to replace Jovan Raskovic or ...

9 A. Yes, he said that to me. And I said that that was impossible,

10 that Jovan Raskovic cannot be replaced, he was a popular tribune. He was

11 a popular leader, a leader of the people.

12 Q. You mentioned the -- you mentioned that you saw him twice, once

13 before Geneva and once after. What actually did you do in Geneva, so that

14 the Judges know?

15 A. I was a representative of the world Serbian community at a meeting

16 of the Commission for Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities.

17 It was a commission of the United Nations.

18 Q. Why did you meet Mr. Milosevic before and after? Did -- did he

19 ask for that or why?

20 A. I can't remember exactly.

21 Q. And this discussion about Mr. Raskovic, was it before you went?

22 A. It was in February. I think it was before, but I'm not sure of

23 that.

24 Q. And why did Mr. Milosevic want Mr. Raskovic to be replaced?

25 A. Raskovic opposed Milosevic in public. He criticised him on a

Page 13108

1 number of occasions, on a couple of occasions. I know that he spoke of

2 the impotence of the JNA at a meeting in Lapac. Yes.

3 Q. Witness, when you -- on this other occasion around this meeting in

4 Geneva, what did Mr. Milosevic talk to you about?

5 A. The main topic of discussion always was the question of our

6 security and what would happen to the Serbs in SAO Krajina, their

7 destiny. That was always the main issue. And he always said, "The JNA

8 would protect you," he said, and, "You have the right to remain in

9 Yugoslavia."

10 Q. Witness, did you meet Mr. Milosevic in March 1991 around this --

11 at a time when demonstrations took place in Belgrade?

12 A. Yes. Before that, I had a conversation with him, at the beginning

13 of March, in connection with the events in Pakrac.

14 Q. Yes. What was it about, the conversation?

15 A. There was an incident in Pakrac, a conflict between Serbs and the

16 Croatian police, when the JNA also intervened.

17 Q. We know about this event. You do not need to tell us the event as

18 such, but what did you talk with Mr. Milosevic about?

19 A. I called him up by telephone to ask him what was going on in

20 Pakrac, and he said, "Don't worry. Everything will be okay. You can go

21 to Knin."

22 Q. Was he informed on what was going on in Pakrac at that time?

23 A. From what he said, I understood that he was.

24 Q. But I was actually asking you about contacts with Mr. Milosevic at

25 the time when demonstrations took place. Did you see him then? When did

Page 13109

1 you see him, and what was it?

2 A. Yes. During the demonstrations, I was called by Matkovic, a

3 senior official in the SBS, to come to a counter-rally organised by the

4 SBS against the opposition that was demonstrating. I avoided going. Then

5 I was asked to send a letter, a message to the participants in the rally

6 and to come to Belgrade after that, to be in Belgrade, and that was the

7 reason why I came to Belgrade. After several days, I was received by

8 Milosevic.

9 Q. And what did you talk about with him?

10 A. I remember that he was very angry. He criticised the opposition

11 as traitor, especially Vuk Draskovic, describing him as a traitor, that

12 they were working against the Serbian national interests and that

13 Draskovic was in cohorts [as interpreted] with Tudjman and Mesic.

14 Q. But can you explain why you were called to Belgrade to participate

15 in a counter-rally? Why?

16 A. I represented the Serbs of Krajina, and Milosevic wanted the

17 public to know that the Serbs of Krajina supported him, so that he could

18 restore support for him in Serbia.

19 Q. After you returned to Knin at that time, did you get a call from

20 Mr. Milosevic?

21 A. On the 16th of March, between 11.00 and 12.00, at midday, by

22 telephone. And he said, "Support Yugoslavia," and I said, "Fine," and

23 that was it.

24 Q. Did he say in which way you should support Yugoslavia?

25 A. Nothing specific, but I understood he meant that we should declare

Page 13110

1 our support for remaining in Yugoslavia.

2 Q. Why did you understand it this way? Did you discuss that

3 beforehand with him, or where does your understanding come from?

4 A. Yes. On the basis of the -- of his position. That was his

5 position. That was my understanding of what he advocated, what he stood

6 for, what kind of political idea he upheld.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we can go into open session.

8 [Open session]

9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.


11 Q. Did you actually then act accordingly in the Krajina to this wish

12 to support Yugoslavia? What did you do? Not you personally, but the

13 Krajina authorities do?

14 A. The Executive Council of SAO Krajina decided to secede from

15 Croatia, and this proposal was sent for adoption to the Municipal

16 Assembly, and the assemblies and communes undertook to adopt this. So

17 Krajina seceded from Croatia and in that way remained within Yugoslavia.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we have three documents related

19 to this issue, and it's -- they are all three in the -- in Exhibit 351.

20 It's tab 22, tab 64, and tab 65, and they should briefly be put to the

21 witness.

22 Q. Witness, the first document is a decision of the -- of 18 March

23 1991 of the Assembly of the Knin Municipality, as part of the SAO Krajina,

24 amending the statute of the SAO Krajina to expunge references to Croatia,

25 in favour of "Federation."

Page 13111

1 The second document is a decision dated 18 March 1991, same

2 date, of the Assembly of Knin to secede from Republic of Croatia.

3 And the third document is actually a similar -- is related to the

4 municipalities of Drnis, Sinj, and Sibenik, and it's also on the 18th

5 March 1991. Is that correct?

6 A. I'm not receiving the interpretation. Yes, it is correct.

7 Q. Thank you. We don't need to discuss this document further.

8 Witness, we are still in March 1991. Are you aware that Milosevic

9 and Tudjman met in March 1991?

10 A. Yes.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

12 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

13 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


15 Q. How do you know that?

16 A. Slobodan Milosevic told me, and later on I heard it from others as

17 well.

18 Q. What did Mr. Milosevic tell you, and when did you meet him in this

19 effect?

20 A. Towards the end of March 1991, that's when it happened, and he

21 brought in a map on that occasion, a map of the former Yugoslavia, with

22 the republican borders on it. He placed it on the table. He took his

23 thumbnail and drew a line, as if he was separating a portion, breaking

24 away the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, near Bihac, and with this

25 gesture and incision, he said, "Tudjman needs Bihac." And then he added,

Page 13112

1 "He needs a road between Benkovac and Drnis too." And I remained rigid.

2 I didn't react at all.

3 Q. Why were you rigid? What did it mean for you?

4 A. I was stunned because it meant everything -- it meant quite the

5 opposite to what he had been saying up until then, that the SAO Krajina

6 had the right to remain in Yugoslavia and that the JNA would protect it.

7 And in this way, it was -- having said this, it was quite obvious that it

8 would be Croatian territory, together with Bihac. Bihac is between SAO

9 Krajina and the other parts of Yugoslavia, towards Belgrade.

10 Q. Witness, you --

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

12 put to the witness the Exhibit 326, tab 11. That's actually the map that

13 you yourself provided.

14 Q. And could you show us which sections Mr. Milosevic actually cut

15 out with his thumbnail, as you said? Can you show this on the map to us

16 with the pointer?

17 A. May I proceed?

18 Q. Yes, please.

19 A. He made an incision with his thumbnail along this direction.

20 Bihac is up there. So this is the Bihac region and Cazinska Krajina. And

21 this is what he did, a very sharp movement downwards, and then he pointed

22 to the area above with his finger.

23 Q. Yes. Can you show it?

24 A. He needed a road between Benkovac and Drnis.

25 Q. Yes. Thank you. Witness, did Mr. Milosevic react in any way to

Page 13113

1 your rigid reaction?

2 A. I don't remember. I really couldn't say.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

5 [Open session]

6 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.


8 Q. Witness, we have already heard from other witnesses of the

9 Plitvice events, and we would not need to go into much detail. But can

10 you tell us what was planned in -- whether there was a police station, a

11 Serb police station, planned in the Plitvice region at that time? Do you

12 know that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Who made this decision?

15 A. The decision was made by the authorities in Krajina.

16 Q. And why did you make this decision?

17 A. The Croatian government had announced that in the Plitvice area it

18 would set up a separate municipality, so that Plitvice would be set aside

19 from the Korenica municipality. And it was an area of the Plitvice Lakes

20 National Park, which was very important to the Krajina region.

21 Q. And was actually -- who was given the task to establish the police

22 station, and was it really established?

23 A. The secretary of the SUP of SAO Krajina, Milan Martic, did not set

24 up the police station, but armed persons were deployed there, members of

25 the police force and others, in different ways, but not through the

Page 13114

1 establishment of a police station.

2 Q. Is that again the so-called parallel structure that you

3 mentioned? Was it active there then?

4 A. That's right, yes.

5 Q. Did this structure then clash with the Croatian police?

6 A. It was an armed conflict, and people were killed in it. After

7 that, the Croatian police force took control of Plitvice.

8 Q. Did the JNA intervene?

9 A. The JNA did intervene, yes, several hours after the Croatian

10 police forces had taken control of Plitvice, and they deployed between the

11 Plitvice area and the municipality and the village of Korenica.

12 Q. Did the JNA then stay in control of the region?

13 A. It held the zone there, that area, up until August. At the end of

14 August, it expelled the Croatian police and took control of the area.

15 Q. And when you say "August," August which year?

16 A. 1991.

17 Q. Was MUP Serbia personnel involved in this event in Plitvice? Do

18 you know?

19 A. They knew about these preparations. Now, how far they themselves

20 took part in it and organised it, I really can't say. I don't know.

21 Q. When you say they knew about these preparations, what do you mean

22 "they"? Who is "they"?

23 A. The people from the DB, the State Security Service of Serbia.

24 Q. And which person precisely?

25 A. At that point in time, I don't know who was actually there, but a

Page 13115

1 man from the group that was there permanently or, rather, at that time.

2 Q. Witness, with the help of the usher, I would like to put to you

3 two documents that reflect also what happened at that time, and it's

4 Exhibit 352, tab 36 and 35. It is the decision -- the decision of the

5 Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, dated the 1st of April, 1991, on the

6 joining of the SAO Krajina to the Republic of Serbia, and actually the

7 Official Gazette publishing this decision; is that correct?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Who drafted the declaration, and whose idea was it? And if

10 needed, then we can go into private session. I'm not sure now.

11 A. The draft was made by Borivoj Rasuo, as far as I know.

12 Q. Was it also his initiative to do that, and if so, why?

13 A. It was his initiative, yes, to provoke Serbia, to intervene.

14 Q. To intervene in what? In which way, and for what reason?

15 A. To become involved in the protection of the region and to see that

16 it remained in Yugoslavia, outside Croatia.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

18 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

19 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


21 Q. Did it provoke a reaction from Belgrade? Did Mr. Milosevic, in

22 particular, react?

23 A. There was very sharp reaction on Mr. Milosevic's part, and he

24 telephoned through the military base in Bihac, and he called me up in my

25 flat and asked me to deny all this and to have the decision rescinded.

Page 13116

1 Q. Did he give you -- did he give you a reason why he was opposing

2 it? What did he say?

3 A. He said that we have to come out in favour of Yugoslavia, declare

4 ourselves in favour of Yugoslavia and not in favour of Serbia.

5 Q. Did he tell you why, why it was so important?

6 A. At that time and later on -- no, he didn't say clearly why. He

7 just said Yugoslavia. He kept saying Yugoslavia. But the reason was

8 quite clear to me.

9 Q. What was the reason?

10 A. So that his direct links and links with Serbia would not be seen,

11 links to what was happening in Krajina.

12 Q. Why do you come to this conclusion? What is the basis of this?

13 A. Well, from the many conversations and from much of what he said

14 and from his concept of how to realise his political goal, and that

15 concept was quite simply to make it appear that other people were stepping

16 down from Yugoslavia, whereas that part of Yugoslavia which he envisaged

17 to remain in a newly organised state should appear to have remained there

18 in a passive way and not by taking action. And he said the Serbs have the

19 right to remain in Yugoslavia. The JNA will protect those areas. Peoples

20 have a right to self-determination. Let the Croats leave. Let them go.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

22 [Open session]

23 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.


25 Q. Witness, did -- actually, did the authorities in the Krajina

Page 13117

1 reverse their decision then and change it into remaining in Yugoslavia

2 after this intervention?

3 A. After later interventions, they did do so, yes. After the

4 interventions were repeated.

5 Q. Repeated by whom? Who intervened?

6 A. The president of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milosevic.

7 Q. I would like to put to you now another document, and it's also

8 related to the 1st of April, 1991, and it's Exhibit 352, tab 38.

9 Witness, it is a request or, rather, it's an order, a mobilisation

10 order, and this mobilisation order of the 1st of April, 1991, there is a

11 conclusion in this order saying the following:

12 "We request from the Government of the Republic of Serbia that

13 the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia

14 provide technical and personnel support to the SUP of the Serbian

15 Autonomous Region of Krajina."

16 Is that related to what you called to provoke Serbia?

17 A. This was a call to realise the promises of Serbia.

18 Q. Was the situation so severe at that time in Plitvice that you --

19 that you in the Krajina felt it necessary to mobilise and to do these

20 actions?

21 A. Yes. The situation was highly dramatic, to such an extent that it

22 appeared that the Croatian government would take control of the entire

23 region of Krajina.

24 Q. Yes. You mentioned that MUP Serbia staff was already on the

25 ground. You mentioned in Plitvice there was a person, and you mentioned

Page 13118

1 that staff came, additional staff came. Who did come to the SAO Krajina

2 in April 1991?

3 A. Let me just say before I answer that there was one man I saw in

4 Knin and not at Plitvice, before the events of Plitvice took place. And

5 he came to Knin. That is to say Jovica Stanisic came to Knin. Franko

6 Simatovic came, Fica, Captain Dragan, and several others. I don't

7 remember their names.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

9 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

10 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


12 Q. When did you meet Frenki Simatovic for the first time and what

13 were the circumstances?

14 A. At the beginning of April 1991. Jovica Stanisic brought him to my

15 flat and introduced him to me as somebody who was an expert in different

16 areas.

17 Q. What was -- was there a subordinate relationship between the two

18 of them? Was one of them the superior of the other or were they equal?

19 A. I understood that Stanisic was the senior of the two.

20 Q. What did they want from you? Why did they meet you?

21 A. To see where I lived. And I had moved to a new apartment at the

22 time. They said that they wanted to check and see whether my flat was

23 being tapped by the army, among other things.

24 Q. Why by the army? And which army; the Croatian army or the JNA?

25 A. They meant the JNA. At least, that's what I thought.

Page 13119

1 Q. Why would they suspect the army to do things like this?

2 A. Well, I assume because the army had services of this kind and

3 monitored what citizens were doing, especially public persons.

4 Q. And when did you meet Captain Dragan for the first time?

5 A. In April 1991 in the Golubic youth centre, which later became a

6 camp of the police.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session, Your Honour.

8 [Open session]

9 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.


11 Q. When did it become a camp, and what kind of a camp?

12 A. It was a training camp, a camp used for training of the DB, the

13 state security, and the Krajina police force. And they trained the armed

14 formations there and armed units were formed as a result. They were

15 organised as a Special Police Unit and the volunteer detachments.

16 Q. Those people trained there. First of all, how many people were

17 trained there at a time?

18 A. The training took place in a short space of time, perhaps ten

19 days. At least, that's what I was told. And the groups numbered up to a

20 hundred persons, approximately.

21 Q. And in which time period did this camp function; from when to

22 when?

23 A. From April 1991 until August 1991. In August, there was another

24 training centre at Vukovic near Benkovac, as far as I know, and I heard

25 that something similar existed at Samarica, but I didn't see that third

Page 13120












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 13121

1 one myself.

2 Q. Who was in charge in this training camp in Golubic?

3 A. Franko Simatovic was.

4 Q. How do you know that?

5 A. From him personally.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

7 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

8 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


10 Q. When did he tell you that, that he was in charge there?

11 A. In the first half of May, 1991. I was called to -- I was invited

12 to go to the centre, and he was the host there, and he showed me around.

13 He showed me what they were doing in the centre, in and around the centre.

14 Q. Did they have a shooting range?

15 A. Yes, they did. They had a shooting range between Golubic and

16 Strmica, on the right side of the road.

17 Q. Did Mr. Simatovic show you this shooting range, and did he explain

18 something about the equipment there?

19 A. That's right. When he showed me round the centre in the youth

20 settlement of Golubic, he took me to the shooting range. And I didn't see

21 the actual targets that were usually shot at, but there was a gun or a

22 machine-gun of some sort, an anti-aircraft gun, multiple-barrelled. And

23 he showed me this device and said that they had used it to shoot at the

24 Croatian policemen in Borovo Selo on the 2nd of May, 1991.

25 Q. When you visited this Golubic camp, what was the state in -- in

Page 13122

1 May 1991? What was the state of organisation? Did they have files on

2 people they trained? How -- what was the grade of, degree of organisation

3 there? Was it run professionally?

4 A. Yes, that's right. Nikola Manovic, who was the assistant to

5 secretary Martic, showed me the records and files for each municipality

6 and for all the recruits at the centre, the trainees. I asked him whether

7 there were any people from Knin, and he said, "Yes, of course," and he

8 opened a separate drawer and showed me all the files. I took a brief

9 look, but I didn't recognise the names, and I didn't go into that any

10 more. And there were people there in uniforms, with long-barrelled

11 weapons. They were well-disciplined, their hair was neatly cut, and so

12 on.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

14 [Open session]

15 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.


17 Q. Witness, does that mean that people from all municipalities were

18 trained there, all municipalities from the SAO?

19 A. That's right, yes.

20 Q. Were these people also equipped there with weapons and uniform and

21 other equipment?

22 A. Uniforms and long-barrelled weapons, yes, as far as I know.

23 Q. Those people trained there, did they later become members of the

24 police or the TO, or both?

25 A. They became members of the special police force, or "milicija,"

Page 13123

1 and members of the so-called volunteer detachments, whose name was changed

2 later on, and they became known as units of the Territorial Defence later

3 on, but in structure they remained the same.

4 Q. You said that Mr. Simatovic was in charge of the camp. What role

5 did Captain Dragan have?

6 A. He was a training instructor to begin with, and later on he

7 commanded one of the units of the special police forces.

8 Q. Was he the only trainer or were there also other trainers?

9 A. There were others.

10 Q. Who was his deputy, if he had any?

11 A. He had several deputies, or "komandirs," in his units. I don't

12 know that he actually had a deputy, but he had subordinates, commanding

13 officers, in his unit under him.

14 Q. Was there a certain Ciga Simic, a trainer there and sort of

15 commander of a unit?

16 A. As far as I know, he was a commander. I don't know whether he was

17 an instructor.

18 Q. What was the relationship between Frenki Simatovic and Captain

19 Dragan? Was Captain Dragan a subordinate of Frenki?

20 A. He was a subordinate, but as far as I know, their relations are

21 comradely. In terms of hierarchy, however, he was subordinate.

22 Q. And Milan Martic, how was he -- what was his subordination

23 situation, if any?

24 A. He was actually subordinate, or under the influence of people from

25 the State Security Service of Serbia, and Slobodan Milosevic personally.

Page 13124

1 Q. How do you know -- to whom was -- you said he was actually

2 subordinated or under the influence. To whom was he subordinated?

3 A. Ultimately, it was Slobodan Milosevic.

4 Q. How do you know that?

5 A. From the way Milosevic treated him. I had personal insight into

6 this.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

8 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

9 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


11 Q. When did you have opportunity to see Mr. Milosevic treat

12 Mr. Martic? How often did you see them together, and how did he treat him

13 then?

14 A. The first time I saw them together was in August, between the 9th

15 and 10th of August, and the 15th or 16th of August, 1991, in President

16 Milosevic's office in Belgrade. On other occasions later, I saw them in

17 1995, 1994.

18 Q. And when you saw them, how did he treat Mr. Martic?

19 A. As a person who was expected to obey him, as someone who was his

20 man.

21 Q. Did, for instance, Mr. Milosevic give him instructions or even

22 orders?

23 A. I know that in August he asked to become the commander of the

24 Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina. Later on, I know -- I heard from

25 Martic that he instructed him not to accept the Z-4 plan for the

Page 13125

1 resolution of the political status of the Krajina which had been offered

2 by the international community. I know, because Milosevic personally told

3 me, that he gave him orders concerning military activities in the area of

4 Livanjsko Polje on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 Q. When did Mr. Milosevic tell you that? What was the occasion?

6 A. About Livanjsko Polje, in early April 1995.

7 Q. How did it come that Mr. Milosevic talked to you about it?

8 A. I asked a meeting with Milosevic, as Minister of Foreign Affairs

9 in the government of the Republic of Krajina. I wanted his opinion about

10 the Z-4 plan and I wanted to complain to him that the Croatian army, the

11 HVO from Bosnia and Herzegovina, was threatening Knin across the Dinara

12 mountain chain. And I took with me a sketch, a map, to show him what this

13 was all about.

14 Q. Yes. And how, then, did these talks end up with Milan Martic?

15 A. Milosevic said -- this was a conversation with Milosevic in April,

16 and it was about Martic and General Mladic. Milosevic took the map I had

17 brought. He showed the territory, the wedge that had been made by the

18 Croatian forces on Livanjsko Polje, and he said, "I have already told

19 Mladic and Martic to cut this off." And then he indicated a direction

20 from Glamoc to Dinara. He showed the line where he had told them to cut

21 it off.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

23 show the witness the map again, tab 11, tab 11 of the Exhibit 326.

24 Q. Is it on this map, or ...? Witness, is this part on the map, or

25 would you need another one to show us?

Page 13126

1 A. It can be found on this map, but it's not very visible. It can't

2 really be seen well.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can use, actually, this municipality map,

4 and it is -- I have here a smaller version that fits on the ELMO, and it

5 is actually Exhibit 333. It's a small version. You should have that as

6 well.

7 Q. Can you show us what Mr. Milosevic showed you on the map? Can you

8 tell us which municipalities there are? Because we can only see the

9 municipalities.

10 A. This is the municipality of Livno and Bosanski Grahovo on the

11 territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian forces,

12 starting in November and December 1994, had broken through Livanjsko

13 Polje, in the direction of Grahovo, and taken a wedge-shaped area here,

14 and Milosevic indicated that he had told Mladic and Martic to cut it off

15 in this direction here.

16 Q. In the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Were Mladic and Martic at that time cooperating there and involved

19 in military actions together?

20 A. Military operations were being conducted there by the army and

21 militia of Republika Srpska. I don't know to what extent the forces of

22 the Republic of Serbian Krajina took part in that.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. We can go back into open session.

24 [Open session]

25 THE REGISTRAR: We're back into open session.

Page 13127


2 Q. Witness, you mentioned a certain Fica as well. Was he also a

3 person from the Serbian MUP, or who was he?

4 A. I heard from him personally that he was from the personal

5 bodyguard of President Milosevic.

6 Q. What role did he have in the SAO Krajina?

7 A. He was one of the instructors from the State Security Services of

8 Serbia.

9 Q. In the Golubic camp, or where?

10 A. In Golubic, as far as I know.

11 Q. And you mentioned that later on other camps, similar camps, were

12 organised. Who was in charge in the camp in the Benkovac area?

13 A. I know about Captain Dragan, that he was.

14 Q. Was there also such a place in Kistanje?

15 A. Not in the same way.

16 Q. What was in Kistanje?

17 A. I can say that it was Frenki's private base, not a military base.

18 Q. What was there that made it Frenki's private base? Who was

19 there?

20 A. Frenki had an assistant who had some connections with Kistanje.

21 His name was Goran Starcevic. I think this was one of the places where he

22 stayed around Kistanje.

23 Q. Was there a police formation there, or what do you consider a

24 base?

25 A. His place of residence, his and that of his assistants. It wasn't

Page 13128

1 a military or a police base. It was where he lived. That's how I

2 understood this.

3 Q. And during the conflict in Croatia, that is, summer 1990 to winter

4 1991, was Frenki actually constantly in the SAO Krajina?

5 A. Frenki was in the SAO Krajina, as far as I know, on two -- two

6 times. The first time was from around the 8th of August, 1991, and then

7 from September and throughout 1991.

8 Q. Let me clarify something. You said earlier on that you actually

9 saw Frenki in April 1991. Now you say from around the 8th of August,

10 1991, you saw him. Is there a mistake in the year? Let us just clarify.

11 When did he come to the -- when did he come to stay in the SAO Krajina?

12 A. In April 1991. That's when he came.

13 Q. And you mentioned the 8th of August. What date does that mean, or

14 is that a mistake?

15 A. 1991. 1991. That was when he was supposed to leave the Krajina.

16 I assumed that he had left as of that date.

17 Q. And when did he return?

18 A. As far as I know, in September 1991. He was there again.

19 Q. And did the same apply to Captain Dragan, the same periods?

20 A. Yes. Captain Dragan left in early August, on the 7th or 8th of

21 August, 1991, and came back again sometime in November.

22 JUDGE MAY: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if that's a convenient moment, we

23 will adjourn.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

25 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

Page 13129

1 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.


4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. Witness, we have mentioned now several armed formations outside of

6 the army, the JNA, police, special police, TO, MUP, Serbian MUP. Was

7 there a clearly defined command structure linking all these groups? Was

8 there a clearly -- clearly a command structure, how these all fit

9 together?

10 A. Yes, there was.

11 Q. What was the command structure from the top down to the

12 municipality level?

13 A. There were two lines of command or chains of command. One line

14 went through the Presidency of Yugoslavia, the JNA, and the Territorial

15 Defence units directly under its command. The other line went through the

16 State Security Service of Serbia, that is the Ministry of Interior of

17 Serbia, and through a parallel structure, the milicija or police of the

18 Krajina and special volunteer units and the regular police and the groups

19 belonging to the state security service. At the top of both lines was

20 Slobodan Milosevic, or they coordinated and subordinated themselves on the

21 ground while engaging in operations, however, these two lines were quite

22 clear.

23 Q. Joint actions, were there any joint actions between these two

24 command structures, that is the military JNA structure and the police and

25 volunteer structure? Did they conduct joint actions, and if so, who was

Page 13130

1 then in command in the field?

2 A. For the most part, they engaged in joint operations. I know from

3 August 1991 onwards, it was the JNA that played a command role in these

4 operations.

5 Q. You mentioned that already the police structure and on top of it

6 you mentioned Mr. Milosevic, and you explained why you got to this, why

7 you thought so and what your facts are to this effect. What -- why is

8 Mr. Milosevic, as the President of Serbia, why is he on top of the JNA

9 military structure? Did you get information to this effect, that he had

10 this position in relation to the JNA?

11 A. He was the main political figure, the most influential person, the

12 most powerful person who had the political initiative, and he subordinated

13 all other structures to his political initiative, that of Yugoslavia,

14 including the JNA.

15 Q. Do you know --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry. I just wanted to ask the witness.

17 Are you familiar with the concept of a Commander-in-Chief?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you saying that Mr. Milosevic was

20 Commander-in-Chief of the JNA?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Formally this was the

22 Presidency of the SFRY, but de facto it was Milosevic.


24 Q. When -- how did Mr. Milosevic actually control or command the JNA,

25 then, when he's not the formal commander? What -- how did he command the

Page 13131

1 JNA?

2 A. He -- he ran part of the Presidency of the SFRY, the so-called

3 Rump Presidency of the SFRY. He controlled them from the summer of 1991

4 onwards. He had influence over General Kadijevic, the federal Secretary

5 for National Defence, and General Adzic who was the Chief of Staff of the

6 JNA, as far as I know.

7 Q. What is the basis of your knowledge? How do you know that? Did

8 you actually see them together, the generals and Milosevic?

9 A. I know they were together. Milosevic told me, and so did members

10 of the Presidency of Yugoslavia.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

12 JUDGE KWON: Before that, I would like to ask one question.

13 Mr. Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic controlled the Presidency

14 of the SFRY and some generals. If you are going to say some person is

15 controlling over some persons, it should be different from that. They

16 are -- from the fact that they are of the same opinion. Am I right? The

17 Presidency of the Federal Republic are of the same opinion as the -- as

18 Mr. Milosevic. How is it different? And if Milosevic is to control them,

19 what are the whips and carrots? What are the consequences if they don't

20 follow? Can you assist us with these questions?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From what I know, some members of

22 the Presidency of Yugoslavia, especially Jugoslav Kostic, told me that

23 Milosevic was his chief. From the behaviour of Borisav Jovic, the

24 president of the Presidency and later its member, he had the same attitude

25 to Milosevic. He saw Milosevic as his superior, as someone in authority.

Page 13132

1 Branko Kostic and Sejdo Bajramovic behaved in the same way.

2 Milosevic himself said in July -- I think I've already spoken

3 about this; he said to me and Karadzic, "Where should I deploy the army?"

4 He behaved like a man who was able to deploy the army, to control it. I

5 heard these words from him.

6 In July, 1991, on another occasion, Milosevic invited me to his

7 office, and when I arrived, his secretary said that the president was busy

8 right then, that the generals were there. And then Milosevic came out and

9 said he was meeting the generals. I can't remember now whether it was

10 Adzic or Kadijevic I saw, whether he told me they were there, but that was

11 the impression I gained, that the two of them were with him on that

12 occasion.

13 On the 26th of August, 1991, on another visit to Milosevic, when I

14 visited him, he asked me about Spiro Nikolic, a general and commander of

15 the Knin Corps.

16 These are things that spring to mind right now, but I found out so

17 many things. It wasn't just that they were of the same opinion, as His

18 Honour said, but within that group, Milosevic was the leading authority.

19 He was a sort of chief. He also had party mechanisms to influence people,

20 like, say, Dobajramovic, Jugoslav Kostic, and Borislav Jovic. He could

21 appoint them or replace them from their posts. And I also know from the

22 events in October 1991 that he exerted influence in Montenegro through

23 Branko Kostic. He influenced the leadership of Montenegro, Bulatovic and

24 Djukanovic, and I don't know whether I can remember any other specific

25 events at this moment.

Page 13133

1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There's no need to go into private session

3 now. It's actually ...

4 Q. Witness, returning back to Frenki Simatovic and to the SAO

5 Krajina, I would like to put to you an exhibit, and it is tab 67 in

6 Exhibit 352, and it's a report from the 5th or 6th August 1991 of the

7 Serbian Autonomous District Krajina, 6th August 1991, report submitted

8 by -- can you tell us who submits the report and to whom?

9 A. I can't say exactly who submitted it. One of the men belonging to

10 this structure, the staff of the Territorial Defence, which was in the

11 process of formation. It was submitted to the Prime Minister of Krajina,

12 the secretary of the police of Krajina, the state security of Krajina, the

13 command of the Territorial Defence, and to Frenki. The reference is to

14 Franko Simatovic.

15 Q. And looking at the letterhead and the stamp, are they of the kind

16 used at that time?

17 A. Yes. It is the stamp that was used for this purpose, until the

18 30th of September, 1991, and the letterhead as well.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

20 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

21 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


23 Q. The supreme commander of the SAO Krajina TO that is here the first

24 in the line of addressees, this is you?

25 A. As the Prime Minister, according to the law that was implemented

Page 13134

1 on the 1st of August, 1991, that should have been me.

2 Q. And did you receive this report and any other kinds of

3 reports -- that kind of reports?

4 A. Yes, up to perhaps the 9th of August. Later there was some

5 disruption.

6 Q. And Frenki Simatovic also received such reports? Are you aware of

7 this?

8 A. Yes, they were sent to him. Now, whether he received them ...

9 Q. You have already mentioned that the police and the parallel

10 structure was financed through Serbia. You have explained that already.

11 How about the costs for the training camps that we just mentioned? Who

12 paid for the cost of the training camps and the arms, the weapons that

13 were then distributed there?

14 A. It all came from the MUP of Serbia, that is, from Serbia, through

15 the state security service. Some uniforms were made by a local factory.

16 Q. You have mentioned, in regard of the weapons, that this came

17 through a man called Braco Mihalj Kertes. How often did you meet this

18 person, and how familiar are you with him and his voice?

19 A. Several times, five or six times perhaps. Five or six times. He

20 has a specific tone of voice and his accent is rather like Vojvodina.

21 It's not a typical Batva [phoen] accent, but it's rather like that.

22 Q. Did you ever meet him in his office, and if so, where was it

23 situated?

24 A. I did meet him, on the 4th of January, 1992. The office was above

25 the office of President Milosevic. And I would also meet him in President

Page 13135












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 13136

1 Milosevic's offices, in the secretary's office one floor down.

2 Q. What position did Mr. Kertes have and what was he doing in

3 President Milosevic's office?

4 A. I don't know exactly the formal position that he held at the

5 time. Earlier on, he was a member of the Presidency of Serbia. In 1991

6 and 1992, I don't know what actual position he held.

7 Q. When you met him, what did you talk with him about? What subject

8 did you have with him?

9 A. In his office, the topic was -- somebody called me from the

10 Presidency building - I think it was Jovica Stanisic - to tell me to come

11 to the building, or one of them called me, on the 4th or 5th of January,

12 in the afternoon.

13 Q. Which year?

14 A. In 1992. And when I arrived at the Presidency building, that is,

15 the Presidency of Serbia, they told me at the entrance that I should go to

16 Kertes's office, above Milosevic's offices. And I found Jovica Stanisic

17 there; the chief of the counter-intelligence service of the State Security

18 Service of Serbia, a man whose name I've forgotten, a large, heavily built

19 man that looks like Frenki, but it's not Frenki. And Kertes accused me,

20 in the presence of the other two, why we were opposed to the Vance plan

21 and why we were disgracing President Milosevic, that we musn't do that.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to try it again

23 with an intercept, and it is -- and I would rather ask you not to use this

24 extra-small bundle of documents, because I think it's more confusing

25 matters than adding -- helping and assisting you. I would therefore

Page 13137

1 suggest you -- we can go into open session. I forgot to say that. I

2 suggest you could simply use the intercept binder. It's actually tab 29

3 of 353. And for the technical booth, it's track 6.

4 [Open session]

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we are actually playing the full

6 intercept, and you can easily follow the English script, and the witness

7 should have the B/C/S version. And maybe you can put it on the ELMO.

8 Yes.

9 [Intercept played]



12 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Is Braco there? Radovan Karadzic speaking.

13 UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Yes. One moment.

14 RADOVAN KARADZIC: How are you? All right?

15 UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Good. I saw you. You had your hair cut a

16 bit.

17 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Ha ha. Well, they were preparing items

18 ... have they shown ...

19 UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Yes. The whole of it.

20 RADOVAN KARADZIC: How much of this did they show?

21 UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: I watched it also on Yutel, and they showed a

22 lot of it. That was the first time you emerged, as I would say, 'you've

23 emerged from the holster.'


25 UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Ha ha. Here you are.

Page 13138

1 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Thank you. Hello.

2 BRACO: And the same to you a thousand times over.

3 RADOVAN KARADZIC: How are you?

4 BRACO: Well, I'm busy.

5 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. Tell me, do you have a lot of work to

6 do?

7 BRACO: I have, a lot.

8 RADOVAN KARADZIC: A lot of work, haven't you?

9 BRACO: This morning, I can say after Samarang it's much better.


11 BRACO: I didn't have time down there, because those from

12 Montenegro had been there, the first and second ones.


14 BRACO: I left. I didn't have time, but ...

15 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I can see it's been busy ...

16 BRACO: But I discussed matters with these ...


18 BRACO: With those with 'stars.'

19 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, did you?

20 BRACO: Yes. I sent them to fucking hell.

21 RADOVAN KARADZIC: What do you mean? Go to fucking hell?

22 BRACO: Well, I told them everything.

23 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see, I see.

24 BRACO: I told them everything, that there would be convoys and

25 convoys now.

Page 13139

1 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I badly needed that, that ...

2 BRACO: Yes. Yes. I passed all of that to them. Now, I've rung

3 a friend, a countryman from the federal --

4 RADOVAN KARADZIC: This is where I need it, in this metropolis.

5 Because if you don't take business premises in the metropole, and you

6 don't open a shop in a metropolis ...

7 BRACO: Yes. There must be flour, there should also be salt,

8 there also must ...

9 RADOVAN KARADZIC: There should be high-quality goods, this and

10 that.

11 BRACO: It should be well supplied, like a supermarket.

12 RADOVAN KARADZIC: If you lose a metropolis in terms of trade, if

13 you don't corner it ...

14 BRACO: Of course. Of course.

15 RADOVAN KARADZIC: That is where the main battle is fought, and if

16 you don't succeed there ...

17 BRACO: Well, of course. And you know what? The most important

18 thing is that the locations are attractive.

19 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes, that's true. A pedestrian zone, where

20 people ...

21 BRACO: Well, of course. And when it's painted, it should be

22 clear what is yellow, what is white, and slowly --

23 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Exactly! Excellent! That's good. Apart from

24 that? So you're in a better mood today, aren't you?

25 BRACO: I am. However, on Saturday I wanted to kill myself.

Page 13140

1 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, my. Was it then?

2 BRACO: Well, I have been having a hard time, guys. You have no

3 idea how hard.


5 BRACO: I know. I mean, I've been having a truly hard time.


7 BRACO: I can see the needs, I can see everything. There's grain,

8 flour, everything in Vojvodina ...


10 BRACO: It's been left there lying around in stock.

11 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes. And nothing --

12 BRACO: Well, it's expensive since it's in bloody stock.

13 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes. Of course. Yeah, the storage

14 itself is expensive!

15 BRACO: Yes.

16 RADOVAN KARADZIC: They've risen the costs of storage just like

17 that.

18 BRACO: Yes.

19 RADOVAN KARADZIC: And mice ...

20 BRACO: Have you spoken to the manager?

21 RADOVAN KARADZIC: No, I haven't.

22 BRACO: Of commodity reserves? You haven't?

23 RADOVAN KARADZIC: No, I haven't. He was busy, er ...

24 BRACO: Er, you just carry on insisting and insisting ...

25 Understand?

Page 13141

1 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Yes. And on restocking the commodity

2 reserves, so ...

3 BRACO: Yes.

4 RADOVAN KARADZIC: They should give us everything that is near its

5 best-before date straight away.

6 BRACO: Right.

7 RADOVAN KARADZIC: And they should ... this for themselves,

8 uh-huh ...

9 BRACO: That's right.

10 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Fresh food to their storehouse.

11 BRACO: Yes, that's right.

12 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I think that our reputation will rise amongst

13 people with this.

14 BRACO: Well, you know, when people are not hungry and thirsty,

15 then it's ...

16 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Less difficult.

17 BRACO: Uh-huh. Political situation is less difficult.

18 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. And they can see that the party is doing

19 something.

20 BRACO: That's right.

21 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Concerning those everyday matters. That's ...

22 BRACO: True ...


24 BRACO: That should be, and newspapers, there should be ...


Page 13142

1 BRACO: Everything.

2 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. Tell me what the political situation is

3 like. Do you know anything?

4 BRACO: Well, let me tell you, it's weird. Weird quietness.

5 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Well, yes. They really want to go ...

6 BRACO: I believe so. I've had some information this morning that

7 every house will get a battery, which is very interesting. That means

8 they will try with the blackout.

9 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Uh-huh, their house, is it?

10 BRACO: Yes. Yes.

11 RADOVAN KARADZIC: And nobody is going to attack them, for fuck's

12 sake.

13 BRACO: No. No.

14 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Where? In Slovenia or Slavonija?

15 BRACO: I'm talking about Croatia.

16 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, Croatia?!

17 BRACO: Yes.

18 RADOVAN KARADZIC: So theirs ..., to get, to distribute

19 batteries.

20 BRACO: The HDZ will give everyone a battery.

21 RADOVAN KARADZIC: How come they have so many batteries? Bloody

22 hell.

23 BRACO: I haven't got a clue.

24 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Well, who is going to attack them? Are they

25 mad?

Page 13143

1 BRACO: Well, no. I think that they, that everyone, that is left

2 in a cinema -- and they are attacking, and it's easier with batteries than

3 without them!

4 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Oh, I see. Yes. So they would attack ...

5 anyway?

6 BRACO: They have, they have a safe plan. Everything has been

7 worked out. You see, when you do that and see what you've done, then you

8 will need a battery.

9 RADOVAN KARADZIC: And when, when would, er, you expect that?

10 BRACO: On Vidovdan, the latest.

11 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Fucking bastards.

12 BRACO: I think Vidovdan, because Serbs will relax then.

13 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. I see.

14 BRACO: And so on. I've been trumpeting that everywhere and ...

15 RADOVAN KARADZIC: It should be given to newspapers. It should be

16 given to newspapers.

17 BRACO: And I've been sending all kinds of messages. Serbs on

18 Vidovdan, in a dignified manner, but do not detach yourselves from

19 everything.

20 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Right. Right.

21 BRACO: From the families and so on.

22 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Fuck. That's disheartening, but this with food

23 is heartening now.

24 BRACO: Are you, are you at work, in your office?

25 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I'm at work, but I will take two or three days'

Page 13144

1 leave.

2 BRACO: You'll take a leave?

3 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I'll take few days' leave, because I have

4 political -- I have to calm down a bit. Krajina, er, wants to secede and

5 join the other Krajina.

6 BRACO: Oh, God, oh, God. That's ...

7 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I have to calm the fools down, and ...

8 BRACO: Well, that's ...

9 RADOVAN KARADZIC: They make some decisions, but they can't carry

10 this one out now and in that way.

11 BRACO: Oh, fucking bastards, are they crazy?

12 RADOVAN KARADZIC: That's only in case somebody is seceding from

13 Yugoslavia and ...

14 BRACO: Well, it's clear. And the moment they secede, it's

15 clear.

16 RADOVAN KARADZIC: It is clear.

17 BRACO: And then we mustn't wait.


19 BRACO: Then we mustn't.

20 RADOVAN KARADZIC: We, we'll then secede from Yugoslavia and

21 that's it.

22 BRACO: That's how it was ... rump Yugoslavia.

23 RADOVAN KARADZIC: No matter how big it is. It would be better if

24 it were big, but ...

25 BRACO: Well, we are fighting for a big one, for the current one,

Page 13145

1 whatever the outcome.

2 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Yes. There will be a small one at least

3 and ...

4 BRACO: That's right.

5 RADOVAN KARADZIC: So it has started well, hasn't it?

6 BRACO: Yes.

7 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. You haven't seen the manager of the

8 commodity reserves, so you will, er ...

9 BRACO: Yes. Yes. Don't worry. I'll go to the manager of the

10 commodity reserves. Just to see, you know?


12 BRACO: So that he hurries the responsible officers about the

13 request.

14 RADOVAN KARADZIC: Understand the gravity. Because if starvation

15 sets in, you won't be able to do anything about it.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Stop. I have one question to the translation

17 booth. I think there is a word, and a quite significant word, missing.

18 Can we replay that short sequence where Mr. Radovan Karadzic says: "I

19 see. You haven't seen the manager of the commodity reserves..."? And I

20 think you missed a word there.

21 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are reading from the script.


23 Q. Witness --

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But we can stop with intercept playing here

25 at this point in time.

Page 13146

1 Q. Witness, did you hear -- did you listen to this intercept before

2 during -- during your conversations here in The Hague?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. Did you -- do you know the voices of the people speaking?

5 A. I recognised the voice of Radovan Karadzic and Braco Kertes.

6 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mrs. Uertz-Retzlaff. I need some kind of

7 clarification from the interpreter. I understand that they said the

8 interpreters are reading from the script, not interpreting from the voice

9 or the Serbian version. They just read it.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, they just read it.

11 JUDGE KWON: Okay.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I understood they would check it with the

13 voices or the B/C/S version.

14 You don't do that?

15 THE INTERPRETER: The sound is so bad it's simply impossible. I'm

16 sorry.

17 JUDGE MAY: We're going to have these tapes properly checked at

18 some stage by some independent body such as our own translation services.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, you will have these intercepts.

20 Actually, they are part of the exhibit. And when you listen in to them

21 personally, you will see that the quality is much better when you play it

22 on a normal machine with that same CD. The witness has already mentioned

23 it several times. But the witness, I think, would be able to clarify that

24 matter that I wanted to raise.

25 JUDGE MAY: No. But the point that I'm making is that we will

Page 13147

1 need this checked by our own translation services in due course.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We will take care of

3 this.

4 Q. But, Witness, let me ask you a question in relation to the

5 contents of the tape. These two persons that you recognised speaking,

6 they speak about food. They speak about supermarket. They speak about

7 batteries. Is that what was really traded and shifted at that time from

8 Vojvodina to other places within Yugoslavia? Do you know that? Do you

9 have any information?

10 A. I don't know. This, for me, is an intercept, though there was

11 flour and sugar so it was -- but that is not what they were referring of.

12 They -- they were speaking figuratively. I would say it would be a mildly

13 coded conversation.

14 Q. What are they talking about?

15 A. They're talking about weapons, what Kertes was -- that was his

16 field.

17 MR. KAY: Your Honour, we've come to the same problem we've come

18 to throughout in dealing with these intercepts, of interpretation by the

19 witness.

20 JUDGE MAY: If a foundation can be laid for his opinion, then he

21 can give it for what it's worth. If he has a similar experience or

22 something of that sort. If it's merely an opinion, then of course it's

23 purely worthless.

24 MR. KAY: We haven't got there yet to say whether it is a proper

25 foundation.

Page 13148


2 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you get the point. It's merely for this

3 witness to say they're thinking about something else -- talking about

4 something else. It's merely his opinion unless he's got something to base

5 it on.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the witness had actually already

7 explained that he was shown weapons by a certain person, and we spoke

8 about that in private session, and he said that this person mentioned that

9 these weapons were received through Braco, and he also said that Braco --

10 JUDGE MAY: I think this is all a matter of argument. You can

11 certainly --


13 Q. Witness --

14 JUDGE MAY: You can certainly put that to us. We will have to

15 consider it. But I don't think we can hear the witness's opinion on this

16 any more.


18 Q. Witness, Mr. Karadzic says in relation to the manager of the

19 commodity reserves -- do you recall that you discussed this and you heard

20 this before in the Prosecution's office when you heard, did you find a

21 mistake in the translation when we discussed it? What does Mr. -- when

22 you --

23 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment.


25 Q. Can we have a look at the B/C/S --

Page 13149

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How can such a question be put as to

3 whether he found an error in the translation?

4 JUDGE MAY: He can say if he found it. We'll have it checked. He

5 can say what his opinion is --


7 Q. Witness --

8 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. He can say, "I

9 listened to this and this is what I heard." What it's worth, of course,

10 is a totally different matter.

11 Yes. Briefly, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you.

13 Q. Witness, Mr. Karadzic makes a remark in relation to the manager of

14 the commodity reserves, and in the B/C/S version:

15 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. You haven't seen the manager of the

16 commodity reserves...

17 Can you find this, please? And can we put it on the -- do you

18 have this? And Braco actually then says:

19 BRACO: Yes. Yes. Don't worry. I'll go to the manager of the

20 commodity reserves. Just to see, you know?

21 It's rather at the end of the conversation.

22 A. Yes, I remember that. It said that it wasn't the chief of the

23 commodity reserves but Slobodan Milosevic, if that's what you're referring

24 to.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is page 3 of the Serbian

Page 13150












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 13151

1 version, Your Honours.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Mr. Tapuskovic, the telephone --

3 JUDGE MAY: Don't correct him.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. Your Honours, there are actually

5 twice mentioning of the manager. It's first on page 3, but then also at

6 the end of the conversation. It should be on the second to last page.

7 JUDGE MAY: Have you got a copy to give to the witness with it

8 highlighted?

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes. He's actually -- yes. And can

10 you give the witness ...

11 Q. Witness, do you have this section where Mr. Radovan Karadzic

12 says:

13 RADOVAN KARADZIC: I see. You haven't seen the manager of the

14 commodity reserves...

15 Can you please read this? It is marked. It's marked.

16 JUDGE MAY: Just put it in front of the witness. Let us not waste

17 any more time. Put the marked passage in front of the witness.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've found it. I've found it.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can you please read the two sentences in your

20 language, and can we have the translation?

21 A. RADOVAN KARADZIC: Uh-huh. Fine. Down there to the chief of the

22 commodities, you haven't been there. So you will.

23 BRACO: Yes. Yes. Don't worry. I'm going to see the chief of

24 the commodity reserves to see only, you understand?


Page 13152

1 Q. Stop there.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, as you can see, the word "down

3 there" is missing in the English version that we have, and it was just

4 translated.

5 JUDGE MAY: As I say, we'll have this matter properly translated.

6 Yes. Let's move on.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you.

8 Q. You can put this away now. I would like to put two documents to

9 you in relation to this matter. The first one is Exhibit 352, tab 40, and

10 it's a request by Milan Martic to Jovica Stanisic and Milan Tepavcevic at

11 the state security department of the MUP to determine expenditure. And

12 just to look at the stamp and the signature. Is that -- and the header.

13 Is that what was used, and is it Mr. Martic's signature?

14 A. Yes, the letterhead and the stamp, but the signature is not

15 Martic's, though his name is indicated. It says "For Martic," so somebody

16 signed on his behalf. It says, "For the Minister, Milan Martic." So

17 somebody else signed it.

18 Q. And the other document is tab 41 in that same exhibit, and it's a

19 letter by Nebojsa Pavkovic to Radomir Stojicic of the 22nd of March, 1995,

20 in relation to training centres. And again I would like just to -- you to

21 speak about the letterhead, the stamp, and the signature. Is that what

22 was used at that time?

23 A. Yes, that's right. Pavkovic was the deputy, but I can't recognise

24 the signature. I don't remember what his signature was like. But

25 everything else fits, so probably that too.

Page 13153

1 Q. And this letter is addressed to the Ministry of Interior, MUP,

2 Mr. Radovan Stojicic, and it's about the help in relation to Sabotage

3 Squad training. Do you know, was such a cooperation between the MUP

4 Serbia and the MUP of the SAO still ongoing at that time?

5 A. Yes, there was. I heard about it. I don't know specifically

6 which men were involved.

7 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Witness, I would like to return with you

8 now to meetings with Mr. Milosevic, and we have already touched on

9 referenda that were conducted in 1991. Did the Assembly of the SAO also

10 hold a referendum in May 1991?

11 A. That's right, yes.

12 Q. What was put to the voters?

13 A. For the SAO Krajina to be joined to the Republic of Serbia and to

14 remain with Serbia and Montenegro within Yugoslavia and others who want to

15 remain in there. It was first decided that they should vote on being

16 conjoined to Serbia, but then it was changed. The question was changed

17 upon the intervention of Mr. Milosevic.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session.

19 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

20 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


22 Q. What do you mean by the "intervention of Mr. Milosevic"? What

23 kind of an intervention was that?

24 A. He asked that we state our views and vote for Yugoslavia and not

25 for Serbia. And he was angry because of the referendum. He was also

Page 13154

1 angry because we had said we'd be sending a commission to inform the

2 Assembly of Serbia about the results of the voting at the referendum.

3 Q. Did you personally speak with Mr. Milosevic on this occasion, and

4 if so, where was that?

5 A. Yes, I did. At the beginning of May, in his office.

6 Q. What did he want you to do, and did you actually then react to his

7 wishes?

8 A. To come out in favour of Yugoslavia, to say yes to Yugoslavia.

9 And he said that some academicians had told him that I should be killed

10 because I was so stubborn, a troublemaker, and I was constantly upsetting

11 matters. However, I left him saying the opposite, or, rather, saying what

12 had already been established, determined. And later on - I can't remember

13 now - some other people insisted that we supplement this question and

14 that's what was, in fact, done.

15 Q. So what was, at the end, the question to put to the voters?

16 A. "Are you in favour of joining up with Serbia and remain in

17 Yugoslavia with the others who wish to remain in Yugoslavia?" So the

18 question asked of the voters was expanded. To join up with Serbia and

19 remain in Yugoslavia.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

21 [Open session]

22 THE REGISTRAR: We're back into open session.


24 Q. I would like to put actually the documents dealing with the

25 referendum to the witness just briefly. It's tab 30. It's all in the

Page 13155

1 binder 351. It's tab 30, tab 32, tab 33, and tab 35, all dealing with the

2 referendum, the decision to conduct it, the report on the referendum, the

3 list of municipalities who voted, and a decision of the SAO Krajina

4 electing a deputy group to present results of the referendum to the

5 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

6 Witness, we do not need to discuss this document. It's just for

7 you to just see.

8 That's all correct?

9 A. That's right, yes.

10 Q. Was this delegation that was mentioned in the last document, was

11 it actually received by the National Assembly of Serbia?

12 A. No, it was received by the vice-president of the Assembly, Borivoj

13 Petrovic, in private, and took them out to dinner.

14 Q. What was the result of -- what was the result, and what happened

15 after the referendum?

16 A. After the referendum, what happened was that the Assembly of the

17 SAO Krajina proclaimed the results of the voting at the referendum, and

18 after that, the SAO Krajina constituted itself again anew as a federal

19 territory of Yugoslavia.

20 Q. We have discussed the police situation in the Krajina, and the

21 military situation, and I would -- I would like to go into private session

22 for the next sequence.

23 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

24 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


Page 13156

1 Q. Did you -- did the government of the SAO Krajina ever have any

2 control over Martic and any police force within the SAO Krajina?

3 A. No, never.

4 Q. Did you try to change that in April -- in spring 1991, and if so,

5 what did you do?

6 A. I did try at the end of May 1991, and instead of the Minister of

7 the Interior, that Martic should be replaced and be the Minister of

8 Defence and that both these men be responsible to the government of the

9 SAO Krajina. And the Assembly did in fact elect Martic as Defence

10 Minister, but he didn't want to hand over his militia -- hand over the

11 militia, police force. And on the 27th of June, 1991, he forced the

12 issue, and he was given that post again. That is to say he was re-elected

13 to the post that he continued to hold, in fact, throughout that time. And

14 according to what people from the police force told me, he did this with

15 the help of Frenki and the people around Frenki.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session.

17 [Open session]

18 THE REGISTRAR: We're back into open session.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I would like to -- I would like to put to

20 the witness now the document tab 54 -- 54, yes, in Exhibit 352. It's a

21 decision on the formation of a Special Purpose Unit of the Serbian

22 Autonomous Region of Krajina to be called the Krajina Police, and to be

23 under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The task of the --

24 according to Article 2:

25 "The task of the Krajina Police shall be to defend the

Page 13157

1 territory ... of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, secure vital

2 facilities, the Region's institutions and other tasks within the domain of

3 internal affairs."

4 According to this task, is that actually a regular police task?

5 A. It should have been the territorial police force, a sort of

6 gendarmerie. That's what it should have been.

7 Q. So that was the plan.

8 A. That's right.

9 Q. And -- it's in here in this decision. It's actually said that the

10 Ministry of Defence should be in charge of this. And I have here as the

11 next document the exhibit -- tab 55, Exhibit 352, and it's actually the

12 decision to appoint Mr. Milan Martic in this position that you just

13 mentioned.

14 And the next exhibit is tab 55 of that same --

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. -- 56 of that same document, and it is the election of -- a

17 decision on the election of the Minister of Interior, and it's Dusan

18 Vjestica.

19 A. That's right, yes.

20 Q. And did Mr. Martic agree to this while this decision was made on

21 the 29th of May, 1991?

22 A. That day he did agree and took the oath of office as Defence

23 Minister, but the very next day he didn't want to.

24 Q. And who told you that this was according to an influence of Frenki

25 Simatovic? Who told you that, and how did you hear of it?

Page 13158

1 A. People from the police force, the police station in Knin.

2 Q. And I would like to put to you --

3 A. And Martic told me, too, himself. He said, "I don't want to."

4 Q. Witness, did Mr. Vjestica, did he try to take over his function?

5 A. He did try, yes, to take over his function, and he appointed some

6 people. The head of the police station in Knin, that was a new man, and a

7 deputy for him. However, as far as I heard, people from the police force

8 said that Martic and the others, that people tore up the documents and

9 laughed, and he didn't try and do it again.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I don't think that I actually

11 need to put the two witnesses -- exhibits to the witness. It's actually

12 what he said already. It's the confirmation of appointing on the 27th of

13 June, 1991, Dusan Vjestica to be the Minister of Urban Planning, Housing,

14 and Public. And the Minister of Interior of the Serbian Autonomous Region

15 is then appointed, Mr. Milan Martic.

16 Q. Did the politicians in the Krajina try to get control over the

17 police in August 1991?

18 A. Yes, through the organisation of Territorial Defence of the SAO

19 Krajina.

20 Q. What was done?

21 A. Martic was appointed deputy commander of the Territorial Defence,

22 and he applied the law according to which the police force should be

23 subjected -- subjugated to the Territorial Defence, the command of the

24 Territorial Defence.

25 Q. Witness, that was actually not my question, and I think I will put

Page 13159

1 to you a document, and that is the tab 62 from Exhibit 352, and it is a

2 decision of the government of the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina

3 of the 1st of August, 1991, to abolish the state security service on the

4 territory of the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina.

5 Can you tell us what the background of this decision was?

6 A. The background was the following: To exempt the influence of the

7 State Security Service of Serbia and the DB in Krajina, which was part of

8 the State Security Service of Serbia, and to gain control and influence

9 over the internal affairs department, the police force, in Krajina. That

10 meant that the Ministry of the Interior should be under the control,

11 placed under the control, of the government. That was an attempt that was

12 made.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

14 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

15 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.


17 Q. At that time, was Mr. Stanisic in Knin, and did you discuss this

18 step with him?

19 A. Yes. On that day, Stanisic was in Knin, and I met him there. He

20 asked me what happened, and I said that the government would set up an

21 agency for national security of its own. He just sort of grinned. He was

22 mocking me sarcastically.

23 Q. Did you at the same time also try to establish control over the

24 armed groups that were not part of the police? Did you try to establish a

25 TO controlled by the SAO authorities?

Page 13160

1 A. That's right, yes. The Territorial Defence was under the

2 competency of the municipal staffs of Territorial Defence under the JNA.

3 The JNA had the keys to its weapons, and I wanted to combine the

4 Territorial Defence of SAO Krajina to set up a Main Staff, main

5 headquarters, and that the Territorial Defence should come under the Prime

6 Minister and government of SAO Krajina as the executive personage.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again, and I

8 would like to put a decree to the witness. It's tab 63 of Exhibit 352.

9 [Open session]


11 Q. Is this decision a decree on the insignia worn by member of the

12 armed forces, Territorial Defence, and Special Purpose Units of the SAO

13 Krajina? Is that related to the matter that you just mentioned?

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. Did the TO actually succeed in becoming an independent institution

16 controlled by the SAO government?

17 A. No, it did not.

18 Q. What happened? Who resisted it?

19 A. Slobodan Milosevic helped set up a Main Staff of the Territorial

20 Defence, but it was subordinate to the Yugoslav People's Army.

21 Q. At that time, did you also have a clash with --

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Would have to go into private session,

23 sorry.

24 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

25 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

Page 13161


2 Q. At that time, did you have a clash also with Frenki Simatovic and

3 Captain Dragan, and if so, what happened?

4 A. That's right. At the beginning of August - I think it was around

5 about the 8th or 9th of August - after these legal provisions had been

6 adopted on Territorial Defence and after this decree, this document that

7 was passed, he sent a man by the name of Djoko Majstorovic to take the

8 insignia of the Territorial Defence to a club that was set up at the Knin

9 fortress where the wartime staff of the Territorial Defence of Knin was to

10 be lodged, and at that time it was the seat of Captain Dragan, Milan

11 Martic, Frenki, and the men around them.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise if I'm wrong, but as I

14 can't hear the witness at all and I'm looking at the transcript, what he's

15 saying, I understand that it is tab 63 that we're -- tab 63 is a decree of

16 Milan Babic about insignia worn by members of the armed forces of the

17 Territorial Defence, what the flag looks like, and the crossed swords on

18 it, and I didn't understand that that was the subject upon which the

19 explanation was given. Is that my mistake or not?

20 JUDGE MAY: He's moved on, and he's describing a clash with

21 Simatovic.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And it's actually -- this clash is actually

23 related to this exhibit, because it's about the flag and the insignia and

24 the establishment --

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

Page 13162

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it is that exhibit, is it?

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, it's related to that exhibit.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Witness, go on.


6 Q. Yes. Please continue.

7 A. I apologise. Are we in closed session?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. I went to that on the -- at the Knin fortress which is where

10 Captain Dragan, Frenki were, to see what was going on, because

11 Captain Dragan told the man carrying the insignia that while he was there,

12 Babic wouldn't be setting them up. And I went to see what was happening.

13 When I arrived, the people there from the municipal headquarters

14 of the Territorial Defence were dispersing. They said that Captain Dragan

15 had let them go. They were there providing security for the area

16 otherwise. And I arrived up there. I went into the meeting hall, the

17 conference hall. I was told that Captain Dragan was there.

18 Captain Dragan was in a meeting. He was having a conference with his

19 unit, the unit, the special unit he was in command of.

20 I went into the meeting room and sat next to him, and somebody

21 said later on, told me that when I went in and sat down, Frenki got up and

22 left the room. Nobody addressed me. Captain Dragan held a speech,

23 continued to deliver his speech to his men, to his people. He said that

24 it was -- that the politicians were to blame for everything and that he

25 was leaving, he was going to leave Knin, and that he was going to leave

Page 13163

1 his men to Frenki and that everything would be resolved.

2 Q. Were you threatened on that day by anyone?

3 A. Yes, I was. Captain Dragan's men followed me to the centre in

4 Golubic or part of Golubic, which is where the civilian structures of the

5 Knin municipality were supposed to be deployed in case of war, and I had

6 gone there to tell the men not to disperse, but I was followed there by

7 Captain Dragan's men. They blocked the whole area and shouted, "Where's

8 the man that has to be killed? Where is he?" And then I escaped from

9 that locality and went to the neighbouring village. And in the morning, I

10 called up President Milosevic.

11 Q. Why did you call him? What did you want from him?

12 A. To tell him that those men around Frenki are idiots. They're

13 mad. They don't know what they're doing. I was very much afraid, and I

14 wanted to ask him to withdraw them from Krajina, and he promised that he

15 would do so.

16 Q. What did --

17 A. Frenki. I'm sorry. I asked Frenki, that Frenki be withdrawn,

18 quite specifically.

19 Q. What did you tell him? You said you told him that they were mad

20 and what they were doing. What exactly did you tell him what they were

21 doing?

22 A. I don't remember that I explained this over the phone to him on

23 that occasion. I didn't go into all the details on that occasion. I just

24 gave a general assessment of them.

25 Q. And why did you ask for the removal of Frenki and not of

Page 13164

1 Captain Dragan?

2 A. Frenki was the boss up there. He was in charge of those men.

3 Q. And you said Mr. Milosevic promised to -- that he would do that,

4 and did he do that? Did Frenki --

5 A. I didn't see Frenki around up there any more. I assume he did. I

6 wasn't quite sure, but Frenki, on the 26th of August, 1991, was removed,

7 and Milosevic said that Frenki should go back to Krajina again. And I

8 assume that in this interim he had actually left Krajina. I mean Frenki.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, can we finish that sequence?

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.


12 Q. You said that he later -- you said Mr. Milosevic then said that

13 Frenki should go back to the Krajina again. When did he say that? What

14 were the circumstances of this?

15 A. On the 26th of August, 1991, in his cabinet, when somebody

16 conveyed a message to me from him that I should come to see him to a

17 meeting there. And when I arrived, that was it. That was when he told

18 me.

19 Q. And did Frenki then return to the Krajina?

20 A. He did return, yes. I met him and heard about him in September

21 1991.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, that finishes this sequence.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll adjourn. Before we do so, I should

24 say, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, by my calculation you've got four and

25 three-quarter hours left.

Page 13165












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 13166

1 Are we in open session? Let's go back into open session so people

2 can hear.

3 [Open session]

4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.

5 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn. Before we do, I should say,

6 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you have four and three-quarter hours left with this

7 witness and should plan accordingly.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, may I raise this issue of time

9 today or do you want me to start with this tomorrow? Because I want to

10 make a request.

11 JUDGE MAY: You want to?

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I want to make a request for more time.

13 JUDGE MAY: How long more are you asking for?

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I'm asking for two more days.

15 JUDGE MAY: Two more days. That's another eight hours.


17 JUDGE MAY: Well, we'll think about it.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, shall I explain myself?

19 Because this witness is of a very special type of witness, and for the

20 Croatia section of the case, he is the only one of this type. And if we

21 hear his entire evidence that he has to give, we can definitely drop

22 other -- other lower-level insiders who can give us little pieces of the

23 evidence that this witness can give us as a whole, and we could simply --

24 I'm not in a position at the moment to say who exactly would we drop. I

25 can only say that people will be dropped. And actually, the Prosecution

Page 13167

1 team is at the moment checking and already filtering out who can be

2 dropped of the next lower-level insider witnesses.

3 JUDGE MAY: Just give us some idea so we know what the position is

4 as to how many witnesses you're talking about.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I can give you this idea tomorrow morning.

6 JUDGE MAY: If you would.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But it will definitely be five or six people,

8 at least.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll think about that. Meanwhile, let me

10 deal with one other general matter concerning sittings or hearings this

11 term and into next.

12 The first matter is this: that it seems there may be some

13 rearrangement of the dates of the Plenary. It was fixed for the 10th to

14 the 12th. Now, I don't know whether there will be or not, but fairly

15 definitely we'll be sitting on what was the first day, the 10th. I think

16 it's the 10th. It was the first day. I'm told it's the -- there seems to

17 be some doubt about it.

18 MR. NICE: I think it's the 11th is the first day of the Plenary.

19 Our last sitting day was Tuesday the 10th.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, it's the 11th. We will definitely be sitting the

21 11th. It may be that we will look to sit the other days too.

22 MR. NICE: Thank you. That's very helpful to know.

23 JUDGE MAY: And dropping another day as a result of the

24 rearrangement. But that is yet to be confirmed. It may not take place,

25 but definitely the 11th.

Page 13168

1 I suggest that we use the 19th, which is an odd day -- 18th of

2 December, rather, the Wednesday. If necessary, of course, we'll finish a

3 witness, but it may be sensible to use that for the administrative and

4 other legal arguments, Mr. Torkildsen's evidence, for instance, and the

5 various submissions we've had about the conduct of the trial. Again,

6 closer to the time, we can arrange that.

7 Finally, advance notice of January's sittings: The first break in

8 January sittings will be between the 22nd and the 24th of January. I

9 think the 24th of January may be a court maintenance day. I can't

10 remember that definitely, but anyway, we will be breaking in that period.

11 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

12 JUDGE MAY: And we will let you have a calendar, let everybody

13 have a calendar for the next term, as it were, as soon as we can.

14 Very well. Tomorrow morning, please.

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m.,

16 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 21st day of

17 November, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.